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ABSTRACT 
 
Self-deception is a key component in Friedrich Nietzsche’s concept of ressentiment. It 
also plays a significant role in Paul’s notion of the fall. This thesis explores issues of 
self-deception in the realm of Nietzsche-Paul discourse. Specifically, Nietzsche’s 
explication of self-deception inherent in ressentiment is used to elucidate Paul’s usage 
of self-deception in the context of the fall. Nietzsche’s work on ressentiment is set in 
historical context to identify circumstances, people, and events that influenced 
development of his overall thought. A literature review is also supplied to appreciate the 
development of ressentiment. The primary source for Nietzsche’s treatment of 
ressentiment are his late works. Analysis of Nietzschean ressentiment is conducted 
through them, first by means of a genealogical study of the castes of ressentiment, then 
in terms of an examination of the mechanism of ressentiment. This supplies a 
knowledge of the fundaments and workings of ressentiment requisite to identify its 
crowning feature, self-deception. The resulting platform allows a fresh reading of 
Pauline fallenness, specifically concerning the notion of self-deception, in terms of the 
internalisation and moralisation of ressentiment. Paul’s Letter to the Romans, 
particularly Chapters 1 and 2, is the material for this reading. The correspondence 
between select contours of Pauline fallenness and those of Nietzschean ressentiment 
validates the hypothesised association, propelling the investigation of self-deception 
forward. This brings to light a congruence of self-deception between the Nietzschean 
ressentiment-man and the Pauline fallen-man. It also recommends a driving motive for 
self-deception, fear of death. Death as a theme for Nietzsche is examined both 
biographically and philosophically. Seminal conclusions from the thesis argument are 
reviewed, contributions to the existing literature are offered, and significance of the 
project for the psychology of religion is discussed. 
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The world will be standing on its head for the next few years: since the old God has abdicated,  
I shall rule the world from now on. 
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These men who have turned the world upside down have come here also. 
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Chapter 1: A WORLD INVERTED 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Friedrich Nietzsche envisioned a future in which man would rule a world of his own 
creation. Obscuring his vision was the world in which he lived, one ‘completely 
fabricated by a lie’ and full of upside down1 thinking, values, and truth (A 10). 
Nietzsche inveighed against ‘the half-Christian, half-German narrowness and naïveté 
heaviness’ that was the morality of his day (BGE 3.56). It had been so corrupted that it 
made people sick and drove them mad. It had not always been that way, though. He 
claimed that from time immemorial, morality was life lived freely, instinctively. 
Morality was appraised only in positive terms, among which Nietzsche included virtue, 
danger, insult, and even godliness (of a sort)—every valuation except that of evil (D 
1.18). Judeo-Christianity appeared and hijacked this natural morality by revaluing it 
(1.14), supposedly for the sake of alleviating suffering. In the spiritual guise of 
redemption, escape from suffering was attained through moral improvement. Ironically, 
it required suffering; one had to deny himself, which Nietzsche interpreted as denying 
life. The unassailable ground for this way of looking at the world was God (OGM 3.17). 
Nietzsche considered the biblical world view of a divinely guided and guarded 
humanity to be a man-made lie motivated by ‘malice and revenge’ (EH ‘Why I Write 
Such Good Books’ D 2). He claimed that it had given rise to ‘that decadence morality’ 
which resulted in ‘the degeneration of the whole of humanity’2 (2). ‘Away with this 
inverted world’, Nietzsche wrote (OGM 3.14). ‘The earth has been a madhouse for too 
long’ (2.22).  
Nietzsche laid much of the blame for this mad, upside-down world at the feet of 
the Apostle Paul. According to Nietzsche, Paul was the founder of Christianity (GS 
5.353; D 1.68), the apogee of all moralities that sought to imprison man in a ‘labyrinth 
of “fixed ideas”’ (OGM 2.22). One of its most basic ideas was sinful guilt before God 
(D 1.68). Through Paul’s masterful use of ‘that most dangerous and explosive material, 
ressentiment’ (3.15), his ‘lust for domination’ gave rise to Christianity’s overthrow of 
the Roman world (D 1.68, 71f). In the seventeenth chapter of ‘The Acts of the 
                                                 
1
 The German, die … auf den Kopf gestellt, literally means, ‘put … on its head’ (see A 8f).  
2
 Nietzsche explained in D 1.68 that the gospel results in sinful man’s redemption from, inter alia, 
bondage to ‘the carnality of the flesh’. Nietzsche employed a double entendre with the respect to ‘the 
flesh’ by using it in the subsequent clause to refer to the entire human race, which is ‘continually dying 
out, as if decaying’.  
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Apostles’, Paul discoursed in Athens on the ‘unknown God’ (17:16-34). Nietzsche also 
used the term ‘unknown God’ in BT (‘Attempt at a Self-Criticism’ 3) and in Z (4.5.1).3 
Given his Christian upbringing and his proclivity for biblical allusions, it is likely that 
he took it from Acts 17, and specifically Paul’s Mars Hill sermon.4 But it is a previous 
stop along the Via Egnatia in Thessalonica to which I draw our attention here (Acts 
17:1-9). Paul spent three Sabbaths reasoning with the Thessalonians from the Jewish 
scriptures. A great number of listeners evidently converted to the faith. Incensed at this, 
and perhaps alarmed by recent reports of disorder in Philippi caused by Paul’s 
preaching (16:12-40), the Jews fomented a riot against the Apostle and his company. 
They hurled this accusation: ‘These men who have turned the world upside down have 
come here also’ (italics supplied, 17:6). The Greek word of import here, ἀναστατόω, 
generally means ‘subvert’, ‘overthrow’, ‘cause trouble everywhere’ (Marshall 
1980:279). In the EH passage above, to say nothing of numerous others, Nietzsche 
effectively uses the Bible to justify blaming Paul and his gospel for overturning the 
social order.  
Both Nietzsche and Paul campaigned to put to right their respective visions of an 
upside-down world. Nietzsche crusaded to revalue all values in a world he viewed as 
already inverted, and prophesied ‘its redemption from the curse placed on it by the 
previous ideal’ (OGM 2.24; see also 1.7; A 8). Paul strove against a kosmos whose 
values he viewed as antithetical to God’s (Rom 3:6, 19). For Nietzsche, this moral 
inversion was a result of ressentiment; for Paul, it came through sin in consequence to 
the fall.5 A significant obstacle to each of their campaigns was the self-deception they 
attributed to their opponents.  
A key Nietzschean concept employed in this thesis is ressentiment. Ressentiment 
is a psychological phenomenon chiefly characterised by values inversion. It is 
perpetrated by the vengeful oppressed upon their oppressors to dispossess them of 
power without attacking them overtly. In its highest expression, it results in god-
creation for people of ressentiment to justify their ‘most secret tyrants’ desires’ (Z 2.7), 
i.e., to be new masters. This is impossible apart from the subsidiary characteristic of 
self-deception within ressentiment. I contend that the reaction of fallen-man, as Paul 
                                                 
3
 Near the end of his journey, Zarathustra encounters a man acting ‘like a madman’ (4.5.1). Four times in 
his lament, the madman speaks of ‘my unknown secret God’.  
4
 Nietzsche’s extensive analysis of Paul’s Damascus Road experience in D 1.68 makes it impossible to 
believe that Nietzsche was not thoroughly familiar with Acts (see chapters 9, 22, and 26). 
5
 Literally speaking, fall, fallen, and fallenness are not Pauline terms. They are, however, common 
theological parlance associated with Paul’s representation of humanity’s estate and experience as a result 
of original sin. 
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analyses him in Romans 1 and 2, can plausibly be interpreted as a case of ressentiment, 
with a sufficient number of features shared with Nietzsche’s ressentiment-man to make 
comparison possible. For the expressed purpose of this thesis, I anchor this contention 
in the notion that both are characterised by values-inversion and self-deception. Thus, 
the Apostle’s fallen-man corresponds to Nietzsche’s ressentiment-man.  
An outline for the remainder of this chapter begins with a historical background of 
Nietzsche’s life and thought. It provides context for the influences on him and his ideas 
(1.2). Terminology germane to this thesis will be treated in this section and the next. A 
literature review is conducted to create a critical framework for existing research on 
Nietzschean ressentiment and its subsidiary component, self-deception (1.3). Matters 
related to English translations of Nietzsche’s works will be discussed (1.4). Finally, an 
outline for the thesis will be supplied in terms of research questions pursued (1.5). It 
comes deliberately after the literature survey because these questions are better 
appreciated after undertaking the survey.  
 
1.2 Nietzsche’s Thought in Historical Context 
To understand Nietzsche’s thought, one ignores at one’s peril the historical currents that 
swept toward his birth and in which he was raised, as well as the key persons and events 
that influenced him. The years of his childhood and youth marked the psyche and 
shaped the intellect from which Nietzsche’s thought would pour forth. His ideas, 
themselves, were motivated by a desire for greatness, and he embarked on a lifelong 
odyssey in search of it. As a boy, he sought honour first before God, then as a young 
scholar among his contemporaries, and finally beyond everyone. He did this despite, or 
perhaps in reaction to, being plagued by tragedy, loss, and chronic poor health. From his 
personal struggles, it could be argued, emerged the conceptual context for all 
Nietzsche’s thought, the agon.  
Nietzsche provocatively stated, ‘I am dynamite!’ in Ecce Homo (‘Destiny’ 1), the 
last and most intimate of all his writings. He spoke of the kind of power that could 
abolish the restrictive morality of his day, as he esteemed it, and thereby open the way 
to a limitless future for mankind. The aim of his ‘Revaluation of all values’ was to 
overturn the decadent status quo in Germany and beyond, by subverting the Christianity 
which had given rise to it, and in which it had now become ensconced (1). Some three-
hundred years before Nietzsche was born, the centuries-old order in Europe had been 
toppled by the Reformation. Ironically, that contest played out within a hundred-mile 
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radius of Nietzsche’s birth place. It was unintendedly instigated by an Augustinian 
monk named Martin Luther (Cate 2003:1). After years of struggle with the 
righteousness demands of God’s law, Luther’s ‘extremely disturbed conscience’ found 
peace in Paul’s Letter to the Romans (Luther 1960:336). Specifically in the phrase, ‘the 
righteousness of God’ (Rom 1:17), Luther finally came to understand God’s 
righteousness not only as active in judgement on sin, but passive in the sense of a gift 
whereby sinners were justified by faith.6 Nineteenth-century Lutherans held Romans to 
have been authored by a similarly plagued soul nearly fifteen-hundred years earlier 
(Cate 2003:307, 488). So when Friedrich Nietzsche launched his revaluation to replace 
the morality ushered in by the Reformation, he took aim not only at his fellow 
countryman, but also on the source of Luther’s inspiration. Nietzsche trained his sights 
on the Apostle Paul.  
A generation before Nietzsche was born in 1844, the changing currents had once 
again swept the geographical, political, social, and religious landscape of early 
nineteenth-century Europe (Blue 2016:14). Nietzsche’s father, Karl Ludwig Nietzsche 
(known as Ludwig), was born into a pastor’s home on the eve of the great Battle of 
Leipzig in October of 1813. No doubt cannon fire could be heard in the Eilenburg 
parsonage approximately twenty kilometres to the east. Ludwig’s son, Friedrich, would 
later grow up at Grandmother Erdmuthe’s knee thrilling to stories of the battle when 
Napoleon was defeated for the first time (Cate 2003:12; see also Clark 2007:358-71).7 
Out of that revolutionary period the balance of power shifted once more. A resurgent 
Prussia recovered its lost territories and confederated them with Westphalia, 
the Rhineland, much of Saxony, and other lands, vaulting the alliance to a place among 
the great powers of Europe (2007:388-98; Cate 2003:3f). Youthful imaginations glorify 
combat (Nietzsche and his peers would later eagerly volunteer for military service), so 
Friedrich’s mind must have swirled with visions of aspirational struggle. 
After decades of turmoil capped off by the Napoleonic wars, peace returned to the 
Continent. The Germanic lands in particular had enjoyed three centuries of Pietism, a 
religious movement characterised by a rejection of intellectual authorities, the primacy 
of a free conscience, and a preference for a devotional theology of the heart over an 
                                                 
6
 In 1511 Luther made a pilgrimage to Rome in search of answers, but only returned with more questions 
and increased dread. The period roughly spanning the fall of 1513 to the fall of 1516 was personally 
momentous for Luther. They were spent in preparation for and delivery of lectures on both the Psalms 
and Romans at Wittenberg. Scholars such as Michael Mullet consider this endeavour critical to his 
conversion (1950:51-62). 
7
 The vanquished emperor would become one of Nietzsche’s true few heroes (Cate 2003:12). 
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academic theology of the head (Parkes 2013:27; Shantz 2013:27f). But Enlightenment 
values had seeped into the movement, altering it ever so slightly on the surface, but 
fundamentally relativising it. The naïve faith of previous generations was being 
displaced by a reflective faith of the modern one (Shantz 2013:276f). The catechism of 
children in Saxony stressed morality over doctrine. Lutheran values of disciplined, 
honest work and social responsibility were inculcated. It was in this increasingly 
secularised post-conflict German Confederation, however, that indigenous and religious 
conservatism mounted a resistance and began a revival (Blue 2016:14). The Nietzsche 
home stood against this secular spirit in the strength of the new Awakening theology to 
which Ludwig had been exposed in his university years (1833-37). It was a radical 
movement in many ways, returning to tenets articulated by pietistic pioneers Philipp 
Spener (1635-1705), August Francke (1663-1727), Johann Schütz (1640-90), and even 
Johann Arndt (1555-1621). Of particular note were emphases on a direct experience of 
sinfulness, new birth as the necessary condition for entrance into heaven, an optimistic 
view of the future for God’s people, and in all things a deep religious feeling (Shantz 
2013:95-97; Parkes 2013:28). Young Friedrich whole-heartedly embraced each of 
these; the older Friedrich would repudiate them all with commensurate passion.  
Local cultures began to flourish in nineteenth-century Europe, and a new stratum 
of society developed. Amongst Germanic peoples, at least, the ‘cultivated classes’ 
emerged. They would be known collectively as the educated middle class. Though this 
group was defined by the professions its members held (e.g., law, judiciary, medicine, 
pastoral ministry, teaching, academia, art), it was better known for its esteem of 
education. The German word for ‘education’, Bildung, carries three relevant meanings: 
‘education, cultivation, and most importantly, self-cultivation, the melding of one’s 
character, talents, and sensibility and judgement into an amalgam of wisdom and 
insight’ (Blue 2016:43, 91; Watson 2010:53f, 833f). This middle class enjoyed creature 
comforts, not as ends in themselves, but as a means of pursuit of enlightened culture. As 
an ascendant ‘cultivated caste’, they wielded significant cultural power in the mid-
nineteenth century Prussian state (43f). Ludwig, who descended from a long line of 
Lutheran pastors and was appointed a parish priest, was a member of this upwardly 
mobile class (Benson 2013:107; Cate 2003:2, 4).  
Ludwig married Franziska Oehler on his thirtieth birthday, and he took her home 
to his parsonage in Röcken. One year later their first child was born on 15 October, 
propitiously sharing a birthday with the current monarch, King Friedrich Wilhelm IV. 
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Accordingly, they named their son Friedrich Wilhelm, but his nickname was Fritz. He 
was especially sensitive to music, and since his father was the best piano player in the 
community, the sound of music filled the Nietzsche household and imprinted the boy 
for life (Cate 2003:6). But this was not the only thing that may have marked him. 
Evidently Ludwig’s public persona masked private insecurities. By his own confession, 
self-doubts were masked by retreating to his pulpit. When he preached, he transformed 
from a demure and tentative individual to a courageous and decisive leader (Parkes 
2013:28). It may be that Fritz picked up on his father’s double demeanour, thus 
gleaning early insight into the phenomenon of self-deception. Parkes also draws 
attention to Nietzsche’s later writing, ‘The Parents Live on’, in which he remarked that 
‘the unresolved dissonances between the characters and dispositions of the parents 
continue to resound in the nature of the child, and constitute the history of his inner 
sufferings’ (HH1 1:379). This adult commentary seems to draw on a knowledge of 
tension between his parents, perhaps due to their divergent backgrounds: Ludwig from 
one of relative sophistication and education, Franziska from a spartan and more 
practical one (Cate 2003:4-6). In BGE 194 Nietzsche writes, ‘Parents can’t help making 
their child into something similar to themselves—they call this “education”—no mother 
doubts at the bottom of her heart that with a child she has borne herself a possession, no 
father disputes his right to subject it to his own conceptions and evaluations’.   
Any possible tension between his parents ceased July 1849, just before Fritz’s 
fifth birthday. Ludwig’s health had begun to turn in the spring of the previous year. 
Fritz seems only to have become aware of his decline in September, as he recorded at 
boarding school in his first attempt at autobiography, ‘Devastating blows fell from 
heaven’ (Parkes 2013:33). Homeopathic therapy at a clinic in Naumburg proved 
ineffective, so Fritz, Elizabeth, and baby Ludwig Joseph were shut up to the winter of 
their father’s vomiting, weeping, hyperventilating and screaming. In the new year a 
specialist from Leipzig diagnosed the condition as ‘softening of the brain’, as Fritz 
would put it years later (quoted in Parkes 2013:34).8 By spring Ludwig was blind and 
almost mute. On 30 July Karl Ludwig’s agony ended. ‘Overcome by the thought of 
being separated from my dear father for ever’, Nietzsche wrote, ‘I wept bitterly’ (quoted 
in Parkes 2013:35). Though most biographers date Nietzsche’s thinning faith to his late 
teenage years, signs of his departure were already appearing in the poetry of his 
preadolescence (35). A fair distillation of many of the ‘life questions’ confronting Fritz 
                                                 
8
 An autopsy would later confirm the diagnosis (Parkes 2013:35). 
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at the time could be represented in the classic dilemma faced by people of all times: if 
God is all powerful and all loving, why does he subject his servant (in this case, his 
father) to such torture? It is a question Fritz would wrestle with one way or another for 
the rest of his life. 
 In April 1850, Franziska packed up her children and her worldly possessions and 
moved back to Naumburg to be close to her family (Cate 2003:8-10). Their first 
domicile would be considered today an urban flat. Ludwig’s sisters lived with them, and 
the children attended the local elementary school. Five years later Franziska moved to a 
spacious house on the edge of town where the children had room to play and explore 
(10f). As Fritz grew, so did his education. In 1854, he was enrolled at the local 
Domgymasium in which he quickly distinguished himself from his peers. As a good 
Lutheran boy, he worked hard from before sun-up to well after sundown, but his 
academic success came more by means of his budding intellect (12). Of particular note 
was his talent for the literary and musical arts, which he practiced outside of school. He 
wrote poetry and essays, and dedicated time to educating himself musically. His passion 
for study in all his endeavours strained his eyes and brought him blinding headaches, 
maladies that would plague him for the rest of this life (13). Still he studied and wrote. 
He laboured over his most extensive work around his fourteenth birthday, an 
autobiographical work, ‘Aus meinem Leben’ (14).9 He also threw himself into the study 
of classical music, bordering on obsession for the great German composers Mozart, 
Haydn, Bach, Beethoven, Schubert, and Mendelssohn. These he extolled for their 
doxological quality; by contrast, modern music was exhibitionist and sinful. From an 
excerpt of his ‘Life’, it is apparent that even at this early age the objects of his passion 
were evaluated through a moral prism (15). 
He received a scholarship to the prestigious Schulpforta boarding school in 
September 1858, owing to his father’s former state employment and not personal 
achievement (Brobjer 2008b:322ff). The educational programme’s emphasis on 
academics left little time for physical exercise or creative diversions (Cate 2003:17). 
Nietzsche chafed at the ‘uniform discipline of a regulated school’ (Nietzsche quoted in 
Blue 2016:308). He therefore struggled in courses that constrained his thinking to 
predictable formulas and rote memorisation, but abandoned himself to those that played 
to his literary and artistic strengths. His precious extra-curricular time was devoted to 
the composition of poetry and music, some of which was awarded prize marks (Cate 
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2003:33). By the middle years of his schooling, his preference for personal musings 
over formal pedagogy increased to the point that he found himself exploring new vistas 
of thought. 
Internal tension was brewing by Friedrich’s fourth year at Pforta. His Christian 
affections were wearing thin on account of his studies, theology among them. This led 
him to question fundamental doctrines of Christianity such as ‘the existence God, the 
immortality of the soul, the “divinity” of Christ, the “inspiration” of the “Holy Ghost”’ 
(Cate 2003:31). If his scepticism was in doubt before, this period confirms Friedrich’s 
falling away from the faith of his fathers. He viewed his youthful thinking as 
constrained by juvenile prejudices blindly accepted as truth. Friedrich wrestled back and 
forth between free will and environmental forces that undoubtedly influenced an 
individual. He came to see that these forces, both internal and external, must be 
combatted in order to attain any sort of personal freedom. In the summer following his 
fourth year, he launched a personal study of both the French Revolution and the New 
Testament Gospels. As a result, he connected early Christian slave morality to the 
Jacobins’ vengeful antipathy that resulted in the wholesale overturning of French 
society. These musings represent the inchoate forms of Friedrich’s doctrines of self-
overcoming, the agon, the self, and fate, all of which would flower a quarter of a 
century later in BGE and OGM (33f).  
Much of Friedrich’s final year was spent writing his senior thesis on a little-
known sixth-century BCE Greek poet, Theognis of Megara (Blue 2016:169-71). This 
was his first notable philological work, yet it was not his first foray into the field. From 
1861, he became absorbed in the fourth-century BCE Gothic King, Ermanach (128f). 
The saga of his defeat survived in both German and Scandinavian mythologies, so it 
was perfect for a comparative study of texts, languages, and histories. Elements of 
betrayal, revenge, guilt, and punishment permeated the plot in which moral and other 
valuations became transformed when the oppressed became the oppressors. Friedrich 
used the term ‘transvaluation’ here (Cate 2003:37), and it would become prominent in 
OGM. It was through ‘Theognis’, however, that Friedrich’s aptitude for philology shone 
(Cristi & Velásquez 2015). Such prodigy did not go unnoticed by a certain university 
professor who would go on to nurture the lad to rework the paper at Leipzig into an 
essay worthy of publication in the prestigious Das Rheinische Museum für Philology 
(Cate 2003:69, 72). From his research for both of these works, Friedrich began his life-
long exploration into the nature of myth-making and value-creating.  
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It is important to mention Friedrich’s discovery of Ralph Waldo Emerson while at 
Pforta, probably in 1861-62. Later discovery of Nietzsche’s annotated copies of 
Emerson’s books and collected essays, his effusive praise of Emerson in letters and 
other notes, and his extensive excerpts of Emerson’s writings indicate that he read him 
all the way through his life (Brobjer 2008a:23-25; see especially 119-21, footnotes 11-
24; Blue 2016:129f). ‘He loved Emerson from first to last’, writes Kaufmann, and 
Nietzsche even entitles a section of an 1888 essay by his name (TI, ‘Roving Expeditions 
of an Inopportune Philosopher’, 13) (1974b:11). Paul Janz argues for nineteen distinct 
Emersonian influences that would manifest in Nietzsche’s later thought. They include, 
among others, ‘atheism, the revaluation of all values, the relativity of morality, the 
philosophy of becoming, … that man is something to be overcome, … the Übermensch, 
the eternal recurrence [and] amor fati’ (Brobjer 2008a:118, footnote 5). Though Janz 
may over-argue his case in points, his larger point of Emersonian influence finds 
support in the scholarly community, e.g., Jaspers, Nietzsche (1965), Hayman, Nietzsche 
(1980), and Pletsch, Young Nietzsche (1991) (118, footnote 5), Stack, Nietzsche and 
Emerson (1992). There was arguably no greater influence on Friedrich Nietzsche than 
Emerson, save perhaps Schopenhauer. 
Final exams loomed in the spring of 1864. As a consequence of six years of 
nonchalance toward some important courses during his tenure, his graduation from 
Pforta hung in the balance. Friedrich did in fact graduate from Pforta with his university 
qualification due to flashes of brilliance in certain subjects and a penchant for test-
taking (Cate 2003:35-39). 
Nietzsche matriculated to Bonn University in the fall of 1864. Driving his choice 
of institutions was Bonn’s two leading philologists, Otto Jahn and Friedrich Ritschl. 
Ritschl had ties with Pforta (Cate 2003:40f). Almost immediately upon arriving in town, 
he joined a student fraternity that, like other fraternities, kept regular evening hours in 
the town’s taverns (41). Like many a first-year university student, Nietzsche became 
swept up in the extracurriculars of beer-drinking, opera, and theatre. The debt he 
incurred forced him to write home for money on more than one occasion, and was met 
with a chastening reply from his mother in a February 1865 letter. Despite this, the flow 
of money continued (43f). He went home to Naumburg for Easter break to face the 
disapproval of his mother (and sister) over his profligate behaviour. This was nothing, 
however, compared to the shock they exhibited when he informed them of his prodigal 
departure from the study of religion, and of theology altogether (Blue 2016:310). A 
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prime reason for this was his exposure to David Strauss’ sensational Life of Christ at 
university (1864). In the train of Kant and Hegel, Strauss asserted that the nature of 
things could not be known until the process by which they came to be was analysed. 
Applied to the New Testament, hidden realities that lay beneath events in the Gospels 
needed to be exposed, as well as the hidden motives of those who recorded them. 
Strauss subjected the claims of Christianity to rational thought, which he insisted left 
the Bible’s miraculous accounts explainable in scientific terms and governed by natural 
laws. It also rendered the historical Jesus as a mere man, albeit a good one 
(Cate:2003:44f). Nietzsche’s training in philology was congenial to Strauss’ novel 
research. It had taught him of the necessity of myth-making by primitive peoples, and 
that first-century Christians were in desperate need of inspiration in light of their Roman 
oppression. Therefore, part deliberately and part unconsciously, Nietzsche employed a 
nascent genealogical approach to cast the faith as a constructed narrative: Jesus’ birth, 
death, and resurrection was designed to serve as Christian ‘truth’ (44-46).  
Nietzsche made clear his dissatisfaction with theological studies by formally 
transferring his academic registration to the faculty of philology when he returned for 
his second semester (Cate 2003:47). This, however, was not enough to mollify his 
disappointment over time already poorly spent at Bonn. His new direction would take 
him back west across the country to Leipzig. At least three reasons are apparent for his 
move. Bonn had been an expensive place to live. With Leipzig and Naumburg barely 
fifty kilometres apart, not only would he be closer to home, but nearer his funding 
source. He would also be reunited with his friend, Carl von Gersdoff, who was giving 
up law at Göttingen for German literature at Leipzig. Leipzig University was attractive 
for the new life it was infusing into its declining philology program by acquiring the 
nationally renowned, Friedrich Ritschl (49f). Nietzsche never looked back to Bonn 
(Blue 2016:207). 
No sooner had Nietzsche begun his philology studies at Leipzig in October of 
1865 than he happened upon Arthur Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and 
Representation in his new landlord’s bookshop. Schopenhauer’s style and worldview 
enraptured Nietzsche so that he constantly read him, and urged his friends to do so as 
well (Brobjer 2008a:29). He adopted him as mentor, so identifying with him that in a 7 
April 1866 letter to a friend he confided that referencing either Schopenhauer or myself 
‘is often the same thing’ (Middleton 1996:11). In Schopenhauer Nietzsche found 
authorisation for his own recently-expressed atheism. Beyond this confirmation, 
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Schopenhauer served as a major influence to think philosophically, so much so that it 
affected his philological studies, despite warnings from Ritschl (Brobjer 2008a:29). 
Schopenhauer’s perspectives on metaphysics, suffering, art, language, ethics, and pity 
would greatly shape Nietzsche’s own thinking and writing for a decade, then become 
counterpoints for his work from 1876 onward (30-32). One major reason for 
Nietzsche’s break with Schopenhauer at that time was the Schopenhauer’s pessimism. It 
stemmed from his view of the world as comprised of interminably conflicting desires 
that were devoid of telos—purposeless suffering. Nietzsche’s own life already had been 
filled with pain and loss. Whether he realised it or not, it seems likely that he wanted to 
free himself from ‘the revolving wheel of Ixion’ and ‘the eternally yearning Tantalus’ 
(Schopenhauer 2010 1.3.38). Nietzsche’s reading around this time of Schopenhauerian 
philosopher, Eugene Dühring, is also relevant for one small fact. Inside of the back 
cover of Nietzsche’s copy of Dühring’s Der Wert des Lebens (The Value of Life, 1865) 
lies the first known association of Nietzsche with the term, ressentiment. The word 
appears there in his own handwriting, along with a couple of page references where 
Dühring discussed it in the book. It also occurs several times a lengthy excerpt he 
copied (Brobjer 2008a:68, see also 148, footnote 34). 
In the summer between his first and second year at Leipzig, Nietzsche read 
Friedrich Albert Lange’s Geschichte des Materialismus (History of Materialism, 1866). 
Lange rejected all metaphysics, preferring the natural world to be explained in material 
terms, with the exception of mental processes, which remained linked with a Kantian 
formal idealism (Brobjer 2008a:34). He argued inter alia that the history of philosophy 
could only be understood through the history of science. Lange, along with 
Schopenhauer, intensified Nietzsche’s desire for philosophy. Lange’s use of Charles 
Darwin’s The Origin of the Species (1859) gave Nietzsche a scientific basis for his 
growing desire to replace modern mankind’s superstitious and immature religious ideas 
with sound philosophical reasoning (Cate 2003:73-75).  
Evidence of Nietzsche’s passion may be seen in his preoccupation with two 
ancient Greek personages throughout the second half of the decade: Democritus, the 
pre-Socratic philosopher, and Diogenes Laertius, a little-known third-century BCE 
historian of philosophy who wrote on Democritus in a ten-volume history of Greek 
philosophy, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers (Brobjer 2008a:35, 49). 
Democritus presented biographies of philosophers from Thales to Epicurus, along with 
a comparative analysis of their thought (Blue 2016:263-65). Nietzsche spent a full year 
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on a paper examining Laertius’ sources for submission in a Leipzig University essay 
contest in September 1867, which he won (Cate 2003:75f). His essay was publicly 
praised by Ritschl, and it became his second published work, also submitted to Das 
Rheinische Museum, in two successive issues (78f).10    
 By his final year at Leipzig, Nietzsche’s interest in philology reached low ebb. 
He therefore did not welcome the communiqué from the head of the department that he 
would have to invest another entire year to achieve his educational goal, a doctorate. 
Juxtaposed with his declining interest was a growing admiration for the controversial 
music of Richard Wagner. In November 1868, owing to a kindness from Professor 
Ritschl’s wife, he was invited to a dinner at the Brockhauses of Leipzig given in honour 
of Wagner who was stopping through on tour. The two not only discussed music but 
also philosophy, and particularly Schopenhauer. By the end of the evening, Wagner had 
extended an open invitation to his new admirer to come visit him in Switzerland. 
Nietzsche himself was so inspired by the evening’s discussion that he resolved to stay 
the course in Leipzig to finish his doctoral studies and write his dissertation (Cate 
2003:83-86).  
The dawn of 1869 cast a propitious light across Nietzsche’s professional path. A 
chair of classical philology at the University of Basel had just been vacated, and Ritschl 
wanted his protégé to fill it. He was unaware of Nietzsche’s waning interest in 
philology, and most certainly of his being mocked by Nietzsche behind his back. In a 
twist of irony, Ritschl put his own academic reputation on the line for his pupil. His 
glowing endorsement coupled with some behind the scene politics paved the way for 
Leipzig University to grant Nietzsche early Promotion, to exempt him from the 
requirement of earning a Habilitation credential, and be awarded an honorary doctorate. 
Nietzsche ascended the post of professor at age twenty-four, though without tenure 
(Barnes 2014:129; Blue 2016:302-04). The university made the official offer to 
Nietzsche on 13 February 1869, and he arrived in Basel on 19 April (306, 311). As part 
of his processing into the institution, he was asked by a former professor, now an 
administrator, Wilhelm Vischer-Bilfinger, to apply for expatriation from Prussia 
(Salomé 2001:xxii). It was an unorthodox, though not unprecedented, move to conserve 
the university’s recent hire in the event that war mandated his conscription.  
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 A postscript to the affair lies in the essay committee’s citation of the essay’s epigraph in their remarks 
on Nietzsche’s accomplishment. Translated from the Greek the epigraph, it read, ‘Become such as you 
are’. This maxim evidently stayed with him for life, for in a slightly altered form it served as the subtitle 
for his final book, EH, ‘Become What You Are’ (Blue 2016:274f). 
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Nietzsche spent his first year of teaching knee-deep in subjects from the pre-
Socratic philosophers to Latin epigraphy. His fall semester called for thirteen hours of 
lecture per week, slating him Monday through Wednesday for the earliest daily slot at 
7:00 a.m. He was also obligated to teach Greek and Latin six hours a week in the local 
Paedagogium (Pletsch 1991:106f; Cate 2003:90). Nietzsche’s health would soon buckle 
under such a load, with frequent relapses to follow. Each episode left him increasingly 
compromised. In particular, his eyesight began to fail. Nietzsche escaped the pressures 
of teaching by taking advantage of Wagner’s invitation to visit him in Tribschen, 
Switzerland, just two hours away by train (95-101). From May 1869 through April 
1872, he spent many weekends and holidays at the Lake Lucerne residence, twenty-
three visits in all. No doubt there would have been more, but his host moved to 
Bayreuth, Germany (Hollingdale 1999b:56). Most importantly, Basel was the place 
where Nietzsche’s writing career began in earnest. In a span of sixteen years he would 
generate material for fourteen published books, as well as three significant unpublished 
articles.    
The Franco-Prussian War broke out in July 1870 while Nietzsche was on 
midsummer holiday southeast of Lake Lucerne. He dispatched letters to both Vischer at 
the university and the municipal education board requesting a leave of absence from 
university for military service. As a proud former cannoneer, he envisaged making some 
material contribution to the war effort. He was granted liberty on 10 August, but due to 
his lack of Swiss citizenship, his role was restricted to that of medical orderly. Within a 
month, the overwhelming acuity of victims, long work hours, and poor hygienic 
conditions conspired to make Nietzsche himself a casualty. He was discharged mid-
September due to debilitating bouts of diphtheria and dysentery. Not only had he lost 
his health (again) and another chance to distinguish himself, but now he had lost 
statehood. When Nietzsche concluded his teaching career, he would become a wanderer 
for the remainder of his sane life (Cate 2003:113-16).  
In January 1871, Nietzsche’s nerves were again frayed, now due to the drain his 
teaching duties had become on his private philosophical pursuits. He even wrote 
Vischer to request a transfer to the philosophy department to fill a chair that had just 
come open. He did in fact breakdown and so was granted further leave, which he took in 
southern France, his sister tending to his convalescence. Upon his return, his load was 
lightened in view of his physical and psychological infirmities, but he was denied the 
transfer (Cate 2003:122-25). 
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The 1872 publication of Nietzsche’s first book, The Birth of Tragedy, commenced 
what scholars consider the early period of his writings (1872-1876). The inspiration for 
Tragedy had begun ‘somewhere in an Alpine nook’ two summers prior (BT ‘Attempt at 
a Self-Criticism’ 1). It was an exploration into the pessimism of the ancient Greeks as 
they sought to understand their world of suffering, contradiction, change, and ultimately 
death. The book was essay in genre, musical in form, metaphysical in aim, and filled 
with Schopenhauerian concepts. Humanity was driven by unseen forces, which meant 
that the lived-experience was subject to an illusory order. The Greeks responded by 
developing tragedy to express life as changing and powerful (i.e., the Dionysian side), 
without losing the benefits of life as stable ordered (i.e., the Apollonian side). Their 
chief was the ability to tolerate the Dionysian. Since music could be experienced 
immediately apart from conscious thought, it was believed to be the pathway to oneness 
with the universe. Euripides killed tragedy by smuggling in Socratic rationality, which 
effectively cast a glare across the world of will so that only the illusory world of 
phenomenon was visible. Nietzsche’s Germany (and Europe) was increasingly 
becoming pessimistic for its inability to explain the mysteries of the universe, even 
though scientific rationalism was on the rise. Wagner’s music, according to Nietzsche, 
was manifesting Dionysian power just in time to check societal decay and promote 
cultural recrudescence. Nietzsche’s Tragedy was widely panned. His former mentor at 
Leipzig, Ritschl, jotted a two-word evaluation in his diary, ‘idea-rich giddiness’, and 
wrote him a letter taking issue with most of the contents of the book (Cate 
2003:145). Students avoided his lectures in droves (165). Nietzsche himself 
acknowledged embarrassment over his work in the preface he wrote for its 1886 edition 
of BT (‘Attempt at a Self-criticism’ 6), even while subtly congratulating himself for 
pioneering paths into secret places (7).  
On the heels of this first publication, Nietzsche wrote three articles that never saw 
printer’s ink during his lifetime. In 1873, he wrote ‘On Truth and Lies in an Extra-moral 
Sense’. He argued that the fundamental human drive is to create metaphors to make 
sense of the world. Reason, language, and knowledge are thus inventions. Over time 
their origin is forgotten; they are viewed as corresponding to reality, and so represent 
‘truth’. In the same year he wrote ‘Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks’ in which 
he discussed the thought of sixth and fifth-century philosophers Thales, Anaximander, 
Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Anaxagoras. He argued that the world is mechanically 
produced through a continual recombination of its matter directed by nous (i.e., mind or 
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Geist), which was also material. Noteworthy is the ground he laid for the concept of 
ressentiment in Anaximander. In 1874, Nietzsche wrote ‘We Philologists’ in which he 
took to task his fellow philologists for treating their profession as a mere job instead of 
using it to mine the culture of the ancient Greeks and Romans for ethical treasures. 
Through proper teaching, the tide of decadence that Nietzsche perceived to be sweeping 
modern Germany could be critiqued so that a high (classical) culture could be 
recovered.  
In the next four years, Nietzsche would cross a Rubicon by producing four 
lengthy essays that generally criticised German culture. They were collected and 
published in 1876 under the title Unfashionable Observations, a project which 
Nietzsche had envisioned in August 1873 to be comprised of thirteen essays (Schaberg 
1995:31f). In the spring of 1873, Nietzsche produced his first essay, ‘David Strauss the 
Confessor and the Writer’. He undermined the widely popular Strauss by branding him 
a cultural philistine who not only self-authorised critique of German values, but whose 
ignorance was leading the country away from an acquisition of greatness by glorifying 
past national accomplishments.  
In February 1874 Nietzsche published ‘On the Utility and Liability of History for 
Life’. Nietzsche argued that culture formation was being ill-served by defining itself in 
terms of historical process and evolutionary mechanics. To justify existence by looking 
backwards was a hold-over from Christianity, and only led to a devaluation of values 
ending in nihilism (‘Utility’ 5-10). Nietzsche did not think that the flux of history could 
be ignored, however, but its chaos was to be organised and overcome (10). This 
presages the concepts Nietzsche would rely on in the future: the Übermensch who 
would, by will to power, overcome all things including himself in the eternally recurring 
agon.  
In October of the same year Nietzsche published the third essay of UO, 
‘Schopenhauer as Educator’. He idealised Schopenhauer as the type of philosopher who 
can instruct man in the highest ethic. It is the ethic of self-realisation, which involves 
distinguishing between man’s apparent nature and his true nature, or physis. One must 
not succumb to the allure of the former so that one can pursue the ‘transfiguring 
overarching purpose’ of the latter, ‘attaining power in order to come to the aid of the 
physis’ (UO ‘Schopenhauer’ 3).  
The fourth essay of UO, ‘Richard Wagner in Bayreuth’, was published in July 
1876. It is important to step back for a moment to the summer of 1873, when a student 
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named Paul Rée enrolled in Nietzsche’s lecture series on ‘The Pre-Platonic 
Philosophers’ (Hollingdale 1999b:90). Rée was a Jewish atheist who was interested in 
natural explanations for religious experience and morality. Along these lines, he 
authored a short work, Psychological Observations (1875), and a major work, The 
Origin of the Moral Sensations (1877). As Rée’s status developed from student to 
friend, so his influence on Nietzsche grew, with the result that Nietzsche began to defect 
from Wagner and to abandon the pessimism rooted in metaphysics of his own earlier 
work (Brobjer 2008a:41; Kaufmann 1974a:90). Nietzsche considered Wagner’s new 
‘cultural’ centre at Bayreuth a threat to any hopes of reviving the true German spirit. 
Wagner was becoming the cultural philistine Nietzsche had lambasted just three years 
ago. Unfortunately, he had already committed to a laudatory essay on Wagner (see 
Middleton 1996:119f). His notebooks from the period (Newman 1946 4.435) and his 
frequent (perhaps psycho-somatic) ailments (Hollingdale 1999b:97f) both strongly 
suggest that this created a tremendous schism within Nietzsche due to his growing 
disdain for the composer. With the help of Peter Gast, however, Nietzsche found room 
to compartmentalise praise of Wagner for his mesmerising music away from the 
unabashed desire for power that had produced such creativity (Schaberg 1995:406). 
Years later Nietzsche would rationalise that he was writing about himself, and even 
Zarathustra (EH ‘The Birth of Tragedy’ 4).  
1878 heralded new directions for Nietzsche. The May publication of Human, All 
too Human marked a definitive break with Wagner.11 In this work he attacked moral 
assumptions by undermining the origins of Christianity’s (and Schopenhauer’s) 
metaphysical notion of good-evil. With a nod to Rée (HH ‘On the History of the Moral 
Sensations’ 35), he posited alternative explanations for this morality in the 
physiological causes and psychological needs of worshippers (‘Of the First and Last 
Things’ 13, 17), and also in the nature of language itself (11). This undermining of an 
opponent’s position anticipates Nietzsche’s genealogical approach, his notion of 
ressentiment, and his ‘hammer philosophy’. He would become indelibly linked to them 
all. HH was written in aphoristic style, not original to Nietzsche, but chosen by him to 
allow anything from a single point of critique to a lengthy argument in essay, each with 
verve and humour. His final section, ‘By Oneself Alone’, would recommend taking 
one’s philosophy ‘in the end [as] nothing but their own biography’ (513), and would 
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‘The Wanderer and His Shadow’ was added in September of 1880.They were published altogether in 
1886 under the title Human, All too Human: A Book for Free Spirits. 
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pave the way for the character who would serve as his quasi-alias, Zarathustra. HH also 
began what scholars designate Nietzsche’s middle period (1878-1882)12 in which 
appeared, as we have just seen, undeniable elements of his own evolving philosophy. 
Finally, his regularly incapacitating health forced him to spend stints away from his 
teaching duties, foreshadowing his resignation from Basel in May-June of 1879 
(Hollingdale 1999b:107, 109-12, 115). He thus began his peripatetic lifestyle, 
predominantly in Switzerland, Germany, and northern Italy, for the final decade of his 
rational life. A modest annual pension funded his existence (Schaberg 1995:77). 
In June 1881, Nietzsche published Dawn. The subtitle, Thoughts on the 
Presumptions of Morality, suggests it was a continuation of his previous exploration 
into the origins of morality. The chief developments of this work were two. One was his 
idea that morality is one of man’s ‘crudest and subtlest deceptions (namely self-
deception)’; it is an ethical explanation for customs catalysed by desire for power and 
fear of consequences (D 2.103, 140). A second was the further development of his will-
to-power concept, now identified as ‘strength [that] has been overcome by something 
higher, … that energy that a genius expends not on works, but on himself as a work, 
that is, on his own mastery’ (5.548). His retrospective commentary in EH considered 
this book the commencement of his war on morality, the victory of which would 
constitute ‘that new morning [in] a whole world of new days’ … characterised by ‘a 
revaluation of all values’ (‘Books’ D 1). 
The Gay Science was published in August 1882.13 Nietzsche contended true 
knowledge of the world need neither be regarded as banal nor feared. Life in all its 
glory and gore was something that could be cheerfully embraced, not something that at 
best had to be endured. In service of this argument, he put forth numerous existential 
ideas: the murder of God (GS 3.125); good having evolved from evil (1.4); a desire for 
power as the source of all values, even love, pity and self-denial (1.14, 27); self-
overcoming as the path to meaning (4.285, 290); the rejection of any worlds other than 
the present material one. All of these ideas combined to set up the grand hypothetical 
Nietzsche used to introduce his notion of the eternal recurrence at the close of his book: 
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 Incidentally, this five-year stretch was given entirely to the production of what has been called 
Nietzsche’s ‘Free-Spirit Trilogy’ (Caygill 1991; Franco 2011). It consists of HH1, D, and GS. 
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 The 1882 edition consisted of four books. An expanded edition was published in 1887 that included 
Nietzsche’s Preface, a fifth book, and an appendix of songs. 
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‘What if …’ (4.341).14 The teaching of this doctrine he would leave for his next book 
and its hero, Zarathustra (4.342).15   
 Thus Spoke Zarathustra was published in stages from 1883 to 1885. It 
hallmarked the commencement of his late period (1883-1888) when he began bringing 
fragments of his thought together into a composite philosophy. Above all, Zarathustra 
showcased the triumvirate of Nietzsche’s philosophical ideas: the Übermensch, will-to-
power, and the eternal recurrence. Literarily, Z is the story of a hermit who goes on a 
quest for self-overcoming. It is a polemic against Judeo-Christianity, inverting biblical 
images and doctrines to show the supremacy of his own perspective on life and 
meaning. Life is hard, but it can also be wonderful. Zarathustra seeks a higher plane of 
existence that takes hold of all of life, a mode of existence enjoyed only by higher 
beings whose values exceed those of ordinary people. Will-to-power is the key to 
unlocking all this bounty. By it, one can embrace pain as joy, be lord of the earth, and 
become the sun in a world of one’s own creation (Z 4.19f).  
Beyond Good and Evil was published in June 1886. It is a continuation of many of 
the themes from earlier works and, as he shares in a 22 September 1886 letter to Jakob 
Burckhardt, ‘it says the same things as my Zarathustra—only in a way that is 
different—very different’ (Middleton 1996:255).16 The poetic motifs in Z find 
correspondence in the prosaic elucidations of BGE, and his style begins to shift from 
aphorism to more protracted essay. BGE is Nietzsche’s attempt to work out will-to-
power both as a philosophical reality in the development of humanity (BGE 2.36), and 
as a historical reality in the context of what he perceived to be a degenerating Europe 
and Germany (8.240-56). He railed against traditional morality because it inhibited a 
true flourishing of the human species. The crux of the problem was Christianity. It 
commanded self-denial (i.e., the thou shalt not’s of the Old Testament Decalogue; see 
also 5.199) in the service of doing good for God’s Kingdom (alternatively, ‘progress’). 
Self-denial deferred happiness to a world beyond because life in this evil one was pain 
and suffering. Nietzsche, therefore, claimed there must be a higher being, one who 
would go beyond present moralities by legislating one’s own good and evil (6.211). 
Admittedly, this involved pain, both experiencing it in oneself as well as inflicting it on 
others through exploitation, destruction, and oppression. But true life could be found 
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 This aphorism and the next were the finale of the original edition of GS. 
15
 The text of this final aphorism is almost verbatim the text of ‘Zarathustra’s Prologue’, Part One.  
16
 Nietzsche also expressed this intention in a draft for a preface to his intended second volume of BGE. 
He chose rather to use it as his preface to HH2. 
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only by taking it whole: every high and every low, every weal and every woe, each 
delight and every sorrow, ‘all in the same succession and sequence’ (GS 4.341), time 
without end (BGE 3.56). Those who would operate in the will-to-power showed that 
they were worthy of such a glorious, albeit dangerous, existence. 
On the Genealogy of Morality was published November 1887 as an intentional 
sequel to BGE (Kaufmann 1992a:439). In it Nietzsche continued his critique of 
Christianity via three essays. His first essay contended the binary designation of good 
and evil was not eternal. Its origin was the triumph of slave morality over master 
morality, prototypically in Christianity’s conquest of Rome by means of ressentiment. 
His second essay presented ressentiment as giving rise to the moral trappings of guilt 
feelings and bad conscience. These were really consequences of will-to-power being 
inhibited from natural expression (i.e., by punishment) and turned back and inward 
upon the individual. Rather than allow some metaphysical explanation for good-evil, 
Nietzsche traced their origins back to the amoral values of good-bad in the naturalistic 
creditor-debtor relationship. In the third essay, Nietzsche characterised ascetic ideals, 
chiefly truth and love, as weapons used by the priest to subjugate the weak and gain 
power for himself. Ramifications of this affected every aspect of life and society: 
religion (OGM 3.17), modern science (3.23), politics (3.25), historiography (3.26), and 
even the atheism of Nietzsche’s day (3.27). The height of irony was the priest’s coup de 
grâce, the invention of deity to provide unsurpassable meaning in life, and so provide a 
once-and-for-all answer to the crying question, ‘Why suffering?’ (3.28). 
Nietzsche generated five short works in 1888, the last year of his creative life. The 
Case of Wagner was published in September. Nietzsche personified the ‘problem of 
decadence’ in Wagner (CW ‘Preface’). Wagner’s music served as the epitome of 
cultural decline, beguiled as he was by Schopenhauerian and Hegelian ideals (4, 10). If 
this wasn’t bad enough, Wagner defected to Christianity; worse still, he helped create a 
cultural pandemic by infecting Germany and Europe with ‘moral and religious 
absurdities’ through his famous operatic productions, ‘Parsifal’ and ‘Der Ring des 
Nibelungen’ (i.e., ‘The Ring of the Nibelungen’, 3-5). In a turn of the knife, Nietzsche 
lauded Bizet for his ‘Carmen’. This is because he perceived it to adumbrate the 
Übermensch, as well as promote will-to-power values such as cruelty in terms of love 
and creativity in the service of killing, all in a spirit of cheerfulness and the strength of 
courage (1f). 
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Twilight of the Idols was written in August-September 1888 (published January 
1889). He censured Germany for its apathy over the cultural malaise that had crept in. 
He reprised and deepened criticisms previously levelled at Socrates, Plato, and Kant, 
then castigated Christianity for present-day nihilistic values. Nietzsche’s answer to this 
was to overturn the moral tables through the transvaluation of all values. The effective 
subtitle, How to Philosophise with a Hammer, signified the use of a tuning-fork to 
determine what is sound and what is rotten or hollow (TI ‘Preface’). Nietzsche was 
tapping on the ideals of Christianity to show their hollowness and unworthiness of 
belief. These ideals were in the twilight of their usefulness, and thus candidates for 
destruction.  
Nietzsche wrote The Antichrist in September 1888 (published 1905). He 
continued his attack on Judeo-Christianity because of its world-historical 
destructiveness to noble values (A 24-45) and its deadly war against the higher type of 
human (5). The work was also intended to be a grand revaluation of all values (9; see 
also EH ‘Twilight of the Idols’ 3). 
Ecce Homo was written in October-November 1888 (published 1908). It was 
widely considered to be an autobiographical statement, and was conducted primarily via 
retrospective commentary on his each of his books. He wrote such good books because 
they possessed the insight of ‘a psychologist without equal’ (EH ‘Why I Write Such 
Good Books’ 5). They pushed aside accepted boundaries and provided new vistas of 
thought and life into the rare ‘genius of the heart’ (6). Framing the catalogue of his 
book’s commentaries were characterisations of himself: he was so wise on account of 
his aesthetic intuitions; he was so clever as a consequence of his personal disciplines; he 
was a destiny because he was willing to go the way of the Zarathustrean immoralist 
(‘Why I Am a Destiny’ 4-6) to blow up the power structures that had stood for two 
millennia (1f). He was willing to sacrifice the present and destroy the past for the sake 
of the future (4). His name would be enshrined forever as the one who unshackled 
humanity from a make-believe world to live free and noble in a new world of their 
making. He signed the book, ‘Dionysus versus the Crucified’ (9). 
Nietzsche contra Wagner is Nietzsche’s final work, written in December 1888 
(published 1895). The book is comprised of altered selections from previous works 
dating from 1877 (NCW ‘Forward’). Nietzsche did not neglect to praise Wagner when 
he truly invested himself in his music, but he did accuse him of ultimately selling out to 
the masses. Christianity corrupted him, and great was the fallout thereof, for his music 
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became a dangerously corrosive to the German population. In this, Wagner became a 
focal point for Nietzsche’s own anti-Christian views. His vantage point for such 
criticism came from identifying with the Greeks, who ventured ‘the highest and most 
dangerous peak of present thought and looked around from up there [and] looked down 
from there’ (italics original, ‘Epilogue’ 2).17  
Having contextualised Nietzsche’s thought in his personal history, a concise 
review of the relevant literature pertaining to Nietzsche’s concepts of ressentiment and 
self-deception is now offered.  
 
1.3 Review of Literature on Ressentiment and Self-deception 
Nietzsche’s notion of self-deception cannot be sufficiently understood apart from the 
context his moral critique assigns to it, which is ressentiment. A body of literature in 
anglophone reception has therefore been developed18 to explore the issues associated 
with both ressentiment and self-deception as they occur in value creation.19  
In A 24 Nietzsche claimed ressentiment to be the psychological origin of morality, 
epitomised in Judeo-Christian morality. Bernard Reginster observed twenty years ago 
this claim to have been largely ignored by scholars (1997:281). Investigation of 
ressentiment considered without reference to Judeo-Christianity has not fared much 
better. Nevertheless, the relative dearth of scholarship on the subject has included some 
well-known contributions: Scheler, Ressentiment (1998); Deleuze, Nietzsche et la 
Philosophie (1961);20 Staten, Nietzsche’s Voice (1991); Bittner, ‘Ressentiment’ (1994); 
Solomon, ‘One Hundred Years of Ressentiment’ (1994). To this short list we should add 
Weber, The Sociology of Religion (1964) and Améry, ‘Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne’ 
(1966).21 Curiously, for all the promise in the sweep of Solomon’s title, he interacts with 
only three authors who engage the phenomenon of ressentiment in any meaningful way: 
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 Two other works for which Nietzsche is responsible should be mentioned. He wrote a collection of 
poems in the fall of 1888 known as Dithyrambs of Dionysus. Six of them were published in the 1891 
edition of Z. Three others were taken in slightly altered form from Z, Part Four. The Will to Power is the 
title of a volume consisting of selections from Nietzsche’s notebooks between 1883 and 1888 (Kaufmann 
1968:xv). It is highly controversial in that he never intended for them to be published in that form. His 
sister acquired sole copyright of all his writings in 1895 (Hollingdale 1999:220). In 1901, she published 
the book as volume fifteen in her first edition of a collected works of her brother. A 1904 edition added 
200 pages of notes. A 1906 edition in two volumes expanded the number of notes to 1,067. This remains 
the total for all subsequent editions (Kaufmann 1968:xvii). 
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 Literature on Nietzsche is so voluminous that I have concentrated on his reception in English-speaking 
scholarship. Examples of journals exclusively devoted to Nietzsche studies include International 
Nietzsche Studies, Journal of Nietzsche Studies, New Nietzsche Studies, and Nietzsche-Studien. 
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 See section 1.5 of this chapter for the research questions used to explore these issues.  
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 English translation, Nietzsche & Philosophy (1983). 
21
 English translation, ‘Beyond Guilt and Atonement’ (2009).  
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Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971); Kaufmann, Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality (1974); 
Strawson, ‘Freedom and Resentment’ (1974).22 Not much has changed in the years since 
Reginster made his observation. Typically, ressentiment is given only cursory coverage 
in broader treatments of Nietzsche’s discourses on master and slave moralities, the bulk 
of which are conducted within commentaries on OGM (Weber 1964:110-17; Kaufmann 
1974:371-78; Strong 1975/1988:245-50; White 1997:136-49; Ridley 1998:15-40; 
Lippitt 2000:77-79; Williams 2000:20-23, 100; Murphy 2001:133-38; Williams 
2001:20-35 passim; Leiter 2003:202-06;23 Janaway 2007:90-123 passim; Benson 
2008:125-38, 150-55; Hatab 2008:37-68 passim; Acampora 2013:110-50 passim).  
 
1.3.1 Ressentiment in the First Half of the Twentieth-century 
Study of ressentiment attracted precious little attention in the half-century following 
Nietzsche’s passing in 1900. Four names achieve stark relief in this regard. In 1912 
Max Scheler published his half-anecdotal, half-polemical volume entitled, 
Ressentiment.24 According to Scheler, ressentiment as the source of moral values was 
the most profound discovery of its kind in recent times. Scheler treated ressentiment as 
an ethical concern, but explored both its psychological and sociological implications. 
With Nietzsche, he concluded that its significance lay in its toxic power for value-
formation and value-deception. When Nietzsche applied the concept to the value of 
Christian love, however, Scheler considered Nietzsche’s theory to be ‘completely 
mistaken’ (1998:63). Scheler considered Christian love, or agape, not to be a 
consequence of ressentiment, but its complete opposite. According to Nietzsche, the 
provenance of ressentiment was the sensory realm, while agape belonged to the 
spiritual (64). The direction of ressentiment, in keeping with its ancient Greek origins, 
was from lower to higher, from image to essence, from ignorance to knowledge, and 
from need to fullness. Christian love reversed all of this so that strength inclined toward 
impotence, wealth to poverty, fullness to deficiency (64f). Furthermore, Scheler took 
issue with Nietzsche’s assertion that moral judgements, sourced as they are in 
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 Rawls and Strawson actually used the term, ‘resentment’, which Solomon accepts as virtually 
synonymous with ressentiment (1994:103). 
23
 To be fair, Leiter does treat ressentiment analytically. Still, it is simply a thousand-word detour on the 
way to his explanation of the argument of the first essay in OGM.  
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 First edition: 1912 ‘Über Ressentiment und moralisches Werturteil’ In Zeitschrift für Pathopsychologie 
Jahrg. I, H. 2/3 Leipzig: Verlag Engelmann. Final expanded form: 1915 ‘Das Ressentiment im Aufbau 
der Moralen’ In Gesammelte Abhandlungen und Aufsätze. The 1961 and subsequent translations are 
based on Vom Umsturz der Werte 4
th
 edn, Vol. 3, Maria Scheler, ed., In M Scheler, Gesammelte Werke, 
15 vols. Berne: Franke Verlag (Scheler 1961:33). 
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ressentiment, must be subjectively derived from repressed feelings and desires (117-21; 
2012:270f). Perhaps as a vestige of his early Catholicism, and most certainly due to 
Kant’s influence, Scheler held that agape, as an example of genuine morality, is ‘never 
based on ressentiment’, but ‘rests on an eternal hierarchy of values [that] are fully as 
objective and clearly “evident” as mathematical truths’ (1998:52f). The supreme 
manifestation of Christian love in the human record ‘is supposed to have taken place in 
Galilee: God spontaneously “descended” to man, became a servant, and died the bad 
servant’s death on the cross’ (66)! In Nietzsche’s schema, sacrificial love was 
manifestly ressentiment, and operated on a self-created value system that is the inverse 
of the status quo; for Scheler, such sacrifice merely recognised and moved toward 
higher values that come as givens (1973:228-32). Scheler concluded that ‘the root of 
Christian love [i.e., as a reversal in values] is entirely free of ressentiment’ (1998:67, see 
also 44-53).  
A second significant figure to interact with Nietzsche’s thought was Sigmund 
Freud. In 1914 he published an essay on ‘The History of the Psychoanalytic 
Movement’, boldly proclaiming that the whole structure of his budding discipline rested 
on the theory of repression (1962a:15f). In 1915 he elaborated on the theory in essays 
entitled, ‘Repression’ (146-58) and ‘The Unconscious’ (166-208).25 Freud never used 
the term ressentiment, and though he claimed not to have been influenced by Nietzsche, 
many have argued to the contrary. Hans Loewald observed a direct influence on Freud 
from Nietzsche (1988:71). In Nietzsche's Presence in Freud's Life and Thought (1995), 
Ronald Lehrer marshalled evidence to indicate that Freud’s debt was not merely 
inspirational, but substantively informational (1995). Jacob Taubes declared Freud to be 
‘very dependent’ on Nietzsche (2004:88), and Barker claimed that repression accounts 
for Freud’s own denial of Nietzsche’s ‘enormous impact’ on him (1996:99). Didier 
Anzieu pointed out that Nietzsche coined the term das Es (the id),26 and showed how 
dependent Freud’s discussions of super-ego and guilt feelings were on Nietzsche’s 
notions of resentment, bad conscience, and false morality (1986:88f; see also 100f, 581; 
Hollingdale 1999a:110-15; Smith 2011:129).27  
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 This volume, Die Geschichte der psychoanalytischen Bewegung, was republished with minor additions 
in 1924 (Leipzig: International Psychoanalytischer Verlag). The 1962 translation is based on this version 
(Freud 1962a:3). 
26
 Freud actually credited Georg Groddeck for this term (1989:17), though it is hard to believe that he was 
unaware that its genealogy led back to Nietzsche and his frequent use of the term. 
27
 See also Hollingdale for similarities between Nietzsche’s explanation of conscience and Freud’s super-
ego (1999:119-24). Regarding further possible influence of Nietzsche on Freud see Jones (1953-
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Third, Max Weber in his posthumously published The Sociology of Religion 
(1922) highlighted ressentiment as the means of social revolution, whereby the Jews 
inverted their perceived status from a ‘pariah people’ to a prestigious one (1964:112, 
15). Following Nietzsche, he argued they created an ethical system anchored in a 
religious scheme. This was achieved by inverting the ancient belief that privilege (i.e., 
blessing) flowed from righteousness, advocating instead that it stemmed from 
sinfulness. The unique hallmark of this novel order was vengeance. It manifested as ‘a 
conscious or unconscious desire for vengeance’ (110), a ‘religious resentment’ among 
the ‘disprivileged’ people (112), and as a universal deity whose wrath would be poured 
out on the entire world (113). When it came to Christianity’s alleged roots in 
ressentiment, however, Weber parted company with Nietzsche, arguing discontinuity 
with Jewish forbearers. Though he acknowledged ressentiment played a part in 
salvation religions (i.e., Judaism), he claimed it was merely part of a much larger and 
more complex reality, that of universal suffering. The drive for salvation was not 
exclusive to Christianity, nor Judaism for that matter. Weber said Christianity removed 
the ‘penetrating feeling of resentment (i.e., ressentiment)’ (115). It did this by 
addressing the intellectual needs of the human mind driven not by material 
circumstances, but ‘by an inner compulsion’ to pursue ethical and religious questions, 
and thus deriving a sense meaning and order in the cosmos (117).  
Martin Heidegger was the fourth important scholar to engage Nietzsche. His work 
of the late 1940s found publication in a 1950 essay, ‘Who is Nietzsche’s Zarathustra?’.28 
He reworked Nietzsche’s views on the nature of being and time in such a way that they 
were no longer bound by ontology, in the attempt to obviate the all too human rancour 
against time, which was the existential origin of ressentiment (Heidegger 1968, see also 
1972). He accomplished this by focusing on Zarathustra’s speeches, ‘The 
Convalescent’, ‘On the Great Longing’, and ‘On Redemption’ (1984:212-26). 
Heidegger also made significant use of ‘The Anaximander Fragment’, a text on which 
Nietzsche based his Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks (PTG 1873).29  
According to Heidegger’s Nietzsche, mankind’s chief obstacle on the way to the 
overman (the one who could handle the eternal recurrence) was the spirit of revenge. 
                                                                                                                                               
1957:3.283), Ellenberger (1970:276-78, 542f), Wallace (1983:17), Gellner (2003:20-22), Cybulska 
(2015). 
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 This essay, the fruit of a lecture course, was included in 1950 Holzwege, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann GmbH. It was subsequently published in 1954 in Vortäge und Aufsätze, and in 1961 in an 
eponymous four-volume work, Nietzsche, both Pfullingen: Verlag. 
29
 See also Heidegger’s ‘The Anaximander Fragment’ In Early Greek Thinking: The Dawn of Western 
Philosophy (1985) and ‘Anaximander's Saying’ In Off the Beaten Track (2002). 
25 
 
Man’s capacity for reflecting on himself was to relate beings to what is, i.e., Being, 
whether (perceived to be) actual or possible (1984:220f). Viewing Being through the 
thought of Schelling and Schopenhauer, Heidegger claimed that Nietzsche had in mind 
‘Being of beings’ when he spoke of will-to-power (222f). This kind of thinking thrust 
Nietzsche into the metaphysical, which meant the spirit of revenge had to be dealt with 
in this realm and not merely in a psychological dimension. Heidegger used etymology 
to relate revenge to persecution, claiming it was not only reactive, but proactive. He 
does not specifically mention ressentiment, but he writes in terms that bespeak it: 
Vengeful persecution … defies its object by degrading it, in order to feel superior to what 
has been thus degraded; in this way it restores its own self-esteem, the only estimation that 
seems to count for it. For one who seeks vengeance is galled by the feeling that he has been 
thwarted and injured (221). 
To define revenge even further than ‘persecution that defies and degrades’ (222), 
Heidegger quoted from Nietzsche’s aphorism, ‘On Redemption’” ‘This … alone is 
revenge itself: the will’s ill will toward time and its “It was”’ (223). The essence of this 
is time irrevocably passes away. Revenge (and ressentiment) hates transiency, so the 
will imposes constancy and absolutes to create an imaginary world it can control. In 
doing so, time and reality are degraded such that the eternal recurrence cannot be 
experienced, and the overman cannot realise itself as Being in the flux of time (224-26). 
Heidegger refused outright to discredit or refute Nietzsche, but he let stand Nietzsche’s 
idea of ‘perpetual Becoming through the eternal recurrence of the same’ made being 
‘stable and permanent’ (228). As such, he questioned whether or not Zarathustra’s 
doctrine could actually overcome ressentiment or bring about redemption from the spirit 
of revenge (229).30  
Looking back over the half-century following Nietzsche’s death, relatively few 
scholars entertained the concept of ressentiment. Those who did considered it for its 
ethical, psychological, and sociological implications. Scheler and Weber, in the decided 
minority of those who discussed it explicitly, made a turn by insulating Christianity 
from Nietzsche’s accusation that it bore the noxious effects of ressentiment on Europe 
and western civilisation. Elsewhere, ressentiment was discussed conceptually in relation 
to its influence on the human psyche. It was also discussed in an attempt to provide a 
philosophical basis for the notion of Being by going beyond discussions in psychology 
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 Heidegger remarked, ‘Nietzsche’s metaphysics is not an overcoming of nihilism. It is the ultimate 
entanglement in nihilism’ (1984:4:203). 
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and delving into the realm of ontology. Self-deception, as expressly involved in 
ressentiment, was virtually left unaddressed. 
 
1.3.2 Ressentiment after World War II 
After WWII, interest in Nietzsche began to rise, in part due to Walter Kaufmann’s 
omnibus volume, The Portable Nietzsche (1954).31 It helped rehabilitate Nietzsche’s 
image after being co-opted by the Nazis. Associated interest in ressentiment also 
increased in scholarly precincts, which I will treat in two groupings. The bulk of this 
interest came in the form of ressentiment as an applied concept in fields such as 
philosophy, sociology, psychology, politics, ethics, religion, and even economics. 
Scholars often worked in fields that overlapped others, say philosophy with sociology, 
or politics with ethics, in which case I have chosen a single field in which to categorise 
their contribution. Others delved into the technical aspects of the phenomenon itself. 
The secondary literature is voluminous enough that representative selections have been 
made. 
 
Philosophy 
In the field of philosophy, Pierre Klossowski was among the revolutionary thinkers who 
popularised Nietzsche in the francophone world of the 1960s and 70s. He was 
particularly enamoured of Nietzsche's solution32 to the toxic psychological state of 
ressentiment. That solution was the eternal recurrence. After thirty years of study, 
Klossowski presented a conference paper in 1964 entitled, ‘Forgetting and anamnesis in 
the lived experience of the eternal return of the same’. He combined this with a 
collection of articles he wrote over the next few years to publish Nietzsche and the 
Vicious Circle in 1969. Michel Foucault, upon reading a hot-off-the-press copy, 
dispatched a letter to Klossowki, lauding it as ‘the greatest book of philosophy I have 
read, [along] with Nietzsche himself’ (2005:vii). In this volume, Klossowki picked up 
on Nietzsche’s observation that the flow of time is irreversible (in PTG), which means 
all events, both willed and non-willed (i.e., those that lie beyond one's control) are fixed. 
Invariably, not everything that could have been done was accomplished, and even that 
which was done may have been wrong. Such imperfection, with its inherent suffering, 
becomes locked in time, rendering time punitive. The eternal recurrence removes the 
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 It included complete translations of Z, TI, A, and NCW. Prefaces to each of these works, a general 
introduction, translated excerpts from ten other works, and notes rounded out the 700-page volume. 
32
 Klossowski actually called it ‘redemption’ (1997:69). 
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‘once and for all’ character of events, and the heaviness attending those who must live 
with them in consequence. The cause of guilt is thus removed, and ressentiment is 
obviated (Klossowki 1964:67-69). Klossowki courageously departed from the growing 
Nietzsche establishment by evaluating Nietzsche’s project to be a failure. It undermined 
stable reality, intelligible knowledge, identity of the subject, and coherency of 
experience. For Klossowki, the eternal recurrence turned out not to be a redemptive 
circle, but a vicious circle. Man does not overcome ressentiment en route to the 
superman, but is enslaved by it on the road to becoming inhuman (121-71). 
Gilles Deleuze was another Nietzsche reviving force in post-WWII France. One 
of his most outstanding efforts was Nietzsche & Philosophy (1961) in which he 
analysed Nietzsche’s novel contribution of sense and value to the philosophical 
enterprise (Deleuze 1983:1). He used two key Nietzschean doctrines, the will-to-power 
and the eternal recurrence, to correct what he claimed was Hegel’s misguided attempt at 
universal synthesis (147-94). He founded his analysis on a faithful examination, by 
most accounts, of Nietzsche’s discussion of active and reactive forces. Deleuze was 
keen to distinguish the two by recycling Nietzsche’s types of the master and the slave. 
Everybody consists of a hierarchy of forces, but what makes one a master or a slave is 
the ‘determinate relation in the subject itself between the different forces of which it is 
made up’ (115). The master type is animated by active forces from within, which allow 
him to act independent of circumstantial or societal influences. Active forces create 
authentic humanity that is strong and free, self-determined and self-esteemed. The slave 
type, by contrast, draws his identity and meaning from external sources. Reactive forces 
animate this weak man who determines his worth and course of action by measuring 
himself against the strong master and by complying with the ruling system.  
Deleuze said active forces manifest will-to-power, but reactive forces manifest 
ressentiment. Reactive forces may dominate, not by overcoming power, but rather by 
undermining it. Will-to-power is measured on the basis of one’s capacity for autonomy. 
The degree to which they determine their own meaning and action is the measure of 
their strength and nobility, i.e., the master type. Individuals characterised by 
ressentiment are reactive. What is more, they mask this from themselves with values of 
negation such as humility, patience, justice, and love.33 These ressentiment values, 
which Deleuze strongly identified with Christianity, are entropic. When spoken of in 
terms of health and vitality, as Nietzsche so often did, they are toxic or pathological 
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(1983:111-45).34 Ressentiment-people crave stability and absolutes, leaving them 
constitutionally opposed to Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence, which Deleuze equated with 
the affirmation of chance. Change is therefore guaranteed, and this extends to the notion 
of being. ‘Returning is the being of that which becomes’ (48).  
In 1980 Richard Ira Sugarman published a work on the phenomenology of 
ressentiment. He argued Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground (1994)35 revealed a 
failure in Scheler’s otherwise indispensable work on ressentiment. Furthermore, he 
reconceived Heidegger’s work on the metaphysics of being and time. This paved a new 
way to understand the essence and origin of ressentiment in terms of an ontological 
structure of rancour against time. Sugarman put forth Dostoevsky’s underground man to 
illustrate the sense of losing one’s humanity through a morbid obsession with impotence 
in the face of an increasingly rational and scientific world. Only when man is willing to 
courageously choose his life—of suffering, success, religion, or of things constructive 
or destructive—is he truly free and in control of his destiny. Take away choice, and man 
ceases to be man. In underground man’s ressentiment-like experience, Nietzsche 
glimpsed how to overcome the spirit of revenge that animated it (Sugarman 1980:1-20). 
Sugarman used Scheler’s work to subject the concrete, ontological form of 
ressentiment in the lived-experience to philosophical analysis. Scheler’s scheme 
permitted resentment to express desire for revenge without transmogrifying into 
ressentiment. This was done by allowing the self to consciously respond to unjust 
suffering with passion-infused sadness and/or anger. Sugarman argued that Scheler’s 
shortcoming was a failure to adequately account for how the self becomes being, i.e., 
the phenomenon of existence. In addition to ontological problems, it created ethical 
ones in that it left no solid foundation for the righteous indignation necessary to fight 
injustice. Ressentiment was thus left to cycle on to the deception of self-induced 
suffering (21-41). Heidegger’s interaction with Anaximander provided a corrective to 
this Schelerean devaluation of the historicity of being. Transience is the penalty that 
being pays to time, he gleaned from Anaximander. Morality enters the picture when the 
temporal character of reality is resisted by the spirit of revenge. Self-deception borne of 
ressentiment lay at its root, and a practical acquiescence to the way-things-are (i.e., 
being) as punishment. This locked man into a sadly fixed experience.  
                                                 
34
 See Klossowski above. 
35
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Nietzsche proposed the eternal recurrence and will-to-power to overcome this 
malady, and the overman to manifest its meaning. According to Heidegger, such a 
world would be devoid of meaning because it was comprised of discrete moments that, 
though each one recurred endlessly, none of them could serve to interpret the others 
(56-96). Sugarman’s rethinking of Heidegger with respect to historicity, suffering, and 
longing allows for acknowledgement of the rancour against time, and the engendered 
ressentiment, to be overcome. This happens not in man’s eternally recurring now’s, but 
in the interstice between the inescapable response to his past and the unsettling 
openness posed by his future. Nietzschean and Schelerian ressentiment was obviated by 
building on Heidegger’s ontology such that Being gives itself the time-event as a 
promise of what is to come (97-132). 
Robert Solomon purported to critique postmodern philosophy by using the 
Nietzschean ressentiment diagnostically (1990:268f). He argued ressentiment is not 
altogether the despicable emotion that Nietzsche and his interpreters have made it (see 
also Solomon 1994). Rather, it has positive effects that include bolstering the value of 
egalitarianism, which is necessary for social cohesion, and energising the value of 
pluralism, which supplies the creativity necessary for revolutionary change. Yet 
Solomon fully admitted to ressentiment as a personal and social corrosive (1990:277-
80). He concluded that ‘postmodernism is an expression of academic ressentiment’ on 
the part of those who find themselves marginalised and slighted by the enduring spirit 
of the age, despite their enthusiasm for alternative philosophies and their rejection of 
classical philosophies (289). 
Christa Acampora’s Contesting Nietzsche (2013), and particularly her chapter 
entitled ‘Contesting Paul’, argues ressentiment-based morality changes everything. It 
moves the location of the moral contest from the material to the metaphysical sphere 
(114-22). It changes the matter in dispute from values of becoming (i.e., good and bad) 
to those of being (i.e., good and evil) (122-26). It changes the goal of the contest from 
living in the moment, in which one may find their identity in present deeds that are open 
to all possible outcomes, to living in light of the past, which constrains both the present 
and future by what might have been (128-47). 
 
Sociology 
In the late 1960s and into the 70s, René Girard, a philosopher of social science, dealt 
with Nietzsche’s moral philosophy in a way that forced him to part company with 
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‘contemporary Nietzscheans’ of his day, and with Heidegger (Girard 2001:244f). He 
applied ressentiment to anthropological studies, and to Nietzsche’s contention between 
Dionysus and Jesus as the Crucified. Girard held to the standard view that ressentiment 
is ‘the interiorization of weakened vengeance’, and ‘that its ultimate target is always 
ressentiment itself, its own mirror image, under a slightly different mask that makes it 
unrecognizable’ (252). In Jesus’ death as a sacrifice for sin and a way out of suffering, 
Nietzsche saw ressentiment as vengeance against master values (250), resulting in 
corruption of humanity. Girard recognised Christianity advocated the victim’s 
perspective, but he separated from the crowd by claiming the vengeance sought by 
ressentiment was not caused by Christianity. Jesus, as the uniquely voluntary and 
innocent victim, rendered the vengeful scapegoating mechanism inoperative (see also 
Girard 1987). Nietzsche had made this claim because he was shot through with 
ressentiment himself, which was made possible by the civilising effects of Christianity. 
Girard claims that only in the relative calm of nineteenth-century ‘post-Christian 
society’ could Nietzsche find ‘the luxury of resenting ressentiment’, and he called for 
‘real vengeance’ to deal with what he considered its disastrous effects on society 
(2001:252f). Girard also implied that Heidegger’s endorsement of Nietzsche’s death of 
god (i.e., the exhaustion of the Christian religion) was a sign of his own ressentiment. 
Regardless of Heidegger’s denials of having nothing against Christianity, Girard 
maintained that Heidegger did in fact contend unawares with the biblical god (259f).36  
In 2002 social scientists Bernard Meltzer and Gil Musolf published an article 
detailing the similarities and differences between resentment and ressentiment. They 
acknowledged both Nietzsche’s groundbreaking work in formulating the concept of 
ressentiment, especially in application to the spread of Christianity, as well as its 
subsequent development by Scheler in relation to the rise of l’esprit bourgeois in 
Western Europe. They claimed a distinction between resentment and ressentiment. 
Resentment is the more common, fleeting emotion that takes umbrage over offenses and 
disparities. Ressentiment is a relatively less common, longer-term sustained response to 
similar stimuli (2002:241-45). They supplied empirical data to identify social contexts 
giving rise to ressentiment, obviously siding with a Schelerian perspective (245-47). 
They also highlighted consequences that may issue from ressentiment. They went 
beyond both Nietzsche and Scheler by concluding that ressentiment, rather than merely 
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 Girard claims even Freud to have manifested ressentiment when he writes about the collective murder 
of God in Totem and Taboo (2001:260). 
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resulting in a smouldering affective emotional state, may lead to individual and 
collective social activism that applies pressure for revolutionary change (248-51). 
 
Psychology  
Bernard Williams (1994) argued that Nietzsche’s philosophy could simplify psychology 
to a moral system sourced in blame.37 In the spirit of Paul Ricoeur’s ‘hermeneutics of 
suspicion’, he claimed the task of morality is to diagnose problems in the phenomenon 
of the will (Williams 1994:239-41). This was based on two fundamental ideas: real 
action and an independent self, or agent. Williams cited the BGE Preface and D 2.124 to 
show that Nietzsche held these to be metaphysical illusions (contra Heidegger), as well 
as the notion of the one idea being caused by the other (243). The result is the unnatural 
phenomenon of blame, which Williams viewed as springing from Nietzsche’s famous 
ressentiment. This was nothing more than an expression of power (244-46).  
David Goicoechea (2000) employed ressentiment in articulating the psychology of 
evil. He used Augustine and Nietzsche as ‘two of the greatest psychologists of the 
Western world’ to make his case (Goicoechea 2000:54), With respect to good and evil, 
he said that Augustine’s notion of free-willed choice dominated modern thought until 
Nietzsche came along with his notion of will-to-power. Will-to-power allowed one to 
overcome ressentiment, and pursue the joyful wisdom that is amor fati. Augustine held 
that choosing good required grace. Otherwise, choice, while seeming to be free, was 
really a self-deception because it was tethered to hidden radical evil. According to 
Goicoechea, Nietzsche’s psychology went beyond Augustine in that it located this self-
deception in the unconscious (55f). 
Morgan Rempel (2002) examined Nietzsche’s claim that Christianity was not a 
normal historical phenomenon, but a psychohistorical development sourced in the 
Apostle Paul (62ff). The substance of Nietzsche’s examination was Paul’s conversion 
experience (Acts 9, 22, 26), and may be found in D 1.68. According to Nietzsche, 
Paul’s conversion came, not primarily by the flash of light accompanying the risen 
Christ on the road to Damascus, but by a flash of insight as to how to use the Crucified 
One for his own purposes. He deconstructs Paul’s first-hand account of the event when 
he writes, ‘Essentially what happened … is this’, and then provides his own 
interpretation of what transpired in Paul’s mind (italics supplied, D 1.68; see A 24). 
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 In this section, my reference is not to the field of psychology, but to those writers who take interest in 
Nietzsche’s psychology. 
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Nietzsche’s entirely novel and ‘careful reading’ (Nietzsche 1968:103) got behind Paul's 
words to his motives, sublimated by ressentiment, which were sourced in his need for 
relief from the crushing demands of God’s law (see WP 2.171). So Paul projected his 
repressed self-reproach onto Jesus, transforming the Saviour’s execution into an 
atonement. The relief Paul pursued but could not achieve (i.e., freedom from guiltiness) 
became possible by creating a religious system that could supply something that did not 
exist (i.e., forgiveness from deity). Rempel stresses that, for Nietzsche, Christianity was 
fuelled by ressentiment, leading to nihilism (2002:92-112).  
Ken Gemes (2009) used Nietzsche’s ressentiment to explicate the Freudian 
concept of sublimation in the discipline of psychotherapy, especially as it relates to the 
notion of repression. He held that repression involves the disintegration of the self and 
thus may manifest pathological symptoms, whereas sublimation achieves the integration 
of the self and is ‘a necessary condition for full psychic health’ (2009:38). Where 
Freud’s account failed to make this distinction, Nietzsche’s discussion of the majority of 
modern humanity, the herd, provided material for doing so. All human beings are a 
collection of competing drives, and herd humanity is characterised by the constant 
disorganisation of these drives.38 This is repression, whereby a master drive stifles or 
forces into disguise weaker drives, not allowing them expression, or even causing them 
to manifest the inverse of the original aim of the strong drive (e.g., Christian love as an 
expression of envy). By contrast, sublimation is the process in which the master drive 
allies weak drives in a concerted result toward its original aim. Repression is 
characteristic of ressentiment; sublimation allows one to overcome it and embrace amor 
fati (46-52; see also Richardson 1996; May 1999). Gemes names Melanie Klein (1926), 
Hanna Segal (1952), and Hans Loewald (1973, 1988) as those in the minority of 
psychoanalysts influenced by Nietzsche (2009:52-54). 
William Remley (2016) made the case that Nietzsche strongly influenced Sartre to 
the extent that his notion of ressentiment served as the basis for Sartre’s analysis of 
racism and, particularly, anti-Semitism in Anti-Semite and Jew (1948). The 
psychological structure of Sartrean anti-Semitism is similar to that of Nietzschean 
ressentiment. They both involve herd beings who hide from ‘the other’ in anonymity, 
hatefully negating ‘the other’ to affirm themselves (Remley 2016:149-52; see also 
Solomon 1994:110-12). They attempt to overcome what they perceive to be decadence 
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 Nowhere does Gemes use the term will-to-power, but his discussion of drives may be generally 
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in the surrounding culture, and fear might be affecting them, by redirecting their deepest 
beliefs and drives. This is the sublimation and self-deception of ressentiment, and is 
made possible by the constant reality of will-to-power, only with different accident-
goals (see Reginster 1997:282f). As propounded by Nietzsche, fear of the other and the 
self-overcoming made possible by will-to-power found much relevance for Sartre in the 
problem of anti-Semitism. The solution to anti-Semitism found correspondence in 
Nietzsche’s ressentiment. Will-to-power allows one to overcome circumstances to 
become a whole, authentic person in a Nietzschean sense, and also in a Sartrean sense 
(Remley 2016:153-57).  
 
Politics 
In the field of politics, Jean Améry,39 a survivor of Auschwitz and Buchenwald, 
published an essay in 1966 entitled, ‘Resentments’.40 Based on the inhumanity he and 
millions of other Jews experienced at the hand of the Nazis, he justified his resentments 
as ‘the special kind … of which neither Nietzsche nor Scheler … was able to have any 
notion’ (1980:71). Two decades of contemplation resulted in his estimation that the 
natural process of psychological healing in which polite society encourages forgives and 
forgets is ‘immoral’ (72). Therefore, Améry viewed resentment (i.e., ressentiment) as 
the only emotion powerful enough to fight injustice (i.e., the Holocaust). It could do this 
by maintaining a posture of unforgiveness and a mindset of not forgetting in the face of 
social pressures to move on and normalise relations. Only resentment keeps the pain of 
injury sufficiently alive to beget the emotional energy and moral courage necessary to 
prevent such abhorrence from recurring (73-81). Though he committed suicide in 1978, 
Améry’s work has influenced others who work in matters of retributive, distributive, 
and reconciliatory justice (Heyd 2004; Brudholm 2008; Fassin 2013). 
The eminent political philosopher, John Rawls, published A Theory of Justice 
(1971).41 His landmark work attempted to develop a philosophy of justice for 
application to political structures, the goals of which were to formulate a framework for 
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 Améry was born, Hanns Chaim Mayer. 
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 The original title, ‘Ressentiments’, was translated into English as ‘Resentments’ for inclusion in a 
collection of his writings entitled, At the Mind’s Limits (1980). This posthumously published version is 
the one referenced here.  
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 This edition was primarily comprised of articles previously written by Rawls. In his ‘Preface to the 
Revised Edition’ (1999), Rawls states he extensively revised his work for a 1975 German translation (as 
well as other languages), responding to criticisms and incorporating insights subsequently gained. These 
changes were reflected for the first time in the 1999 English publication, which is the edition referenced 
here. 
34 
 
corporate justice and to safeguard individual freedom. He briefly touched on 
Nietzsche’s notion of ressentiment in a discussion of the role of envy in a just social 
system.42 He distinguished between envy and resentment, the latter being a ‘moral 
feeling’, the former, not. Rawls’ point was not to laud resentment, but to make it a tool 
of rationality in achieving social justice (see Rawls 1999:467-74).  
Literary critic, Fredric Jameson, published a seminal work on Hegelian-Marxist 
philosophy, The Political Unconscious (1981). He theorised literary creation is 
inescapably, even if unconsciously, affected by historical context and the respective 
forces at play within them (1981:17). Thus, literary interpretation is political 
interpretation: ‘always historicize’ (9). In applying his theory to classical texts of 
Balzac, Gissing, and Conrad, one of Jameson’s chief tools was the ‘ideologeme’, which 
is the ideological kernel that is both descriptive and prescriptive of culture (76). 
Ideologemes transmit ‘narrative paradigms’ from ancestors to descendants, but they do 
so as subtext (185). Ressentiment, was ‘the ultimate negative category’ of ideologeme 
(60f) that framed nineteenth- and twentieth-century Western literature (and culture) in 
the binary distinctions of good and evil (87f). Jameson identified Nietzsche as ‘the 
primary theorist’ of ressentiment, ‘if not, indeed, [its] metaphysician’ (201; see also 
Dowling 1984:133). Yet he suggests that Nietzsche was also ignorant of the fact that 
ressentiment was already a reality of the European culture of the day. That is, 
ressentiment was a bourgeois value wielded by its elite to both maintain their standing 
in society and deny social advancement to poorer classes (Jameson 1981:201f). Support 
for Jameson’s proposal of Nietzsche’s ignorance might be found in the historical 
context of Nietzsche’s life. 
 
Ethics 
Robert Solomon (1994) cast ressentiment in a constructive light in a lengthy discussion 
of its ethical dimensions and how they might impact ethics. He argued Nietzsche’s 
brilliant insights concerning resentment43 were caricatured by traditional expositors. 
Solomon preferred aspects of Scheler’s more positive assessment of the phenomenon. 
First, he did not regard resentment ‘an ethics of weakness, an expression of weakness, 
or a devious attempt to protect the weak from the strong’, but suggested it sprang from 
the free and educated of all societies who merely wanted to increase their already 
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 Pertinent to his discussion, Rawls only mentioned Nietzsche in a footnote (1999:469, footnote 8). Also, 
his discourse employed the term resentment instead of ressentiment. 
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 See Solomon in footnote 22 of this chapter. 
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ascending power (Solomon 1994:115). Second, resentment is ‘a keen sense of injustice’ 
that links members of society together, regardless of stresses and discord (117; see also 
1990:278f). It gives rise to politics and a give-and-take strategy that acknowledges 
shared disadvantage and injury, thus legitimating dissent as a means of achieving justice 
for all (1994:116f, 124). 
Daniel Smith (2011) discussed Deleuze’s theory of desire, with particular 
attention to the unconscious, in the context of immanent ethics. Deleuze equated 
‘morality’ with ‘constraining’ rules used to judge actions and motives based on 
transcendent values, while ‘ethics’ was a group of ‘facilitative’ rules that evaluated 
action, thought, and speech in relation to whatever mode of existence was implied 
(Smith 2011:124). Morality asks the question, What must I do, signifying actions are 
measured and power is constrained by limits. Immanent ethics ask the question, What 
can I do, and is interested in expansive capacities that go beyond limits. Smith claimed 
Deleuze looked to Nietzsche (and Spinoza) for such an immanent approach to ethics 
(124). Nietzsche advocated replacing the transcendent duality of good and evil with the 
immanent ethical contest between master and slave modes of existence. Ressentiment 
thwarts all this by creating an illusory transcendent world that gives us limits (i.e., 
enslaves) and perverts our desire such that we no longer seek expansion, but desire our 
own repression (i.e., self-deception) (125f).  
Christine Swanton (2011) made a case for Nietzschean virtue ethics. Virtue is 
driven by will-to-power, which itself is understood as increasing strength, growth, and 
improvement in becoming who one is (Swanton 2011:297-302; see also Richardson 
2001). Self-improvement is the basis of action, not its goal. Since there is no terminal 
point at which action for improvement ceases, virtue may be conceived as relative. The 
point of reference is the strength of the subject at any point of evaluation (Swanton 
2011:300). Not only is virtue continuous, but it is also agonistic in that it necessarily 
involves, among other things, self-overcoming. The key is will-to-power in its overflow 
that manifests in Nietzschean virtue in the strong. Swanton cites Nietzsche’s example of 
the noble response of dismissing an offense (OGM 2.10). Whatever danger, destruction, 
or deficit the transgression might have imposed is overcome by the strength of nobility. 
This the weak cannot do, at least not inwardly, for their clemency ‘may be a form of 
repression in which anger is driven inward [i.e., resentment] and surfaces in various 
distortions’ (Swanton 2011:301). In ‘this self-sublation of justice … mercy … remains 
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the prerogative [i.e., virtue] of the most powerful’, by which Nietzsche meant those who 
live beyond the law (OGM 2.10).  
 
Religion 
Jörg Salaquarda was among those who engaged Nietzsche’s thought in the realm of 
religion. In ‘Nietzsche and the Judeo-Christian Tradition’ (1997) he argued Nietzsche’s 
presentation of ressentiment-motivated Christianity was erroneous, and even false 
(1997:107). He did, however, acknowledge the existence of ressentiment as a 
psychological attribute of reactive morality, and conceded the religious sphere may be 
especially susceptible to it. He ultimately rejected, with Scheler (1998), Nietzsche’s 
assertion that the roots of Judeo-Christianity grew out of the soil of ressentiment 
(1997:109).  
Thomas Bertonneau (1997) argued along similar lines. He used a second-century 
work, True Doctrine,44 by anti-Christian Greek, Celsus, to critique Nietzsche’s assault 
on Judaism, Christianity, and Jesus (1997:2f). Bertonneau quoted extensively from 
Celsus to evidence his vilification of Christianity, claiming the animating spirit of his 
attack presaged Girardian mimesis and the scapegoat mechanism (8). Yet such calumny 
itself revealed resentment, which Bertonneau described as the desire for life and being 
that lies beyond one’s reach, so that the pain of not having it must be assuaged by 
devaluing the said life and being (11). Bertonneau, a self-professed non-believer, 
concluded that Nietzsche’s particular denigration of both Christianity and Jesus exposes 
his own enthrallment to resentment (14; see also Conway 1994:328). Gary Banham 
corroborated this point in ‘Jews, Judaism, and the ‘Free Spirit’ when he suggested the 
Nietzschean personae behind the authorship of A ‘partakes very fully’ of the revenge it 
purports to expose (2000:74f).  
Tim Murphy’s ‘Peter, Paul, and Nietzsche: Tracing the Signifier “Christ” through 
Christian History’ (2001) showed how the psychological essence of ressentiment 
translates to political power (131). He highlighted the creative and transformative nature 
of ressentiment to support his claim that Jesus and the ideals he manifested were 
reinterpreted and adapted to suit the needs of historically subsequent parties. Against 
much established literature on Nietzsche’s critique of the early church (see OGM 2.12), 
Murphy claimed Nietzsche viewed ‘Paul’ as the signifier of the early church, the group 
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 This work (Greek, Ἁληθὴς Λόγος) is available in English (Celsus 1987). It is translated from its only 
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whose ressentiment caused him to revalue and reverse values in such a way that they 
needed not be related to their source (Murphy 2001:133-37). Before Paul, ‘Peter’ was 
the signifier of the early disciple-Synoptic community (128-33). After Paul, Luther 
became the signifier (137-39). Beyond Luther, it was the entire history of Christianity 
(139f). Murphy concluded with the point that Nietzsche, perhaps unwittingly, rendered 
a critique on German Protestant Hegelianism. By mapping his own revaluation onto 
both the past and the present, history could not be seen as the progressive unfolding of 
ultimate meaning and purpose, but rather an ironic manifestation of opposites (140f; see 
also Shapiro 1989:131f).  
Bruce Benson, in Pious Nietzsche (2008), asserted fundamentally that Nietzsche 
argued most with those whom he resembled, and Paul was one such person (73). 
Benson gave a familiar sketch of Paul’s and Christianity’s relationship with 
ressentiment (120-33). Particularly interesting was Benson’s strong suggestion that 
Nietzsche was full of ressentiment and full of self-deception. In this regard, Benson 
frequently associated the two concepts (162f, 202-11).  
 
Economics 
In ‘Nietzsche, Proficiency, and the (New) Spirit of Capitalism’ (2015), Bernard 
Reginster discussed virtue ethics in the context of economics. He said ressentiment is an 
obstacle to entrepreneurial capitalism (Reginster 2015:458). He argued capitalism 
showcases Nietzsche’s will-to-power through the prized value of proficiency (and 
effectiveness). It is typically identified as an executive virtue (475). By it one imposes 
values through achieving desired ends, come what may, overcoming failure or success, 
destruction or construction. Reginster proposed that will-to-power be construed as ‘the 
desire for effective agency’, and its resulting satisfaction be equated with Nietzsche’s 
‘feeling of power [as] an experience of ability, competence, or proficiency’ (455f). He 
suggested proficiency is ‘a central and essential ingredient of happiness’, which ‘has 
been appropriated to anchor the ethical outlook of capitalist entrepreneurship’ (463). 
Ressentiment threatens achievement of these happy and virtuous ends by bringing to the 
fore a feeling of impotence, which neutralises the courage requisite for the capitalist 
enterprise (475). Any success thus achieved is hollow because the agent’s feat would 
then be measured by values altered from original ones (457).  
Having looked at applications of ressentiment in specific fields of study, we turn 
now to matters of conceptual analysis in the reception of ressentiment. First, we will 
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consider the phenomenon of ressentiment as it is treated in terms of its overall contours. 
We will then examine several aspects of ressentiment that are matters of debate. 
Among the few scholars that analysed the phenomenon of ressentiment itself, 
there is general agreement over its major contours (Sugarman 1980, Reginster 1997, 
Morelli 2008; Poellner 2004, 2011). The bulk of Nietzsche’s explicit discussion of 
ressentiment may be found in OGM 1.10-14, 2.11, and 3.14-15. Chapter Two of this 
thesis will cover ressentiment in depth, but a précis of the phenomenon is offered here. 
Ressentiment is a psychological state initiated by some offence or injury, actual or 
imagined, resulting in a feeling of inferiority by the party offended, who also feels 
powerless to rectify their now oppressive circumstance. Blame for the injury, which 
Nietzsche often refers to in terms of suffering, is assigned by the offended to the 
offender. This casts the offender as a hostile ‘other’, and catalyses a response of 
resentment in the offended. Over time this response to the offence at the original injury 
generates both a desire for mastery over the oppressor and a heightened sense of 
inability to bring that circumstance about. Therefore, the offended party adopts a new 
evaluative matrix that inverts the previous one. This results in a perceived alleviation of 
suffering. Concomitantly, a new balance of power arises wherein the offended now feels 
justifiably superior to the oppressor who, by the same token, is now seen to be inferior. 
This much is largely uncontested.  
There are internecine debates over various aspects of ressentiment such as 
terminology, valuation, positive value, structure, and self-deception. With respect to 
terminology, commentators are divided as to whether to use ressentiment or resentment 
in reference to Nietzsche’s umbrella phenomenon of reactive-feelings. Legions use the 
terms as functional equivalents, albeit with qualifications, often for the sake of 
convenience to the English reader. For example, Williams states that, other than 
ressentiment having become technical terminology in psychology, resentment 
adequately covers Nietzsche’s intended meaning if it is considered sublimated 
(2000:136, note 6; see also Solomon 1994:103; Richardson 1996:60; Bertonneau 
1997:11; van Tongeren 2000:211; Meltzer & Musolf:2002:242; Brudholm 2008:13f). 
Others maintain that, while resentment can refer to Nietzsche’s ressentiment, a 
distinction is necessary for the latter to bear the freight Nietzsche intended for it in the 
first place (e.g., Scheler 1961; Weber 1964:110-17 Nehamas 1985:162f; Bittner 
1994:128; Higgins 1994:43; Reginster 1997:296f, 287; 2015:458, Fassin 2013:253f). 
For example, Reginster claims that resentment is best used in a restricted moral sense 
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that presupposes the condemnation of rejected values, while ressentiment refers to an 
irrational endorsement of the very values rejected (1997:296).  
With respect to the valuation (or revaluation) function of ressentiment, what is it 
that ressentiment changes or re-/devalues?45 Leiter states that ressentiment-filled slaves 
devalue ‘unpleasant stimuli’ (2003:204), the stimuli he later characterises as ‘really 
external (i.e., the masters, their oppressors)’ (italics supplied, 259; see also Morelli 
1998:4).46 For Deleuze, ‘values are changed’ (1983:170; see also Schacht 1995:16; 
Solomon 1996:208f). By this otherwise simple statement, he actually means that 
ressentiment, as the passive and unwitting nihilistic expression of will-to-power (by 
which it is typically known), must actively value reactive feelings so as to embrace 
them, and thus affirm them (Deleuze 1983:172-75; see also Rose 1993). Reginster 
claims ressentiment does not revalue values themselves, i.e., the attributes associated 
with the one who is resented (i.e., strength, beauty, unfettered freedom). What changes 
is the way the ‘man of ressentiment’ (OGM 1.10) relates to those attributes. Secretly, he 
still prizes the said attributes and wants to pursue them, yet openly he rejects them 
(Reginster 1997:289-97). Thus, he is plunged into self-deception, relating to the said 
values both favourably and unfavourably out of a dis-integrated self (297-305). Guy 
Elgat claims that the slaves revalue ressentiment itself, so instead of desiring revenge, 
they interpret their drive as an aspiration for hope and justice. Concomitantly, they 
perform a ‘meta-revaluation’ on the entire project of revaluation itself so that hope and 
justice become (positive) moral objectives and laws (Elgat 2015:539; see OGM 3.14). 
 Regarding the value of ressentiment itself, Peter Poellner stands virtually alone in 
the claim that ressentiment possesses no net positive phenomenal value (2009b:167f, 
footnote 27). Contra Nietzsche’s apparent partial endorsement of ressentiment (OGM 
1.10; WP 693, 695), Poellner suggests a) any gains from ressentiment are necessarily 
tainted by self-contempt, rendering them undesirable, and b) nowhere does Nietzsche 
affirm that any instrumental value from ressentiment (e.g., cleverness) makes 
ressentiment necessary for the acquisition of such a gain, for it could be acquired by 
other means. A host of others regard ressentiment as ultimately positive for the 
phenomenal results it causes. Examples include Améry (1980), Solomon (1994), 
Barbalet (1988), Rawls (1999), Small (2001), Bowles (2003), and Fassin (2013) who 
advocate its use in fighting injustice. Kathleen Marie Higgins (1994) views ressentiment 
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as a sort of emetic that makes us sick enough to recognise our problem of repression, 
and want to do something about it.  
There are numerous ways of representing the structure of ressentiment in terms of 
number and/or level of elements, features, or parts. Reginster depicts ressentiment as a 
combination of three elements (1997:286f). Goicoechea’s representation breaks down 
into five parts (2000:54-56). Poellner conceptualises the phenomenon in six essential 
constituents (2004:48f).47 Morelli combines both Nietzsche’s and Scheler’s conceptions 
of ressentiment in a structure cycling through nine elements (1998). Sugarman views 
Scheler’s schema as an elaboration of Nietzsche’s philosophical work on ressentiment, 
and graphically portrays it in what he calls a ‘Hermeneutical Circle of Ressentiment’ 
(1980:32, see also 21-34). My own scheme consists of four components, and provides 
the structure for Chapter Two of this thesis.48 
One such component in ressentiment is self-deception, the psychological 
phenomenon that pervades Nietzsche’s discussions of moral valuation in his mature 
period (Pippin 2010:90). I consider self-deception the culminating move of 
ressentiment, and it serves as the focal point of this thesis. Self-deception allows the 
injured, oppressed party to justify for themselves the process by which they enjoy 
acquired power over their former oppressor. It supplies a confidence rooted in the way 
things ought to be (i.e., morality), resulting in a deep and abiding strength to maintain 
power. Self-deception as a general phenomenon has generated numerous matters for 
debate including whether attitudes, beliefs, and memories are held in the conscious or 
unconscious, as well as whether the processes in achieving them are reflexive or 
controlled. There are also matters debated particularly in the Nietzschean literature on 
the self-deception of ressentiment. They include, chiefly, models of the self and matters 
of agency. Both of these boast voluminous literature, the complex intricacies of which 
lie beyond the scope of this thesis. What follows is a classification of notable 
contributors in these two debates pertaining to self-deception in ressentiment. 
The first debate concerns the fundamental models of the self discussed in 
Nietzschean literature on self-deception, of which there are principally two. The first 
may be grouped under the rubric of deflationary models. Sometimes referred to as literal 
or ‘garden variety’ self-deception, deflationary models discount unconscious motives or 
beliefs, as well as sub-agents. Very few Nietzsche scholars embrace a deflationist 
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interpretation of Nietzsche, but multitudes give at least cursory mention of it to provide 
contrast for their own models.49 One Nietzschean deflationist is Guy Elgat (2015). He 
applies Mele’s deflationary understanding of self-deception (2000) to Nietzsche’s 
account of slave self-deception. Claiming the advantages of empirical support and 
simplest explanation (2015:541f), Elgat argues slave self-deception does not require 
conflicting beliefs or intentions, held either consciously or unconsciously, to generate 
the ressentiment project of revaluation that produces new values embraced by slaves 
(525, 538-41). Rüdiger Bittner (1994), also a deflationist, argues that ressentiment is an 
everyday phenomenon experienced by suffering people who desire something better. 
They are predisposed to want change, so they bias evidence and manufacture lies, 
slightly and incrementally enough so they can upgrade their metaphysical and moral 
beliefs, thus making them feel better about themselves (13-33). 
A much more common approach to Nietzschean self-deception is found in 
Divided Mind models. These accounts consist of psychological divisions or subsystems 
that hold relatively autonomous beliefs, motives, and desires. These models are 
attractive to Nietzscheans because of his statements on fundamental conflicting drives 
(BGE 1.12, 2.36; WP 2.179, 3.488-92) and repressed instincts (OGM 1.10). Speaking of 
repression, Freud’s theory of repression and the unconscious from the early twentieth-
century was foundational for later Nietzsche scholarship.50 Reginster (2007) observes 
the ‘pathological logic’ of ressentiment (303; WP 2.135) causes a loss of integrity of the 
self, which results in a diminished life experience (301-05). The ressentiment type of 
‘self-deception is precisely such a self-division’ that results in a ‘split within the agent’s 
self’ (298; see also Via 1990:10, 17; Janaway 2007:205-22; Katsafanas 2001:184f). 
Sharli Paphitis (2010) agrees with Reginster, but couches her discussion in terms of a 
rational slavish self wanting to overrule an animal master self. The rational self, in an 
effort to ameliorate the pain of internal conflict, overrules instinctive affects in favour of 
reflective ones to achieve a sense of wholeness (124; see also Morelli 1998). In so 
doing, a person deceives themselves by denying genuine aspects of their self as a true 
expression of who they are (Paphitis 2010:126-29). Only when a person courageously 
embraces the pain of conflict between their conflicting ‘selves’ can they experience 
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psychological integrity and be their truest or most real self (128f). John Richardson 
(1996) explains competing drives and conflicting fundamental values in terms of 
Nietzsche’s famed ‘Perspectivism’ in Nietzsche’s System (35-39). The resentment of the 
slave disrupts the affective sense of wholeness and associated feelings of strength and 
joy that the master creates, despite the chaos of drives that constitutes the self. The 
blame generated by resentment causes the slave to seek external reasons for their own 
suffering, while denying the cause within themselves. Thus, they impose a revalued 
order on the world around them, effectively disjoining them from their past and 
disordering them toward the future (133-35). Poellner accounts for the unity-in-diversity 
phenomenon of the self by positing two mental systems, in what I call a Revised 
Sartrean-influenced model (2004:60-64).51 Borrowing from both Husserl and Sartre, he 
suggests a unified self is best achieved when one (consciously) accepts the greatest 
diversity of phenomenal values in the lived-world, good and bad, actual or potential, 
then orients one’s life so that the internal (unconscious) ordering of drives reflect those 
values. Ressentiment hinders such an attempt, rendering the self ‘unfree’ (i.e., a slave). 
The inability to see this about oneself constitutes self-deception (2009b:168f; see also 
Sartre 1956:439f).  
A second debate regarding Nietzschean self-deception concerns agency. There are 
many concepts and issues that fold into agency such as morality, freedom, free will, 
spontaneity, control, autonomy, intention, motive, action, responsibility, culpability, and 
consciousness. Not only do many of these overlap, they intrude on debates other than 
agency. In light of constraints on this thesis, we will engage the surface level of the 
discussion, i.e., whether or not Nietzschean self-deception involves moral agency. The 
qualification of agency as moral, itself, becomes immediately thorny. For my purposes, 
I shall consider it as the case when the self has epistemic access to genuinely causal and 
effectual motives. Representative of those who hold that the self cannot manifest such 
agency include Leiter and Reginster.  
Leiter points out Nietzsche in D repeatedly compares humans to plants. Plants do 
not need a ‘gardener’ to direct their genetics (i.e., basic drives) to grow (2003:62f). 
Leiter canvasses D along these conceptual lines, as this excerpt shows from D 2.116: 
‘The primeval delusion still lives on that one knows … how human action is brought 
about … [But] [a]ctions are never what they appear to be … Moral actions … are 
essentially unknown’ (Nietzsche quoted in Leiter 2003:102). Without personal 
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knowledge of one’s motives, moral agency is impossible. Reginster likewise holds to a 
naturalistic account of Nietzschean agency, discussing it in the context of a psychology 
of Christian morality (2013). Morality is simply a function of drives, which themselves 
arise from physiological sources (see BGE 1.6; GS 4.335). Such ‘agency’ lacks genuine 
free will (see BGE 1.21; TI ‘The Four Great Errors’ 7), and its consciousness is either a 
secondary cause or an epiphenomenal incidence (see D 2.116; GS 4.333; WP 3.478) 
(Reginster 2013:702). Even when Nietzsche describes ‘the sovereign individual’ (OGM 
2.2) as one who is ‘able to vouch for itself as future’ (2.1), Leiter claims such rhetoric is 
merely an accommodation to the reader, and that Nietzsche still ‘does not think human 
beings have a capacity for genuinely autonomous choice’ (Leiter 2003:227f). When 
ressentiment enters the picture, it transfers the locus of valuation from the material to 
the metaphysical, from the physiological to the rational, and from the individual to the 
universal. Christian morality, as Nietzsche characterises it in OGM 3.11, is life-denying 
for its self-contradiction. Will-to-power, that which ultimately drives all living things, is 
thus pitted against itself such that the self is rendered unaware of its instinctual desires. 
The self seeks to meet manufactured needs (i.e., metaphysical) which can never be 
satisfied—a dangerous and pathological route to nothingness (Reginster 2013:720-24). 
On the other side of the debate are those who hold the Nietzschean self can and 
does manifest moral agency. Solomon takes issue with Nietzsche’s ‘supposedly 
“neutral” descriptions’ of agency illustrated in lambs and birds of prey OGM 1.13 
(1994:121, see also 115-20). He claims these portrayals are predicated on a simple-
minded dualism (weak versus strong) rooted in a poorly devised biological determinism 
(115f). Solomon argues this determinism, which is Nietzsche’s ‘peculiar brand of 
fatalism (amor fati)’, when combined with his dualism, suggests that weakness and 
strength are fixed as surely biological characteristics (120f). This obviates a robust 
sense of agency and ethics, since behaviour is predetermined. Becoming what one is 
becomes somewhat muted. Against this, Solomon contends we have ‘a great deal of 
latitude in the cultivation of our innate abilities’ (121; see also Janaway 2007:123). 
Biological and sociological influences notwithstanding, he claims virtue can be 
manifested and even cultivated, and that resentment, contrary to popular interpretation 
of Nietzsche, serves to invest the agent with a sense of meaningful stakes against which 
to measure our actions (Solomon 1994:121-24). John Richardson (1996) qualifies an 
agent as one who commands the long process, backwards and forwards, of willing (in 
the sense of approving, or finding pleasure in) all events, circumstances, forces, and 
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actions as one’s own (207-16). Gabriel Zamosc (2011) also holds to a sense of agency 
in Nietzsche, and particularly takes issue with Leiter’s interpretation of the sovereign 
individual. Nietzsche’s language in OGM 2.2 is not accommodation, but plain on its 
face: the sovereign individual, answering only to himself, is free from ‘the morality of 
custom, [and] is autonomous and supramoral (for “autonomous” and “moral” are 
mutually exclusive)’. The sovereign individual is not bound by ethical code52 dressed in 
a ‘social straightjacket’ (OGM 2.2). His behaviour is self-determined, not imposed by 
an external system. Furthermore, Nietzsche’s description of the sovereign individual as 
‘master over himself’ strongly suggests enough strength and enough awareness of will 
and desire is at hand to carry through as a moral agent, regardless of fated circumstances 
(Zamosc 2011:110f).53 Ken Gemes (2009) asserts that ‘genuine agency’ requires 
‘agency free will’, which only those who possess the requisite courage and capacity 
may achieve (37, see also 37-45). Robert Pippin’s (2010) ‘expressivist’ view holds that 
agency is not behind the deed (see OGM 1.13), but in it. Agency is expressed through 
what happens in the present (i.e., action), and need not be concerned with what has not 
happened. Agency takes responsibility for the present, thus obviating guilt over the past 
and the ressentiment generated thereby (Pippin 2010:67-84; see also Acampora 
2013:139-50). Thomas Miles (2011), similar to Zamosc, considers the ‘self-mastery’ of 
the sovereign individual to consist ‘of a self-affirming conscience that guides [him] to 
take on great tasks and fulfil his commitments to them’ (12). 
From the foregoing review of the relevant literature we can see that the 
Nietzschean conceptualisation of ressentiment was entertained by few scholars prior to 
the Second World War. Even when it was, self-deception as an associated phenomenon 
was hardly addressed. In the second half of the Twentieth Century to the present, study 
of Nietzschean ressentiment gained momentum, particularly as an applied concept to 
various fields such as sociology, politics, and religion. Comparatively few scholars 
examined the phenomenon of ressentiment itself for its technical aspects, and even 
fewer specifically focused on the constituent aspect of self-deception.  
It is in this field I locate my thesis. I propose a connection between the way 
Nietzsche regards ressentiment and the way Paul regards the fall. This entails folding 
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together elements of Nietzsche’s philosophy and the Apostle Paul’s theology, teasing 
out both for their psychological and sociological implications. The purpose of this 
approach is to shed light on the way Nietzsche and Paul explicitly or implicitly 
understand self-deception in the conceptual context of ressentiment. This calls less for 
new interpretations of Nietzsche and Paul, independently considered, than for 
theoretical linkage between the two. Specifically, I want to facilitate a two-way 
engagement in which Nietzsche’s appraisal of Paul in regard to morality opens a way of 
Pauline reflection back onto Nietzsche. First, therefore, I will seek a Nietzschean 
reading of Paul through a ressentiment lens, principally of the Apostle’s understanding 
of sin involving self-deception as practised by the ‘unrighteous’ in Romans 1 and 2.54 I 
will then consider how Paul might respond to Nietzsche on Nietzsche’s terms, yet retain 
his own substance. This kind of engagement has not been attempted before. 
We must now entertain a word on the source texts used to study Nietzsche’s 
thought, with special reference to the relevant works translated into English. 
 
1.4 English Translation of Source Texts 
English translations of Nietzsche’s works are plentiful today, and they began to roll out 
shortly after his death. Oscar Levy enlisted a cadre of translators for his eighteen-
volume project, The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche (1909-13). Little further 
work was done until after WWII when, most notably, Walter Kaufmann undertook a 
fresh translation of Nietzsche. His compendium, The Portable Nietzsche (1954), was an 
attempt to correct previous misinterpretations. By the late 1950s and early 60s Italian 
scholars, Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, had begun first-hand investigation of 
Nietzsche’s notebooks preserved at the Goethe and Schiller Archive in Weimar, 
Germany. The fruit of their labours was a multi-volume, critical German translation, 
Kritische Gesamtausgabe (KGW), commenced in 1967.55 In 1980, a cost-effective, 
condensed edition was launched by Ernst Behler and Bernd Magnus, then taken up and 
continued by Alan Schrift and Duncan Large. The result was the fifteen-volume set, 
Kritische Studienausgabe (KSW), which has arguably become the defacto standard 
edition. The work of these scholars and associated teams of researchers resulted in 
dissemination of comprehensive translations to the wider world. In 1995, Stanford 
University Press undertook a translation of the entire Nietzschean corpus into English—
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published and unpublished works, complete with notebooks from his early years and his 
tenure at Basel, as well as material previously unavailable dated to his final years. The 
projected goal was an entirely comprehensive and even more critical work in nineteen 
volumes, The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche.56 In terms of translation, I 
predominantly use this edition in my thesis, while a plethora of other excellent English 
translations rounds out the references made. 
In terms of content, this thesis is predominantly occupied with Nietzsche’s later 
writings, those published from 1881 onward that explicitly feature morality.57 My chief 
exhibits are Beyond Good and Evil (BGE) and On the Genealogy of Morality (OGM), 
both of which Nietzsche himself considered his ‘most far-reaching and important’ 
works (Middleton 1969:299), as well as linked in purpose (OGM 1.17).58 The former of 
the pair proves to be a provisional expression of the latter (OGM ‘Preface’ 2), and the 
latter is intended to be a sequel to the former (OGM ‘Editor’s Introduction’ 1; see 
Magnus 1985:305). OGM also contains the preponderant usage of Nietzsche’s term, 
ressentiment, as well as the locus classicus of the same in 1.10. Lampert, citing Strauss, 
claims that Nietzsche writes BGE with an upward-building architecture consisting of 
296 sections/parts (Stücke), comprising nine chief sections/parts (Hauptstücke), 
organised into two main divisions, separated by ‘Epigrams and Interludes’, all framed 
by a ‘Preface’ and an ‘Aftersong’—‘the whole book is a coherent argument that never 
lets up’ (2001:6f; see Kaufmann 1974a:108). Likewise, Nietzsche arranges the 
aphorisms of OGM into essays which, in turn, coalesce into a passionate argument. 
Schacht draws attention to OGM’s preface to signal that Nietzsche ‘aspires to 
comprehension in a strong sense of the term, and will settle for nothing less’ 
(1995:259). Deleuze calls it his ‘most systematic book’ (italics supplied, 1983:87; see 
Staten 1990:15). White, after quoting Nietzsche’s eschewance of systematisation in TI 
(‘Arrows and Epigrams’ 26), writes that though he ‘does not strive to be systematic’, 
this does not mean ‘that he never builds’ (i.e., an argument) or ‘that he is incoherent’ 
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(1990:7). Nietzsche’s ‘argument’ revealed that he was not satisfied with mere 
communication. He wanted to persuade: he took aim on his readers (BGE ‘Preface’) and 
heaped blame on ‘anyone’ who could not understand him (OGM ‘Preface’ 8). Together, 
BGE and OGM not only form the skeleton of his moral philosophy, but flesh it out to a 
great extent. 
Though primary attention will be given to Nietzsche’s late period, works from the 
entire Nietzschean corpus are necessary to adequately illuminate his thought. Beyond 
his published œuvre, Nietzsche’s Nachlaß occupies something of an academic limbo. 
Some claim Nietzsche is not responsible for that which he chose not to publish 
(Hollingdale 1999b:ix). Others refuse to read the unpublished writings (Ridley 
1998:14), while others regard them as Nietzsche at his most authentic. Heidegger 
considered the Nachlaß a well of Nietzschean doctrine (Heidegger 1987:159ff). With 
due regard to Magnus’ warning (1988:218-35), Schacht’s advice seems to resonate 
more closely with the spirit of Nietzsche when he cautions against a ‘puritanical’ 
approach toward Nietzsche’s ‘published works … as a canon of texts to be zealously 
guarded and defended against dilution by any admixture of other material’ (1995:119). 
Therefore, I treat the Nachlaß as a ‘supplement [to] the indications of his thinking to be 
found in what he has published’ (1995:119; see Ansell-Pearson 1991:xvii, note). The 
same holds for his notebook-scribblings, collected and posthumously published in The 
Will to Power (Kaufmann 1998:129), Spinks’ caution notwithstanding (2003:164). 
Intentional and mature connections between WP and other works cannot be denied, such 
as WP 4.876 to OGM 1.4, the latter mentioning the ‘infamous case of Buckle’, and the 
former providing Nietzsche’s derisive commentary on Buckle as ‘a plebeian agitator of 
the mob’ for his prejudiced and mistaken understanding of moral genealogy.  
 
1.5 Outline of Thesis 
The remainder of this thesis proceeds along the following outline, and is comprised of 
research questions explored. Ressentiment is showcased in Nietzsche’s investigation of 
the origins of moral phenomena. He terms his enquiry a ‘genealogy’ because he views 
morality as descending to modern man through the struggle for power in the human 
species (OGM ‘Preface’ 4). A cast of types of humanity is prominent in this ‘lineage’. 
Thus, Chapter Two asks after the nature of three of Nietzsche’s types of humanity (i.e., 
character or personality attributes) that are involved the ‘history of morality’ (7). What 
are their chief characteristics? How did these types arise in the first place? What is their 
48 
 
role in the development of morality, and how does ressentiment manifest itself in the 
same? How do the types interact with each other, and to what end? Following this, 
ressentiment will be examined as a mechanism, breaking it into its constituent 
movements to understand how they work together, and to isolate its culminating move, 
self-deception.  
The operative term for Chapter Three is correspondence. Based on the technical 
picture of ressentiment gained previously, I will ask whether or not the contours of 
Nietzsche’s ressentiment find correspondence in features of Pauline fallenness. This 
enquiry will be performed by mapping salient aspects of ressentiment onto chapter 1 of 
Paul’s ‘Epistle to the Romans’. This will highlight self-deception as a nexus between 
Nietzsche’s and Paul’s thought, which will then become a guiding focus for my assay of 
Romans 2 for elements and expressions of self-deception. 
Chapter Four focuses on the crowning move of ressentiment, self-deception. A 
philosophical analysis of ressentiment is considered to ask if it can adequately account 
for the difficulty typically associated with Nietzschean self-deception. An analysis of 
Pauline self-deception is performed to elucidate its workings on theological grounds. I 
then ask if the two analyses can somehow be synthesised to provide greater resolution 
on the phenomenon of self-deception. Finally, I examine fear, and specifically fear of 
death, as a possible fundamental motivation for self-deception. 
Chapter Five presents the salient conclusions of the thesis in a rehearsal of the 
argument. Contributions of this project to the existing literature are also discussed. The 
thesis concludes with implications of the project for the field of the psychology of 
religion.  
In the following chapter, we will examine Nietzsche’s origin story of morality, 
which he terms ‘genealogy’. We will do so in terms of its key human types, which 
Nietzsche groups into castes. Through their interactions we understand the crucial role 
ressentiment plays in the development of morality. We will then examine ressentiment 
in depth for the sake of understanding how its various moves transpire. Our ultimate 
objective is to identify and understand the culminating move of ressentiment, which is 
self-deception. 
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Chapter 2: THE CASTES AND PHYSIOLOGY OF NIETZSCHEAN 
RESSENTIMENT 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Nietzsche laments the a priori world around him as a previously-inverted value system 
(OGM ‘Preface’ 3). He blames Christianity and the phenomenon of ressentiment for this 
corruption in his day (A 62; OGM 1.8-10). Therefore, he calls for all values to be 
revalued, especially those of truth and morality (BGE 9.262; OGM 3.24).1  
Walter Kaufmann claims ressentiment to be ‘an integral part’ of Nietzsche’s 
philosophy, and ‘one of the key conceptions of Nietzsche’s psychology’ (1974a:374, 
71). Max Scheler heralds Nietzsche’s discovery as ‘the most profound’ in that period 
concerning ‘the origin of moral judgments’ (1998:27). Bernd Magnus stresses ‘the 
notion of resentment, ressentiment, [is given] prominent display [in OGM], for it 
functions just precisely as the sort of explanatory tool which is needed to account for 
some moral attitudes and beliefs’ (1986:48). Peter Poellner asserts it lies ‘at the heart of 
the later Nietzsche’s most central philosophical preoccupation: the critique of “moral 
values”’ (2004:46). René Girard indicates, to Nietzsche, ressentiment is ‘the worst of all 
possible fates’ (1996:252). Nicholas Birns classifies it as ‘one of the thorniest concepts 
in the Nietzschean lexicon’ (2010:1). This chapter will attempt to understand it. 
Nietzsche’s OGM will serve as the primary text for several reasons. Most 
obviously, it occasions the earliest employment of the term ressentiment and stands as 
his only treatise in which he develops the concept. It is also widely recognised to be the 
most mature and clearly argued expression of Nietzsche’s comprehensive philosophy. 
According to Christopher Janaway, OGM is the ‘most sustained philosophical 
achievement, his masterpiece, and the most vital of his writings for any student of 
Nietzsche, of ethics, or of the history of modern thought’ (2007:1). Aaron Ridley 
considers it to be ‘the most important piece of moral philosophy since Kant’ (1998:1). 
Nietzsche himself regards it as ‘perhaps the most uncanny things written so far’ (EH 
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‘The Genealogy of Morals’2).3 I will supplement from his other works, as well as 
employ secondary literature germane to the discussion. 
While drawing on the standard secondary literature, this chapter amounts to my 
own independent account of Nietzsche’s ressentiment, but without adopting an 
interpretation that is idiosyncratic or manifestly unorthodox. It entertains a wide 
discussion of ressentiment to demonstrate the embeddedness and functioning of self-
deception within it. I begin, therefore, by following Nietzsche the philologist in a brief 
investigation of the word, ressentiment. Reasons for so doing should be patent when 
examining a writer who must venture beyond his own language to select a term so 
integral to his system. Following this I will conduct an extended genealogical 
investigation of the context of ressentiment, which is Nietzsche’s understanding of 
morality as it has evolved to the present. This is accomplished by explicating his 
archetypal characters of master, slave, and priest in order to trace some familiar themes, 
thereby situating those types to interact with each other and be understood in fresh 
ways. Finally, this orients the subsequent break down of ressentiment into its 
constituent parts which, working together, give ressentiment the transformational power 
Nietzsche requires of it. 
 
2.2 Philology 
After years of inspiration from the lakes of Sils Maria, Nietzsche publishes OGM in 
1887 and features his first usage of ressentiment. Without definition or explanation, 
either expressed or implied, the word splashes across the pages midway through the first 
essay: ‘The slave revolt in morality begins when ressentiment itself becomes creative 
and gives birth to values: the ressentiment of those beings who are denied genuine 
reaction, that of the deed, who make up for it only through imaginary revenge’ (OGM 
1.10). Rather than viewing the concept of ressentiment as appearing from nowhere, a 
sounding of Nietzsche reveals it to be elemental in his argument. Also, Nietzsche’s 
prequel to OGM, BGE, presages ressentiment through the familiar contours of will-to-
power, good-bad distinction, herd mentality, guilt and guilt feelings, and the revaluation 
of values.  
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 This is the title of Nietzsche’s essay in EH, and so should not be confused with his entire volume by the 
same title, designated in this thesis by the abbreviation of OGM. 
3
 Ratschow concludes, against this host of scholars, that OGM does ‘not belong in the same class’ as the 
majority of Nietzsche’s works published prior to it (1988:64). 
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Still, why does a German philosopher living in Switzerland go fishing for 
language in French waters? The answer, in part, lies in historic accidents swirling about 
in early nineteenth-century Europe. The Enlightenment tide is receding, carrying with it 
the primacy of the individual and a recrudescent feudalism (Young 2006:205). 
Germany, in particular, is fractured to the point that ‘the differences between the various 
dialects of German [are] so strong that communication between people from different 
regions [is] difficult or impossible’ (205). Nietzsche deplores the ‘dilapidation of the 
German language’ of his day (UO ‘Strauss’ 11). So it is no wonder the lingua franca 
attracts the expeditious mind of a young philologist, and it is from such semantic 
currents Nietzsche draws his term from everyday French. 
Ressentiment as a word is neither new for Nietzsche nor anyone else. Nicholas 
Birns writes, ‘If a French person had heard the word used, all they would have 
understood is the garden-variety connotation of “resentment” in English. It has no 
original idiomatic meaning in French’ (2010:4; see Huskinson 2009:23).4 RJ 
Hollingdale’s classic biography consistently translates the word into English as 
‘resentment’ (1999b). There are etymological signs that the word derives from the Old 
French ressentir, and combines the prefix re-, which ‘designates both repetition and 
backward motion’ (Stringer 2000:264), with the root sentire, ‘to feel’, which relates to 
‘sense’.5 The overall force of the word is to feel or perceive anger or indignation 
(Simpson & Weiner 1992:1566; Barnhart 1995:656), and that, immediately ‘through the 
senses and not [mediated through] reflection in the mind’ (Kee 1999:64). In his 
introduction to Max Scheler’s volume entitled, Ressentiment, Manfred Frings adds that 
the French version possesses a ‘peculiar strong nuance of a lingering hate’ not typically 
intended in the English usage of resentment (1998:5). Nietzsche most likely eyed the 
term in the essay by Montaigne, ‘Cowardice, Mother of Cruelty’ (1976 2.27).  
Kaufmann asserts in his commentary on OGM, ‘the German language lacks any 
close equivalent’ to ressentiment (1992b:441). Scheler informs us it is not adequately 
translatable into German (1998:25). Birns, however, informs it is ‘a mistake to think 
that when Nietzsche originally uses ressentiment he is using a word insulated from 
ordinary German conversation’, citing both Groll and Verstimmung as ‘rough 
equivalents’ (2010:4). Small states unequivocally that ‘the term ressentiment is already 
well-established in the writings of … Eugen Dühring’ (2001:171), a German 
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 For an extensive comparison of the two words, see Meltzer & Musolf’s ‘Resentment and Ressentiment’ 
(2002). 
5
 This excludes usages which have become obsolete since the seventeenth-century. 
52 
 
philosopher and economist with whom Nietzsche is quite familiar, and frequently 
hostile (OGM 2.11, 14, 26). Furthermore, Nietzsche himself treats ressentiment as an 
already-familiar sphere for the study of moral inquiry, specifically in dealing with 
justice (2.11; see 1.14). Regardless, there is consensus in philosophical, sociological, 
and psychological communities that Nietzsche casts the word ever after in technical 
coinage. 
 
2.3 Genealogy 
Beyond philological investigation, a much fuller profile for ressentiment may be 
developed through genealogical enquiry. Mining for understanding necessitates that, 
before dealing with the concept itself, we retrace Nietzsche’s search into the context of 
ressentiment. The context is morality: ‘the conditions and circumstances from which 
[morality] grew [and] under which [it] developed and shifted’ (OGM ‘Preface’ 6). One 
might even consider it an exhumation. Rather than accept the morality of his day, he 
proposes a critique of ‘these “values” as given, as factual, as beyond all questioning’ 
(6). He reformulates his implied hypothesis into a polemical question, ‘What if the 
reverse were true?’ He proceeds to insinuate that morality might be precluding 
humanity’s development, tht evil might actually be more beneficial than good, and the 
present might inhibit the future. Nietzsche closes his preface with a thinly veiled answer 
to his own question: ‘Morality [is] the danger of dangers’ (6). Furthermore, Nietzsche’s 
diagnosis of morality as modern degeneration serves as entrée for his attack on Judaeo-
Christianity, appropriating the concept of degeneration for his ends (see also BT 
‘Attempt at a Self-Criticism’ 5). Moore claims he accomplishes this by subversively 
dealing with ‘Christianism [as the] flowering of decadence has its roots in the very 
values which have shaped Western civilization’ (2002:139f). 
Before continuing, Nietzsche’s concept of genealogy itself requires explanation. 
He views the subject of his study, morality, as evolutionary (non-Darwinian6) and 
naturalistic, as opposed to eternally absolute and metaphysical (see EH ‘The Birth of 
Tragedy’ 4). This leads him to excavate history to find ‘our human moral past’ (OGM 
                                                 
6
 Moore (2002) makes the case that Nietzsche’s views on evolution, so called, are not influenced directly 
by Darwin (22), but must rather ‘be understood in terms of what has been called the “non-Darwinian 
revolution”’ (16). A leading light of this movement, on whom Nietzsche leans, is ‘Anglo-German 
zoologist named William Rolph’ (47). Moore includes a lengthy quotation from Rolph’s Biologische 
Probleme (1882) in which he argues that evolution’s driving force is ‘a struggle for the increase of life, 
but not a struggle for life’ (italics supplied, 53). Moore notes this passage is ‘heavily marked by Nietzsche 
in his copy of Rolph’s book’ (53, footnote 44). Moore makes a similar claim of Wilhelm Roux’s 
influence on Nietzsche (37f). 
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‘Preface’ 7), what Foucault calls a ‘materialism of the incorporeal’ (1981:69), and to 
discover this ‘well hidden land of morality … for the first time’ (OGM ‘Preface’ 7). 
Heretofore, investigation into moral origins has repeated ‘the errors of the greatest 
philosophers’, thus requiring novel and persistent work in the rubble of history’s stone 
and pebble (HH1 2.37; see Agamben 2009:89). 
Regarding Nietzsche’s methodology, Smith warns against viewing Nietzsche’s 
‘genealogy’ as ‘the historical study of the ramifications which lead outwards from 
concepts in which a number of meanings intersect’ (1999:xv). Nietzsche’s genealogy 
should not be confused with the typical historical inquiry. Paul Ricoeur makes this 
apparent in his discussion of Nietzsche’s (and Freud’s) ‘reductive hermeneutics’, which 
has reinterpreted mankind’s history to free it from absolute origins, favouring instead 
possible sources and—even better—empty places in which power allowed the rise of 
ethical and religious values (2004:438). Geuss succinctly states that ‘giving a 
“genealogy” is for Nietzsche the exact reverse of what we might call “tracing a 
pedigree”’ (1999:1). Relevant to my reading of Nietzsche are two points of Geuss’ (and 
Ricoeur’s) rationale. First, he asserts the search is not for ‘an unbroken line of 
succession from the origin’ to the subject in question (1999:1, 3-6, 14f). However, 
Nietzsche’s OGM does seem to lay out a lineage of sorts, the generation of which may 
be fairly characterised as dialectical and perhaps even teleological, but not in any 
absolute sense (2.13; see also Azzam 2015:102f). He designates the development of the 
nobles as ‘the intermediate age’ (OGM 2.19, see ‘Preface’ 6, 2.12) and speaks of the 
philosopher emerging from ‘the previously established types’, by which he means 
priestly and religious ones (3.10). Guess’ second assertion is the goal of genealogical 
inquiry is not to find ‘a single origin’. For example, one cannot trace ‘the historicity of 
the legend of [the] origin’ of Nietzsche’s Christian morality back to a seminal event, 
person, or group (WP 2.251). Rather, morality results from a ‘conjunction of a number 
of diverse lines of development’ (Geuss 1999:4). Still, Nietzsche cannot extend his 
moral investigation back interminably, so he himself chooses starting points (26, note 
11). Therefore, ‘the moral conceptual world’ has beginnings which are ‘like the 
beginning of everything great on earth [that] was thoroughly drenched, and for a long 
time, in blood’ (OGM 2.6; see Moore 2002:79).  
The salient feature about this primordial cauldron is the characteristically 
Nietzschean agon it represents, and out of which humanity as a new animal is created. 
Genealogy assigns present morality a beginning, which means it has not always been. It 
54 
 
has been subject to accidents of history so that it has become what it is … and might 
have been otherwise. Additionally, anything that begins may also end. Thus, morality 
may be expected to become something else entirely, perhaps even to end someday 
(Mulhall 2005:32). Describing origins in this way permits an alternative starting place 
and the construction of a platform upon which Nietzsche may build his case. 
For the sake of this investigation then, we will examine the types—Nietzsche 
labels some of them castes (BGE 9.257; OGM 1.7; see HH1 45; A 57; Middleton 
1996:297f)—which constitute this lineage.7 Within them the philosopher identifies such 
historical accidents as physical changes (e.g., gradual and sudden) in human society 
(e.g., from nomadic to settled), specific entities (e.g., Jesus, the Church, Paul), the 
development of certain psychological dispositions (e.g., bad conscience, sin, guilt 
feelings), and the rise of various social customs (e.g., contractual relationships and legal 
punishment) which both precipitate and catalyse other events. I will follow Nietzsche’s 
discussion of three of his castes germane to this thesis, which he conducts at varying 
lengths in a patchwork throughout OGM. I will arrange them in this order: noble, slave, 
and priest.8 The aim of this presentation is to weave together strands of Nietzsche’s 
argument in a logical manner.9 Thus, they will be couched in the serviceable metaphor 
of a lineage of descent, which will cast light on his moral genealogy. 
Discussion of the priestly caste will be disproportionately greater than that allotted 
the others, the rationale lying in its critical role for Nietzsche in human moral evolution. 
The noble and slave castes are merely raw material for change, while the priest serves as 
the agent of change. Like a flame to a tinder keg, so the priest ignites the revolution of 
morality, sparked by a revaluation of values. He is a creator, so to speak, impressing 
will into the stuff of humanity to shape it into its current state-of-the-species, the slave-
cum-master. I will argue Paul the Apostle assumes many of the characteristics and 
much of the role of the priestly caste (see section 2.5). Thus, greater devotion is given to 
developing this caste so it may provide an adequate source of information from which 
Paul may be analysed later. 
                                                 
7
 Ridley refers to them as ‘personality types’ which, he claims, Nietzsche uses as ‘magnets for issues or 
for aspects of issues which are then pursued, psychobiographically, through a disquisition on the 
personality types that exemplify them’ (1998:14). 
8
 His other two castes are the barbarian and the philosopher (of-the-future), the former serving as the 
initial and natural state of humanity, the latter as Nietzsche’s hopeful vision for the species. 
9
 From OGM 2.12, we understand Nietzsche to argue against a linear connection between cause of origin 
and effect, or eventual purpose. However, Foucault in Discipline and Punish (1995) uses Nietzsche’s own 
genealogical method in contravention to Nietzsche, and precisely in relation to the same subject matter, 
discipline, to show causes and effects between power and subjugation. Therefore, developing a 
conceptual linearity in Nietzsche’s thought is not without precedent.  
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2.3.1 Noble 
The initial caste in Nietzsche’s lineage is the barbarian. ‘Let us admit to ourselves 
unsparingly how so far every higher culture on earth so far has begun! ... In the 
beginning the noble caste was always the barbarian caste’ (BGE 9.257). This caste is the 
cradle for all races, not merely German, nor even European, but for all peoples. 
‘Roman, Arabic, Teutonic, Japanese nobility, Homeric heroes, Scandinavian Vikings’—
all trace their roots back to the beast of prey (OGM 1.11). 
Barbarians become a ‘master-race’ by conquest, not contract. ‘Human beings with 
a still natural nature, barbarians in every terrible sense of the word, predatory men who 
… hurled themselves on weaker, more civilized, more peaceful races’ (BGE 9.257; see 
OGM 2.17). The conquered race becomes the oppressed, and the new social landscape 
is inhabited by two castes: slaves, and those who rule them, masters. 
These rulers are ‘the born “masters” (that is, of the solitary, beast-of-prey species 
of man)’ (OGM 3.18). Their superior power provides for themselves privilege, which 
presumably translates literally into a higher station: homes on heights, transportation on 
horseback or even on the backs of humans, elevated seating at public events for 
unobstructed views, selection of unbruised fruit from the top of the merchant’s cart, etc. 
(see BGE 6.257f). How natural for these aristocrats to view themselves as both noble 
and standard bearer, sanctioning whatever they do as good. ‘From this pathos of 
distance they first took for themselves the right to create values, to coin names for 
values’ (OGM 1.2). Nietzsche asserts language itself is an ‘expression of power: they 
say “this is this”’. Thus, whatever the master designates ‘good’ becomes good. More 
fundamentally, the concept of good is sourced in the ruler himself, grounded in being, 
not doing. The noble kind of human being feels itself to be value-determining and is 
value-creating (BGE 9.260). 
Nietzsche also produces etymological evidence to demonstrate ‘the terms for 
“good” … as formulated by the different languages ... all lead back to the same 
conceptual transformation’, always and everywhere to a social context of nobility and 
aristocracy (OGM 1.4). For those who have ears to hear, he offers ‘the main nuance’ of 
good. Objectively, this refers to ‘someone who is, who has reality, who is real, who is 
true’; subjectively, good becomes transformed into truthfulness, as opposed to lying and 
dishonesty (1.5). Over time, good becomes synonymous with nobility, and associated 
traits such as fullness, bravery, gentility, and capability are contrasted with those of 
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commoners who cannot be trusted because they are weak and thereby forced into 
humility, patience, and industry (1.5). No thing—deed, word, or event—along this 
human value scale is yet invested with culpability. Thus, the noble caste arises in what 
might be termed the pre-moral era. Modern morality, for reasons that follow, finds it 
hard to empathise with such values as duty only to peers, capriciousness ‘beyond good 
and evil’ toward those of lower rank, and the wisdom of maintaining both certain 
enemies and coping mechanisms for keeping them close as friends (BGE 9.260). 
Furthermore, Leiter notes that ‘the concept of “good” in the hands of the masters 
connotes a distinctive psychological or characterological state, and not simply class 
position: “later ‘good’ and ‘bad’ develop in a direction which no longer refers to social 
standing (GM I:6)”’ (2003:201). He also comments ‘that while “master” and “slave” 
begin as class-specific terms, their ultimate significance is psychological for Nietzsche, 
not social ... “slavish” and “noble” are intended to have psychological or 
characterological connotations’ (217). 
 
2.3.2 Slave 
An ineluctable result of an aristocratic caste is a plebeian one. A master necessitates a 
slave. Technically, slaves constitute a caste for Nietzsche, but their essential values are 
not conducive for true community, and their demise is always immanent (HH1 2.45). 
Comparing the ‘good person’ of the noble caste to the ‘bad person’ in the lower stratum 
of society, he attributes ‘no common feeling’ to slaves, but valuates them as merely ‘a 
mass, like bits of dust’ (2.45). True, slaves are derived from nobles, but at best this 
renders them a sub-caste, at worst, parasites. ‘Worst’ is the position they in fact occupy 
in Nietzsche’s schema. Slaves are poles apart from nobles;10 opposite the high-born and 
privileged are the low and common, among whom conditions are ripe for ressentiment, 
the hallmark feature of slavish existence. ‘Ressentiment is the triumph of the weak as 
weak’, writes Deleuze, ‘the revolt of the slaves and their victory as slaves. It is in their 
victory that the slaves form a type’ (1983:117). 
Whereas the master-life is characterised by happiness, the slave-life is one of 
unjust suffering. Slaves interpret masters’ actions, even their very existence, in terms of 
oppression. The greater the autonomy and higher the joy experienced by masters, the 
heavier the burden and deeper the misery felt by slaves. Slaves are trapped in their 
                                                 
10
 Nietzsche uses ‘master’ and ‘noble’ as virtual synonyms. 
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predicament due to their subjugation; they are powerless to throw it off … but they can 
hate with ‘the hatred of impotence’. And they can revolt, but in a most unusual way. 
Nietzsche speaks through Tacitus to introduce the Jews as ‘a people “born to 
slavery”’ (BGE 5.195), and ‘the greatest example’ of the spirit of impotence (OGM 1.7). 
Originally, Nietzsche identifies the Jews as strong and proud people, even warriors. Life 
in their early history is good, their outlook positive, and why not? God is for them. But 
everything changes with their defeat and consequent subjugation. To bear their 
oppression, they interpret their defeat and oppression as punishment. Domination is not 
an accident of history, a natural product of conflict which can go one way or the other. 
It is the result of sin. Their identity and experience are defined in relation to another, to 
the Other. Their trouble is metaphysical; God has turned against them. He is punishing 
them through exile, and they are impotent to change the world in which they now find 
themselves imprisoned. So they long for the next.  
The present world becomes something evil to escape. Thus, slaves begin to long 
for death, viewing it both as release and victory. Those who control the world, the 
masters, are viewed as evil, too. Evil is to be resisted, but how do impotent slaves resist 
a powerful master? The answer comes by internalisation. By means of sublimating the 
struggle, Nietzsche’s response is that slaves (epitomised in the Jews) invert the balance 
power by pronouncing as blessed their values such as poverty, lowliness, and 
impotence, and damning to hell aristocratic values such as power, lust, and beauty (BGE 
1.7). This is Nietzsche’s famous ‘slave revolt in morality’, originating from bad 
conscience (OGM 1.10), generated by ressentiment, and resulting in the reversal of all 
values. Masters measure everything by using the self as the starting point for good. 
Sheerly by contrast, slaves are designated ‘bad’, which means that masters can discount, 
marginalise, or even dispose of slaves. Notably, this is typically without remorse or 
calumny. Slaves perform an opposite calculation, only more so. They measure their 
morality by using another outside of themselves, thus objectivising it for their reference 
point: the master, whom they hate (see Deleuze 1983:115f). Therefore, masters are not 
simply ‘bad’, but ‘evil’. In contrast to, and derived from their value of the master, slaves 
designate themselves as ‘good’. Hence, slave morality may be said to be evil-good, 
whereas master morality is simply good-bad. Furthermore, the slave regards everything 
that the master is not as good. Thus, slave morality defines itself in terms of what it is 
against, while master morality does not concern itself with such navel-gazing. It is 
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positive and gets on with life. Not surprisingly, Nietzsche castigates slaves for their 
master-supplanting morality. 
Nietzsche identifies Christianity as heir to the Jewish slave revolt in morality by 
describing the former as the veiled hateful outgrowth springing from a tree of revenge 
(BGE 1.8). ‘What is it that we combat in Christianity?’ he asks. It is to fight slavish 
devaluing of courage and pride, and the promotion of self-contempt (WP 2.252; see also 
Nehamas 1985:126). Slave morality reaches its zenith in Christianity’s 
transmogrification of mere ‘bad’ into ‘evil’, thus transferring the battleground from 
world and body to soul and conscience. For Nietzsche, this is precisely where the 
danger lies: internally. Through the ‘sedimented accumulation of innumerable 
generations’ (Lampert 1995:369), the moral values of the new system have come to feel 
so normal and strangely comforting, their truth so naturally plausible (see Kaufmann 
1974a:109).11 The morality of the common person, whether through democracy or 
socialism, has so tamed them to prevent them from destroying themselves that they 
have become drugged, intoxicated, polluted, and even poisoned into mediocrity (OGM 
3.13f, 26). ‘Europe’s doom’ is a bellwether for all, bringing into view ‘the sight of 
human beings [that] now makes us weary—what is nihilism today if it is not that?—We 
are weary of human beings’ (1.12). 
Materialists cannot evade Nietzsche either. He assails English psychologists in 
particular under the premise they misunderstand history, and thus follow Darwin ill-
advisedly. Departing from seven years of association with Paul Rée over matters both 
personal (i.e., Lou Salomé) and philosophical (i.e., origin of conscience) (Kaufmann 
1974a:48, 60-62), and lumping him in with ‘all English moral genealogists’ (OGM 
‘Preface’ 4, see 7), he focuses his attack on morality in terms of the evolutionary 
flourishing of humanity. The evil instincts are expedient, species-preserving, and 
indispensable to as high a degree as the good ones; their function is merely different’ 
(GS 1.4). Several years later, he mocks Rée and his findings as psychologically weak 
(perhaps intimating ressentiment) (OGM ‘Preface’ 7), suggesting a manifestation of 
‘small subterranean hostility and rancor toward Christianity (and Plato), that perhaps 
never made it across the threshold to consciousness’ (1.1).  
Both materialist and metaphysician alike would view Nietzsche’s slave stage in 
human evolution as a necessary evil. For it is only through guilt and ‘bad conscience’ 
                                                 
11
 For an excellent extended discussion on how force becomes justice becomes truth, see Wood’s Chapter 
Two in ‘The Reign of Duplicity: Pascal’s Political Theology’ (2013:51-91). 
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leading to the ressentiment-motivated transvaluation of values that humanity acquires 
depth and becomes ‘an interesting animal’, a free-willing subject equipped with an 
awareness of a whole new dimension of being (OGM 1.6). As seen in the next section, 
slave innovation makes civilisation possible. And since it is not possible to go 
backward, Nietzsche advocates the arduous task of continuing mankind’s evolutionary 
journey (Nietzsche 1994:xiv).  
One final note is necessary. The profile edges of this group are fuzzy at times 
because what he says of the slave, Nietzsche often says of the priestly caste (Elgat 
2015:524, footnote 3).12 In fact, he identifies his preeminent example, the Jews, as both 
a slave people (BGE 5.195) and a priestly people (OGM 1.7). Though Nietzsche thinks 
it is likely priests may originate ‘from the knightly-aristocratic’ evolutionary branch of 
the human tree (1.7), they so closely associate with slaves that they identify with the 
sick herd, the flock. This perspective is not hard to derive from Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, 
noting especially the verb tense he utilises: ‘Verily, these herdsmen themselves still 
belonged among the sheep’ (italics supplied, Z 2.4). Subsequently, priests seize the 
opportunity to move ahead of weaker members and become a lead sheep. From there it 
is only a matter of degrees to achieve shepherdship. This position brings with it 
opportunity to fleece their fellows: slaves become lead sheep become shepherds-who-
shear, which is to say, priests (OGM 3.15). ‘What [Paul] himself does not believe was 
believed by the idiots among whom he cast his teaching.—His requirement was power’ 
(A 42). Benson concludes that ‘Nietzsche’s account of Paul is that Paul single-handedly 
elevates himself to the role of priest’, which is obviously a position of power, ‘from 
what Nietzsche would consider to be a slave nation’ (2008:130). 
 
2.3.3 Priest 
Sometimes Nietzsche refers to this caste as ascetic, other times as ascetic priest or 
aristocratic priest. I will employ his most basic reference, that of ‘priest’. The priest 
appears ‘regularly [and] universally … in almost all times [he] emerges; he does not 
belong to a single race; he flourishes everywhere; he grows from all social classes’ 
(OGM 3.11). Thus, priestly origins may include the castes of the noble or of the slave. If 
the former, Nietzsche posits a group within the noble class separating itself from the 
military faction for the sake of ritual purity, then identifying with the slaves. Regardless 
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 Ridley discusses Nietzsche’s blurring of distinctions further (1998:46-50). 
60 
 
of its origin, the priestly caste is not merely, nor even primarily, a biological or social 
entity, though certainly Nietzsche would be the last to disembody it.  
Nietzsche seeks to present the many manifestations of the priest. First and 
foremost, he is a leader. He takes the form of a shepherd of the flock/herd (OGM 3.11), 
a ruler over a kingdom (3.15), a self-appointed and ‘foreordained’ saviour (3.15; see 
17), and a trailblazer to a different plane of existence (3.13). The priest is no common 
leader, however. Hence, second, he is an opportunist, using resources to his advantage 
over others. As such, he is a tamer of animals (3.15), a physician dispensing medicine 
(3.15f), a magician performing tricks (3.20), a sorcerer wielding potions and casting 
spells (3.20), a huckster who peddles idealism (3.26), an artist in psychology (3.20), and 
an oracle and interpreter of strange forces and events (3.5). Third, the priest is a 
‘religious person’ (3.10). He is a saint separated from this world (3.1), a soul resolved to 
desert solitude (3.7), the guardian of ‘ancient good customs’ (3.9), a pontiff leading to 
another world (3.11), and a contemplative who seeks wisdom in the infinite and 
objective (3.26). Fourth, he is a warrior by different means (3.15). He is a self-evolved 
‘new type of predator’ (3.15), the most formidable enemy (3.7), a munitions expert in 
‘that most dangerous and explosive material’ (3.15), an opponent of all that was 
originally good (1.7), and a fighter for ‘his right to existence’ (3.11). 
The priests’ adversarial posture is, understandably, not directed against the slaves, 
for the slaves hold no obvious power. Rather, priests focus ‘antithetical valuations’ into 
an insidious power grab against the reigning class, thus creating opportunity for their 
own caste, a priestly aristocracy. For Nietzsche, the ‘greatest example’ of this is the 
Jews (OGM 1.7), whose world-historic mission causes all other campaigns of conquest 
to pale by comparison (1.9). The Jews, in Nietzsche’s estimation, hold the distinction of 
being ‘the priestly people of ressentiment par excellence’ (1.6). Their power is 
generated from hatred, ‘the most spiritual and poisonous variety ... Priests have always 
been the truly great haters in world history’ (1.7). This hatred is sourced in impotence. 
To appreciate Nietzsche’s understanding of impotence, counterintuitively, one must 
understand his meaning of power.  
Nietzsche posits that power manifests itself in will, which is an active, form-
giving energy. Everything—morality, truth, life, the world, perceived existence—begins 
with and pertains to the ‘instinct of freedom (in my language: the will to power)’ (OGM 
2.18). It is life-force itself, the very locus of humanity (BGE 2.36, 9.259). This force, 
this instinct, cannot be destroyed, but it can be channelled in the creation of new forms. 
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Nietzsche’s philosophy owes much to Spinoza, with whom he ‘must come to terms’ 
(HH2 1.408), and over whom he gushes in a July 1881 letter to friend Overbeck 
(Middleton 1996:177). Since Nietzsche never actually seems to read Spinoza, his debt 
comes by way of (though not exclusively, even by 1881) the second volume of Kuno 
Fischer’s History of Modern Philosophy (1865) (Brobjer 2008a:77f). Prominently 
featured is a discussion of Spinoza’s ethics in which the term conatus is favoured to 
describe force as both inertia and as a thing’s fundamental drive of self-preservation 
(i.e., to exist) (see Fischer 1887:114f; see also Schacht 1995:178-82). Moore notes 
Nietzsche takes issue with this concept as ‘an innate, essential tendency to endure’, and 
instead reacts to the conatus by interpreting the fundamental striving of each organism 
as ‘essentially a striving for more power’ (2002:46). Regardless, understanding will-to-
power in its manifesting forms forces this inquiry to return to the mists of genealogy.  
In its rawest form, will-to-power is the desire to conquer and control. Unabated, 
the original barbarian caste would destroy itself. Therefore, parties must negotiate, if for 
no other reason than survival. Following on, a capacity for society is bred out of the 
primitive relationship between provider and receiver. More specifically, out of this 
relationship evolves humanity’s faculty of free will by which it evaluates others against 
itself, calculates risk, and contends with fate—all of this so it can now make promises. 
Promises are binding commitments to a course of action (Migotti 2013:510). They 
undergird contracts and are the glue used to construct society.13 This somewhat crude 
and certainly alien process eventually passes from consciousness and intellect into 
instinct and behaviour. Humanity possesses a conscience (2.1f; see HH1 2.99; see also 
GS 5.354). 
Humanity’s promise-keeping ability is sourced in a capacity for memory, and 
memory is lastingly ‘burned in’ through pain (OGM 2.3).  
The debtor, in order to inspire trust for his promise of repayment … pledges something by 
virtue of a contract to the creditor in the event that if he does not pay, … the creditor could 
subject the body of the debtor to all kinds of indignity and torture, such as cutting as much 
of it as seemed appropriate for the size of the debt. (2.5) 
Violation of a creditor’s trust by a debtor becomes the creditor’s right to violate the 
debtor in return. With the passage of time, promises and violations are codified so every 
offence becomes valuated (2.8), not in terms of literal reparation, but in terms of 
equivalents: ‘the [creditor’s] pleasure of being allowed to vent his power uninhibitedly 
                                                 
13
 Migotti holds that Nietzsche sources motivation for promising in a commitment to oneself, viz. personal 
integrity, and not in commitment to another, viz. moral obligation (2013:513-19). As a practical matter, 
the manifestation for corporate human development is the same. 
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on someone powerless … the enjoyment of violating’ (2.5). Nietzsche likens this 
pleasure of the creditor to the celebration of warriors after victory (2.9). Thus, cruelty, 
‘the master’s right’, becomes just and good (2.5). 
Nietzsche further argues the processes of conscience require reason accompanied 
by self-restraint and sobriety. Their combined force leads to ‘this whole gloomy 
business we call reflection’ (OGM 2.3). Herein, depth in the ‘essentially dangerous 
[priestly] form of human existence’ begins to develop (1.6). Related to reflection is ‘that 
other “gloomy thing,” the consciousness of guilt, the “bad conscience”’ (2.4). It, too, 
stems from the ancient creditor-debtor relationship. The capacity to contract one’s self 
requires personal evaluation, which amounts to measurement against others. The pricing 
of goods and services, as well as the assigning of values for exchange, constitutes the 
human as the self-aware ‘valuating animal’ (2.8). Failure to measure up to contractual 
obligation now means, at the very least, an internal pain through bad conscience, if not 
external recompense through money, possessions, or physical cruelty (2.5). 
As mentioned previously, primitive, concrete, and violent contractual concepts 
become codified. Eventually this code translates into social forms of justice and the 
notion of objectivity. Thus, civilisation characterised by law blossoms. Ipso facto, this 
mandates law enforcement. In such an arrangement, the community stands for the 
creditor, and the lawbreaker for the debtor who is treated as an outsider-enemy to the 
community. The debtor, therefore, deserves any and all warlike hostility prescribed by 
the law, which Nietzsche reckons to be ‘the copy … of normal behavior toward the 
hated, disarmed, defeated enemy’: in short, punishment (OGM 2.9). 
Punishment according to the tradition of ‘previous [naïve] genealogists of 
morality’ finds its roots in some strict, formal purpose, and its utility branching out of 
that purpose into creative applications (OGM 2.12; see 13). Nietzsche contends, 
however, while utility certainly is subjective, so is purpose. Punishment has ever served 
its master-of-the-moment, and thus is always being ‘reinterpreted for new views’. It 
‘involves a new interpreting, a contriving in which the previous “meaning” and 
“purpose” must necessarily be obscured or entirely extinguished’ (2.12). Punishment is 
‘a power-will playing itself out in all events’ (2.12). It is a late phenomenon and holds, 
not a singular meaning, but ‘a whole synthesis of “meanings”’ (2.13). Nietzsche 
supports this assertion by supplying an incomplete list of twelve purposes for 
punishment, developing the last in a dedicated aphorism, 2.14. He claims the purpose of 
arousing feelings of guilt as a means of reform does not correspond to the historical, 
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empirical record. Rather, punishment has the reverse effect in that it ‘makes people hard 
and cold’. It actually confirms criminals’ alienation from the community and fortifies 
their resistance to justice. This is because of humanity’s pre-moral state, and state of 
mind. The very same sorts of procedures brought to bear in the act of punishment are 
merely those employed in prehistoric times by the strong upon the weak. There is no 
guilt as such, just fate taking its course as directed by power. So punishment may tame a 
wrongdoer, but it does not reform them (2.15). 
Returning to bad conscience, Nietzsche hypothesises it is an ineluctable change of 
the first magnitude, beyond even evolutionary measurements. It is an alteration of 
cosmic proportions. The civilising of pre-moral humanity does not eradicate its drives, 
but rechannels them into its inner world, expanding them into the soul. Thus, instead of 
pure joy, it feels pleasure in suffering; in place of unmitigated strength, it delights in 
weakness; in substitution of abounding health, it becomes content in profound sickness 
(OGM 2.16-18). 
It must be stressed that this sickness is an ‘active force’ (OGM 2.18), the same 
will-to-power of the blond beast ‘repressed, pushed back, imprisoned deep within and 
ultimately discharging and venting itself only on itself’ (2.17). As such, bad conscience 
is still a form-creating power, ‘the genuine womb of all ideal and imaginative events … 
[bringing] to light a plenitude of strange new beauty and affirmation, perhaps even 
beauty itself’ (2.18). This new beauty is basically the new scale on which unegoism 
ranks supreme. Humanity now enigmatically revels in selflessness, self-denial, and self-
sacrifice, but the genetic linkage stays intact: ‘this delight belongs to the realm of 
cruelty’, the same compensation as debt in the ancient commercial relationship, which is 
to say, guilt (italics supplied, 2.18-20).  
The truly diabolical usage of guilt lies in its function in the evolutionary process. 
The primeval tribe carries an obligation to its ancestry for their ‘sacrifices and 
accomplishments’, for it is upon them the tribe has been built. In a bizarre calculus, the 
tribe’s debt of honour grows to exceed its ability to repay because its forbearers become 
magnified, at least in regard to their significance, beyond the value of the tribe itself. 
That is, the tribal community remains finite while the significance of the ancestral 
community increases ad infinitum, thus leveraging the tribe’s sense of debt to its 
progenitors. Nietzsche may have in mind the Moai, those monumental elongated heads 
of the primitive Rapa Nui of Easter Island, sculpted to represent deified ancestors (see 
OGM 2.19). See Figure 2.1. 
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Nietzsche writes, ‘The ancestors of the mightiest tribes must have grown to 
prodigious proportions’ such that, ‘in the end the ancestor is necessarily transfigured 
into a god’ (OGM 2.19). Nietzsche asserts the true origin of guilt is fear of the gods, and 
the inevitable evolution of the pantheon into a single universal god, ‘the Christian God 
as the maximal god achieved to date’ (2.20; see Acts 17:22-34). Along with this comes 
the suspicion of unpaid debts and the commensurate desire for release from them, but as 
the creditor is now untouchable (i.e., an infinitely holy God), so is the debtor’s hope of 
repayment. Thus, by means of beliefs made indelible through the repetition born of 
obligation (i.e., ‘religion’), guilt becomes moralised and maximised. First, it is turned 
back into the debtors’ bad conscience so they are both responsible for their own 
predicament and precluded from resolving it. ‘Along with the impossibility of 
discharging debt, the thought of the impossibility of discharging penance is also 
conceived, the notion that it cannot be discharged (of “eternal punishment”)’ (OGM 
2.21). Second, guilt is turned back upon the creditor through the ‘genius of Christianity: 
God sacrificing himself for the guilt of humanity … the creditor sacrificing himself for 
his debtor … out of love (can you believe it?—) out of love for his debtor’ (2.21)! The 
innovation of a holy God moralises guilt which deceives humanity regarding its true 
nature and its true pain, both of which stem from imprisonment in the civilised state.  
Herein lies the diabolical genius of the priest, the channelling of the human will to 
a goal, to nothingness, in contrast to not willing: the ascetic ideal (OGM 3.1). In Europe, 
which represents for Nietzsche the leading edge of civilisation, this amounts to 
Christianity (BGE 3.62; 3.14). The priest is the founder of this slave revolt (OGM 1.7-
Figure 2.1 Totems, Rapa Nui, Easter Island, used with permission 
65 
 
9), despot of this monotheism (2.20), and leader of the herd of the sick.14 It is not only 
the strong who seek to control their existence, but the weak, the herd. Will-to-power is 
manifested by the slave population, ‘not through brute strength, but by sheer force of 
numbers’ (Moore 2002:55), and is manipulated by the priest. As leaders of the herd, 
priests themselves are sick with the contagion of ressentiment which, in turn, shapes 
their worldview to one of a ‘completely different existence’ (OGM 3.11). 
Nietzsche describes the priest as a model of the ascetic life lived in a realm where 
ressentiment toxifies the soil and pollutes the air. Such a ressentiment-filled life ‘is 
paradoxical to the highest degree’ because its enjoyment increases in proportion to its 
suffering, even as its capacity for life decreases (OGM 3.11). That the priest is 
ruthlessly committed to his ideal should come as no surprise, for his very existence 
depends on it. He not only believes it, he wills it. Thus, he fights those who oppose it as 
those who oppose him personally, using ‘energy to stop up the sources of energy’ 
(3.11). His weaponry is superior, spiritual in nature, even as he himself has evolved into 
a ‘new type of predator’, and is the master of self-contradiction, healing wounds and 
wounding to heal; his necessity to the herd is self-created (3.15). 
The necessity of the priest is also required by evolution, both in what humanity 
has already become and in the future form Nietzsche envisions for it. Within the 
cesspool of morality still survive ‘rare cases of power of soul and body in humans, the 
human lucky strokes …, those who turned out well’ (OGM 3.14). Nietzsche frets over 
mixing the two populations, weak slaves and strong masters, in all civilised cultures 
because the former will threaten the latter by subverting their ‘trust in life’ (3.14). The 
ultimate revenge of these purveyors of ressentiment, he contends, would be realised 
when they succeeded in shoving into the conscience of the happy their own misery … so 
that someday they would have to begin to be ashamed of their happiness ... [Such an] 
inverted world … would be … the supreme viewpoint on earth. (3.14) 
Thus, segregation is required, the sick from the healthy, for the sake of humanity’s 
future. But who to care for the sick, and such a large population, too? The priest (3.14f). 
His medication is powerful, dispensed with craft and ruthlessness. Though the 
priest is also sick—how else can he understand his patients?—he retains enough 
mastery of himself to will his charge over the herd. In this way, he protects them from 
                                                 
14
 By virtue of the language he selects for his discourse, Nietzsche appears to number Richard Wagner 
among the priests: ‘Recall how enthusiastically Wagner followed in the footsteps of the philosopher 
Feuerbach back in his day … [but] in the end he had the will to teach otherwise ... to preach reversal, 
conversion, negation, Christianity, medievalism and to tell his disciples “it’s no good! Seek salvation 
somewhere else!” Even the “blood of the Redeemer” is invoked at one point’ (OGM 3.3). 
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the outside threat of the violent and healthy, and also from the threat—at least from an 
awareness of the threat—of demise from within. Such demise comes as a natural result 
of guilt and remnant effects which, left unattended, would contaminate the entire 
population. The priest must, therefore, deliver the herd from its own ressentiment, lest it 
destroy itself. Interestingly, he does not desire to eradicate this force so much as to 
control it because it is indispensable in securing his own position.15 He is not after a 
cure; his medicine is palliative, and it comes in different forms (OGM 3.17-21). If it 
were possible to formulate the essence of the priest’s role—keeper of the sickly status 
quo and comforter of the diseased—into a single pill, it would be the narcotic of 
ressentiment-turned-back-on-itself. This is the only force powerful enough to deaden 
the almost unendurable pain of the guilty person who believes their suffering to be 
deserved. Physiologically, it masks consciousness of the true problem through 
scapegoating: 
For every sufferer instinctively looks for a cause of his suffering; … a guilty perpetrator 
who is receptive to suffering—in brief, some kind of living thing upon which he can 
discharge his affects in deeds or in effigy based on some pretext … “I suffer: someone must 
be to blame for this”—thus thinks every diseased sheep. But its shepherd, the ascetic priest, 
says to it: “Right you are, my sheep! someone must be to blame for it: … you alone are to 
blame for yourself!” (3.15) 
This reflexive ressentiment Nietzsche distils from the phrase, ‘you alone are to blame 
for yourself’, into the concepts of ‘guilt, sin, sinfulness, depravity, [and] damnation’ 
(3.20). In short, this is religion, specifically, Christianity. Ultimately, that ‘genuine artist 
in feelings of guilt’ exploits the bad conscience in what ‘has so far been the greatest 
event in the history of the sick soul’ (3.20). Nietzsche writes in A 49, ‘the concepts of 
guilt and punishment, inclusive of the doctrines of “grace,” of “salvation,” and of 
“forgiveness” [are] lies … A priest’s attack! … the invention of sin (italics original). 
Calling it sin, the sufferer ‘should understand his suffering as a state of punishment’ 
(3.20), and that, justly deserved. The priest directs the will of the guilty to re-wound him 
to the point of paralysis. Henceforth, ‘he is like the hen around which a line of chalk has 
been drawn. He can no longer get out of this circle’ (3.20). The slave becomes a sinner! 
The opiate of religion takes full effect. By reinterpreting suffering as guilt feelings 
and punishment, the slave population is exploited to the ends of ‘self-discipline, self-
surveillance [and] self-overcoming’ (OGM 3.16). As a result, the weak and sickly are 
rendered harmless to one another, the incurable self-depleted from the population, and 
the remainder kept in isolation from the healthy. Nietzsche refers to this collection of 
                                                 
15
 As previously noted, will-to-power in the original barbarian caste must be controlled, else be destroyed. 
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individuals as the church. It serves an indispensable governing role for society in the 
present, and preserves a remnant to evolve into greater forms of humanity in the future. 
The priest is not just diabolical, but also magnificent. His magnificence lies in his 
creativity, one might even say, his entrepreneurial spirit. He has ‘dared, innovated, 
thwarted, and challenged fate more than all the other animals put together: he, the … 
insatiable one who struggles with animal, nature and gods for ultimate mastery’ (OGM 
3.13). In turn, he makes possible the survival of humanity through the machinations of 
ressentiment, for in ‘this system of procedures the old depression, heaviness and 
weariness were thoroughly conquered, life became very interesting again ... [In] his 
kingdom … people protested no more against pain’ (3.20, see 17). The priest creates an 
outlet for humanity’s fettered will, thus rescuing it from a withering extinction, in the 
face of the unanswerable ‘cry of his question, “why suffering”’ (3.28)? The priest’s 
creativity also takes the form of protective and provisional status (BGE 3.62; 3.13), that 
is, as means for the next caste, or species of humanity: the philosopher. ‘Graphically 
and vividly expressed: until the most recent times, the ascetic priest gives us the 
repulsive and gloomy caterpillar form in which alone philosophy was allowed to live 
and crawl about’ (OGM 3.10). On the diabolical side, the priestly caste is full of 
deception, first towards itself, then to the masses. As a result, its medication serves not 
to cure suffering agents, but to consign them to an inescapable prison, for its remedy has 
‘ultimately in its aftereffects … proven itself a hundred times more dangerous than the 
disease from which it was supposed to redeem’ (1.6). Regardless, Nietzsche applauds 
the power of will in such a class, even as he rails against it. Without the priest, there 
would be no philosopher of the future.  
This, then, is the cast of castes for ressentiment, and their organic relations to each 
other. To understand how ressentiment works itself out, I will now treat ressentiment as 
a biological mechanism, examining its component parts and how they interact with each 
other to accomplish revaluation. In so doing, I will identify a key component in the 
workings of ressentiment, self-deception, to be used later in a fresh reading of Paul. So 
we turn now to what I call the physiology of ressentiment. Admittedly, this metaphor 
leaves much room for ambiguity, imprecision, and paradox—some even claim 
contradiction. This should come as no surprise, however, when pursuing the physiology 
of a psychological phenomenon. 
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2.4 Ressentiment as Mechanism 
What follows is an explication of ressentiment into its constituent parts. Stage One, 
Internalisation, consists of two phases (see sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2). Stage Two, 
Moralisation, also consists of two phases (see sections 2.4.3 and 2.4.4). This schema 
certainly should not be regarded as inviolable, as different authors organise their 
understandings of ressentiment in different ways.16 Regardless of how it is broken down, 
dissecting it (see UO ‘Utility’ 7) allows us to identify its core, the source of its power 
and its meaning. 
It also bears mentioning that Nietzsche would view the parts of ressentiment more 
in terms of phenomenological associations than as a chronological progression. This is 
helpful to keep in mind in view of the inescapable historicity of his genealogy, so that 
these phases of mind and affect may be permitted to coordinate with one another. They 
defy delimited sequencing, often overlapping one another. This harmonises well with 
the Nietzschean idea of the human body as a manifestation of power, of forces.17 Moore, 
quoting from Nietzsche’s notebooks, illuminates the topic: 
If we translate the characteristics of the lowest living being into terms comprehensible to 
our ‘reason’, they become moral drives. Such a being assimilates its neighbour, transforms 
it into its property … assimilation means to make a foreign object alike, to tyrannise… 
Slavery is necessary for the development of a higher organism, likewise castes. (italics 
original, 2002:79f) 
With all this in mind, I term this discussion a physiology of ressentiment.  
One could argue that Nietzsche spends his entire adult life in the quest of mastery, 
so it is fitting that he has opinions about ambition. Control, absolute and unabashed, is 
not only the pursuit of superhumans, but of everyone, including the squeamish, 
degenerate, disease ridden, milquetoast. Ressentiment is this poor-excuse-of-a-
specimen’s means for achieving it. Existentially, it includes the right of self-determined 
morality, meaning, and identity. Therefore: measuring from one’s own self, right and 
wrong may be arbitrated; mastery over interpretation and allocation of meanings falls 
under one’s purview; perception and projection of one’s own self is, perhaps, the most 
fundamental right of all. Psychologically, ressentiment speaks to overcoming 
domination, which must always be understood in relation to something else, an other.18 
                                                 
16
 See section 1.3.2 of this thesis. 
17
 Nietzsche’s understanding of the organism as the site of a competitive struggle owes much to the 
intellectual lineage of Roux, Haeckel, and Lange (Moore 2004:34-37). 
18
 Though enquiry into the psychology of ressentiment is plentiful, our project remains focused on 
Nietzsche’s discourse on it in the context of the revaluation of moral values, and specifically as it gives 
rise to self-deception in order to consummate the phenomenon. 
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This psychological aspect is the focus of the remainder of this chapter. Implications 
from the former will be entertained later. 
 
2.4.1 Ressentiment as a priori: Expansion of Will-to-power 
This is Stage One, Phase One of the ressentiment mechanism. Nietzsche’s will-to-power 
is ‘the tendency of all beings—humans included—not just to survive, but to enlarge and 
expand—to flourish, so to speak, even at the expense of others’ (Volf 2011:67f). See 
Figure 2.2.19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ressentiment is war by other means incessantly waged by the weak (OGM 2.11, 3.14). 
Relatedly, Huskinson represents much of Nietzsche scholarship when she pits will-to-
truth against will-to-power (2009:6-8, see also 11-13). I argue Nietzsche holds that will-
to-power depicts will-to-truth as a means to traditional morality, in the process exposing 
will-to-power as a slavish functionary in the service of will-to-truth and a guise for 
maintaining the status quo (OGM 2.11f; TI ‘Preface’; see Thielicke 1984:229f). If the 
assumption is that ressentiment begins by ‘I’ in the sense of initiating an effect (i.e., I 
will x), this is not technically correct, for actually ressentiment is a response. 
Ressentiment is will-to-power manifesting itself indirectly. It does so psychologically 
through affects, both conscious and unconscious, in response to an unfavourable 
balance of power. The prefix re- in the word ‘response’ directs attention backwards in 
the course of values formation. ‘Ressentiment … is reaction from the ground up’ (OGM 
1.10). Such a bold statement prompts inquiry after the provenance of such a major 
impetus in Nietzsche’s slave revolt, that of the ressentiment mechanism. From where 
does ressentiment arise? Answers to this question plunge one into the first stage of 
                                                 
19
 I am indebted to LC Chin (2006:8) for the conceptual ideas from which I have derived my portrayal of 
the ressentiment mechanism. 
Figure 2.2 Stage One, Phase One of Ressentiment 
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ressentiment, that of internalisation, and set up the sphere in which ressentiment is 
formed. 
A partial answer to this question is ressentiment arises from bad conscience, ‘the 
genuine womb of all ideal and imaginative events’ (OGM 2.18). The generation of these 
phenomena surely fits Nietzsche’s description of ressentiment activity in creating entire 
worlds (1.10), as well as those things deep and interesting (1.6), promising (2.16), and 
beautiful (2.18). Ressentiment also creates things not so laudable in Nietzsche’s view 
such as sin, redemption, judgement, and deity, but these still technically fall under the 
rubric of ‘ideal and imaginative’.  
However, this merely serves to push the inquiry of origins back further so that it 
must be asked, whence bad conscience? Nietzsche’s answer is three-fold. First, 
ubiquitous will-to-power seeks expansion via ‘all those instincts of the wild, free, 
roaming human beings’ (OGM 2.16). But where such expansion was formerly 
unchecked, it meets a historic accident of earth-altering change. In any conflict there is 
the vanquished and the victor, the victor defining the state of affairs that holds. This 
ushers in ‘something new, … a ruling structure’ (2.17). In a word, it is the State, and it 
drastically changes the field of contest. Made up of ‘the conqueror- and master-race’ 
(1.5), it organises the world by measuring everything against its own values, effectively 
creating a system of power tilted in its own favour (2.17). The key, Nietzsche informs 
us, is what it does to those conquered, the slave race. 
The oldest ‘state’ accordingly emerged and continued to function as a terrible tyranny, as an 
oppressive and ruthless machinery until such a raw material of people and semi-animal was 
not only thoroughly kneaded and pliable [i.e., submissive], but also formed. (2.17) 
Thus, Nietzsche holds the State is responsible for forming bad conscience. 
This broad framework leaves such wide gaps in understanding that a second 
response to explain the appearance of bad conscience is needed. Nietzsche asserts the 
bad conscience grows out of the soil of ‘the oldest and most primitive personal 
relationship of all, in the relationship between buyer and seller, creditor and debtor’ 
(OGM 2.8). Originally a debtor’s failure to repay his creditor results in the substitution 
of something he owned, ‘for example his body or his wife or his freedom or even his 
life’ (2.5). Nietzsche goes to great lengths to evidence the socialisation of mankind into 
a self-aware, promise-keeping animal. For all its levels of sophistication, it is still a 
function of (will-to-) power exercised through cruelty (2.3-6). Such cruelty employs 
pain as a ‘mnemo-technique’ to burn in a sense of contractual liability, what Nietzsche 
terms ‘memory’ (2.3). Over time, personal obligations originating in the simple 
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creditor-debtor relationship evolve into corporate legalities and social complexes, a 
‘morality of custom and the social straightjacket’ necessarily imposed by the powerful 
so that humans may grow beyond barbaric, competing nomads and into a moral 
collaborative civilisation (2.2). In this emergent form, the community represents to its 
members what the creditor has previously represented to the debtor. Masters become 
refined, after a fashion, into nobility as those who abide law and custom (2.8f; see D 
1.9). Nevertheless, the currency of compensation inherent in the creditor-debtor 
relationship essentially ‘consists in a court order and right to practice cruelty’ (OGM 
2.5). ‘Locked once and for all under the spell of society and peace’, cruelty remains the 
right of rulers (2.16). Only now cruelty has become codified into forms of punishment 
and justice employed by the rulers of the polis, the State. ‘The major moral concept 
“guilt”’, Nietzsche claims, ‘has its origin in the very material concept “debts”’ (2.4). So 
he does not construe this guilt as moral in nature. Slaves are simply punished as 
violators (2.8f), yet from the vantage of ‘disinterested malice’, which is to say ‘with the 
clearest conscience [on the part of debtors] in the world’ (2.6). Nietzsche sums up all 
this under the institution of law, and considers transgressors to violate economic 
standards of the community rather than moral ones in any absolute sense. Ultimately, 
therefore, bad conscience is unintentionally caused by the sheer physical enslavement of 
one race by another, and a normalising of that relationship (2.11, 17). 
Third, bad conscience also appears as a result of incipient priestly influence, 
beginning in the era when priests are considered, or at least associated with, aristocracy 
(OGM 3.17). According to Nietzsche, the priestly valuation ‘branch[es] off from the 
knightly-aristocratic [manner of valuation] and then develop[s] into its opposite’ (1.7). 
Knights (and warriors) prize ‘a powerful physicality, a blossoming, rich, even 
overflowing health, along with whatever is required for their preservation: war, 
adventure, hunting, dancing, war games, and in general everything that involves strong, 
free and cheerful activity’ (1.7). Priests value other things. They are impotent and thus 
afraid to act openly for fear of reprisals. Their desire for expression remains 
undiminished, however, and so gives rise to hatred. This hatred is directed toward those 
in power, whether primeval barbarian-masters or present-day noble-masters. It results in 
a posture contrary to everything represented by the masters (aforementioned as knights). 
For Nietzsche, masters are the picture of Life. They say yes to everything in the world, 
whether good or bad. The impotent, by contrast, say no to everything in the world, 
imagining another domain to which to flee for refuge from the perceived suffering of 
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this one. The impotent, for Nietzsche, represent something even more dangerous and 
profound than death. Theirs is the way (paved by the priest) to nothingness (1.6f). 
The impetus for this a priori phase is will-to-power. It is ‘the more natural outlet’ 
(italics supplied; for ‘outlet’ read, ‘force’) at work before bad conscience is invented 
(OGM 2.22). In the next section, we will learn it is both responsible for, and manifests 
itself in new form as, bad conscience when it becomes blocked by the strictures of State.  
 
2.4.2 Ressentiment Conceived: Force Turned back by State 
This is Stage One, Phase Two of the ressentiment mechanism. More needs be said about 
punishment. The natural, perhaps angry, response of those punished is the ‘genuine 
reaction, that of the deed’ (OGM 1.10), to throw off the stranglehold of the masters. In 
light of the existing power disadvantage suffered by the comparatively weak, though, 
this recourse seems impossible.20 What can be accomplished against the very force of 
life itself, that which is ‘the instinct for freedom (in my language: the will-to-power)?’ 
(2.18). Elsewhere, Nietzsche calls this will-to-power ‘the essence of life, … the 
principle superiority of the spontaneous, attacking, infringing, reinterpreting, reordering 
and shaping powers, upon whose effect “adaptation” first follows’ (2.12, 15). It is 
outward in direction. It will seek expression. It will achieve its goal. It can neither be 
annihilated nor interminably caged. It can only be redirected. Thus, ‘this instinct of 
freedom violently rendered latent— … repressed, pushed back, imprisoned deep within 
and ultimately discharging and venting itself only on itself: this, and only this is bad 
conscience in its beginnings’ (2.17).21  
Nietzsche uses the term ‘bad conscience’ in two senses, the first of which we will 
entertain now. This sense of bad conscience bears no ‘inculpatory implication’, as 
Kaufmann translates it (Nietzsche 1992b:464), and stems from mere socialisation. From 
the previous section we understand socialisation to derive from the strictures of State. 
Nietzsche asserts that the establishment of customs, including moral norms, is 
fundamental to civilisation (D 1.16). I will term this ‘gestational bad conscience’. It 
produces two different outcomes, one negative and one positive. To discuss it, we must 
recover the thread of punishment from above. The negative product comes by way of 
the violent and sudden emergence of the State (OGM 2.17). Mankind, in the form of the 
blond beast, strides forward in the creation of civilisation, while at the same time 
                                                 
20
 Such could also be the fate of those heretofore considered powerful and noble. 
21
 Nietzsche’s will-to-power is Rolph’s inchoate ‘increase of life’, both of which are fundamentally 
characterised by a ‘principle of insatiability’ (quoted in Moore 2002:52f).  
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stepping backward into a snare of its own making, a torture chamber made possible by 
the State, in which ‘all those instincts of the wild, free, roaming human beings [are 
turned] backward against human beings themselves’ (2.16). That is, ‘all instincts that do 
not discharge themselves externally’ [Nietzsche lists some of them: ‘enmity, cruelty, 
lust in persecution, in assault, in change, in destruction’] ‘now turn inward—this is what 
I call the internalization of human beings ... That is the origin of the “bad conscience”’ 
(2.16).  
Since Nietzsche views everything through the prism of materialism, this 
internalised will-to-power manifests itself in an altered humanity. Instead of being an 
outwardly directed, spontaneous force that changes and creates the world around 
mankind, redirected will-to-power forms a new world within it. From what we learned 
in section 2.4.1, the State-as-creditor punishes the citizen-as-debtor for failing to keep 
her promises (i.e., obligations to customs). To avoid future such pain, she must develop 
a memory of her promises. To carry out what the memory prescribes, she must develop 
a will. Nietzsche claims the will, in seeking to fulfil promises, gives rise to a sense of 
responsibility. None of this could transpire without the never-before existing internal 
environment, created by will-to-power, called bad conscience. Nietzsche discusses bad 
conscience in the more common term of consciousness, which he relates to awareness, 
which leads to self-awareness, to which he also refers as reflection (OGM 2.1-3). This 
‘tremendous process’ produces the responsible (read, ‘culpable’) individual, one with 
the ability to make promises and the implicit capacity to keep them (2.2). The power to 
remember conflicts with ‘the force that works in opposition here, that of forgetfulness’ 
which Nietzsche also terms ‘faculty of repression’ and ‘repression apparatus’ (2.1).22 
Memory overcomes forgetfulness so nature can achieve its goal of breeding an animal 
whose capacity is justified, whose power is absolute, and who has the right to make 
promises (2.1). Promise signifies mastery of the self and, most notably, its future (2.1). 
Promise-making requires ‘mnemo-technique’, the use of pain to create memory, which 
is essentially an idea forged into a person (2.3). The greater the pain, the more 
unforgettable the idea, until the idea becomes instinctual and absolute. Ultimately, bad 
conscience culminates in ‘what later is called the “soul”’ (2.16). In sum, mankind as a 
                                                 
22
 Nietzsche’s famous ‘doorkeeper’ passage in OGM 2.1 features the Hemmungsapparat, translated as 
‘repression apparatus’ by Del Caro, and as ‘apparatus of suppression’ by Deithe (Ansell-Pearson 
2007:35). Though modern psychology distinguishes between the two, Nietzsche’s usage precedes such a 
distinction and so should not be pressed into the service of one notion more than the other. Thus, I make 
no distinction when referring to the phenomenon of self-deception. 
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responsible animal consciously relates itself to the surrounding world by means of the 
world within. See Figure 2.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The positive product of gestational bad conscience also comes by way of the 
State, but superveniently. Although Nietzsche denigrates things ‘unegoisitic’ at the 
outset of Essay One (OGM 1.2ff), he seems to lend veiled praise to a prime example of 
such in Essay Two, bad conscience. Nietzsche warns us to ‘beware of thinking 
contemptuously of this whole phenomenon [of bad conscience]’ (2.18). He knows it 
might be tempting to dismiss it due to its ugly and painful origins (2.18). How can 
anything good come of something bad? Bad conscience might also be discounted 
because of negatives which ensue. Admittedly, the ramifications of bad conscience are 
far more damning than one might first imagine. The same (will-to-) power that surges 
upward to erect the State’s halls of power also works ‘in a backward direction and in the 
“labyrinth of the breast” … creat[ing] for itself the bad conscience and negative ideals’ 
(2.18). It creates a No-saying animal in a No-saying world. But Nietzsche does not want 
us to throw out the baby of ‘all ideal and imaginative events’ with the dirty bathwater 
associated with bad conscience (2.18). 
Nietzsche’s warning is issued so that something positive is not missed. In this 
light, he should be heard saying, ‘Guard against dismissing altogether this phenomenon 
merely on account of the negatives it possesses at the outset’. To the one with vision 
enough, the result of bad conscience is something so incalculably unexpected and lucky 
that the course of human evolution is interrupted and the axis of the earth altered (OGM 
2.16). That is, bad conscience transforms the world of humanity into a curiosity 
interesting enough to necessitate divine spectators (2.16). This newly evolved race 
possesses beauty worthy of ‘affirmation’ (2.18). It seems to be a contradiction to what 
one (i.e., Nietzsche) might want, but one must somehow account for the enigmatic 
delight of ‘selflessness, self-denial, self-sacrifice’—the creation of generative and 
Figure 2.3 Stage One, Phase Two of Ressentiment 
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regulative ideals (2.18). Bad conscience has redeeming value. No doubt, though, 
Nietzsche takes solace that the positives thus incurred by bad conscience still have their 
source in the cruelty of punishment (see section 4.2.1).  
Thus far, the first two phases of the development of ressentiment have been 
explored. They comprise the internalisation stage (OGM 2.10-16), which is the 
damming up of force (will-to-power) to create a reservoir (gestational bad conscience). 
This sense of bad conscience is devoid of any inculpatory implication and serves as the 
womb for ressentiment. It will become clear shortly that this ressentiment takes on the 
character of its environment. That is, just as bad conscience is pre-moral at this point, so 
also one should think of ressentiment. Accordingly, I will term it ‘proto-ressentiment’ at 
this point in the cycle (see Ridley 1998:15-40). Based on several passages on the slave 
revolt and its morality, understanding proto-ressentiment may be advanced.23 With 
particular respect to slaves, it may degrade into the malignancy which is characteristic 
of their impotence. This course of development will be traced in detail in the next 
section. 
Ressentiment need not perforce follow this pathological pathway, however. 
Indeed, it may not present itself at all in the master, the noble. Masters may deem an 
offence either as insignificant and, therefore, unworthy of attention, or as momentous 
enough to deserve their response. In neither case, however, is the offender perceived in 
moral terms, that is, as an evil enemy (OGM 1.10). On the occasion when ressentiment 
does manifest itself in nobles, it ‘consummates and exhausts itself in an immediate 
reaction’ (1.10), and ostensibly ends in overcoming, with no deleterious effects. 
Evidently this ‘reaction’ is so fast, immediate in fact, Nietzsche considers it evidence 
that these well-born, supercharged humans are active by necessity (1.10). This contrasts 
dramatically with impotent slaves who sever instinct from action. The result is the 
slaves’ enervated instincts, along with accompanying emotions, begin to fester and 
ultimately poison them (1.10). Slaves become silent, biding their time, devising a 
response: the slave becomes reactive-man (1.10, 2.11). Not so nobles because their 
discharge-by-instinct precludes the toxic effects of ressentiment (1.10). 
In concluding my discussion of gestational bad conscience, it is helpful to ask 
how ressentiment originates in it. One might argue that ressentiment rises spontaneously 
in direct consequence to the formation of bad conscience. However, this fails to address 
                                                 
23
 A number of references to ressentiment in this regard may be found in the following aphorisms of 
Essay One: 10 (8x), 11 (3x), 13 (1x), 14 (1x), 16 (4x). 
76 
 
the heart of the question due to the indefinite nature of ‘spontaneously’.24 On the other 
hand it may be argued Nietzsche’s use of bad conscience requires ressentiment to be a 
latent expression of will-to-power inherent in the oppressed (OGM 1.10). In accounting 
for this view, I might say ressentiment arises indirectly, thus still giving opportunity for 
expression via the bad conscience. Like tension produced by the bending of a bow, it is 
merely, but unavoidably, potentialised because of a powerful force operating on the 
individual-become-slave. The nobles act out immediately, instinctively, thus mitigating 
the negative effects of ressentiment. Bad conscience for them remains non-moral, and 
ressentiment is ‘temporary’. It is still ‘bad’ in that their action is constrained and not 
free. But again, bad conscience, as the incubator for personal development (i.e., into 
memory, will, consciousness, etc.) and corporate development (i.e., into culture), 
however painful the experience of its formation might be, may still be viewed as benign 
and even beneficial.  
The second sense in which Nietzsche uses bad conscience contrasts with the first. 
The impotent fear retaliation by means of a straightforward deeds-reaction (OGM 1.10). 
They cannot ‘attack with the fists, with the knife, with honesty in hate and love’ (A 49), 
and so scheme their response over time. This causes the internal environment to become 
toxic so that ressentiment roots and grows. As it does, bad conscience assumes a 
permanent disposition. It becomes truly bad; in my terms, it becomes ‘toxic bad 
conscience’. As we shall see, Nietzsche closely associates it with ressentiment, so much 
so that elaboration on it is saved for the ensuing sections. 
Stepping back for a moment, what is not clear is what causes proto-ressentiment 
to become active or reactive, yielding temporary or enduring results, respectively. That 
is, if both slave and noble collapse into the same relatively impotent individual, given 
sufficiently adverse circumstances (i.e., domination), then what sine qua non determines 
which mode of valuation, slave or noble, should be employed (OGM 1.10)? Nietzsche 
mourns humanity’s illness, but also envisions it to be pregnant with great possibility 
                                                 
24
 Given the ascetic ideal is born of bad conscience, Leiter’s answer to the question of ‘how and why an 
essentially ascetic or “life-denying” morality should have taken hold among so many people over the past 
two millennia’ (2003:9) ultimately proves unsatisfying. Leiter’s solution requires the invention of ‘type-
facts’, which are those characteristics that define a person as a particular type according to a ‘fixed 
psycho-physical constitution’ (8). Leiter’s train of thought approximates this: a person behaves out of 
what they believe, and they believe out of who they are. Leiter writes, ‘The “morality” that a philosopher 
embraces simply bears “decisive witness to who he is” – i.e., who he essentially is – that is, to the 
“innermost drives of his nature” (italics original, BGE 6)’ (9). When he employs the metaphor of a tree 
being typed by the fruit it yields, Leiter takes us back to the same unhelpful starting place. Question: How 
do you know what kind of tree it is? Answer: By the fruit it produces. Question: What kind of fruit is 
produced? Answer: The kind that comes from that type tree.—The net result is unsatisfying. 
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(2.16-18). He seems puzzled as anyone over the magnitude of ‘humankind [as] sicker, 
more uncertain, more changing, more indeterminate than any other animal’ (3.13). How 
is it ‘such a brave and rich animal’ must also be ‘the most endangered, the one sickest 
for the longest time and the most seriously ill of all sick animals?’ (3.13). How can so 
many yeses be birthed by so many nos (3.13)? What possible proposal can Nietzsche 
make to increase the number of humanity’s ‘lucky strokes’ (3.14)? As has been 
mentioned, the development of bad conscience may take one of two different pathways. 
One leads to a staging ground for immediate action by the masters, thus rendering it 
benign, the other toward a breeding ground for subterranean scheming by the slaves, 
thus rendering it malignant. Since Nietzsche follows the second pathway to fully portray 
the mechanism of ressentiment, we will follow it from here forward.   
 
2.4.3 Ressentiment Seeks Relief: Expansion Propelled by Pain 
This is Stage Two, Phase One of the ressentiment mechanism. In the slave, thus far, a 
pent up force (will-to-power) has created for itself a reservoir (bad conscience), within 
which ressentiment has arisen. Following the pathway for the toxic form of 
ressentiment, bad conscience mutates into that form which Nietzsche claims to bear the 
‘sting of conscience’ (OGM 2.14), what we are calling toxic bad conscience. This 
mechanism of ressentiment now enters its second stage, moralisation, in which it 
develops the dastardly character for which it is infamous. 
Just as the first phase begins with the catalyst of injury (see section 2.4.1), so also 
this phase (OGM 3.15). Slavish ressentiment is fundamentally a reaction. It is a revolt, 
and Nietzsche’s primary concern. Moreover, this reaction is different from ‘the genuine 
reaction’, and thus connotes inauthenticity (italics supplied, 1.10). Nietzsche’s most 
sweeping single treatment of ressentiment is found in his very first aphorism to exhibit 
the term, OGM 1.10. Here he describes it as imaginary, self-centred, calculating, 
disingenuous, and sinister. Thus, the slave revolt—the wholesale moral inversion 
perpetrated on humanity—is catalysed when ressentiment25 seeks to break out of 
incarceration to create new values. This new moral landscape comes by means of ‘the 
value-positing gaze—this necessary direction to the outside instead of back onto 
oneself’, which Nietzsche declares to be ‘the very essence of ressentiment’ (1.10). He 
also identifies the need of ressentiment for stimulus which is both external to the slave 
and perceived to be hostile in nature (1.10, see 11; also Conway 1994:329). A 
                                                 
25
 I.e., what we are here calling proto-ressentiment. 
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progression of emotive phenomena issue from such stimulus beginning with the 
emotion of anger, and from which arises resentment (OGM 1.8-11, 15; see Willard 
1988:149). Submit this mix to the pressure of refused expression, and it gives rise to a 
desire for revenge (OGM 3.14). Continued pressure over time causes fermentation into 
rancour, and eventually the womb of bad conscience becomes a cauldron brimming 
with the noxious brew of ressentiment (1.11). Add to this concoction the element of 
personal denial, the active ingredient of which is self-deception (1.11, 13f), as well as 
the character traits of cleverness and imagination (1.10), and the revaluing work of 
ressentiment is complete.  
Before breaking down this phase of ressentiment, a step backwards is necessary. 
As discussed in the previous section, proto-ressentiment both benefits and suffers from 
the precondition of bad conscience (in the gestational sense). Civilised people, 
therefore, have come to operate on the state-building principles of sacrifice, trust, 
patience and the like, yet still from out of the sphere of rage that boils within (OGM 
2.18). Modern humanity suffers a painful, even torturous, internal environment 
subjected to tremendous pressure generated by this ressentiment (3.11). In such a 
condition ‘every sufferer instinctively looks for a cause of his suffering’ (3.15). 
Suffering humanity perceives itself injured. Since ressentiment is a manifestation of 
will-to-power,26 its natural expression is ‘overcoming’. In spatial terms, it might be 
viewed as expansion.  
In this light, injury may be understood as restriction experienced by the victim. 
The instinctual response to this is one of retaliation. Nietzsche expresses two reasons for 
the injured to vent affects (OGM 3.11). The first serves as a defensive measure against 
further injury, and the second as an anaesthetic to kill internal pain (3.15). To these I 
suggest a third reason. It relates to will-to-power—retaliation ultimately serves to 
resume a course of expansion. This is not unique to slaves, but to everyone who is 
attacked, maligned, harmed, threatened, or in any other way physically, psychologically, 
or socially limited against their will. Retaliation is normal. Thus, the response-vector to 
injury in the cycle of ressentiment continues to be expansive, outward, and directed 
toward an other.27 See Figure 2.4. 
 
 
                                                 
26
 Del Caro translates it, ‘power-will’ (3.11). 
27
 So Poellner (1995:130f, 253f) and pace Leiter (2003:202f). 
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Figure 2.4 Stage Two, Phase one of Ressentiment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Only now ressentiment turns ugly. It must be remembered that noble ressentiment is no 
longer in view; it has been discharged because it can be. But we are tracking the slaves’ 
ressentiment because they cannot discharge it. They very much want to do so, for will-
to-power requires it. They hunt for a target upon which to unleash their pent-up energy. 
I will develop this further below. 
I should further qualify the concept of injury or suffering within the context of 
ressentiment. Nietzsche’s presumably inexhaustive list includes such occasions as ‘bad 
deeds’, ‘imaginary slights’, and ‘dark questionable stories’ (OGM 3.15). 
Fundamentally, the concept must include anything leading to a disadvantage or power 
imbalance, resulting in perceived suffering. Perhaps most naturally injury is construed 
as physical in nature. Long ago, Nietzsche claims, humanity experiences this as a 
consequence of war when barbarians ‘still possessed unbroken strength of will and lust 
for power [and] hurled themselves upon the weaker’ (BGE 9.257). He proceeds in the 
same aphorism to associate physical domination with ‘soulish’ strength, viewing the 
latter as source of the former. To exhibit such as universal he offers ‘the Roman, 
Arabian, Germanic, Japanese nobility, the Homeric heroes, the Scandinavian Vikings, 
… Goths, [and] Vandals’ as among those who not only pillage and plunder, bloody and 
spoil, but delight in all their exploits out of the expansiveness of their own being (OGM 
1.11; see 10). The vanquished become the weak, and the physical power gradient set up 
over them should be obvious. Additionally, in the Nietzschean system this asymmetry is 
chiefly characterised by a culture impregnated with victors’ values such as strength, 
decisiveness, cruelty, rage, and ecstasy to name a few. Physical domination is not the 
only advantage of powerful rulers, ‘creating values is the true right of masters’ (BGE 
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9.261). Therefore, injury should include one or more forms of psychological trauma that 
often accompanies and amplifies physical injury. The perception of pain, threat, 
restriction, or any other imposed disadvantage can result in phobias and other disorders 
that remain with the victim long after the physical pain disappears (see Volf 2006:6f). 
Regardless of the form of injury, the key is it creates an imbalance of power, which in 
turn results in pain of suffering in the comparatively weak. Power seeks target (Foucault 
1980:98). 
Let us return to the discharge, the release, the outwardly-moving direction of 
ressentiment. After a fashion, everyone reacts ‘outwardly’ to an attack, so why does 
Nietzsche labour over the trajectory of ressentiment? Two reasons are apparent. First, 
ressentiment requires ‘external stimuli in order to act at all’ (OGM 1.10, see 1.2).  
Ressentiment parasitically draws its impetus, its life, from an other. Its entire 
orientation, including self-valuation, begins with what is ‘outside’, ‘different’, and what 
is ‘a non-self’ (1.10). Therefore, Nietzsche can assert ressentiment ‘is reaction from the 
ground up’ (1.10). In doing so he brands the slave as negative. Second, the noble also 
‘reacts’, but not as the slave. The strong nobles simply act out of themselves. The 
difference is they need no justification for their action-response; they are their own 
reference point. Furthermore, since they are ‘saturated through and through with life and 
passion’ (1.10), they view their action as part of the struggle, the game. Moreover, they 
have no need to retaliate either to regain a sense of self-worth or to replenish their 
happiness because they are ‘full human beings overloaded with power’ (1.10). They are 
constantly full, content in themselves and therefore have no dependence on enemies per 
se in their calculus of joy and life. The stimulus of attack is considered merely part of 
the whole, not a detraction from it. There is no vector, purpose, or moral score to keep. 
Thus, Nietzsche shields the noble from the contaminating effects of ressentiment. 
Not only does Nietzsche characterise this stimulus as external, but also hostile 
(OGM 1.10). Since ressentiment has ‘more need of enemies than of friends’ (TI 
‘Morality as Anitnaturalness’ 3), it conceives of the ‘other’ in adversarial terms such as 
‘the evil enemy’ [and] ‘the Evil One’ (OGM 1.10). Huskinson writes that ‘an illusory 
enemy is thus created from the sense of powerlessness so that I conceive myself to be 
oppressed by an external evil rather than my own weakness’ (2009:23). Leiter debates 
the notion of this ‘other’ as someone, preferring to take the ‘enemy’ to be something. 
He argues that ‘states of affairs can provoke ressentiment’ if the victim perceives the 
self to be powerless (Leiter 2003:202f, note 13). Against Leiter, Nietzsche’s language 
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would seem to favour an entity against which the impotent might pitch his revolution. 
He seeks a ‘guilty perpetrator who is receptive to suffering’, ‘some kind of living thing 
upon which … he can discharge his affects’, ‘someone … to blame’, even the victim’s 
‘friends, wife, child and anyone else who is closest to them’ (OGM 3.15). Wittingly or 
otherwise, ressentiment seeks to justify its existence by means of a ‘guilty perpetrator’ 
(3.15). In casting the inflicting party as ‘evil’, it attaches blame: ‘Someone or another 
must be to blame for my feeling’ bad (3.15). Someone, an other, and therefore external 
to the victim, must be responsible for the pain. ‘It’s your fault!’ is the cry. This is no 
mere designation of transaction, but a declamation of wrongdoing. If such a culprit can 
be found, reprisal may be viewed as justifiable, and even mandatory.28 
The objective in seeking an agent to blame is to assign culpability.29 The good-bad 
axis begins to shift at this point as the charge of injustice is assigned in the slave’s mind 
to the stimulus. Mal-intent cannot go unanswered, and so suffering gives rise to anger. 
However, fear precludes open retaliation to the injury, settling instead for repeated 
reflection on the event. This serves to build aggrievement that amounts to resentment 
(OGM 1.14, 2.11). Again, circumstances prevent open reprisal so machinations of 
revenge must suffice (3.14f). These schemes, due to fear, stay captive in the 
imagination, even as the passage of time intensifies the pressure of perceived violation 
and oppression, fermenting them into the settled disposition of rancour (2.11). All this 
emotive force has been directed against an other along the way, the offending party (i.e., 
the strong, the master, the noble). 
However, a strange phenomenon has been occurring beneath conscious notice of 
the injured party (i.e., the weak, the slave, the offended). Keeping the offence in view 
and seeking redress directly in relation to it becomes moot. The target of accumulated 
anger, resentment, vengefulness, and rancour in the injured has become the 
accumulation of emotion itself, divorced from the offence. Were the offence somehow 
to be redressed, the injured would still find themselves hostile toward the offender 
because the swill of emotions still plagues the injured. Furthermore, it may be the case 
that the significance of the offence has diminished over time to the point where the 
offended party can no longer recall details of the incident, or even exactly what it was. 
In such a case, the term ‘blinded by anger’ might be used for the injured party as it 
                                                 
28
 On the externalising, or ‘target’, of blame, see Williams 1994:123-45.  
29
 Separate explorations into concepts underlying and related to agency such as freedom, autonomy, and 
self would take us too far afield from my interest, but for a helpful single-volume compilation of such 
essays, see Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy (Gemes & May 2009). See also Beyond Selflessness 
(Janaway 2007). 
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relates to the original offence. I will develop this more in the next section. One thing is 
sure, however. There remains a party who is held responsible for whatever it was that 
happened. The culmination of all this activity is best diagnosed as an injured party 
suffering a full-blown case of toxic ressentiment.  
Ressentiment, as such, places offended and offender at opposite poles, 
vengefulness carrying with it self-determined authority and righteousness (OGM 2.11, 
3.14).30 From a self-righteous frame of reference the injured person of ressentiment 
conceives their oppressor as an enemy, and not merely an enemy, but ‘the evil enemy’ 
(1.10). In BGE Nietzsche comments ‘that moral value-distinctions were first applied 
everywhere to human beings and only’ abstracted later to apply ‘to actions’ (9.260).31 
Ultimately, then, ressentiment paints itself into an embattled corner, threatened on every 
side by an ‘opposing and external world’ (OGM 1.10). Nietzsche would view this as a 
struggle against life itself, and in doing so, Nietzsche would say it is life is denied (3.17; 
see Z 1.3). 
 
2.4.4 Ressentiment Wins Relief: Force Redirected by Priest 
This is Stage Two, Phase Two of the ressentiment mechanism. All this pain is propelled 
by accumulating ressentiment, which in turn has been driving its victim’s suffering to 
ever more excruciating levels (OGM 3.15). Ressentiment is wielded with singular 
effectiveness by Christianity ‘to break the strong’ (WP 2.252; see Wallace 2006:230). 
‘Every sufferer instinctively looks for a cause of his suffering; more accurately, a 
perpetrator, more specifically, a guilty perpetrator who is receptive to suffering’ (OGM 
3.15; see Azzam 2015:121f). This sets the stage for the ascetic priest, the ‘genuine artist 
in feelings of guilt’ (OGM 3.20). Priests guarantee relief by promising to find a target 
upon which justifiable redress may be unleashed.  This is the deserving ‘other’ of all the 
suffering endured thus far—‘how at bottom they themselves are ready to make people 
atone’, indicts Nietzsche (3.14). The target must be certain, unswervingly reliable to 
receive the onslaught of pain. Nietzsche calls it a sickness, and it is perceived to be 
terminal (3.13). There is no room for error. Absolute control—mastery—is imperative! 
In such a state of vulnerability, Nietzsche enlightens us that ‘all sufferers are of a 
horrifying readiness and inventiveness in pretexts for painful affects’ (3.15).  
                                                 
30
 Vengeance carries negative connotations and ‘vindicate’, positive (see Barnhart 1995:855 and 861, 
respectively). 
31
 This of course also involves the mistake, informs Nietzsche, of separating the deed from the doer 
discussed in OGM 1.13. 
83 
 
Figure 2.5 Stage Two, Phase Two of Ressentiment 
The human being, suffering from himself somehow, physiologically in any case, something 
like an animal that is locked in its cage, unclear as to why, what for? thirsting for reasons … 
he gets his first clue about the ‘cause’ of his suffering from … the ascetic priest: … he 
should understand his suffering itself as a state of punishment. (3.20) 
Like sheep led to slaughter, they flock to their shepherd, the ascetic priest, to 
receive his prescription, the antidote to their toxin. ‘Right you are, my sheep! someone 
must be to blame for it: but you yourself are this someone, you alone are to blame—you 
alone are to blame for yourself!’ (OGM 3.15). And so the priest alters the direction of 
ressentiment (3.15, 20). See Figure 2.5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The victim is not unfamiliar with this redirecting of force, and may in fact strangely 
welcome it. Humanity is delimited by the ‘bulwarks of society’ the first time around in 
the internalisation stage of ressentiment. This time around, obstruction of the outward 
thrust of ressentiment comes via the priest. This move continues to satisfy two deep 
drives. One is for exertion because the will-to-power must still seek optimisation, the 
other a target for discharge, against oneself, ‘first against the “debtor”’ (2.21). 
Moving from bad to worse, Nietzsche reveals the formula for the ‘most terrible 
and most sublime pinnacle’ of the moralisation stage (OGM 2.19, 21)—to toxic guilt in 
a toxic bad conscience, add a deity concept, and the sick becomes a sinner (2.20-22, 
3.15). To perpetuate the condition interminably, the sinner is made the murderer of God 
(see GS 3.125). The self-torment inflicted by this realisation is beyond bearing. 
Mankind itself is the ‘other’, the target deserving of anger and vengeance and 
judgement, so deserving in fact, the self concurs with this judgement: ‘It’s my fault’. 
Amazingly, the cure for this is also available. ‘Those concepts “guilt” and “duty” … 
turn themselves backward … even against the “creditor”’ (OGM 2.21). For it is ‘God 
sacrificing himself for the guilt of humanity, God himself making payment to himself, 
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God as the only one who can redeem from humans what for humans has become 
irredeemable’ (2.21). This is the way it must be—God has willed it ‘out of love for his 
debtor!’ (2.21). This becomes the way humanity as oppressed makes sense of its world 
and can live with its oppressors. 
This wider discussion of ressentiment has been necessary to highlight self-
deception within it. We now move beyond the redirective aspect of ressentiment to hone 
in on the chief elements of this phase. One is the priest’s role. Priests save eternally by 
wounding continually. That is, their cure is not a cure, but a narcotic serving to alleviate 
pain while perpetuating illness. My attention in this section, however, lies not with 
priests, but with slaves. Specifically, it lies with the consummating attribute of slavish 
ressentiment, self-deception. 
Now that slaves have schemed a way to live with their oppressors, they must work 
out a way to live with themselves. One thing they must not do is look back upon the 
path that brought them to power, at least not consciously. ‘The human being of 
ressentiment is neither upright nor naïve, nor honest and straightforward with himself. 
His soul squints; his spirit loves hiding places, secret passages and back doors, 
everything hidden seems like his world to him, his security, his refreshment’ (OGM 
1.11). Slaves must not even imagine their thoughts and emotions have resulted in 
violence against, and subsequent victory over, another. This is the very scenario to 
which they themselves were subjected and which they despised (see Wallace 2007:215-
17). Self-sickness is the soil in which the ‘poisonous plant’ of ressentiment grows, 
where ‘teem the worms of vengeful and rancorous feeling; here the air stinks of secrets 
and unadmitted things ... And what mendacity not to admit this hate is hatred!’ (3.14). 
Therefore, not only will slaves not view themselves in terms of oppression, they cannot 
view themselves in this way. ‘These “good human beings” … who among them could 
endure even a single truth “about humanity”’ (3.19)! Further, Nietzsche writes if ‘the 
suffering and oppressed’ could see their ‘will to morality’ was merely the ‘will to 
power’ disguised, they would know ‘they were on the same plain with the oppressors’ 
(WP 1.55). Somehow, then, they must account for this new balance of power without 
admitting it is new or unusual. Functionally speaking, these slaves-turned-masters must 
see both themselves and the masters-turned-slaves as part of a natural order, as 
everything in its place. How do they do this? 
For Nietzsche, life is will-to-power (BGE 1.13; 2.36; 9.259; OGM 2.12; Z 2.12), 
the optimisation of power. Even the slaves-turned-masters are motivated by ambition 
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for such control (OGM 3.13), but both their position and ambition have come at an 
awful cost, that of personal suffering. It is a painful past, to be sure, and can be re-lived 
in the present if dwelt upon. The affect-objective of ressentiment, however, is to 
minimise pain. They want to forget their ordeal (see 2.1). Psychologically speaking, the 
former slaves become engaged in denial. They not only look away from what the 
powerful masters used to be and do, but also what they, the slaves, used to be and do as 
well. ‘The most common lie is the one you tell yourself; lying to other people is a 
relatively exceptional case’ (A 55). This denial is the capstone of values-inversion and 
the crowning move in ressentiment. This is Zarathustra’s ‘hypocritical word’, the 
creation of a ‘good conscience’ by the wielder of vengeance (Z 2.20).  
For a new-to-power group the process works similarly, historically speaking. 
Nietzsche writes in A 57 that law is fundamentally grounded in the notion of what we 
may call ‘givenness’, and not in its rational origins. In principle, the goal of law is 
automatic obedience via authority accepted unconsciously. In Nietzsche’s argument, 
slaves use a supposed legacy of divine law to underwrite their newly created system, 
which obviates appeal to any higher authority to challenge its legitimacy. Specifically, 
the slave revolt has devalued the master-system of values to the point where it has 
become non-threatening, inconsequential, and even erroneous to the point of rendering 
it incompatible with the new moral system. Pascal, whom Nietzsche numbers in the 
avant-garde of Christianity’s overthrow of ‘the strong’ (WP 2.252), writes of the ‘just 
rule’ of nouveau-noble orders in terms of imagination. Once the conflict for power  
has been settled, then the masters, who do not want the war to go on, ordain that the power 
which is in their hands shall pass down by whatever means they like; some entrust it to 
popular suffrage, others to hereditary succession, etc. And that is where imagination begins 
to play its part. Until then pure power did it, now it is power, maintained by imagination. 
(Pascal 1995 2.31.828)
32
 
William Wood interprets this as the subordinate group being induced to believe, through 
constant projections of ‘benevolent’ power, ‘that the social order is founded on justice 
instead of force’ (2013:56).33 Foucault stresses the cruciality of deception in this regard, 
that ‘power is tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. Its 
success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms’ (1976:86). 
                                                 
32
 Numbers of fragments in Pascal’s Pensées follow Krailsheimer’s schema: following the year of the 
edition’s publication, 1995, the first number refers to section, the second number refers to topic, and the 
third number refers to the fragment itself. 
33
 For an extended discussion on the role of imagination in maintaining social order, see the entirety of 
Wood’s second chapter, ‘The Reign of Duplicity: Pascal’s Political Theology’ (2013:51-91). 
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This devaluation might also be understood as inertia gained through the 
progression of emotive phenomena. The vector of ressentiment has maintained its 
magnitude, even though its direction has been altered. Thus, a repressive force is used to 
deny revenge, resentment, and even anger. The results? Where there is no revenge, there 
can be no scheme. In the absence of resentment, one cannot find evidence of emotion. 
Without anger, how can one understand the notion of injury, much less that of an 
injurer? Thus, all pain and all struggle are recouped, swallowed up in the revolution 
whose cry is, ‘We good men—we are the just’, to which Nietzsche comments in 
response, 
What they demand they do not call retaliation, but ‘the triumph of justice’; what they hate is 
not their enemy, no! they hate ‘injustice,’ ‘godlessness’; what they believe and hope is not 
the hope for revenge … but the victory of God. (OGM 1.14) 
He continues by probing, ‘In hope of what?’, and then answers his own interrogative, 
‘These weak ones—for they too want to be the strong ones someday, there is no doubt, 
someday their “kingdom” too shall come’ (1.14).  
Depending on how powerful the ‘weak’ become, they may not have long to wait 
for ‘someday’. Nietzsche enlightens us that as the power of a community increases, so 
does its sense of leniency. When a full-grown man is kicked in the shin by a child, not 
only does he not retaliate, he instead may protect the child from slipping. He might even 
go so far as to praise the tyke’s spunk. Likewise, as a people grows in stature, 
confidence, and resources—all measures of power—it decreases the discharge of its 
anger on those who injure it corporately. Speaking of such a prosperous group as a 
collective ‘creditor’, Nietzsche writes that the degree to which he (the creditor) can 
tolerate injury is proportional to ‘the measure of his wealth’ (OGM 2.10). He continues, 
‘A consciousness of power in society could be imagined according to which society 
would be afforded itself the noblest luxury available to it—that of letting its offender go 
unpunished’ (italics original, 2.10; see also BGE 5.201). As if the injury had never 
occurred. ‘Mercy!’ (italics original, 2.10). 
It is no secret that Nietzsche disdains the morality of his day, first in his native 
Germany, then across Europe, and ultimately throughout the western world (OGM 1.12; 
2.7; 23; 3.14). To begin his case in OGM, he singles out English psychologists for their 
investigations which have served only to justify modern humanity’s mediocrity as 
dictated by accepted morality. How could they (i.e., the psychologist) not conduct such 
self-serving justification, he wonders, driven as they are by ‘a secret, malicious, base 
instinct to belittle humanity, perhaps impossible to acknowledge to oneself’ (2.10)? A 
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decade earlier in HH1, Nietzsche is already opposed to such conclusions, that society is, 
passively, the result of morality. Rather, he claims the current pathetic state of society 
‘has not been devised by morality: it wants delusion, it lives on delusion’ (HH1 
‘Preface’ 1). And while Nietzsche rails against all ressentiment-driven systems of 
morality as self-deceived, he repeatedly claims ‘that the Christian ethos in particular 
involves self-deception’ (Poellner 1995:229, note 33). 
By means of such deception then, the process of the revaluation of all values, with 
all the painful struggle and attending ressentiment, fades from memory. Left standing 
proudly, but paradoxically, humbly, are new lords of the earth (WP 4.958), reigning 
over the newly achieved state. The meek have inherited the earth (see OGM 1.7, 15). 
 
2.5 Paul: Perpetrator or Victim? 
That Nietzsche believes ressentiment to be a herd characteristic is beyond doubt. 
Propelled by ressentiment, slaves have successfully overthrown masters en masse. 
Nowhere is ‘the symbol of this struggle, inscribed in letters legible across all human 
history’ more prominent than in the bout Nietzsche bills as ‘Rome against Judea, Judea 
against Rome’ (OGM 1.16). The Romans are the world-power of their day, stronger 
than any nation to date. Yet, they do not realise what they are up against, for the Jews 
are ‘the priestly people of ressentiment par excellence’, and their genius for war-by-
other-means, hitherto, has been unknown (1.16). ‘The decisive figure’ in this conflict is 
Paul (Huskinson 2009:29). Nietzsche both labels him a priest and portrays him 
operating as one (A 42). Furthermore, though Nietzsche never directly links priests with 
toxic ressentiment, they surely reek of its characteristics. If these connections can be 
established, it will be possible to associate Paul closely with ressentiment. 
In OGM 3.14 Nietzsche launches a protracted harangue on slaves as the sick, 
those shot through with ressentiment, and also on the risks of the contagion associated 
with their care. The sick pump madhouses and hospitals full of bad air that ‘stinks of 
secrets and unadmitted things’, which escapes from subterranean chambers wherein 
ressentiment boils and fumes (3.14). Furthermore, the unhealthy go to great lengths to 
represent themselves otherwise. They practice forgery, disguise, and propaganda—‘we 
alone are homines bonae voluntatis’ (3.14). They even parade their ressentiment in 
living effigy as ‘they stroll among us as incarnate reproaches, as warnings to us … 
[that] we will have to atone someday, bitterly atone’ (3.14). Fomenting this ressentiment 
is will-to-power, Nietzsche tells us, so the sick slaves might ‘represent any form of 
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superiority’ and thus satisfy ‘their instinct for secret paths that lead to a tyranny over the 
healthy’ (2.14). Nietzsche leaves no doubt that first-century Judea is full of 
ressentiment: ‘the Jews, that priestly people who in the end were only able to achieve 
satisfaction from their enemies and conquerors through a radical revaluation of their 
values, hence through an act of the most spiritual revenge’ (1.7). 
Immediately on the heels of OGM 3.14, Nietzsche informs us in 3.15 the ideal 
physician for the sick is the ascetic priest. He is an ‘odd shepherd’ indeed since he is 
both distinct from, and similar to, those he leads. The majority of Nietzsche 
commentators lean more on the former view, determining the priest to be somehow 
impervious to ressentiment. Against this view, mutatis mutandis, there is evidence the 
priest shares the slaves’ malady of ressentiment, thus making him very much ‘one of 
them’. First, he is pathologically related to his ressentiment-riddled flock through 
sickness. He is a fellow sufferer. Second, he is fundamentally related to the sick by will-
to-power. Yet his distinctive strength over himself and others indicates he is ‘unscathed’ 
by virtue of will-to-power, but it remains intact from/through/despite what? Nietzsche 
moves along too rapidly to say, but his context all along suggests an answer: 
from/through/despite the suffering that keeps one within the flock. The priest shares the 
primal urge to increase. Third, he is characteristically related to the sick as revealed by 
his relations to the healthy and strong. He naturally opposes them, even as do the 
ressentiment-afflicted. He despises them, presuming to attain some superiority; the 
same is said of those burning with ressentiment (see 3.14). Fourth, he wars cunningly, 
indirectly and by subterfuge, promising one thing while delivering another. The 
ressentiment masses also operate by means of artifice, masquerade, and pretext (see 
3.14). He does not lose his ressentiment capacity for deception (see Poellner 1995:229), 
and even self-deception (see Reginster 1997:289, 291, 297). Fifth, he is related through 
ambition for domination. The priest is on a historical mission such that his herd 
becomes a kingdom; no less the ressentiment-herd itself seeks to extend its tyranny 
everywhere (compare OGM 3.14). He is their ally in revolution. In view of these 
reasons, it may be fairly deduced the priest, while distinct from the ressentiment-herd, is 
not immune to its ravages, and so is a carrier of ressentiment as well. Huskinson 
concurs. She not only speaks of ‘Paul's ressentiment’ (2009:29), but characterises Paul 
as, for Nietzsche, ‘the most diseased man’, the disease being ressentiment (see chapter 
subtitle, 25). ‘These herdsmen [i.e., priests] themselves still belonged among the sheep’ 
(Z 2.4).  
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If such is the case, then Rempel provides a final connection, that between priest 
and Paul. Rempel takes great pains to establish such a correlation by means of 
Nietzsche’s own word usage. Rempel spends approximately two pages reeling off 
passage after passage with very little commentary, mostly in A, that associate the words 
‘power’, ‘lie’, and ‘priest’ with Paul (2002:115-17). Rempel’s deduction may be 
summarised this way. Paul, for Nietzsche, is fundamentally motivated by a lust for 
power. He therefore sanctifies the lie concerning Jesus’ death and resurrection through 
his personal interpretation of God’s law, will, and word. In doing so, Paul assumes the 
role of priest so he might come into power and also be able to keep it (115f). Beyond 
Rempel, it is also worth remembering that Paul's heritage connects him with the priestly 
people, the Jews. Lucy Huskinson states in no uncertain terms, ‘If, for Nietzsche, the 
exiled Jew is full of ressentiment, and the priests are even more so, St Paul represents, 
for him, the most corrupt of them all’ (2009:25). Poellner concurs, citing A 55 to 
support his claim that ‘the genuine “priests” and believers of the various religious and 
ethical creeds—Nietzsche of course has again particularly Christianity in mind—are not 
innocently mistaken; they are in some sense self-deceived’ (2000:229).  
So as a Jew, Paul is a master of ressentiment. Menahem Brinker writes, ‘Paul is 
the characteristic product of the Jewish spirit of ressentiment, typical of slave-morality 
in general, and it is he who deliberately falsified the mystical message of Jesus and 
conquered the spirit of Europe, poisoning it with decadence’ (2002:116). Nietzsche adds 
he operates ‘with the logical cynicism of a rabbi’ (A 44). By the same Jewish roots, 
however, Paul is also a victim of ressentiment. Brinker points out, along with Jewish 
priests, Paul has to create and believe in new values, such as salvation by faith alone, 
out of fear for his enemies (Brinker 2002:116). If this be the case, then at some point in 
the ressentiment cycle, Paul engages in self-deception, which amounts to the following. 
Due to his inner turmoil over failure to keep God’s Law, Paul dissembles to assuage his 
guilt-induced pain. That lie provides release of his suffering onto a scapegoat, Jesus, 
who, in turn is said to have been executed because of Paul and his sin. In all this, 
Nietzsche has a vested interest in engaging Paul on his way to answering humanity’s 
crying question, ‘Why do I suffer?’  
What is this interest in bringing Paul into engagement with Nietzsche? Happily, 
the two are already engaged, as evinced by numerous fascinating coincidences that 
emerge in this study. First, just as Nietzsche writes passionately about Paul, so Paul 
writes with equal passion about a person whom I will argue resembles Nietzsche in 
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profile. Second, both authors place heavy emphasis on the human internal environment. 
Third, their respective moral systems are argued for and against an all-powerful deity. 
Fourth, some concept of truth is a focal point for both. Fifth, each provides backstory 
which may be perceived to counter deficiencies in the other’s position. Sixth, each 
regards the other as substituting for the truly ultimate that which is not ultimate, an 
idolatrous object of positive regard. Seventh, morality (or immorality) manifests a 
relatively progressive, developmental characteristic in both schemes. Eighth, they both 
believe themselves to be struggling in a fight of eternal dimensions (WP 4.1067; 1 Tim 
6:12). Ninth, their aspirations for humanity feature a heroic individual whose 
overcoming of the tragic paves the way and provides a model for others to follow. 
Tenth, freedom is a goal of both schemes of thought. While these connections are 
general, they do suggest commonalities in their backgrounds and their thinking.34 The 
remainder of the thesis will show specific connections in their thought. 
More than suspicious, Nietzsche accuses Paul of playing for power, both in terms 
of Paul’s role in Christianity as well as the promulgation of its message. Nietzsche holds 
Paul to be the founder of Christianity, and he thrice claims in D 1.68 this new religion is 
generated from Paul’s ‘lust for domination’. Regarding the message he preached, the 
Apostle’s repository for it are the Gospels, books about which Nietzsche claims, ‘every 
word is problematic’ (A 44). The power of this supposedly good news lies in its ‘use 
[of] morality as a technique to seduction’, and its messengers (i.e., Christians) magnify 
it in a holy lie (44). The nature of this lie will be taken up in the next chapter. 
Just two years prior to this Nietzsche incorporates several ‘vengeful’ passages in 
OGM 1.15 authored by famous ambassadors of the Christian faith—Dante, Tertullian, 
and Aquinas—which promulgate the lie under the pretence of championing Kingdom of 
God morality. Nietzsche considers this hate masqueraded as love to be a world-class 
and deadly contradiction (1.16). Greater than all these ‘apostles of revenge’, however, is 
Paul, that ‘madman’ and ‘appalling fraud’ whose falsehood is catalysed by the revenge 
of ressentiment (A 46). Nietzsche tells us that he, himself, ‘cannot read a single word 
without seeing gestures’ (44), such that under his scrutiny as a philologist, Paul's fraud 
cannot evade detection behind his ‘holy books’ (47). Moreover, as ‘an old psychologist’ 
and ‘someone with ears even behind his ears’, he who is ravaged with ressentiment ‘is 
made to speak out’ even though he ‘want[s] to keep quiet’ (TI ‘Preface’). Nietzsche 
pronounces him ‘incurable’ (A 47). Taking a cue from Nietzsche, we turn our attention 
                                                 
34
 Further parallels may be found in Salaquarda 1985:126-29. 
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to the writing of the Apostle Paul and, more precisely, to the res signified by Paul’s 
verba. If the Apostle is diseased with ressentiment, as charged by Nietzsche, it stands to 
reason that anything issuing from him bears the same contagion.  
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Chapter 3: PAULINE FALLENNESS IN LIGHT OF NIETZSCHEAN 
RESSENTIMENT 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter One explored the literary and historical contexts for the thesis, and Chapter 
Two examined the makeup of the phenomenon of Nietzschean ressentiment. This 
chapter uses ressentiment as a lens through which to read the first two chapters of Paul’s 
Epistle to the Romans, effectively resulting in a Pauline theology of ressentiment. 
Obviously, when I refer to a Pauline theology of ressentiment, I am not assuming its 
absolute identity with the phenomenon in Nietzsche. From now on, then, I will assume 
the propriety of speaking in theological terms because Nietzschean ressentiment reflects 
points of Paul’s analysis of fallenness.  
The chapter follows this outline. First, the rationale for the kind of reading 
proposed will be specified (section 3.2). That is, a ressentiment reading of Romans 1 
and 2 gains purchase in what is arguably Paul’s most systematic diagnosis of the human 
condition, whether Jew or pagan. This is made possible by employing a hermeneutical 
strategy derived from Karl Barth. Second, a theological exegesis of Paul will be 
performed by mapping the structure of Nietzschean ressentiment onto the Pauline text 
(section 3.3). This brings to the surface for us a creational subtext in Romans 1, which is 
Genesis 1-3 (section 3.3.1), and in which I locate the internalisation stage of 
ressentiment. I will then map ressentiment onto the Romans 1 text proper, wherein we 
will find the moralisation stage of ressentiment (section 3.3.2). This will serve to refine 
my focus for the next move, which is an examination of Romans 2. Using what we 
learned from the previous mapping exercise, I will specifically seek evidence in the text 
of self-deception (section 3.3.3). 
 
3.2 Rationale  
Pauline fallenness cannot be strictly equated with Nietzschean ressentiment. With 
respect to the text in view, what is being asked is whether or not the fallen condition 
bears features which can be usefully conceptualised in terms of ressentiment. Hence, the 
question of hermeneutics looms. Different hermeneutical strategies for reading Romans 
abound. In one account by Jae Hyun Lee, a spectrum of approaches for reading Romans 
is specified. They are labelled social-scientific, intertextual, narrative, rhetorical, and 
linguistic discourse (Lee 2010:1-24). I am not denying any of these approaches may be 
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valid. Indeed, while I cannot in this thesis defend a full-scale hermeneutic, my exegesis 
will undoubtedly show the use of one or more of them. Notwithstanding, my project 
crucially employs an option quite possibly not at all classifiable as a species of 
hermeneutical theory. That is, theological and philosophical reflection on the text in 
light of Nietzsche has unearthed what may plausibly be conceived as some kind of 
ressentiment structure in Pauline reasoning. Additionally, in mulling over the proper 
hermeneutical way to account for this discovery, I have been struck by the possibility of 
reading Paul in light of a Nietzschean conceptuality. I propose this possibility by using 
Karl Barth in his treatment of Romans.1  
Though Barth may not have developed a formal hermeneutical theory, he does 
employ what amounts to a hermeneutical strategy. Barth insists he exegetes Paul, but 
his critics ‘severely’ handle him, and charge him ‘of imposing on the text rather than 
extracting meaning from it’ (Barth 1933:8-10). Principally, this is because Barth reads 
Paul according to a conceptuality alien to Paul. Barth defends his ‘system’ by putting 
forth his ‘prime assumption’ that his exegetical task can only be accomplished with the 
illuminating aid of a conceptuality admittedly not found in the text itself. It is one that 
recognizes ‘what Kierkegaard called the “infinite qualitative distinction” between time 
and eternity’ (10). Barth believes he can remain faithful to Paul’s language (verba) 
while at the same time affirming that the corresponding theological substance (res) 
fuses horizons between the Pauline world and his own. Thus, Barth recounts his 
personal wrestlings with the ‘Epistle to the Romans’ to get to Paul’s intent: ‘During the 
work it was often as though I caught a breath from afar, from Asia Minor or Corinth, 
something primeval, from the ancient East, indefinably sunny, wild, original, that 
somehow is hidden behind the sentences’ (quoted in Busch 1976:98). In the preface to 
his first edition, he talks about ‘penetrating’ Romans to hear ‘the mighty voice of Paul’ 
(Barth 1933:1). In the preface to his second edition he writes, ‘There “remains” 
everywhere, more or less in the background, that which subtly escapes both 
understanding and interpretation, or which, at least, awaits further investigation’ (12). 
Barth interprets the verba of man’s plight in Romans in consideration of what he takes 
to be the res.  
I will similarly approach Paul and Nietzsche, proposing to fuse horizons along the 
following lines. In Barth, I find justification to address the Pauline text with 
                                                 
1
 So-called Barthian exegesis and related hermeneutical theory, setting aside any discussion of historical-
critical theory, is not without controversy (see Colwell 1997:163-79; Webster 2005b ‘Karl Barth’; 
Watson 2007:163-91). 
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Nietzschean thought, and ask whether it is tolerant of interpretation in terms of 
Nietzschean ressentiment without violating Paul. The objective in using Barth is not to 
defend his hermeneutics on the level of theory (if, indeed, he may be said to have one), 
but rather to put forth a model that allows us to perform this reading. I recognise this 
cannot be done straightforwardly; any attempt would be a blatant exercise in distortion 
and arbitrariness. Such a procedure must therefore be undertaken with care, in this 
instance, because the nature of the investigation concerns the deep philosophical 
adumbration of Paul’s res to which his verba point. I trust my use of this model in 
reading Paul along ressentiment lines will, as Barth does with his project (Barth 
1933:10), demonstrate its fruitfulness ad hoc through my exegesis. 
My proposed reading of Romans will demonstrate a correspondence between 
Nietzschean ressentiment and Pauline fallenness. This will be done by mapping the 
structure of ressentiment onto a Pauline analysis of human fallenness, specifically in 
Romans 1:18-2:16. That is, Paul’s fallen-man can be interpreted in terms of bearing 
ressentiment if Nietzschean language is used to describe fallen-man’s actions and 
attitudes. The project encounters an immediate problem in Romans 1:18-32 in that only 
half of the map is apparent. That is, the second half of Nietzschean ressentiment, 
moralisation, correlates with elements of fallenness on the ‘surface’ of the text, but the 
first half of ressentiment seems to be missing. I will argue the first half of the structure 
of ressentiment, internalisation, lies in a creational subtext of Romans 1.  
In support of this creational subtext, or sub-layer, NT Wright remarks that ‘the 
line of thought in 1.18-25 has “Adam” written all over it’ (2013 3.769).2 Just prior to his 
opening commentary on Pauline theology in ‘Romans’, Dunn writes that ‘one of the 
most striking features of Romans is the fact that Paul repeatedly calls upon Genesis 1-3 
to explain his understanding of the human condition’ (1998:90f; see Keener 2009:33). 
Bell argues that ‘Paul refers to the fall of Adam, to Israel and to every generation’ 
(1998:126-31). These assessments have much to commend them. Certainly, there is a 
creation-wide, universal atmosphere about the Romans pericope, generated by at least 
eight contributing factors related to the text itself. One factor is the primary conceptual 
subject of the passage, divinity, presented here in its most general appellative, θεὸς3 
(Rom 1:20, 25). A second factor is the primary conceptual object in the passage, 
                                                 
2
 Pace Campbell 2009:1082, footnote 63. 
3
 See Kleinknecht, et al. 1965:65-119. 
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ἄνθρωπος4 (18, 23). Consistent coordination with the plural pronouns, as well as 
concord with the plural verbs, strongly advocates for taking it as a collective singular. 
All humanity is the object (see Dunn 1998:82f).5 A third factor is the sweeping nature of 
divine initiative directed earthward: ὀργὴ (Rom 1:18), φανερόω in regards to ἀλήθεια 
(18f), and παρεδίδωμι as God’s judgement in part (24). A fourth factor is the wider 
context of the passage which reinforces the theme of universality, apparent in the lead-
in to the passage in Romans 1 where Paul relates ‘the power of God for salvation to 
everyone who believes’ (italics supplied, 16). The theme continues in Romans 2 (italics 
supplied): ‘you have no excuse, O man, every one of you who judges’ (1); ‘There will 
be tribulation and distress for every human being who does evil, … but glory and honor 
and peace for everyone who does good’ (9f); ‘For all who have sinned without the law 
will also perish without the law, and all who have sinned under the law will be judged 
by the law’ (12). Romans 3 carries on with the charge of sin against ‘all, both Jews and 
Greeks’, so that ‘the whole world may be held accountable to God’ (italics supplied, 
3:9, 19).6 A fifth factor is the creational language employed by Paul: κτίσις (1:20, 25), ὁ 
Κτίζω (25), ποιήμα (20), πετεινον, τετράπόυν, and ἐρπετόν (23).  
Beyond the previous five factors, MD Hooker helpfully provides a sixth factor by 
linking Romans 1 (and its context) with the prelapsarian chapters of Genesis by means 
of a catalogue of thematic connections (1960:300f). A seventh factor involves the 
pivotal concept of wisdom, insight sought by man, in this case, apart from divine 
revelation. Both passages in view hinge around verses in which the conceptual term 
appears, expressed as σοφός (wise, i.e., wisdom) in Romans 1:22 and as לַכ ָׂש in Genesis 
3:6. An eighth and final factor which connects Romans 1 with Genesis 3 and the fall is 
the key term, εἰκών (compare Rom 1:23 with Gen 1:26f). Regarding this, Hooker 
convincingly argues ‘that Paul’s account of man’s wickedness [in Rom 1] has been 
deliberately stated in terms of the Biblical narrative of Adam’s fall’ (1960:301; see 
Bruce 1985:80).7 Altogether, these eight factors make a plausible case for the creation-
                                                 
4
 See Jeremias 1964:364-67. 
5
 Sanders would disagree: ‘Paul's case for universal sinfulness, as it is stated in Rom. 1:18-2:29, is not 
convincing: it is internally inconsistent and it rests on gross exaggeration’ (1983:125). 
6
 The leitmotif of universality continues throughout Romans to the end of Chapter 15. It may even be 
found in the ‘excursus’ of chapters 9-11 where Paul seems to detour from his argument and focus on the 
narrower problem of Israel’s estrangement from Yahweh. However, this narrowing more likely serves the 
purpose of making the larger and intended point that ‘God has consigned all to disobedience, that he may 
have mercy on all’ (italics supplied, 11:32). 
7 
See Dunn 1988:53, 91f; pace Fitzmyer (2008:274) and Seifrid (2004:117f), not to mention Witherington 
who asserts that the Wisdom of Solomon underlies Romans 1 but not Gen. 2-3 (2004:63-68), as does 
Campbell who also adds Deuteronomy 4 and Psalm 105[6] to Paul’s intertextual backdrop (2009:360). 
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garden chapters of Genesis, arguably the most universal of all settings, to be considered 
as a substratum for Romans 1:18-25.  
 
3.3 Theological Exegesis 
Obviously, to comment on Genesis is not ipso facto to comment on Paul. Yet, once Paul 
authorises this creational sub-layer, consciously or otherwise, a Genesis 1-3 framework 
must be considered an influence on his Romans 1 subject. This brings us to my 
secondary, or perhaps subsidiary, aim which is to show that the creation account is 
patient of exposition in Nietzschean terms. Paul’s fallen-man has a history, as he 
strongly implies elsewhere in Romans 5:12-19 and 1 Timothy 2:13. Nietzsche’s 
ressentiment-man also has a history.8 A ressentiment reading of Pauline man, therefore, 
involves considering how he might interpret his own origins as portrayed in the creation 
stories of Genesis 1-3. This presupposes fallen humanity could not tolerate a 
straightforward interpretation of their genesis as described in the biblical text, but 
would, in Nietzschean fashion, reinterpret and revalue their origins to justify themselves 
as independent of God, and therefore unaccountable to him.  
                                                                                                                                               
Wedderburn maintains one foot in this camp, but allows ‘that what we have in Rom. 1:18ff. seems to be a 
synthetic description of which the ideas of Gen. 3 have played a part, along with other Old Testament 
passages’ (1978:419). Another candidate text for what lies in the back of Paul's mind is Jeremiah 2, verse 
11. Bell expands Paul’s reference of the fall to include that of Israel and of every human generation, in 
addition to that of Adam (1998:26f, 124-27). Stowers is against reading the fall story in Romans 1:18-32 
(1994:86-97).  
Lee recognises Fitzmyer’s conclusion, but also allows both Moo and Porter who advocate the 
temporal boundary of Paul’s depiction in Romans 1:18-32 to range from the time of creation to his 
present day (2010:110, footnote 27). Barrett unequivocally states both that ‘there are allusions in this 
paragraph that show that Paul has in the back of his mind the story of creation and the fall in Genesis 1-
3’, and that ‘Paul's conclusion echoes the Wisdom of Solomon, which also sees the root of evil as 
idolatry, but on a deeper level’ (1994:62). Hooker, acknowledging the work of Sanday and Headlam, 
allows reference to Wisdom by Paul (1960:299), also giving room for the other two passages. Moo 
presents another argument against Pauline allusions to ‘the fall of humankind in Adam’, while still 
allowing for ‘allusions to the creation story’ (1996:109, footnote 85; Keener 2009:34, footnote 79). He 
asserts that ‘in Gen. 1-3, “idolatry” (the desire to “be like God”) precedes the fall; in Rom. 1, a “fall” (the 
refusal to honour God, v. 21) precedes idolatry’ (1996:109, footnote 85; see Hays 1993:211, footnote 26). 
In response, a verse-by-verse comparison of the two passages is offered to support the notion that Paul 
does have in mind Adam’s fall: 
Genesis 3 Romans 1 
2-3 Revelation 19-20 Revelation 
6a Reason 
} 
21 Rejection 
} 6b Rejection 22 Reason 
7-10 Result 23 Recourse 
12-13 Recourse 24 Result 
22-25 Reality 25 Reality 
Reason and rejection here are intimately associated with one another. In Genesis 3, reason for rejection is 
given; in Romans 1, rejection based on reason is presented. Their consideration as a two-part unit is 
signified by ‘}’. Whilst each of the above passages shares some terms and concepts with Romans 1, none 
of them can boast anywhere near the commonalities proffered by Genesis 3. 
8
 Overly pressing this history for details is unwarranted. See section 2.3 of this thesis.  
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The limitations of this thesis prevent me from expounding the Genesis text 
comprehensively in these ressentiment terms, so I have selected several features to 
examine. The first three features pertain to man in his createdness: his instinct for 
freedom, God as a strong master, and the asymmetry of power between God and man. 
Another separate but related feature is fear. It is separate because it characterises man in 
his fallenness; it is related because it helps explain why fallen-man would reinterpret the 
creational features as he does. In the case of each of these features, Nietzsche can read 
Paul’s subject matter in terms of Nietzsche’s ressentiment. However, the point of this 
thesis is when Nietzsche diagnoses the Pauline subject in terms of ressentiment, this is 
something which, from Paul’s point of view, is characteristic of fallen-man’s 
machinations. In fact, I will go so far as to say that even the peculiarly Nietzschean 
concepts of internalisation and moralisation may be conceptually mapped onto Pauline 
discourse to characterise fallen-man. This procedure admittedly requires imagination, 
but is not arbitrary, since it is guided by the said Barthian hermeneutical strategy. This 
procedure is also crucial for establishing the correspondence mentioned above, and is 
foundational for subsequent mapping (section 3.3.2). 
 
3.3.1 Mapping Ressentiment onto Genesis 1-3 
We turn now to a ressentiment reading of the creational setting as depicted in Genesis 1-
3, and the aforementioned features that effectively trace the internalisation stage of 
ressentiment. It must be kept in mind that one of the most significant aspects of 
ressentiment is the desire to revalue values; particularly, to invert them. This is typically 
performed by reinterpreting things and relationships to make them seem different than 
they are. This includes reimagining past events. I propose fallen-man bears just such a 
perspective, that through the lens of ressentiment he reinterprets the creation accounts.  
The first feature to be discussed is the instinct for freedom (OGM 2.18, see 17). 
Paul would hold one of the blessings bestowed on man in creation is freedom (Betz 
1994:116). This freedom entails volition in matters pertaining to acquisition, growth, 
and optimisation for the sake of realising that freedom. Constitutive of this freedom 
would be man’s desire to be free. Nietzsche would view all of this under the rubric of 
the will-to-power (OGM 2.12), for he typically elucidates it in terms of expansion and 
domination.9 Likewise in the biblical garden scene, man is presented from the beginning 
                                                 
9
 See Stage One, Phase One of ressentiment in section 2.4.1 of this thesis. 
99 
 
as both optimiser and ruler in Genesis 1:26-28. This is epitomised in God’s charge in v. 
28: 
And God blessed them. And God said to them, ‘Be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth 
and subdue it, and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the heavens 
and over every living thing that moves on the earth’. 
An argument can be made that the drive for optimisation is a natural outworking of the 
imago Dei and the created order in general. Will-to-power on this construal is not evil, 
nor even bad. How is it, then, this impulse becomes corrupted, such that man might lean 
toward a Pauline fall? A ressentiment reading of this divine mandate would interpret the 
Creator’s decree language to bear the force of restrictive permission, and consider it 
punitive. This reading would willingly ignore at least two possible intentions of the 
decree. One intention could be to channel man’s created energies into the optimisation 
necessary for expansion and rule. The other intention might be to direct man toward the 
fulfilment that man could expect from his work. Effectively, the Creator would be 
viewed as merely allowing man the guise of freedom to ‘have dominion’, thus 
circumscribing the Nietzschean notion of will-to-power as ‘the essence of life’ (OGM 
2.12). Will-to-power as a grant is something that ressentiment cannot abide (2.18).   
The prohibition of Genesis 2:16f is an element of the creation story that bears on 
man’s instinct for freedom: 
And the LORD God commanded the man, saying, ‘You may surely eat of every tree of the 
garden, but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat, for in the day 
that you eat of it you shall surely die’. 
In terms of ressentiment, this decree may be interpreted as further violating freedom qua 
freedom. It would willingly discount the benevolent character of the one who gave it 
(see Gen 3:5), and treat the prohibition as a denial of privilege instead of a protection 
from unknown danger. Paul’s Romans 1:32 declaration of God’s righteous death 
sentence may thus find its precursor here in 2:16f, but in ressentiment terms of negation 
of life. If man’s freedom is construed as will-to-power, then the divine ‘blessing’ of 
freedom is merely a gilded form of oppression.  
This brings us to a second selected feature in the creation chapters, which in 
Nietzschean terms is the presence of the Strong, the Master. This corresponds to God as 
creator in the Genesis text, and of course Paul holds that creation is presided over by an 
omnipotent being. Not only does God create the world from heaven, inferred by 
comparing Romans 1:20 with 1:18, but from there he both reveals himself and makes 
decrees to his creation as well (1:18f, 32). In the Genesis text, this notion is 
communicated through several aspects. One aspect is the consistent use of the Hebrew 
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name for deity, סיהלא, the plural intensive of לא being characterised by strength, control, 
supremacy, ownership, and binding force (Brown, et al. 1951:43; Tenney 1976:761-
64).10  
Another aspect of mastery is the power to create, for the God of Genesis 1 and 2 is 
chiefly a creator. As it happens, Nietzsche indicates the same sort of power is wielded 
by ressentiment, even to the point of creating a world amenable to the ressentiment-self 
(OGM 1.10). No greater sign of mastery can be offered than this, a self-authorised 
world. A ressentiment reading would therefore view the God of Genesis as this strong 
master who does what he does in the knowledge that he has ‘established [himself] and 
[his] doings as good’ (1.2). With himself as his own reference point, he manages ‘the 
right to create values, to coin names for values’ (1.2). This permits the valuation of 
‘good’ regarding the particulars of his creation (Gen 1:4, 10, 12, 17, 21, 25), and ‘very 
good’ in relation to the whole (31). For ‘nothing at all can find a place unless a 
“meaning” in relation to the whole has first been implanted in it’ (OGM 2.17). In terms 
of ressentiment, the giving of names is ‘the master’s right’ and is connected to origin of 
language in such authority (1.2). The biblical text reflects this connection by recording 
the initial creative act via divine fiat—‘And God said’ (italics supplied, Gen 1:3a)—that 
is, creation through language. ‘They say “this is thus and such”’, writes Nietzsche in 
OGM 1.2, to convey the power of language wielded by the master (see Ross 1988:102). 
Thus, in Genesis 1:5 God calls the light day and the darkness night. Even more 
momentously, God calls the zenith of his creation, that unique artefact of his own 
image, man (   ָׂדאָם , 1:26f; compare Acts 17:24f).  
Yet another aspect may be considered a subset of the previous one. It is the 
specific act of naming, which bears the power to define. Genesis 1:2 describes the earth 
as being ‘without form and void’. In language reflective of ressentiment, the world 
becomes ‘interesting’ (OGM 1.7) precisely because of the subsequent forming and 
shaping activity of the Creator in Genesis 1:3-30. Nietzsche informs us when masters 
declare ‘this is this’, by necessity of course they mean that ‘this is not that’. This defines 
boundaries and sets limits. Paul also observes mankind lives within divinely prescribed 
boundaries that are everywhere present in creation (Acts 17:26).11 Here in the Genesis 
text, there is a sequence to creation: not everything is created at the same time. We 
might say that there is a prescribed rhythm to creation: each subsequent act transpires 
                                                 
10
 This acknowledges the compound name of סיהלא היהי  employed in Genesis 2:4-3:23, into which the 
characteristics of סיהלא are incorporated. 
11
 On the authenticity of Paul’s speech in Athens, see footnote 14 in this chapter. 
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within the span of evening and morning. There are various delineations: spatial—
between atmospheric and topographic waters, and between the heavens and the earth 
(Gen 1:6-10); chronological—demarcating day from night, and the passing of days, 
seasons, and years (14-18); biological—reproduction signified by ‘after their kind’ (11, 
12, 21, 24, 25).  
A final aspect of mastery synergises all three of the preceding aspects. It comes 
specifically in the creation of a bifurcate-form, inter-dependent creature. Humanity, as 
portrayed in Genesis, is created and blessed as male and female. This may not be so on 
a ressentiment reading. Humanity’s creation is a manifestation of supreme control, for it 
is named and fashioned into a pluralistic, self-expression of סיהלא—‘“Let us make man 
in our image, after our likeness” ... male and female he created them’ (italics supplied, 
26f). As created, humanity is summoned from non-existence; as named, it is branded 
with an identity; as fashioned, it is moulded into a predetermined form. Thus, in terms 
of ressentiment, man may in every way be viewed under the control of, even to the 
point of being a product of, a Master. Not to be overlooked is mankind’s vocation to 
reproduce its own species as well as to cultivate its environment (Gen 1:28; 2:15). The 
biblical text plainly issues these under the rubric of ‘blessing’ (Ross 1988:113). While 
compliance is not explicitly mandated, a ressentiment reading would definitely sense 
force as underwriting the creator’s directives to ‘be fruitful’ and ‘to work and keep’ the 
garden. Calling creates obligation, and failure to meet the Master’s expectation will 
surely be regarded as disobedience and result in judgement (see Gen 11:1-9). This 
connection is embellished by considering Nietzsche’s portrayal of that ‘oldest and most 
primitive personal relationship of all, [that of] creditor and debtor’ (OGM 2.8). It is not 
difficult to read the creation account in these terms, with God as the creditor and man as 
the debtor, and this certainly finds resonance in the semiotics of Pauline justification 
(Rom 4:4). In view of God’s creation of man’s environment, sustenance, and means for 
pleasure, to say nothing of creating man himself, man’s debt is obedience and 
obeisance. Failure to repay one’s creditor, Nietzsche reminds us, results in the 
substitution ‘of something that [the debtor] otherwise “owns” or over which he 
otherwise still has power, for example his body or his wife or his freedom or even his 
life’ (OGM 2.5; see Gen 2:5). Nietzsche’s further comments in OGM 2.9 trade on the 
principle that an injured creditor is justified in venting hostility on the debtor as an 
offender and a lawbreaker.  
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What is fair repayment for refusing such a creditor as portrayed in Genesis, a 
benefactor to whom man owes everything, even life itself? Might it be forfeiture of that 
life? Such a conclusion is neither unwarranted nor unreasonable. A ressentiment reading 
would say the structuring of man’s very first estate sets in motion his obligatory 
socialisation as a self-aware, promise-keeping animal. For, regardless of its elemental 
form, this state, and man’s awareness of his place in it through conscience, is still a 
function of power. Nietzsche would assert such enforcement is exercised through 
cruelty (OGM 2.3-6). The ultimate cruelty, the right of this creditor-master, being the 
threat of death, finds its biblical analogue in Genesis 2:17. Paul will later write that 
God, who in this reading is the injured creditor, is thus justified in treating sin-debtors 
as enemies (Rom 5:8-10; see also Groves 2007:100), and in responding with every 
manner of wrath and hostility (Eph 2:3; see also 1 Cor 15:25). A ressentiment construal, 
on the other hand, sees it as evidence of bad conscience. From the opening chapters of 
Genesis to Paul’s commentary in Romans 1, its formation begins by redirecting the 
expansion-seeking will-to-power back into man himself (see Stage One, Phase Two, 
Figure 2.1). By ressentiment lights, all these aspects of mastery serve only to mask the 
deity’s privilege as creational ‘givens’. In the spirit of Genesis 3:5, he knows that were 
he disclosed as such, he would be seen for what he really is, a strong Master who 
creates a world ultimately for himself.  
A third feature flows from the second, a resultant asymmetry of power. To set this 
up, we focus our attention on various details in the biblical text. Genesis opens by 
introducing us to סיהלא, the supreme, self-sufficient one (Gen 1:1).12 The creation 
programme ensues immediately, the text evidently assuming the right of סיהלא to create, 
presumably because of his pre-existence and self-sufficiency (1:3ff). Man is introduced 
into the creation account at its conclusion (1:26ff), and becomes animated only after 
receiving the breath of life from the Lord God (2:7). Arguably the most significant 
element in the creation account, excluding man, is the ‘tree of the knowledge of good 
and evil’ (2:9). Beyond Genesis 1:28-30, it is the only thing about which specific 
instruction is imparted, and negative instruction at that (2:16f).  
                                                 
12
 See Paul’s designation of Jesus Christ in 1 Timothy 6:15 as the ‘only Sovereign’ (μόνος Δυνáστης). 
That Paul has in mind the character of the deity from the Old Testament should be obvious in the 
subsequent designations of ‘King of kings’ and ‘Lord of lords’, to say nothing of the unique 
characteristics in the following verse, ‘[he] who alone has immortality, who dwells in unapproachable 
light, whom no one has ever seen or can see’. More may also be said about the nature of worship called 
for, as indicated in the next verse, ‘to him be honor and eternal dominion’ (16).  
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The asymmetry of power between God and man can be detected through a number 
of ‘givens’ within the Genesis text, and a ressentiment reading of them might be as 
follows. The opening salvo of Genesis, ‘In the beginning, God …’, presents an 
archetypal master-figure. God, as creator, is accorded ipso facto privilege to establish 
the first state. Man is placed in this state with the balance of power already against him, 
i.e., through the implicit limitation intrinsic to creatureliness, and that, for the pleasure 
of the Creator (Gen 1:31). Man is summoned into existence without his consent (Lewis 
1994:64; see also Lowe 1999:118). A further layer of asymmetry may be implied by the 
necessity of God’s breathing into man for him to be accorded optimal status, that is, as a 
living being (Gen 2:7).13 It is not enough that man is constructed materially after a 
certain blueprint, but also that life comes only as a result of the dependence-creating 
circumstance of inspiration.14  
Then there is the matter of the ‘tree of the knowledge of good and evil’ (Gen 
2:17). The very fact that it is created as such, and plausibly for the prohibitive purpose 
which unfolds in the creation account, surely serves to instantiate the notion of a 
gradient regarding who is and who is not in charge, who makes the rules and who must 
follow them (Mulhall 2005:115). The content of the prohibition—‘you shall surely die’ 
(Gen 2:17)—reinforces the same and, again, presages the Pauline divine decree of death 
in Romans 1:32. Prohibition regarded as power stands as the constant threat of the use 
of that power, and perhaps anticipates the dynamic of ὀργὴ as Paul uses it in the New 
Testament—a settled opposition to evil, but building toward its breaking forth (see 
section 3.3.2). Life given may also be taken, as Paul expresses repeatedly in Romans 
5:12-19.  
I introduce the final feature by posing a question: why in the first place would 
anyone construe the creation stories in ressentiment terms? The answer, mentioned 
briefly in the previous chapter and discussed at length in the following chapter, is here 
stated simply. It is fear. Fallen-man, as does ressentiment-man, fears authority and the 
consequences of being at its mercy. Therefore, he must interpret events and 
relationships surrounding his origin in a manner that shields him from peril and harm. 
The fear motivating this reinterpretation is projected into the creation story such that 
several rudimentary elements, when read through ressentiment, will coalesce into fear. 
                                                 
13
 The moral aspect of this valuation will be addressed later. 
14
 This notion is later conveyed in words attributed to Paul by Luke, ‘[God] himself gives to all mankind 
life and breath and everything’ (Acts 17:25c). See Gärtner (1955) on the plausibility of the Areopagus 
sermon reflecting Pauline thought. Also note that Luke is an associate of Paul. 
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In the Genesis text, my primary point of reference is the prohibition of 2:16f. Its 
significance for fallen-man is the consequence of which Paul writes in Romans 5:12, 
‘sin came into the world … and death through sin’. To perform a ressentiment reading 
of man’s response to the garden prohibition, however, we must contemplate two 
matters.  
The first matter to contemplate is the Pauline notion of fear, particularly in the 
way he uses it to characterise man’s response to God. Paul’s favourite term for fear is 
φόβος. He uses it to refer to a gamut of human reactions to God, a spectrum that draws 
on a long history. Balz mounts evidence from ancient Greece to show that the φόβος 
word group used in the New Testament bears a range of meaning from ‘terror and 
anxiety to honour and respect’, always in response to an encounter with force 
(1974:192). The same semantic range may be found in the Septuagint: terror and dread 
(Exod 15:16; Psa 55:5; Isa 19:16), or respect and reverence (Lev 19:3; 2 Kgs 17:7; Eccl 
12:13). The salient object of the fear response to my interests is death (e.g., Gen 26:7). 
Sometimes fear of death in the Old Testament is melded with fear of defeat in battle 
and/or subsequent subjugation and slavery (Exod 14:10; Deut 2:4; Josh 9:24). 
In the New Testament, when Paul writes to the Corinthians about ‘bringing 
holiness to completion in the fear of God’ (2 Cor 7:1; see 2 Cor 5:11), the meaning of 
φόβος conveys respect. When he writes to the Romans about fearing state authority 
because, as ‘the servant of God, [he] carries out God’s wrath on the wrongdoer’ (Rom 
13:4), his sense seems to bear something stronger than mere respect because of divine 
anger that underwrites earthly authority.15 Such a fear may also lead to blessing. The 
Corinthians’ fear is rewarded by deeper spiritual intimacy with God, to say nothing of 
benefits in the material realm. The Romans’ fear will result in both approbation, 
mediated through human authority, and a good result, primarily in a material sense.  
The second matter to contemplate is how a ressentiment perspective reframes the 
garden scene wherein the tree of prohibition is planted. From the previous three features 
discussed above, we learned that a ressentiment view sees the scene as oppressive for all 
its fixedness in boundaries and relationships. Based on Nietzsche’s deconstruction of 
the biblical garden account in BT ‘Birth’ 4 (see also A 48), I suggest that Nietzsche 
would be amenable to viewing the garden as the very first State. Taken this way, OGM 
2.17 is especially compelling where Nietzsche writes that ‘the oldest “state” accordingly 
                                                 
15
 In this regard, consider also Moses (Exod 34:30) and Joshua (Josh 4:14), both of whom were perceived 
by Israel to be Yahweh’s agents and, therefore, channels of his power. 
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emerged … as a terrible tyranny, as an oppressive and ruthless machinery’.16 Key to the 
tyrant’s authority is the right of might (see 3.15). Cruelty is the prerogative of masters, 
and the attending self-justification is the means to instantiate rule. It is also the means 
for shaping the realm.17 Accordingly, Nietzsche explains the oldest state works violence 
‘until finally such a raw material of people and semi-animal was not only thoroughly 
kneaded and pliable [i.e., submissive], but also formed’ (2.17). In a state, power 
becomes law becomes morality; those who break the law violate its morality, and are 
subject to the authority in power (2.8f, 16f). 
We now return to the biblical text and the edict of Genesis 2:16f. Keeping in mind 
from above the Pauline notion that God is a being to be obeyed because he is to be 
feared, and the ressentiment construal of the garden scene as the original State in which 
God is an oppressive authority, the prohibition concerning the tree may be read as a 
threat of force. ‘You shall surely die’, when uttered by a despotic master (see 2 Tim 
2:21),18 carries with it ipso facto wounding. It is injurious to any sense of otherness 
seeking expansion; advancement must cease and its course be altered, all under duress 
of confining stricture. Such domination surely catalyses tremendous anxiety, for 
punishment by its very nature threatens potential.19  
In Genesis 3, man does in fact break the divine command and plunges into sin. 
According to ressentiment, he incurs deep debt. As a result of man’s now adversarial 
position, he perceives ‘the anger of the injured creditor (i.e., God) [that] pushes him 
away’ (OGM 2.9). He flees and hides from God out of fear (φοβέω, Gen 3:10), 
specifically, fear of punishment. A ressentiment mindset would rather mete out 
punishment than take it, for it is ‘the imperative declaration generally of what in [the 
authority’s] eyes will count as permissible, as just, as forbidden and unjust’ (OGM 
                                                 
16
 The quotation concludes by asserting that the state is not in accordance with ‘that wishful fantasy that 
has it beginning with a “contract”’ (OGM 2.17). Rousseau, ironically in his work The Social Contract, 
concurs on the fearsome character of the state: ‘In vulgar usage, a tyrant is a king who governs violently 
and without regard for justice and law. In the exact sense, a tyrant is an individual who arrogates to 
himself the royal authority without having a right to it. This is how the Greeks understood the word 
“tyrant”: they applied it indifferently to good and bad princes whose authority was not legitimate’ 
(1952:419). If Nietzsche is not familiar with The Social Contract (1762), it is hard to believe that he is 
unfamiliar with its thought. He gives evidence of familiarity with Émile (see BT ‘Birth’ 3), published in 
the same year, which ‘closes with a synoptic account of Rousseau’s political theory as outlined in detail 
in the Du contrat social’ (1991:20). Furthermore, Nietzsche includes Rousseau in a list of only eight 
thinkers with whom he himself ‘must come to terms’ (HH2 1.408). 
17
 See Chapters One and Two of Berger & Luckmann’s The Social Construction of Reality (1967). 
18
 Note Paul’s allusion to God as δεσπότης in 2 Timothy 2:21. 
19
 I am indebted to Dallas Willard for this insight. What he attributes to the emotion of anger, I have 
applied to the notion of threat. While his discussion does not relate the two, it most certainly allows for it 
(Willard 1988:147f). Furthermore, the threat of death in Genesis 2:17 may be read as lying ‘behind’ 
God’s wrath in Romans 1:18, reinforced by 1:32. 
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2.10). But fallen-man is not in authority. He cannot retaliate to the threat on his life, so 
he hides in impotence, and in fear. 
It has been previously demonstrated that, generally speaking, unactionable fear 
leads to anger. This anger within the confines of this earliest of states, biblically 
speaking, a state characterised by creational limitations as well as commands and 
attending punishments, reinforces powerlessness. It is such impotence, Nietzsche tells 
us, that ultimately generates (proto-) ressentiment (see section 2.4.2). In such a 
pressurised environment, one may see how the creation story, read through a 
ressentiment lens, results in man being ultimately evicted from the garden by an 
oppressive authority. Punishment for disobeying God’s law is the price man must pay to 
realise his potential. The result is ‘the internalization of human beings [and] what later 
is called the “soul”’ (OGM 2.16). What the soul is to ressentiment-man, the guilty 
knowledge of culpability is to fallen-man.  
Nietzsche characterises Paul as ‘the greatest of all the apostles of revenge’ (A 45), 
averring that the New Testament, for which he is the spiritual source, is ‘born out of 
ressentiment’. ‘What follows therefrom’, Nietzsche writes next in A 46, is that the New 
Testament is nothing more than ‘cowardice … shutting of the eyes … and self-
deception’. He continues to use this same lens in A 48 to view the ‘celebrated story … 
which stands at the commencement of the Bible’, and he leaves no doubt that his target 
text is Genesis 1-3. As he has with Paul’s conversion story, Nietzsche claims the 
creation story, and man’s original sin that form the backdrop to Romans 1, have not 
really been understood.  
In this section, I have proposed Romans 1:18-32 contains a theological sub-layer 
which finds its substance in Genesis 1-3 (Hooker 1960; Dunn 1998). Key features of the 
creation setting have been identified as subjects for reinterpretation by a fallen 
perspective, which is to say, through a ressentiment reading. A further feature of 
fallenness, fear, has been identified to help explain the motivation for this reinterpretion. 
Together, these features find correspondence in the first stage of Nietzschean 
ressentiment, internalisation. From here, ressentiment continues cycling toward its 
second stage, moralisation. To see that, we must return to the surface of the Romans 1 
text. There I will continue the mapping of ressentiment onto Paul as he builds his case 
for human fallenness.  
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3.3.2 Mapping Ressentiment onto Romans 1 
Exegesis commences in this section with the second half of Romans 1, verses 18-32. 
Rather than exegete verse by verse or section by section, my procedure will instead seek 
to identify salient aspects of ressentiment to outline the second stage of the mechanism, 
moralisation. This will be conducted through exegetical investigations involving the 
concept of God’s ὀργὴ, particularly in association with ἡ ἀλήθεια about which Paul 
writes. Since this passage is couched in a larger literary section of the epistle, 1:18-3:20, 
two preliminary words related to context will be helpful.  
The first preliminary word concerns the human subjects of Paul’s focus. 
Technically, Romans 1:18-32 is most likely concerned with Gentiles or pagans, and 2:1-
3:8 with the Jews. Stowers follows Sanders in discussing the passage under the 
classification, ‘Decline of Civilization Narratives’ (1994:85; see also Sanders 
1983:125).20 Even though he sees Genesis 3-11 as the backdrop for Romans 1, he does 
not agree it draws on forms of civilisational decline because it leaves out structural 
details (Stowers 1994:90f). Against Stowers, one may argue Paul’s sweeping 
description of the world in Romans 1 resonates with that of the narrative of the early 
chapters of Genesis, including the use of past-tense verbs. Other authors of Hebrew 
Scripture maintain a similar tone and level of generality (Lev 20:22-26; Isa 34:1-15; 
Ezek 5:5-17; Mic 1:2-4), such that Paul may be viewed more in their rhetorical lineage 
than that of the Greeks and Romans (see Collins 2010:138, 160, footnote 64). 
Furthermore, the topic to hand of Romans 1 and 2 is framed by a wider view of 
humanity: Romans 1:16 speaks of ‘salvation to everyone who believes’, and 3:9-20 
indicts ‘the whole world [as] accountable to God’ because of sin. It should also be noted 
when Paul refers to his Romans 1:18-32 subject, he uses a singular noun ἄνθρωπος (18, 
23), which he consistently coordinates with plural pronouns and uses in concord with 
plural verbs. This strongly advocates for taking ἄνθρωπος as a collective singular, and 
for construing Paul’s subject as the vast population of fallen humanity (Hooker 1960-
61:299; Gifford 1977:62; Moo 1996:96; Witherington 2004:58-64; Barth 2010:2.119-
21; see Cranfield 1987:105f; Dunn 1988:54; Wright 2002:428; Seifrid 2004b:118-21). 
Thus, when referring to Paul’s subject(s) in this section, I will speak of mankind in 
general. 
                                                 
20
 In reference to this passage in particular, as well as to Romans as a whole, Campbell characterises 
Stowers’ reading as ‘simultaneously brilliant, insightful, polemical, and muddled’ (2009:465). 
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A second preliminary word relates to Paul’s thesis. The thesis of Romans 1:18-32 
is: God is revealing his righteousness in his wrath against all man. The ultimate context 
for this passage is found just prior to my passage in Romans 1:16-17, and is by all 
accounts considered the theme of the entire letter (Bruce 1985:73-77; Dunn 1988:36-49; 
Wright 2002:423-28). I articulate the theme as this: the gospel is God’s saving power 
revealed in his righteousness (see also 1 Cor 1:18). This is hardly controversial, but I 
state it to discuss the relationship between God’s δικαιοσύνη in verse 17 and his ὀργὴ in 
verse 18, both of which ‘are being revealed’ (ἀποκαλύπτεται).21 I hold the revelation of 
God’s righteousness, perforce, involves the revelation of his wrath, for divine glad 
tidings may only be understood against the backdrop of man’s grim estate.22 These 
tidings are being made known through the gospel, the salvation drama that is moving to 
its conclusion in Jesus. Thus, the gospel is comprised of both offence and offer, which 
Paul takes up in the balance of his letter.23 Romans 1:18-3:20 speaks of man’s offence to 
God’s righteousness, and 3:21ff speaks of God’s offer of righteousness (i.e., status and 
relationship) to man as offender. Positively, the revelation of God’s righteousness finds 
a historical marker in his faithfulness to the ancient promises to Abraham, such that God 
will put to right all things and consummate salvation for the whole world in the 
eschaton (Wright 2013 3.774-815). Negatively, Paul consigns fallen humanity to the 
status of ‘children of wrath’ (Eph 2:3), and warns that wrath is being stored up in the 
present for judgement in the future (Rom 2:5, 16, see 1:32). The palpable tension in the 
drama is set by divine wrath. 
I now engage the exegetical task in earnest. As we shall see, an understanding of 
God’s ὀργὴ in its association with ἡ ἀλήθεια is foundational for understanding Romans 
1:18-32. Therefore, the balance of this section will be given to a cluster of interrelated 
hermeneutical inquiries related to it. Investigation of God’s ὀργὴ may be framed by two 
questions. The first question is, what is the nature of God’s ὀργὴ? To answer this 
question, we must keep in mind that meanings of words are greatly determined by 
syntagmatic and paradigmatic relationships, and any attempt to get to a core sense 
                                                 
21
 There are debates, however, over the meaning of τὸ εὐαγγέλιον, the nature of δικαιοσύνη θεοȗ, and the 
relationship between the two terms, and also the content and time-referent of ἀποκαλύπτω. None of them 
encumber my project. 
22
 See Barth on the ‘shadow side’ of God’s ἀποκάλυπψις (2010 2.1.119-21). 
23
 Paul also presents his gospel to the Philippians as a sign with a dual-message: of destruction for those 
who oppose it, and of salvation for those who promote it (1:28). See also Seifrid who says that the 
positive message of salvation always comes ‘in and through’ the negative message of judgement 
(1998:125). 
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signified by a word must concern itself with the context(s) in which that word is used.24 
Paul primarily employs two words translated as ‘wrath’ in his letters. Five times he uses 
θυμός,25 and its usage aligns with ‘a root that means “to rush along fiercely,” “to be in a 
heat of violence,” or “to breathe violently.” The idea is perhaps best captured in the 
phrase, “a panting rage”’ (Boice 1991:132). Eighteen times he uses ὀργὴ.26 One does 
not commit a genetic fallacy by recognising that Pauline usage of the word conforms to 
a root meaning ‘to grow ripe for something’, portraying ‘wrath as something that builds 
up over a long period of time, like water collecting behind a great dam’ (132). Paul 
seems to reserve ὀργὴ to signify divine wrath, as opposed to human anger. Properly 
speaking, ὀργὴ is not an attribute of God such as love or holiness (Hultgren 2011:90), 
but arises from his nature as ‘a strong and settled opposition to all that is evil’ (Morris, 
cited in Boice 1991:132). Stählin writes that ‘in the NT ὀργὴ is both God’s displeasure 
at evil, His passionate resistance to every will which is set against Him, and also His 
judicial attack thereon’ (1967:425). Bell concludes from his survey of Old and New 
Testaments, as well as post-biblical Judaic literature, that Paul’s usage of ὀργὴ, while 
not possessing an emotional element, is nonetheless personal because God as judge is 
completely invested in his righteous judgement, which includes his wrath (1998:27-33). 
The ἐπί in Romans 1:18 supports the interpretation God’s wrath and resultant 
disposition stems from human disobedience primordially enacted in the Garden, and has 
been sustained since then (see Hultgren 2011:91). If there be any uncertainty concerning 
God’s inclination since that time, a ressentiment view of the gospel takes it as entirely 
malevolent. 
The second question to be asked is what is the nature of ἡ ἀλήθεια, for Paul makes 
it the issue over which God’s ὀργὴ is justified. Romans 1:18 states it simply as τὴν 
ἀλήθειαν, and verse 19 qualifes τὴν ἀλήθειαν as του̑ Θεου̑ (repeated altogether in verse 
25).27 What is this truth about God? Paul answers the question in verse 20 by giving two 
of God’s attributes, αὐτου̑ δύναμις καὶ θειότης. This self-manifestation of God (see 
                                                 
24
 For related discussions, see Thiselton (1977:78f) and Silva (1994:137-69). 
25
 Romans 2:8; 2 Corinthians 12:20; Galatians 5:20; Ephesians 4:31; Colossians 3:8. 
26
 Romans 1:18; 2:5 (x2), 8; 3:5; 4:15; 5:9; 9:22 (x2); 12:19; 13:4, 5; Ephesians 2:3; 5:6; Colossians 3:6; 1 
Thessalonians 1:10; 2:16; 5:9. 
27
 Stripping off the alpha-privative exposes the root λανθάνω, which generally means to escape notice, to 
be hidden, or to deny (Arndt & Gingrich 1979:466). Virgil, with whom Nietzsche evidences familiarity in 
BT (MacGóráin 2012-13:191f, 225), and about whom he most certainly knows as Dante’s guide through 
the gate of hell (OGM 1.15; see Dante 1952:4f), writes of the river Lethe as the stream all must both pass 
over and drink from to forget earthly sufferings en route to final Elysian bliss (Virgil 1952:229f; see 39, 
98). See also Heidegger who translates ‘the verbal stem -λαθ- [as] “to escape notice”, “to be concealed”’ 
(1962:57, footnote 1, 264f; see also 1972: 67-73). 
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ἐφανέρωσεν, 1:19), which Paul characterises as ὁ γνωστὸς and φανερός (1:19), is 
paradoxically limited in content, yet knowable and perceivable. Its scope is universal, 
since  
the mode in which this manifestation was made to them is the mode in which it is made to 
all men, at all times, the explanation is put in the most general and abstract form (Present 
Tense and Passive Voice), without any limitation of times or persons. (italics original, 
Gifford 1977:63) 
Though incomplete, the manifestation of the infinite God is sufficient for man to 
perceive. In the explication of God’s revelation in terms of his attributes, Paul makes a 
pre-emptive move against any claim of ignorance of their reality. The race altogether 
lacks excuse with respect divine truth, and to God’s consequent displeasure, as is 
evidenced in man’s innate propensity for ritual and sacrifice to placate him (OGM 2.3), 
or the creation of idols to evade the said truth (Rom 1:25). A ressentiment reading 
would expect no less from the Apostle of ressentiment. 
The sphere in which man receives this revealed knowledge is said to be ἐν αὐτοι̑ς 
(Rom 1:19). Moo takes ἐν to mean ‘among’, referring to the natural world manifesting 
‘his works of creation and providence’, citing both the typical use of φανερός elsewhere 
in the New Testament, and also verse 20 to buttress his argument (1996:103f, footnote 
56). Schreiner locates the dimension of reception in mental consciousness by stating, 
‘God has stitched into the fabric of the human mind his existence and power, so that 
they are instinctively recognized when one views the created world’ (1998:86; see 
Gifford 1977:62f). Wuest understands ἐν αὐτοι̑ς to be ‘in their hearts and conscience’ 
(1956:29f). Keener points to both the conscience, by virtue of the imago Dei, and also 
to God’s acts in creation (2009:32). Dunn straddles all fences: 
ἐν αὐτοι̑ς could be translated ‘in them,’ or ‘among them,’ but also ‘to them’ with ἐν 
standing for the dative ... The ambiguity probably reflects the common belief in a direct 
continuity between human rationality and the rationality evident in the cosmos. (1998:57) 
The postpositive γὰρ of verse 20 explains, or expands on, the ‘known knowable’ about 
God from verse 19. This lends credence to interpreting the ἐν αὐτοι̑ς of verse 19 as ‘in 
them’. That is, a sense of deity, though empirically observed in the natural world, is 
perceived in ‘the mind’s eye’. Practically, this surfaces the notion of ‘conscience’, in 
keeping with some sort of natural law, neither of which is problem-free. Their 
discussion is reserved for section 3.3.3. 
A ressentiment construal of the nature of God’s ὀργὴ also conveys a sense of 
threat. In the lived-experience, Dallas Willard observes that ‘anger is in its own right—
quite apart from “acting it out” and further consequences—an injury to others. When I 
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discover your anger at me, I am already wounded’ (1988:148). As I have put forth in the 
wider argument of this thesis, ressentiment is a universal condition of fallen-man in 
which wrath is perceived as injury to man, provoking his reaction against it. Through 
such a lens, therefore, it may be argued in principle that divine wrath causes just such 
wounding. There is some question as to the effect of this trauma: is it best characterised 
by fear or by anger, or both? Since Nietzsche expresses interest in criminologists (TI 
‘The Problem of Socrates’ 3), the work of criminal psychologists Yochelson and 
Samenow is pertinent (2004). Their research indicates the responses of fear and anger in 
response to perceived threat are intimately bound.28 They expand on their finding that 
‘fear is the most common basis for anger in the criminal’ by remarking that ‘fear gives 
rise to anger in the noncriminal as well’ (2004:269). Thus, fear may be a concomitant 
with anger, and its relevance will be explained in the next chapter. 
The sense of threat informs the characterisation of the gospel as an offence, which 
Paul explicitly states elsewhere (σκάνδαλον, Gal 5:11; see Rom 9:33; 1 Cor 1:23). The 
ungodly and unrighteous (Rom 1:18) interpret such proclamation as a threat of 
judgement and harm. In turn, such threat and wounding cause a change in humanity. 
Man is no longer free. Like a hiker forced off a broad safe plateau onto a treacherous 
mountain path where every step may be the last, man is no longer at liberty to express 
himself without fear of untoward consequences. Freedom is proscribed.29 Since man’s 
will-to-power has already been forced back inward by the prevailing external structures 
of power (i.e., internalisation stage), perceived injury further stresses man’s already 
pressurised environment, impelling the ressentiment mechanism to cycle onward 
towards the moralisation stage (OGM 3.15). Coincident to anger’s delimiting nature, it 
also possesses a provoking nature. Anger induces anger (Willard 1988:148). Thus, the 
divine ἀλήθειαν and consequent ὀργὴ catalyse a response in man. 
Further investigation concerning God’s ὀργὴ focuses on man’s response to it. In 
OGM 1.10 we learned ressentiment ‘is reaction from the ground up’, but of what does 
such a reaction consist? There are two aspects. From fallen-man’s perspective, he 
cannot admit the problem originates with him, for ressentiment morality always 
implicates what is ‘outside’, ‘different’, and a ‘non-self’ (OGM 1.10). Therefore, man’s 
anger is objectified and externalised. This notion of externalising finds resonance in 
Romans 1 by man’s exchange of God for created things, of objects (23, 25), as part of 
                                                 
28
 See sections 4.5 and 4.6 of this thesis for more on the relationship between fear and anger. 
29
 See Sartre’s discussion on freedom and facticity in this regard, featuring a rock climb (1956:481-89). 
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his revaluation project. Man’s anger-response is targeted outward against one who 
appears to tip the scales of power at the outset (i.e., God) to create conditions favourable 
for himself. Concomitant with this move is that these conditions must be interpreted as 
adversarial for man (see ‘against’, 18). As a result, not only is man described as 
‘ungodly’ and ‘unrighteous’ (18), but branded ‘fools’ (22).30 In the moral arena, these 
are fighting words, and in the face of such posturing and castigation, ressentiment need 
not look far for enemies (TI ‘Morality’ 3). The hostility apparent in the wrathful Other 
ostracises man, at best; more accurately, it transforms him into an antagonist. For 
ressentiment seeks a ‘guilty perpetrator … some kind of living thing upon which … he 
can discharge his affects’, ‘someone or another … to blame’ (OGM 3.15). Thus, God is 
viewed as becoming hostile, a threat to man’s very existence. But the passage does not 
make explicit God is the cause of man’s anger-response of blaming. What can be seen, 
however, are effects. Just as scuttling leaves reveal the presence of wind, so the 
activities associated with man in Romans 1 reveal a response. Man takes affront to God.  
To further develop the answer in relation to the reaction of ressentiment, 
additional questions must be posed. If anger induces anger, and attack provokes 
retaliation, how does one retaliate when the attacker is God? What does anger look like 
when it is threatened by omnipotence? Active aggression against so formidable an 
opponent is absurd. If anger in principle is to be expressed, then it must follow the 
stratagems of ressentiment. Therefore, passive aggression is the only way forward, and 
finds expression both in what man does and does not do. I will address the latter aspect 
first. 
One aspect of the strategy is something of a non-response. Similar to the way man 
reacts to the perceived injury of divine, angry judgement in the Genesis 3 account, he 
also hides from the consequences of violating God’s truth in Romans 1, which is the 
peril of God’s wrath. Viewed through a ressentiment lens, it is not that man gives up, 
but that he simply retreats to strategise redress of injury another way. Realising he is so 
comparatively impotent that direct retaliation is impossible, man cannot do anything. 
Nietzsche writes in GS 3.135 that ‘the Christian presupposes a powerful, overpowering 
being who enjoys revenge. His power is so great nobody could possibly harm him, 
except …’. Instead, man’s tactic must be not to do something. Paul writes, ‘They [i.e., 
                                                 
30
 Paul typically freights the terms ‘fool’ and ‘become foolish’ (i.e., the cognate family of μωραίνω) with 
negative ethical implications, reaching their zenith in 1 Corinthians 2. The end of 1 Corinthians 1 is 
packed with six such terms which, taken as the context for the second chapter, lends to the understanding 
that foolishness is responsible for the execution of ‘the Lord of glory’ (2:8). This becomes ironic in the 
extreme when juxtaposed with the one who writes of the murder of God (i.e., Nietzsche).  
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mankind] did not honor him as God or give thanks to him’ (Rom 1:21). The GS 
quotation continues, ‘… except for his honor. Every sin is a slight to his honor, a crimen 
laesae majestatis divinae—and no more’. The German noun for sin, Verstoß, bears 
meanings of ‘contravention’, ‘violation’, ‘infraction’, ‘infringement’, ‘mistake’, ‘fault’, 
‘blunder’, and carries with it the idea of ‘casting out’ (Messinger 1973:582). Debates on 
whether man’s response consists of two ideas or one divert from my essential point. For 
the sake of efficiency, the idea of ηὐχαρίστησαν (giving thanks) will be subsumed under 
the idea of ἐδόξασαν (rendering honour/glory), so the latter involves the former. 
Together, they indicate man’s reasoned and expected response to the clearly perceived, 
albeit invisible, attributes31 of the Creator-God (Rom 1:20), an inference signified by 
δίοτι (21). Man withholds his obligation to honour God.32 In the attempt to excuse 
himself from this debt, he engages in deception. 
Man’s strategy also entails something that he does to avoid ἡ ἀλήθεια God has 
revealed and the ὀργὴ that results from avoiding it. Man employs the self-defensive 
measures of suppression (κατέχω, Rom 1:18) and exchange (ἀλλάσσω, 23, 25).33 The 
first self-defensive measure man takes is one of suppression (19).34 He excuses himself 
from obligation to God’s revelation (see ἀναπολογὴτους, 20) because he perceives both 
the obligation, and the power that threatens to punish its violation, to be offensive. 
Refusing to serve and worship God in obeisance, man is branded as the antithesis of 
godliness and righteousness in verse 18, those characteristics that originally defined 
him. Ever since the primeval threat of punitive action associated with God’s garden 
prohibition, man has recoiled at the wrath portended in God’s power. Such a threat 
cannot be met impassively, but neither can it be directly confronted. So man reacts 
evasively; he suppresses the revealed truth that obligates him as creature to worship 
God. God’s consequent wrath over such wilful deception further causes man to hide 
                                                 
31
 Dunn connects ‘God’s majesty (glory) [with] his eternal power and deity’ (1998:91), which is apropos 
since God’s glory in Scripture always manifests him who is otherwise invisible. Furthermore, the 
correlation of man’s response of οὐχ ἐδόξασαν (21) to God’s δόξα only serves to heighten the futility of 
their effort and the folly of their offense. The same may be said of Paul’s elsewhere attribution of δόξα to 
Christ, which is the content of the gospel in 2 Corinthians 4:4. In terms of 4:2, Christ is the τῃ̣̑ φανερώσει 
τη̑ς ἀληθείας, conceptual language which Paul also uses in Romans 1:18-19: ‘the truth about God is plain’ 
and ‘God has shown it’. 
32
 In a discussion of self-divination, Roberts quotes Nietzsche’s ironic identification of ‘gratitude as that 
quality of noble (Greek) religion that distinguishes it from Christianity’ (italics supplied, 2000:221).  
33
 These two key terms are treated as two distinct actions, but see Bavnick (1994:45f) who argues 
‘repression’ happens in terms of ‘exchange’.  
34
 See also Thiselton’s discussion, in Freudian terms, on whether or not Paul is aware of subconscious 
drives (2004:157-59). 
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from himself both the cause of God’s wrath, i.e., his own sin, as well as his plight as an 
object of that wrath. It is a vicious circle. 
A discussion of κατέχω is now in order, first in terms of definitions. The term and 
its cognates occur seventeen times in the New Testament, nine of them in Paul’s letters. 
On the whole, they denote ‘holding onto’ as in possession, or ‘holding down/back’ as in 
restraint (Cranfield 1987:112; Murray 1978:37; Arndt & Gingrich 1979:422). Given the 
context of the passage, the latter sense seems to fit Romans 1:18 best, and is adequately 
conveyed through the English term, ‘suppress’.35 
Regarding possible motivation, the logical question to ask is, why does fallen-man 
hold down this truth about God? I suggest he suppresses this truth for at least three 
reasons. One is the truth about God carries with it truth about man, a realisation he 
would rather avoid. Man does not want to be reminded, or even presented with, the 
possibility that he is unrighteous. This possibility would signal tacit admission to being 
diminished, or even acknowledge negative ontological value in the creational economy. 
Dunn writes that ‘any real sense of God’s majesty (glory), his eternal power and deity 
(20), would surely bring home the human creature’s finite weakness and corruption’ 
(1998:91).  
A second reason for suppression is man does not want to contemplate he has 
arrived at his new status as ‘the righteous’, unrighteously. That is, though the process 
seems imperceptible to fallen-man, at the conclusion of revaluation, whereupon he may 
now consider himself wise and righteous, he must shield from himself that he has 
subjugated another. Like the Olympic decathlete who cheats to lay claim to the title of 
world’s greatest athlete, fallen-man cannot countenance the possibility he occupies his 
new place of power just as unrighteously as his former oppressor. This amnesiac state is 
the ‘Night’ fallen-man seeks to conceal the paradox and uncertainty endemic to his 
world, and to promote the confidence needed to flirt with, as Barth puts it, the abyss of 
judgement which he so desperately labours to forget (1933:42-54, especially 48f). For 
either of these reasons, man wants to hide something.  
Yet a third reason for pushing down the truth is accountability. Nietzsche himself 
states it succinctly: ‘We reject God, we reject the responsibility in [i.e., accountability 
to] God’ (TI ‘The Four Great Errors’ 8). Man must eliminate the source to eradicate the 
‘horrific gravity’ of consciousness-become-morality-causing-guilt that weighs him 
                                                 
35 
See Chapter Two, footnote 22 for a note on relationship between suppression and repression in 
Nietzsche. 
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down (OGM 2.16). The work of Dan Ariely, the James B. Duke Professor of 
Psychology and Behavioral Economics at Duke University, lends credence to this 
notion. His experiments with moral/ethical reminders in the face of opportunities to 
cheat yield interesting results regarding those tempted to transgress a known code. 
‘Reminders’ which resulted in significantly diminished cheating—the results were 
zero—were the Ten Commandments for a diverse population, and even the ‘swear[ing] 
on a Bible’ for a group of self-professed atheists (Ariely 2012:40). Ariely cites one such 
experiment that involved university students signing a pledge not to cheat on pain of 
damnation to Hell. As one might imagine, students were outraged, including those who 
did not believe in Hell. Ariely surmises that their irrational outrage stemmed from a 
feeling ‘that the stakes were very high’ (44). Teasing out an implication, which Ariely 
does not entertain, suggests that accountability is sensed more powerfully when 
culpability is connected with God (39-44). In this vein, Christopher Hitchens comments 
on atheist Thomas Nagel’s admitted fear of God, which he discusses as fear of religion. 
He writes that Nagel has precious ‘little to say about the precise source of the fear he 
describes’ (2011:110). ‘Why’, Hitchens interlocutes, ‘would anyone fear the idea of 
God?’ He supplies an answer: ‘I can think of many reasons, myself, usually concerned 
with the annoying and lingering possibility of divine punishment for unexpiated 
wrongdoing’ (110). The ‘pushing down of truth’ has two aspects. Negatively, man 
wants to be free of consequent judgement, the ultimate expression of which is death. 
Positively, he wants self-authorised salvation in a world unchained from its sun (see GS 
3.125). 
So what is being hidden? The text expressly states man is hiding τὴν ἀλήθειαν του ̑
Θεου̑, but in doing so he seeks to bury something else. As mentioned previously, such 
revelation implies truth about man, painful truth. Seen through the lens of Nietzsche’s 
ressentiment, fallen-man views this pain as guilt and fear. Man knows both guilt36 
stemming from the master’s designation of unrighteousness, and fear in anticipation of 
consequent judgement. No doubt this involves τα κρυπτα (Rom 2:16), upon which the 
heart-inscribed natural law applies pressure in the present, and which will create 
exposure to judgement in the future. Coincidently, this comports tightly with Adam’s 
response in Genesis 3 of his evasion of responsibility and denial of guiltiness.  
                                                 
36
 Budziszewski distinguishes between guilt and feelings that result from it: ‘guilty knowledge … does 
not mean guilty feelings’, for guilt stems from ‘deep conscience [which] is knowledge, not feelings’ 
(2003:81). 
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But is this all that is being hidden? What is ultimately hidden? Posing the question 
from a different direction refines it: from what or whom is the hiding done? The most 
natural answer seems to be the hiding is from God. This certainly fits logically with the 
passage, for if weak and threatened man can somehow dismiss divine indictment (i.e., 
‘the wrath of God [being] revealed from heaven’), he may escape the dangerous 
consequences that flow from God’s anger. This notion of hiding from God also fits 
nicely with the backdrop-passage to Romans 1, Genesis 3, in which man is portrayed as 
hiding from God. Paradoxically, even after he emerges from his garden-cover, the 
ensuing discourse with God reveals continued attempts of concealment (Gen 3:11-13). 
In Adam and Eve’s excuse-making and blaming, we may see yet another way to answer 
the question. Man hides (the truth) from himself.  
One final word is required concerning κατέχω in terms of its nature. Power that 
pushes or restrains requires a ‘force that works in opposition’, about which Nietzsche is 
well aware (OGM 2.1). One cannot suppress in a vacuum. For every push down, there 
must be a pushing up. Foucault states a maxim, ‘Where there is power, there is 
resistance’ (1976:95). The ressentiment mechanism supplies just such resistance, i.e., an 
opposing force. What reads as τὴν ἀλήθειαν του̑ Θεου̑ in Paul may be understood to 
effect injury or offense in Nietzschean ressentiment. This offense entails perceived truth 
about man that generates feelings of ressentiment, variously characterised by Nietzsche 
as ‘dreadful’, ‘crushing’, ‘stinging’, and ‘explosive’—powerful enough to require 
drastic coping countermeasures. Since outward release (i.e., in the context of this 
paragraph, ‘upward’ release) cannot be permitted, this response-force must be 
discharged differently. The ressentiment mechanism, therefore, redirects the said force 
backwards (or down) inside of the one confronted with τὴν ἀλήθειαν του̑ Θεου̑. This 
force against force is so painful something must give, much like a bow bent to a 
threatening extreme will break (BGE 9.262), or a powerful spring when compressed 
beyond its capacity must buckle (Budziszewski 1999:28). A further aspect of this 
coping is one must hide even this move from oneself. For to admit it would be to 
validate the reason for hiding in the first place, which would be tantamount to admitting 
guilt. One’s very identity would be threatened (OGM 1.13f).  
The second self-defensive measure man takes in response to God’s ὀργὴ over ἡ 
ἀλήθεια is exchange. Etymologically, the term ἀλλάσσω traces to ‘another’, yielding the 
meaning, ‘to substitute one thing for another’ (Osborne 2004:50). Through the lens of 
ressentiment one may construe this to be revaluation. As an oversimplification of 
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Romans 1:23, man devalues the Creator (i.e., τὴν δόξα του̑ ἀφθάρτου θεοȗ), even as he 
increases the value of that which is created (i.e., εἰκόνος). The absolute is relativised. 
Support for this may be found in Hooker’s claim of the uniqueness of Paul’s use 
of εἰκών in the long-enigmatic phrase of εν ὁμοιώματι εἰκόνος in verse 23. The LXX 
manifests forty-one occurrences of εἰκών, variously referring to ‘idol’, ‘image of God’, 
‘shadow’, and of ‘Adam begetting a son “in his own image”’ (Hooker 1960:297). More 
germane to my interest, the New Testament inventory of εἰκών in non-Pauline usage 
includes ‘idol’ in John’s Apocalypse ten times, ‘image on a coin’ in the Synoptics three 
times, and ‘shadow’ in Hebrews once (297). Paul uses the term eight times, seven of 
which are ‘corresponding to the use of the term in the early chapters of Genesis’, which 
is to say they carry a sense of the image of God or Creator (298). Romans 1:23 in 
‘striking contrast’ bears a sense of the loss of this image as evidenced by man’s three-
fold exchange: ‘the worship of the true God for that of idols, … intimate fellowship 
with God for an experience which was shadowy and remote, … [and] his own reflection 
of the glory of God for the image of corruption’ (305). Pascal’s famous Fragment 
2.8.148 in Pensées (1995) furnishes a catalogue of candidate idols whose value is 
insufficient to warrant replacement of God: 
Since man abandoned him it is a strange fact that nothing in nature has been found to take 
his place: stars, sky, earth, elements, plants, cabbages, leeks, animals, insects, calves, 
serpents, fever, plague, war, famine, vices, adultery, incest.
37
 
Essentially, man trades εἰκών for εἴδώλον, a consequence of substituting ἡ κτίσις for 
θεὸς, including, according to Paul, ἀνθρώπος. 
How does man do this? Biblical genealogy lends another clue here regarding the 
eschewance of personal responsibility, coincident with a shift in culpability (Gen 3:11-
13). God, the party responsible for imposing the standard, viewed as oppressive, is 
assigned blame for injustice. The rationale underlying this is, were the command not so 
restrictive and perhaps arbitrary, transgression would not be forced. This is because 
will-to-power of necessity must find expression, and since any sort of open 
transgression is untenable, it manifests in ressentiment. In doing so, man, who occupies 
the place of the weak, subverts the created order. By means of self-proclaimed 
righteousness, made possible through ressentiment, man displaces the creator and 
captures the moral high ground of righteousness (OGM 1.10). On this reading, God is 
the antagonist and thus responsible for the painful predicament. The answer to the 
crying question—why suffering?—may now be heralded. But fallen-man pushes the 
                                                 
37
 Unless otherwise specified, Pascal fragments from Pensées are from Krailsheimer’s translation (1995). 
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case against God even further, relegating him to the moral subaltern ground of a ‘made-
up world’ that is ‘the lie’ and ‘curse on reality’ and, therefore, unworthy of worship (EH 
‘Preface’ 2). This comports well with that for which man trades τῷ ψεύδει in Rom 1:25. 
Conzelmann suggests that the fundamental meaning of the verb ψευδομαι is ‘to 
deceive’ (1974:594), thus allowing the noun ὁ ψεῦδος to characterise ‘the total 
[deceitful] conduct of sinful humanity’ (601).38 It is worth noting the articulated noun, in 
addition to rendering the following clause epexegetical, may also allude to the first lie 
articulated in the garden account (Gen 3:4f). If so, Paul is conveying this lie denies ‘the 
fundamental truth that God is God’, and subsequently permits the redirection of worship 
due him to the object(s) of man’s choosing (Bruce 1982:174).  
But God’s fate grows worse. Staten identifies the ‘most spiritual, most absolute 
root’ of ressentiment thus:  
If you will not recognize me and thus confer Dasein upon me I will make you go fort, I will 
auto-authorize myself and refuse you that same recognition which you deny me, thereby 
avenging myself against you by consigning you to that nonbeing with which I was 
threatened by your nonrecongnition [sic] of me. (1990:38) 
Beyond thinking of God as ‘the evil enemy’ (OGM 1.10), man dismisses him entirely. 
All of this transpires within man,39 which is able to create a reconfigured world because 
it οὐκ ἐδοκίμασαν τὸν θεὸν ἐχειν ἐν ἔπιγνώσει (Rom 1:28). ‘Knocking over idols (my 
word for “ideals”)—that is more my style’, claims Nietzsche (EH ‘Preface’ 2).  
In verse 28, man’s refusal to acknowledge (οὐκ ἐδοκίμασαν) God finds ironic 
correspondence in the depraved (ἀδόκιμον) mind that issues from such wilful ignorance 
(Hooker 1990:86f). Furthermore, the Romans 1:21 linkage of ‘futility of mind’ with 
‘darkened hearts’ is paralleled in Ephesians 4:17-18,40 and then extended by an 
attending explanation: ‘because of the ignorance that is in them, because of the hardness 
of their heart’ (italics supplied). This Pauline ‘cardioporosis’ signifies unbelieving 
man’s paralysis with respect to the truth about God.41 As a self-imposed anaesthesia, it 
causes in the subject a loss of motor skill and sensation, and also perception42 (Simpson 
& Weiner 1992:48). This reflects much of what memory loss looks like in Nietzsche. 
Again, Zarathustra:  
                                                 
38
 Regarding deception in Paul’s writings, see Barrett (1982) for a topical treatment in concept, and 
Griffith (1991) for an exhaustive treatment of terminology. 
39
 See τοις διαλογισμοι̑ς (Rom 1:21). 
40
 Note that ‘understanding’ is substituted for ‘hearts’ in the Ephesians passage. See also Blumenfeld 
2001:318. 
41
 See πώρωσις, Schmidt 1967:5.1025-28; Weiner & Simpson 1992:1391. For a related discussion of 
hardness of heart, see section 1.4.2 of this thesis. 
42
 When the anaesthetic effect is said to be ‘general’, unconsciousness is induced which prevents memory 
function (see BGE 1.6).  
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How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? The holiest and the 
mightiest that all the world has yet owned has bled to death under our knives: who will 
wipe this blood from us? What water is there for us to clean ourselves? What festivals of 
atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too 
great for us? Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it? (GS 3.125) 
Comfort comes only by way of completing the inversion. To attempt to overthrow 
the regime requires43 assuming the vacated place of deity. This, and this alone, holds 
hope to make one worthy of the anguish-causing deed. So, substitution completes 
narcosis, and the Dionysian revelries (‘festivals’), perhaps intimated in Romans 1:26f 
and also in the enlistment alluded to in Romans 1:32, serve only to cement the 
condition. ‘Nietzsche preached the miracle of man’s becoming his own god’, writes 
Donnellan (1985:176). Wood writes of the phenomenon in terms of a ‘false self [which] 
is nothing but the product of an attempt … to imitate the Creator’, a creator who ‘can 
flourish only in an imaginary world of his own devising’ (2013:120). Via links such 
self-directed deification to Romans 1:24f where Paul speaks ‘of the idolatrous worship 
of the creature rather than the creator’ (1990:39), and Budziszewski concurs: ‘the 
sacredness of human life can easily be deflected into various forms of idolatry, in which 
we reverence ourselves—as God, partly-God, parts of God, gods, or on the way to 
becoming gods’ (2003:35; see also Bell 1998:100, footnote 181). Fallen-man, as a result 
of his self-determination, rejects God from his knowledge, flouting God’s δικαίωμα.44 
Concealing flaws in order to justify ourselves sums up ‘the dynamic of self-deception 
for Paul’, and opens a way ‘to interpret the world as if we were the gods’ (Via 1990:39). 
Paul’s list of the ungodly and unrighteous actions and attitudes at the conclusion 
of his broad indictment of humanity illustrates the folly of man’s wisdom. His 
independence from God results in self-destructive behaviour that can only be accounted 
for by making himself his own measure for valuation. In Nietzschean terms, this is 
ressentiment run full cycle, from initial infliction-oppression by an other (i.e., God), all 
the way to justification of the self as the standard for value. At the heart of the entire 
process lies self-deception. In the next section, I will apply what we have learned from 
the previous mapping project to Romans 2. With a refined focus on self-deception 
coming out of Romans 1, I will specifically seek evidence related to self-deception as 
construed by ressentiment in Romans 2. 
                                                 
43
 Nietzsche’s ‘must’ in the final question of the immediately preceding quotation is significant. 
44
 Theilmann, for one, takes this to be the moral requirements of God, expressed in the Mosaic law 
(1994:169). Dunn hears echoes of ‘the Adam background’, specifically the penal decree that was issued 
in the garden (Gen 2:16f), of which all men everywhere have a sense (1988:76, also 101; see also Moo 
1996:121, but his reference is to Gen 3). Bell takes the unique view of it being a more general 
pronouncement of retribution issuing from the fall (1998:51-61). 
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3.3.3 Applying Ressentiment to Romans 2 
The objective in this section is to apply the gains from our reading of Romans 1 to 
facilitate a ressentiment reading of Romans 2, particularly to identify elements that 
pertain to self-deception. Our focus will be limited to verses 1-16. While Paul’s 
argument certainly progresses into the second half of the chapter, for my purposes, 17-
29 largely reinforce and supplement the ressentiment reading performed on the first 
half.  
My exegesis will follow an uncontroversial outline of Romans 2 (Jewett 
1971:442; Thielman 1994:290, footnote 35; Carras 1992:193-206). Most scholars 
include the chapter in a larger section of the epistle, from 2:1 to 3:8, which speaks of 
Jewish accountability for sin and God’s consequent wrath on their unrighteousness 
(Dunn 1998:vii-xi; Schreiner 1998:vii-viii; Osborne 2004:24-26). Others extend the 
section to 3:20, and include Gentile accountability in God’s righteous judgement 
(Cranfield 1987:28f; Moo 1996:32-35; Wright 2002:410-12).45 Romans 2 may be 
divided in half, with 1-16 referring generally to God’s judgement, and 17-29 to Jewish 
failure.  
I will take the Romans 2 passage in two sections: 1-11 and 12-16. To support my 
theological exegesis, I will conduct conventional exegesis on contested issues in the text 
that impinge on my concerns, along with their subsidiary issues; otherwise, they will not 
be observed. Though of course the scenarios entertained are hypothetical, I will employ 
an indicative mood for the sake of smoother reading. 
 
Theological Exegesis of Romans 2:1-11, God’s Impartial Judgement 
To direct his argument away from Gentile depravity toward Jewish culpability (Lamp 
1999:39), Paul begins this section in diatribe. Diatribe is a rhetorical device that 
indirectly addresses an audience. A speaker may use it to establish rapport with an 
audience, particularly when sensitive matters or convictions may be challenged 
(Stowers 1981:79-118; Song 2001). Paul uses diatribe in Romans almost exclusively in 
sections of theological discourse (Witherington 2004:75). Whether Paul’s remarks at 
this point are directed at the Jews (Osborne 2004:60; Murray 1987:54ff), primarily at 
                                                 
45
 Witherington’s socio-rhetorical approach organises the epistle along a different paradigm, in terms of 
arguments. Thus Romans 2 is broken in two halves, with the latter, 2:17ff, being enveloped into the 
following larger section ending at 3:20, the rubric of which is ‘Censoring a censorious Jewish teacher’ 
(2004:21f). So also Bell, though his partitioning ends at 3:8 (1998:XII). Jewett, however, demands that 
the entire epistle serve as context for the issue of law in relation to Jew and Gentile (1985). 
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the Jews with some application to Gentiles or pagan moralists (Moores 1995:49f; Moo 
1996:126; Wright 2002:438), equally at Jews and Gentiles (Bell 1998:137f), or the 
morally superior Gentile and explicitly not Jews (Stowers 1994:103f; Witherington 
2004:75-78), the recipients of Paul’s accusation stand condemned by their own practice.  
Their hypocritical judgement on others lends credence to his case against them. I take 
Paul to be speaking to Jews, while not ignoring the Gentiles in the audience, for several 
reasons. With respect to ‘the riches of [God’s] kindness and forbearance and patience’ 
in verse 4, the Jews possess a trove of relevant knowledge from the Psalms and the 
Wisdom of Solomon (Moo 1996:132f; see also Bruce 1985:83), to say nothing of the 
divine self-disclosure as ‘a God merciful and gracious, slow to anger, and abounding in 
steadfast love and faithfulness’ (Exod 34:6). The import of Paul’s message is to ‘the 
Jew first and also the Greek’ in verse 9. He predicates his discussion of God’s 
judgement on the Law in Rom 2:12-16, which would have been more meaningful to 
Jew than Gentile. Finally, when Paul abandons his diatribe in 2:17ff, he explicitly 
addresses his reader as ‘Jew’ (Theilman 1994:290, footnote 34; Wiersbe 2007:414).46  
A ressentiment reading of the Jews’ condemnation of τὸν ἕτερον (i.e., the Gentile) 
in Romans 2:1-3 produces possible signs of resentment. Whether by the military and 
political might of the Romans or the sheer numbers of the worldwide pagan population, 
the Jews consider themselves oppressed. Open revolution is impossible, so they seek to 
gain advantage surreptitiously by replacing the traditional field of battle with one of 
their own choosing. This is the ressentiment contest of which Nietzsche speaks in OGM 
1.16, ‘Rome against Judea, Judea against Rome … and not only in Rome, but over 
almost half the earth’. In retaliation, the moralising Jew, as Paul considers him, foists on 
the Gentiles the demand of righteousness. Though Paul does not explicitly mention it 
until Romans 2:12, his use of innuendo from early in the diatribe suggests that the law 
of God is the sole high and holy standard for any self-respecting Jew. This is the 
predicate for Jewish identity. The Psalmist had spoken of Yahweh’s word being exalted 
above the heavens (Psa 138:2), and it was from heaven that Yahweh descended on Sinai 
to speak to his people and give his law to Moses (Exod 19:16-20:1ff; Deut 5:22-26). 
The Jew knew, from the time of its reception, the law was unkeepable (see Bultmann 
1975:66; pace Schechter 1961:148-69), for his forbearers had promised to keep the 
commandments issued by Yahweh (Exod 19:8; compare Rom 2:21f), only to be 
                                                 
46
 Regarding Paul’s Jewish audience, his rhetoric suggests, while he may not have Judaism in mind, he 
may be epitomising the proclivity of its law-based religion for self-righteousness (Longenecker 
2016:310). 
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banished by Yahweh for their arrogant presumption concerning their moral capacity to 
do so (9ff; compare Deut 5:27-29). Despite this unattainability, the Jew condemnably 
judges the Gentiles’ failure to ‘obey the truth’, even as he (the Jew) deceives himself 
about his own sinful failure. Such condemnation echoes from Sinai into the eschaton 
with dire consequences (Rom 2:3, 5, 8).  
In light of the eschatological reference to God’s wrathful judgement, one might 
argue that, psychologically speaking, perception of the law’s consequence is weakened 
for the Jew in that its relegation to some distant future somehow diminishes it. Yet, the 
Jew’s knowledge of God’s sure judgement, which he possesses from the Torah (Gen 
3:15) to the Ketuvim (Dan 12), is belied in his convenient scapegoating of the Gentles 
for moral failure. The hypocrisy thus engendered, in terms of ressentiment, points to 
guilty feelings for living as a law breaker while denying being one (Rom 2:21-23). The 
moralising Jew accomplishes this by devaluing both the deeds of some Gentiles who 
‘by nature do what the law requires’ (2:14)47, as well as his own deeds. He accomplishes 
this by disvaluing the standard of valuation, which is God as he perceives him. The Διὸ 
that opens Romans 2 allows Paul to import all the Gentile indictments of Rom 1:18-32 
onto the Jew (Moores 1995:47-49). His devaluation comes thus by supressing and 
exchanging the truth about God for a lie (Rom 1:18f, 25; 2:2, 5, 8); the former reflects 
righteousness and implied wisdom, the latter the folly of unrighteousness (see 1:18, 22; 
2:2, 8). On a ressentiment reading, the moralising Jew’s real oppression is generated, 
not by the Romans or pagans, but by God himself. The Jew projects his failure on others 
to avoid the wrath of God awaiting the unrighteous, whether Jew or Greek (2:6-11). 
Failure to acknowledge this reality is comparable to the Gentiles who also do not 
acknowledge God (1:28), and results in a false confidence in the self-deceived, of which 
Paul speaks in terms of a hard (σκληρότης) heart (2:5). This verbal noun occurs only 
here in the New Testament, and like its cognate σκληρός, it ‘derives from the stem sqel-
, “to dry (up),” “to desiccate,” with which “skeleton” is connected; it means “dry,” 
“arid,” “hard,” “rough,” “unyielding”’ (Schmidt & Schmidt 1967:1028). Such hardness 
renders the Jewish heart ἀμετανόητος and, therefore, insensitive in a spiritual sense—
incapable of experiencing warmth, strength, and life that derives from nearness to God, 
or of detecting the waning of those qualities when the heart is far from him (see Jewett 
1971:332f; also Isa 29:13).  
                                                 
47
 This is not to confer salvific status on them, but rather to convey a sense of relative righteousness, in 
that there are Gentiles who actually do what the moralising Jew only professes to do. 
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Israel becomes a victim of Rome’s vast imperialism over the course of two 
centuries (D 1.71). The first-century CE context of Paul’s epistle, therefore, finds the 
Jews an oppressed people. In the time of Jesus, Rome has imposed its political authority 
(Luke 3:1) such that ‘Judea [becomes] a prosecutorial province’ (Johnson 2009:33, 
footnote 50). Rome conducts censes (Luke 2:1-3), exacts economic tribute (Matt 22:21), 
and requires Jews to seek authorisation on all weighty legal matters (e.g., Luke 23:1-25; 
Jn 18:31). Daily life in Israel goes on (see Luke 17:26-20), but whatever normalcy is 
experienced is prescribed by Rome (Wylen 1995; Boatwright, et al. 2004). A yoke by 
any other name still chafes, and Jesus himself may have encountered it first-hand if he 
participated in the rebuilding of Sepphoris, a former metropolis just five miles north of 
his boyhood home of Nazareth. The Romans destroyed it around the time of his birth to 
quell an uprising (Josephus 3.2:4; Meyers 1999:114f), but they could not extinguish the 
seething unrest that would simmer in the national subconscious all his life. Ironically, 
this sentiment would be used against Jesus to turn his popularity into infamy, and 
toward his execution (Mk 15:11). A generation later it would boil over in a massive but 
hopeless revolt resulting in the destruction of Jerusalem and the razing of the Temple. In 
Paul’s day, much remains the same. Though some Jews remain in the land, as a people 
they are broken, having been scattered over the decades around the empire, gathering 
themselves into enclaves, notably in Rome (Jn 7:35; Acts 2:5, 9-11) (Williams 1998; 
Esler 2003).48 Paul’s dealings with displaced countrymen around the Mediterranean 
speak to this reality (e.g., 1 Cor 9:20; 2 Cor 11:24; Gal 2:13). Around 49 BCE, Claudius 
expels the Jews from Rome (Acts 18:2), this after a previous expulsion by Tiberius in 
19 BCE.49 The strictures of state delimit Jewish freedom in the early Roman empire.  
 In terms of ressentiment, delimited freedom is restrictive, and when the human 
spirit is so confined it becomes resentful. Liberty denied is interpreted as threatening 
injury. Self-determination, as an expression of will-to-power, must find expression. If it 
cannot be wrested from the Gentile powers on their own terms, then the Jews will 
‘achieve satisfaction from their enemies and conquerors through a radical revaluation of 
their values, hence through an act of the most spiritual revenge … the slave revolt in 
morality’ (italics original, OGM 2.17).  
                                                 
48
 For an extensive treatment of pagan attitudes and resultant effects toward Jews, see Stern’s three-
volume work, Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism (1984), especially volumes 1 and 2.  
49
 The date of the Claudian expulsion is contested. Since his reign was 41-54 BCE, the termini a quo and 
ad quem are thus delimited. If the deported population was large, as the ‘all Jews’ of Acts 18:2 suggests, 
then presumably the event spanned multiple years. See Slingerland (1998); Van Voorst (2000); Lampe 
(2003); Köstenberger, et al. (2009); Keener (2011); Riesner (2011). 
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On a ressentiment reading, this is the mindset of Paul’s intended audience in 
Romans 2. Just as the reactive character of ressentiment always issues forth in a self-
perception made in comparison to the strong, Paul effectively accuses the Jew of 
promoting his superior righteousness over the Gentiles. The Jew views himself as a 
seeing guide for the blind Gentiles, a light to them in their darkness, a trainer for their 
folly, and a mature teacher for them as children (Rom 2:19f). Each expression reveals a 
demotion of Gentiles by the Jew so he may subsequently see himself in a relatively 
flattering light. 
For Paul, this hypocrisy is inexcusable. Here in Romans 2:1-3, the Jew premises a 
righteous high ground from which to condemn Gentiles. The irony is rich. Paul has just 
concluded an indictment of the Gentiles in 1:18-32, informing his audience that God’s 
‘sentence of death’ (Campbell 2009:544) on them for their unrighteousness is just (see 
Gen 1:29a). Yet the fact the Gentiles, while knowingly pursuing wrong, endorse fellow 
wrong-doers, hardly makes righteous by comparison the Jew who condemns wrong-
doing while pursuing it.  
Paul’s diatribal style veils the endemic problem he perceives to plague his Jewish 
audience. His initial salvo speaks to a single Jew, ‘O man’, but his rhetoric quickly 
expands to address ‘every one of you who judges’ (italics supplied, Rom 2:1). On a 
ressentiment reading, Paul’s use of the collective singular here (πᾶς)50 is emblematic of 
the herd of self-perceived weak Jews who find sufficient strength in numbers to judge 
Gentiles. The basis of this judgement is an envy and resentment of the other. The 
Gentiles in this immediate circumstance occupy master status, if for no other reason 
than their Roman citizenship. The Jews, as alien outsiders, perceive themselves to have 
little social standing, within the church or without. To the extent that the teachings of 
Jesus have permeated the Roman fellowship, to say nothing of the manners of civilised 
society, negative behaviour would of course be frowned upon. Thus, their 
condemnation can be neither overt nor direct. In modern psychological terms, such 
might be manifested in what is termed ‘passive-aggressive’ behaviour (World Health 
Organization 2016 F60.8), or simply in attitudes of judgementalism. Either way, the 
comparative nature of ressentiment constructs an ‘us versus them’ situation (see OGM 
1.10). The purpose is to allow the Jewish have-nots to feel superior to the Gentile haves, 
and the basis is a negation of the things they themselves desire (see Longenecker 
2016:310; Reginster 1997:295-97). Paul will later list some of these desirables (Rom 
                                                 
50
 Compare ἕκαστος (Rom 2:6). 
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2:21f). By implication, the very things being evaluated and judged against the Gentile—
possessions, sexual pleasure or freedom, sacrilege51—belie their value to the Jew doing 
the judging. What is more, this revaluation is hidden from the ressentiment-Jew 
performing it. Paul uses the language of a hard and incorrigible heart (5) to signify self-
deception here, and it is stunning in light of the consequence that awaits.52  
Paul now combines the escalated rhetoric of ‘wrath’ (Rom 2:5) with a shift from 
the present to the future (6-11). I suggest his purpose is to break in on the Jew’s false 
sense of confidence before God. That is why in verse 6 Paul, ‘in scripturally resonant 
phraseology (Ps. 62:12; Prov. 24:12; Sir. 16:14)’ (Campbell 2009:550),53 reminds them 
that God’s judgement will not be based on covenantal status, but will hold them 
accountable as individuals (Lamp 1999:39). As Nietzsche would remind us, 
ressentiment-man loves to take refuge in the anonymity of the herd. From this vantage 
point, the weak relegate the strong to a subaltern position so they can in turn occupy the 
vacated superior one. In this Roman scenario, the Jew is responsible for the instigation 
of this same process. Concomitant to winning for themselves power over Gentiles, they 
are self-deceived in that they become blind to their possession of the very values they 
previously abhorred.54 The Jews are neither guided by well-doing (Rom 2:7) nor do they 
adhere to the truth (8), and their resultant state leaves them open to the wrath and fury of 
God. The Jews’ self-deception is so strong55 that Paul ratchets up his rhetoric in an 
attempt to jolt them out of their false security, writing that ‘tribulation and distress 
[await] every soul (ψυχὴν) of man’ (again, stressing the individual) who does evil (9). 
To counter his fellow Jews’ premature trial of Gentiles for their evil works, in this 
passage Paul has recycled some of the ideas he used in Romans 1:17f to indict the 
Gentiles. Putting it all together, Paul warns the Jews that God’s righteousness is being 
stored up for its revelation in wrath (Rom 2:5). In this instance, the object in view is the 
Jews because they, like the Gentiles of 1:18-32, unrighteously disobey the truth.56 As 
those who boast in the law (2:23), they must know of God’s righteous wrath on sin. 
                                                 
51
 These correspond to stealing, adultery, and temple-robbing in Romans 2:21f. The meaning of the third 
sin, ἱεροσυλεῖς, is indefinite. Possible interpretations are a literal pilfering of temples for precious metals, 
withholding a misappropriation of funds intended for the Temple in Jerusalem, or a catachresis for 
sacrilege (Moo 1996:163f; Dunn 1988:114f). Bell makes a strong case for the last option (1998:190, 
footnote 35), but all three have their difficulties. 
52
 The self-deception is only strengthened if the sins denounced in 2:21f relate to commandments in the 
Decalogue (Dunn 1988:132; Bell 1996:190). 
53
 See also see also Job 34:11. 
54
 See discussion of Romans 2:21f above. 
55
 NB, Paul’s later remark on the sureness (πείθω) of their self-perceived righteous position (Rom 2:19). 
56
 See Lee 2010:150. 
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Paul has not yet explicitly named the Jews as the primary target of his discourse, but his 
meaning is inescapable. Their disobedience to ‘the truth’ (see 1:18, 25) and obedience 
to unrighteousness (18, 29-31) implicates them in a vastly wider company—all 
humanity who does evil (2:9) is in mortal danger. When it comes to God’s righteous 
judgement, he favours neither Jew nor Gentile (10f). The latter group he now brings to 
the fore. 
 
Theological Exegesis of Romans 2:12-16, God’s Judgement Based on Law 
The purpose of Romans 2:12-16 is not to laud pagan virtue, but to further indict Jewish 
unrighteousness by exposing a mistaken reliance in possession of the law. To do this, 
Paul exhibits the Gentiles. The first part of this section is given to an examination of 
three key interpretive issues: the identity of the law, especially as it relates to Gentiles; 
the identity of the ἔθνη (Gentiles) in verses 14-15; the nature of συνείδησις in verse 15. 
These issues are interrelated, and discussing them at length is necessary in evincing 
self-deception in this passage. This secures a basis to offer a ressentiment reading of the 
passage, which comprises the second part of this section.  
The first key issue to be addressed is the identity of the law, for the concept of law 
overshadows the balance of the chapter. Fitzmyer lists four ways in which Paul uses 
νόμος in Romans: 1) figure of speech; 2) the Hebrew Scriptures; 3) the Mosaic 
covenant; 4) the natural understanding of some Gentiles (2008:131f).57 One may fairly 
straightforwardly interpret the preponderance of Paul’s usage here as the law of Moses, 
with overlap in meanings 2) and 3) from above. He certainly seems to have the law of 
Moses in mind in Rom 2:12 when he draws the standard distinction between Jew and 
Gentile. That is, Jews are under the law, and Gentiles are without it. The same holds 
true for 13a when he intimates the Jews are ‘hearers of the law’. 
Interpretation becomes particularly interesting, however, when Paul relates the 
law explicitly to the Gentiles in Romans 2:14-15. What is the law the Gentiles possess? 
There are two camps, which may be divided into those who relate law to the Mosaic 
law, and those who do not. In the first camp, Stowers represents the comparatively few 
who hold the Mosaic law was available to Gentile cultures in the ancient Mediterranean 
world, thus ‘the gentiles derived their knowledge of righteousness from the Jews’ 
                                                 
57
 For additional views of νόμος in terms of proposed semantic components, see Winger (1992); for a 
condensed presentation of general views, see Osborne (2004:64-67, footnote). 
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(1994:115) through ‘cultural diffusion’ (117, see also 114-17; also Dunn 1988:98f; 
Eckstein 1983:152).  
In the opposing camp, Bell argues Paul cannot here be speaking of the law of 
Moses, either in its form of extensive commands or that of the Decalogue. Rather, Paul 
must have in mind an unwritten law,58 (1998:153f; see also Barrett 1991:51). Bell gives 
evidence to show an ontological view of the law was acquired as Judaism encountered 
Hellenistic thought. The result was a Jewish wisdom tradition of the law as a divine and 
universal reason pre-existent to creation (156).
59
 Thus, the law would have been known 
to Adam. Concretely, it would later be manifest to Jews on tablets and parchment; to the 
Gentiles it would be written on their hearts (157). In that Paul viewed all humanity ‘in 
Adam’ (see Rom 5:12-21), God’s law would be universally condemnatory. 
Witherington comments along the same lines by contrasting the law of the Gentiles with 
the Mosaic Law: 
Because Paul speaks of those outside of the Law, he makes clear that they are not judged on 
the same basis as those under the Law … [The] Gentiles … have in a sense the Law written 
on their hearts. (2004:82) 
Thielman basically agrees with Witherington, holding Paul’s phrase, γραπτὸν ἐν ταῖς 
καρδίαις αὐτῶν, to be an echo from Jeremiah 31 to the effect that Gentiles, while falling 
‘technically outside the law’, bear ‘the rudiments of the Jewish law implanted in their 
hearts’ (1994:171; see also Murray 1987:74). Osborne interprets the law here along the 
lines of ‘common grace’, with no overt connection with Jewish law, equating it instead 
with a ‘sense of moral conscience that allows [the Gentiles] to understand God’s basic 
requirements’ (2004:69). Since it is God-given, it is a form of the divine law (69). Moo 
claims Paul employs the idea, common in his day, of ‘natural law’, Hellenised but 
without the associated philosophical baggage (1996:150, see also footnote 35; Bell 
1998: 101-18; Mathewson 1999).60  
I conclude the identity of the law as it is ‘possessed’ by the Gentiles primarily 
refers to the moral standard reflecting the eternal character of God. In view of Paul’s 
sweeping generalisation of the Gentiles in Romans 1, it is hard to conceive all of them 
have access to the law of Moses. In that God is impartial in his judgements, he cannot 
condemn those who are ignorant of transgression. On the other hand, it is relatively easy 
to conceive of the law as an unwritten moral code that reflects the character of God. It is 
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 The exception being the reference in Rom 2:15a. 
59
 Dunn’s commentary on Romans 7:7 is apt (1988:379). 
60
 Lamp views Paul as advocating a ‘natural law’ as well, but owing to the tradition that equates wisdom 
with Torah instead of Hellenistic categories (1999:45). 
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generally manifest to all humans, and has been specially and progressively revealed in 
the Jewish canon and the Christian Bible, and supremely in Jesus Christ. In Romans 1, I 
explained Paul to be saying that God’s nature is communicated to all humanity in such a 
way that defying it leaves man morally culpable. All humanity does sin, knowingly. 
They do this because there is no distinction in access to God’s law, which also means 
God’s judgement may truly be impartial. Both Gentiles and Jews are without excuse. 
The identity of the ἔθνη (Gentiles) in Romans 2:14-15 is a second key issue of 
interest, and several interpretations are available. The first interpretation views these 
Gentiles as law-keepers, different from the pagans in Romans 1:18-32 who are 
incapable of doing good, thus rendering Paul inconsistent between chapters (Räisänen 
1983:97-113; see also Sanders 1983:123-25). A second interpretation holds these 
Gentiles may be Christians in the fullest sense of justification by faith in Christ 
(Cranfield 1975:158f; Barth 2010 1.2:304; Gathercole 2002). Third, Paul may be 
referring to Gentiles living prior to Christ, whose proleptic salvation is predicated on 
their doing good in obedience to the law (Davies 1990 39:53-71). Fourth and relatedly, 
these Gentiles may be individuals who obey God imperfectly due to a partial 
understanding of his will (Snodgrass 1986 32.1:73-75). Finally, these may be Gentile 
pagans who live uprightly as directed by their conscience (Bruce 1985:86; Bell 
1998:152f; Witherington 2004:82f, esp. footnote 32; Collins 2010:141-43).  
I adopt the last interpretation, that the Gentiles to whom Paul refers in 2:14-15 are 
unregenerate humans who align their actions with the requirements of the law.61 Three 
points support this position. The first pertains to the term φύσει in verse 14, and the 
ambiguity that results from its placement between two clauses. The tension lies in 
whether it relates to the participle of the previous clause, τὰ μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα (König 
1967:58; Cranfield 1975:156f; Achtemeier 1985:44f; Stowers 1994:115f; Wright 
2002:441f), or to the verb in the following clause, τοῦ νόμου ποιῶσιν (Bruce 1985:86; 
Dunn 1988:98; Fitzmyer 2008:310; Moo 1996:149f; Bell 1998:152f, footnote 97; 
Schreiner 1998:121f). If the former, the verse signifies that the Gentiles do not possess 
the (Mosaic) law by birth right like the Jews (see Rom 3:2; 9:4). On this view, these are 
Gentile Christians who, Paul will go on to say in 8:4, do what the law requires by the 
Holy Spirit. Grammatically, Paul could have clearly communicated this meaning by 
relocating φύσει within the clause, as in 2:27. Furthermore, the expression, ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν 
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 It need not be inferred the actions of the said Gentiles are consistent with the law, enacted it perfectly, 
or are properly motivated. Thus, there is no salvific merit to ‘good’ behaviour. See also footnote 47 of this 
chapter. 
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νόμος, is atypical of Pauline characterisation of Christians (Schriener 1998:123).62 The 
other alternative is to take φύσει with the latter clause. This fits with its typical meaning, 
as anything existing ‘as the result of [a] natural development or condition’ (Louw & 
Nida 1988 1:586; see Köster 1974 9:253-55). Apparently, this is Paul’s meaning when 
he speaks of the essence of olive trees (Rom 11:21, 24), Jewishness (Gal 2:15) and 
‘Gentileness’ (Rom 2:27), and human sexual relations (1:26f). Paul is effectively saying 
the Gentiles have the law innately, as part of their constitution as human. Thus, Paul can 
claim in one breath that the Gentiles do not have the law (twice), specifically the Mosaic 
law, and in the next breath claim they do possess the law in some sense (pace Dunn 
1988:99).  
This points to a second reason for construing the Gentiles as non-Christian, which 
relates to τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιῶσιν in 2:14b. Though they do not have the law, Paul goes 
on in the second portion of verse 14 to say, not that they do τοῦ νόμου, but that they do 
τὰ τοῦ νόμου.63 The ESV translation of τὰ as ‘the things’ corresponds nicely to τὸ ἔργον 
(τοῦ νόμου).64 Also, Paul asserts the Gentiles ποιῶσιν the things of the law. However, if 
he thought of them as Christian, his case would be strengthened by using a form of 
πληρόω to refer their action in relation to the law (Murray 1987:73). The expression, 
ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν νόμος, also seems strange in connection with a Christian (Schreiner 
1998:123). If Paul is referring to non-Christians, it makes sense to take the expression 
as an innate sense of right and wrong, of divine moral standards, broadly construed 
(Moo 1996:150f).65 Paul’s language reveals even pagans can know and do things that 
reflect the character of God and, as a result, have been revealed in the law of Moses. 
Paul’s case against Jewish presumption of impunity on account of having the law is 
bolstered by declaring unbelieving Gentiles also have the law. However, for neither 
group is this enough to escape judgement, for ‘all have sinned and fall short of the glory 
of God’ by not keeping the law entirely (Rom 3:23).  
By association, a third reason for viewing the Gentiles as non-Christian relates to 
the nature and place of ‘the work of the law’ (simply ‘the work’ for the remainder of the 
paragraph) in verse 15. Paul says the work is γραπτὸν ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις αὐτῶν (i.e., the 
Gentiles’ hearts). He characterises the work as ‘written’, which would naturally recall 
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 Along these lines, consider the twice-occurring ἀνόμως in Rom 2:12. 
63
 It would be unusual for the neuter article, τὰ, to modify the masculine noun, νόμος.  
64
 Deidun takes τὰ in 2:15 as a ‘collective variant’ (1981:165; pace Dunn 1988:100). 
65
 See Collins (2010 ‘Appendix 1’; 139f) for the argument that this broad Pauline construal of the law 
does not owe to the Stoics, but is readily available in the Graeco-Roman world around him, as well as in 
the Hebrew Scriptures in which he is steeped. Others take νόμος more narrowly as referring to the Mosaic 
law, specifically (Ridderbos 1959:106; Räisänen 1983:25f; Dunn 1988:99). 
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for the Jew the law of Moses inscribed by God on Sinai (Exod 31:18; 32:16: 34:1). Yet 
the place of engraving in Paul’s text is not on tablets of stone, but on human hearts (see 
1 Cor 3:3). Many see a reference to the new covenant promise in Jeremiah 31:31-34 
(e.g., Cranfield 1975:158f; Ito 1995:26f; Wright 2002:442), whereby people are 
transformed via the work of God so they might obey him instinctively. However, not 
only does Paul not quote from Jeremiah, there is no mention of covenant, new or old, in 
either the chapter or wider context. The covenant promised by Jeremiah was made to 
the houses of Israel and Judah (31:33); no mention of Gentiles is involved, nor of 
knowing God (i.e., knowing his righteous demands), or of any of the other promised 
benefits mentioned by Jeremiah (31:34). In light of the preceding reason, this is because 
the work engraved by God on Gentile hearts is a universal sense of the character and 
will of God, demanded by him to be reflected in the lives of those created in his image, 
which is to say, both Gentiles and Jews. My conclusion regarding the identity of the 
ἔθνη (Gentiles) in Romans 2:14-15 is they are spiritually unregenerate humans not 
corporately chosen by God as recipients of special revelation (i.e., Jews). In this context, 
Paul usage of ἔθνη speaks of those who attempt to live up to the requirements of God’s 
law. 
The third key issue of interest is Paul’s use of ‘conscience’ (συνείδησις) in 
Romans 2:15.66 Legions of interpreters have drawn on CA Pierce’s exhaustive study of 
συνείδησις, Conscience in the New Testament (1955).67 Pierce argues convincingly 
Paul’s use of συνείδησις was not influenced by his Hebrew roots, but was baptised into 
his personal κοινὴ glossary from the Hellenised world. While Stoic philosophy made it 
a technical term, Paul’s takes it ‘directly and entirely from the everyday speech of the 
ordinary Greek’ (1955:54; see also 13-39, 59f; see also Jewett 1971:407, 11, 14; 
compare with Sevenster 1961:84f;),68 even as he innovates its usage for his own 
theological purposes (Bruce 1985:86; Jewett 1971:414). The major debate is whether 
conscience for Paul functions retrospectively in its judgements, or both retrospectively 
and prospectively. Subsumed in this debate is whether or not these judgements are 
                                                 
66
 The other two occurrences of συνείδησις in Romans are 9:1 and 13:5. The preponderance of its Pauline 
usage is found in the Corinthian correspondence: 1 Corinthians 8:7, 10, 12; 10:25, 27, 28, 29 (x2); 2 
Corinthians 1:12; 4:2; 5:11. The remaining occurrences lie in the pastoral epistles: 1 Timothy 1:5, 19; 
3:9; 4:2; 2 Timothy 1:3; Titus 1:15.  
67
 Pierce’s study encompasses the συνείδησις group of words: τὰ συνειδός/σύνοιδα/ἡ σύνεσις. 
68
 Pace Holtzmann (1911), Spicq (1938), Bultmann (1948). 
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exclusively negative or may also be positive.69 Closely related to this is the matter of the 
‘identity’ of the conscience.  
One group limits the conscience to a judicial function that rules on actions already 
taken. The emphasis is on knowledge of deeds already performed, specifically, on evil 
deeds (Pierce 1955:44f, 108f; Jewett 1971:407). Such transgressions normally result in 
‘the pain called συνείδησις’ (Pierce 1955:50, see also 45f; and Osborne, 2004:24f; 
Witherington 2004:82), which he calls ‘that combination of fear and shame which is 
called guilt’ (Pierce 1955:112; see also Thrall 1967:118; Whiteley 1971:210).  
Another group extends the function from judicial, ruling only on past actions, to 
include a legislative function for guidance in decision-making. Harris disagrees with 
Pierce et al., writing about Romans 2:15, that ‘the conscience surely can commend as 
well as condemn’ (1962:178). Thrall modifies Pierce because Pierce does not account 
for passages in which Paul uses συνείδησις more positively, and with a prospective 
influence. She concludes for Paul, the function of the conscience in the Gentile is 
generally the same as that of the Law for the Jew, even to the point of equating the two 
(Thrall 1967:124). Osborne describes the conscience as an ‘internal barometer’ to 
indicate right or wrong (2004:69f; see also Leitzmann 1933:107; Dodd 1949:205; 
D’Arcy 1961:11f; Stelzenberger 1961:55; Zuck 1969:331-34; Barrett 1991:247; Moo 
1996:152). Jewett, in commenting on Romans 13:5, claims that συνείδησις acts only 
retrospectively. Yet, confusingly, in the very next sentence he writes that ‘it is simply 
because one may have a prescience of conscience pangs that one may act so as to avoid 
them’ (italics supplied, 1971:440). Dunn comments, ‘The rationale [of συνείδησις in 
2:15] is still that of 1:18-32, of a “natural” sense of responsibility, consequent upon 
what is known of God and the kind of life appropriate to that knowledge, present in 
wider society’ (1988:101). 
Related to the foregoing is the ‘identity’ of the συνείδησις. It is different from the 
moral standard, or is it somehow the standard itself? New Testament interpretation has 
been significantly influenced by Rudolf Bultmann, who claims Paul’s use of συνείδησις 
draws on the ancient Greeks and Stoics, and not his Hebrew roots. As a result, he holds 
to the traditional notion of the conscience as ‘the voice of God in man’, but he recasts it 
in terms of self-conscious conduct as accountable to the Transcendent (i.e., God) 
(Bultmann 2007:216f; see also Stacey 1956:206-10; Aune 2004:298). Bornkamm 
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 Related to the mention of ποιῶσιν above, Campbell argues these two debates are irrelevant regarding 
Paul’s point, which is that Gentile law-doing evinces ‘prior pagan possession of an ethical code’ 
(2009:556, see also 557). 
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moderates Bultmann by accepting his basic definition of conscience as ‘man’s 
knowledge of himself and his own actions,’ but insists it ‘acts independently of God, yet 
in relation to a sense of divine law (Jewett 1971:410). J-H Eckstein explores the overlap 
in Paul’s usage of συνείδησις and the Old Testament usage of בל. Thiselton reports on 
Eckstein’s influential work, who finds that the semantic range of בל not only includes 
the intellect, but also affective states such as pain, joy, and fear, as well as postures of 
willing such as determination, decisiveness, and evaluation for the sake of decision-
making. Eckstein concludes the meaning of συνείδησις in both 1 Corinthians and 
Romans includes ‘awareness of, reflection on, and evaluation concerning, thought, will, 
decision, and resultant action’ (Thiselton 2000:643). Jewett rejects this, claiming, ‘Paul 
never speaks of God’s rule of man through the conscience’ (1971:407). Others build on 
Eckstein’s work, arguing συνείδησις be taken as self-awareness (Gooch 1987:250; 
Gardiner 1994:40-64), or even consciousness (Horsley 1978:582). Sevenster conducts a 
rigorous comparison of the usage of συνείδησις in Paul and Seneca, finding in the latter 
it not only refers to self-knowledge of man’s own actions, but also extends to his words 
and thoughts. Thus, it qualifies as a moral guardian bearing the divine presence. Seneca 
and Paul view the conscience as both knowledge and as a witness, but whereas it is the 
ultimate arbiter for Seneca, it is always provisional and fallible for Paul (e.g., Rom 
2:14f) (Sevenster 1961:84-102; Jewett 1971:446). 
One final note on the identity of συνείδησις, specifically its συμμαρτυρούσης, 
comes in relation to the final phrase of verse 15, καὶ μεταξὺ ἀλλήλων τῶν λογισμῶν 
κατηγορούντων ἢ καὶ ἀπολογουμένων. If the prefix of συμμαρτυρούσης is taken as 
vestigial and so without force, then συνείδησις bears witness to oneself, and τῶν 
λογισμῶν may be interpreted as an expansion on συνείδησις (Moo 1996:153).70 Paul’s 
further description of these thoughts as transpiring μεταξὺ ἀλλήλων, well-suited to law 
court terminology, sets the tension between them as accusatory (κατηγορέω) or 
defensive (ἀπολογέομαι). If the conjunction ἢ καὶ is taken epexegetically, then Paul 
may mean while some thoughts are approved by the conscience, most are censured. 
These thoughts are constantly debated in the conscience, and any temporal judgements 
are subject to the fallibility and fleetingness of human nature (Campbell 2009:556-58). 
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 Pace Dunn, who sees συνείδησις as distinct from one’s thoughts, such that it provides an independent 
evaluative role in relation to whether or not the heart-inscribed standard is honoured (Dunn 1988a:101f; 
see also Jewett 1971:442-44). Practically speaking, however, Dunn’s explanation of ‘moral consciousness 
… as a sense of confusion or self-contradiction’ is not far from the position I have taken (1988:102).  
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Verse 16 speaks of a future day when all debates will end in the final and infallible 
judgement of God rendered by Christ Jesus (Moo 1996:154; Bassler 1982:148). 
From this discussion, I take the position the ‘identity’ of the συνείδησις is neither 
an internal law nor the source of law. Rather, it stands independent from this law as the 
mechanism by which one evaluates their actions and attitudes against this standard. The 
typical result is a painful awareness for failure to meet this standard,71 along with 
occasional approbation of the same. This seems to best reflect Paul’s usage in Romans 
9:1 and 13:5, as well as in the rest of his letters.  
We now proceed with the exegesis of the passage. Romans 2:12-16 concerns the 
impartial basis of God’s judgement, the law. My ressentiment reading will highlight 
three concepts found toward the end of the passage: conscience, thoughts, and secrets. 
The human conscience is the first concept to consider. In a Nietzschean system, it 
appears in the internalisation stage of ressentiment.72 Its catalyst lies in the strictures of 
State (OGM 2.17) which, as discussed previously,73 we found in the creational subtext 
of Romans 1. There, God as creator establishes moral norms as law. Permission for such 
a reading comes from Nietzsche’s own rendition of the ‘famous story’ of the Garden, 
replete with elements such as the invention of man and subsequent creation of woman, 
the ‘tree of knowledge’, the aspiration to be ‘godlike’, and ‘original sin’ (A 48). In the 
garden state, Adam and Eve, knowing the law of God, transgress it, and so suffer the 
decreed penalty, death (Gen 2:17). In Romans 2:14, Paul writes that the Gentiles 
perform the requirements of the law, even though they do not possess it. As I have 
equated these requirements with the work of the law written on their hearts (2:15a), the 
inscription must be ‘readable’ to be intelligible and convey meaning. The conscience 
performs this function by reflecting one’s performance in relation to the law (15b). It 
does this by means of the Gentiles’ thoughts. 
The second concept to be examined is that of thoughts. Paul’s characterisation of 
Gentile thoughts in verse 2:15c may be taken as an expansion of the function of 
conscience. More specifically, he describes their thoughts in ongoing conflict before the 
bar of God’s law, at which they usually are condemned, but are occasionally affirmed. 
Such a portrayal of ‘thought process’ finds correspondence in the all-too-human 
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 Consider the parallels involved in the message to Belshazzar during the feast in Daniel 5. It is 
communicated in writing, it is distinct from its recipient, and it is moral in nature if the king’s terror is 
considered a judgement of conscience. Some scholars evince Paul’s familiarity with Daniel by connecting 
his discussion of ἡ ἀποστασία with chapters 7-12 of the prophet’s record (Marshall 1983:190-92; Morris 
1984:222, footnote 19; Beale 2003:204-07; Witherington 2006:210-12, 18). 
72
 See sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 of this thesis. 
73
 See sections 3.2 and 3.3.1 of this thesis. 
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phenomenon of continual self-scrutiny and internal debate. Motives, desires, values, and 
thoughts,74 both conscious and unconscious, are brought to bear on hypothetical 
behavioural outcomes played out in the mind. This would suit a Nietzschean (and 
Freudian) interpretation of the conscience from a ressentiment perspective, given the 
concatenation of forces vie for power and expression. The very nature of the struggle 
itself reveals ressentiment at work. At issue in this context is the law of God. 
Paul’s comment that the Gentiles do not have the law (Rom 2:12, 14) provokes a 
question, how he can speak of them desiring in any way to conform to it, let alone be 
held accountable to it (Campbell 2009:552, 57)? Yet the conflict in their conscience 
reveals they do possess this desire—a sense of moral responsibility—in their self-
perceived occasional success in keeping these norms (Rom 2:15c). Regardless, Paul’s 
opening declaration in verse 12 hangs over them: ‘all who have sinned without the law 
will also perish without the law’. Even though Paul does not here characterise the 
Gentiles as cognisant of this consequence, I have claimed from Romans 1 that they have 
both implicit and explicit knowledge of something calamitous. Paul contends that to sin 
without the law is still to violate God’s moral norm, and to do so knowingly (1:19-21, 
23, 25, 28, 32).75 In this ressentiment scenario, God’s moral norm is imposed on man 
through creation as law. Its restrictiveness is perceived as oppressively injurious. Moral 
violation of this law carries with it at least tacit knowledge of consequences. 
Commensurate with God’s power as creator, the consequences may be inferred to be 
dire. Such knowledge is betrayed in the Gentiles evasion of the truth (18, 25). 
Implicitly, the Gentiles can know that the being who subjugates by law in the first place, 
is the same being who can be expected to exact punishment on transgressors. Beyond 
this, Paul reveals the Gentiles know explicitly and specifically the consequence of 
violating God’s moral norm in terms of his decree of death on unrighteousness (32). 
However, not only do they continue in ‘all manner of unrighteousness’ (29, also 30f), 
they recruit others to increase the size of the herd (see 32). The rationale may be either 
to fashion a refuge in numbers from which no individual can be singled out for 
punishment, or to generate strength in a majority from which normative values can be 
imposed. The self-deception of ressentiment explains man’s ability to conduct his way 
in the face of the damning peril of universal judgement. I find a clue to it in Paul’s 
mention of ‘secrets’ in 2:16. 
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 Hereafter, these are collectively referred to as ‘thoughts’. 
75
 Bell claims man possess ‘a residue of knowledge, i.e., some knowledge of the law (2.14-16) and some 
knowledge of a principle of retribution (1.32)’, which he claims amounts to no knowledge (1998:106f). 
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The third concept to discuss is that of secrets. The labyrinth is a frequent image in 
Nietzsche’s writings (Schrift 1990:186-98; Del Caro 2014:153). For my purposes, it 
provides a convenient link between the conscience and what lies hidden within it. 
Nietzsche uses the labyrinth often as a metaphor for man’s experience of life in all its 
uncertainty. Alan White writes, ‘Nietzsche’s labyrinth is our labyrinth, the labyrinth of 
the human condition’ (1990:14). In BGE 2.29, life is portrayed as a dangerous maze into 
which the strong and daring enter, only to get ‘lost, isolated, and torn to pieces by some 
cave Minotaur of conscience [and] perish’. Evidently, only those with requisite strength 
risk the terrors that lie hidden within ‘the labyrinth of the [human] breast’ (OGM 2.18). 
In the labyrinth hide ‘our most secret … inclinations, [along] with our most fervent 
needs’ (BGE 7.214).  
Paul speaks of conflicting thoughts in man’s conscience in Romans 2:15, which 
are constantly being adjudicated to arrive at desires, values, and actions. Paul explains 
that in the future the secrets of men will be judged (Rom 2:16). By inference, when 
these secrets are judged they are exposed. Their hidden nature disappears. But nothing 
is ever hidden from God (2:3; 8:29; 11:31; especially 1 Cor 4:5; also 14:25),76 which 
raises the question, why would anyone try to hide something from him in the first 
place? One ready explanation comes in the form of other-deception: man consciously 
and intentionally hides thoughts from God he knows are unacceptable to him, believing 
somehow a) they will escape God’s notice, or b) though God may be aware of them, he 
will excuse their offense.77 The other explanation is supplied by the self-deception of 
ressentiment: man hides unacceptable thoughts from God, unawares, by first hiding 
them from himself. The critical feature is the revaluative function of ressentiment.  
According to ressentiment, the self is comprised of competing forces and thoughts 
that vie for expression. Some of these may be acknowledged to the self, but others are 
hidden, repressed. They are repressed because they, in one way or another, reflect 
values associated in the strong, and are thus resented. At the same time, these very same 
values remain prized by the relatively weak person. Repressed thoughts concerning 
these repressed values are no less real than acknowledged thoughts, so they continue to 
exert pressure on the self. But not only are these actually-prized values repressed by the 
self, the conflict involved in repressing them is also denied. Thus, the self-deception of 
ressentiment creates a schism in the self; it ‘corrupts or dis-integrates the self’ 
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 See footnote 15 of this chapter, then consider Luke 8:17 (additionally, Hebrews 4:13). 
77
 One could argue this as a case of self-deception in light of the attributes of God’s righteousness and 
omniscience, but it would be difficult to consider it as driven by ressentiment. 
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(Reginster 1997:301).78 Normally, the self seeks an integrated identity. Ressentiment-
man’s standard for this identity is measured against a borrowed standard, one that is 
alien to himself.  
The Gentiles’ secret thoughts find much correspond in this description. They hide 
them from themselves because they do not align with the moral standard of God’s law. 
This law has been imposed on them through creation, and it comes with consequences 
for defying it. Ressentiment, however, views all such infringement on self-determination 
as injury and threat which must be rejected (see WP 1.55). Given the nature of the 
superior other, in this case God the creator, open revolt is untenable. If I may 
characterise it as ‘unthinkable’ in the sense that it is pushed out of conscious reflection, 
this provides a way to understand secret thoughts as self-deception. Since the desire for 
self-determination is a function of will-to-power, it is ineradicable. Yet it must be 
suppressed in light of the law of God which demands conformity to his will. To achieve 
any integrity of self, those thoughts which run counter to God’s law must be repressed. 
That they persist and are real is evidenced by the fact that while sometimes their 
thoughts are manifest as conforming to the good (Romans 2:7, 10), their conscience 
typically accuses them of those repressed thoughts not conforming to the truth of God 
(see also 1:18, 25).  
Modern man’s soul is labyrinthine, writes Nietzsche in D 1.169 (see also BGE 
9.295). This owes to its ressentiment-formed conscience and the negative ideas within it 
(see CW ‘Preface’). These ideas not only violate the self secretly, they do so 
continually, precisely because they are secret to the self. Wrong thoughts, successfully 
kept by the self from the self with the help of revaluation, may in turn be communicated 
by the self to others sincerely as ‘good’. In the case of Paul’s Gentiles, the most 
important perceived other is God. In Z 4.7, Zarathustra decries the Christian God, not 
for his omnipotence, but for his omniscience. ‘He saw with eyes that saw everything—
he saw the depths and grounds of the human, all its veiled disgrace and ugliness … he 
crawled into my filthiest corner’. Power, even divine power, is something Nietzsche 
ultimately admires. However, God’s knowledge of, i.e., his ability to see everything in 
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 See also Sartre’s discussion of bad faith in which the self demands to be considered by the Other as a 
concrete, absolute, and permanent object, i.e., an autonomous self. This projection of a secret vision of 
oneself is sourced in shame, fear, and pride (1956:288-92). Though Sartre rules out God as the definer of 
the self (lxiv, 439f), he illustrates his point with the biblical symbol of the fall of Adam and Eve hiding 
from God. 
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the labyrinth79 of the human soul causes him to declare, ‘I wanted to take revenge’ (4.7; 
see also D 5.464).80 Ressentiment is aroused by such anger and revenge, but because 
open revolt is deemed impossible against another perceived-to-be superior, the 
associated emotions must be kept secret. The Gentiles harbour these secrets even as they 
debate their thoughts in the halls of conscience. The essence of self-deception is they 
keep secrets from God and from themselves.  
We have seen how the structure of ressentiment paves the way for a fresh reading 
of Pauline fallenness in Romans 1 and 2. It applies to Gentiles and Jews, and in fact to 
anyone who perceives themselves disadvantaged or oppressed. It applies to the Gentiles. 
Paul asserts they suppress and exchange the truth about God’s power and nature, both of 
which reveal him to be the supremely powerful creator. It applies to the Jews. Paul 
claims they both condemn the perceived-to-be superior (Roman) Gentiles for their 
sinful behaviour, even as they themselves practice the very same things, and they also 
dismiss God as he has revealed himself in the law by excusing themselves from its 
commands. Furthermore, Paul describes how Gentiles may do the work of the law 
despite wrestling with it in their conscience against the secrets they and all people carry, 
i.e., those thoughts that transgress the character and will of God universally revealed in 
the law. All these behaviours and mindsets, I have argued, manifest self-deception. In 
this chapter, ressentiment has served as a lens for reading Paul’s employment of self-
deception as he levels his argument against fallen and sinful humans. In the next 
chapter, we will explore self-deception at a deeper level in terms of its mechanics. 
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 Dionysus is the singer of ‘Ariadne’s Complaint’, published in the Dithyrambs of Dionysus (1888). He 
concludes his poem or song with the line, ‘I am your labyrinth’. Nietzsche draws this metaphor from 
Greek mythology. Ovid’s epic poem, The Metamorphoses, chronicles Theseus’ slaying of the Minotaur 
and triumph over the labyrinth. Theseus possesses enough strength but lacks the requisite knowledge to 
complete his quest. He needs no additional power to dispatch the beast, but without knowing the secret 
supplied by Ariadne, he will die in the labyrinth for lack of an exit. The moral of the story is, ‘knowledge 
is power’. 
80
 I am indebted to Stephen Williams for this insight (2006:173f; see also 174, footnote 65). 
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Chapter 4: THE MECHANICS OF SELF-DECEPTION 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Demosthenes (fourth-century BCE) reportedly observed ‘nothing is easier than self-
deceit. For what each man wishes, that he also believes to be true’ (Demosthenes 
1985:3.19). Self-deception is not a modern phenomenon, but modernity has made its 
study significant (Crites 1979:109). It is nor uniquely religious. Philosophers from Plato 
to Goethe and Schopenhauer to Sartre have explored man’s intentional blindness. The 
Apostle Paul explicitly bears witness to it. He warns against self-deception in 1 
Corinthians 3:18 (ἑαυτὸν ἐξαπατάτω) and in Galatians 6:3 (φρεναπατᾷ ἑαυτόν). Paul 
uses other terms to describe it in the context of fallen-man’s wilful ignorance of God in 
Romans 1, as we have discussed in Chapter Three.1  
To this point in the thesis it has been unnecessary to give more than a general 
account of the concept of self-deception. Now I must go into detail. Many models span 
the range on this subject including ordinary self-deception, pseudo self-deception (such 
as bias, prejudice, or wishful thinking), unconscious believing, half-believing, avowed 
believing, unnoticed believing, and multi-selved believing to name but a few 
(McLaughlin & Rorty 1988).2 I have identified the concept of self-deception in Romans 
1 (and 2), but even though Paul mentions two ways in which it works, he does not speak 
to the inner dynamics of self-deception’s functioning. Nietzsche’s thought in the 
aggregate, on the other hand, provides needed detail on the subject.  
Self-deception features critically in both Pauline fallenness and Nietzschean 
ressentiment. Broadly speaking, I will now bring them together around the focal point 
of self-deception. I will deliberately focus on certain Nietzsche-centric essays in the first 
part of the chapter because only so can I make the novel connection offered in this 
thesis, which is the exploration of self-deception at the intersection of Nietzsche and 
Paul, and the possibility of elucidating Pauline usage in light of Nietzschean 
explication. Later in the chapter, I will bring to bear other literature that deals with self-
deception, some of it not directly referencing Nietzsche or Paul. This will serve to 
independently substantiate the inescapability of self-deception in the human experience 
                                                 
1
 Some argue Romans 7 also relies on self-deception. Paul’s describes conflict between the conscious and 
the unconscious (e.g., Theissen 1987:177-249). 
2
 A solid, recent work on self-deception is Bayne and Fernández’s Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective 
and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation (2009). Still helpful is Baron’s compilation, 
Perspectives on Self-deception (1988). 
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about which they write. They grapple with the same phenomenon, albeit in different 
ways.  
Specifically, the chapter begins by laying the groundwork of the existential 
origins of ressentiment. Richard Sugarman (1980) lays the foundation here with 
Nietzsche’s PTG, itself a commentary on Anaximander (fifth-century BCE). I move 
then to analyse self-deception in both Nietzschean and Pauline contexts (sections 4.3 
and 4.4). Peter Poellner (2004) shows self-deception to be the culminating move of 
Nietzschean ressentiment. Bahnsen (1995) and Via (1990) offer Pauline theological 
perspectives. I will synthesise these to show how self-deception functions in Paul. 
Finally, I will discuss fear as a possible motive for self-deception, extensively in 
Nietzsche, then in Paul.  
 
4.2 Existential Origins of Self-deception  
Self-deception, and the ressentiment that gives rise to it, is key to the ‘revaluation of all 
values’ (OGM 1.8). Nietzsche claims repeatedly in OGM that this revaluation involves a 
struggle that stretches long into mankind’s past (1.8, 11; 2.2-9). Sugarman retraces 
Nietzsche’s argument that Anaximander originates this conflict by wrestling with 
existence, and posing the question: why is that-which-is so fleeting (see Staten 1990:64-
68)?3 Peering out into the abyss-like ‘mystical night’, the Milesian utters the enigmatic 
statement (in English), ‘Where the source of things is, to that place they must also pass 
away, according to necessity, for they must pay penance and be judged for their 
injustices, in accordance with the ordinance of time’ (PTG 4).4 Sugarman establishes 
Nietzsche’s discovery of the ultimate source of ressentiment as ‘the first metaphysical 
reflection of ressentiment’ (1980:56). Nietzsche’s ensuing commentary incorporates 
Pauline terminology to state a philosophical finding: 
The proper measure with which to judge any and all human beings is that they really are 
creatures who should not exist at all and who are [expiating] their lives by their manifold 
sufferings and their death. What could we expect of such creatures? Are we not all sinners 
under sentence of death? We [expiate] for having been born, first by living and then by 
dying. (italics supplied, PTG 4) 
Anaximander, according to Nietzsche, recoils at the Law of Time because it 
insists that transience is the penalty for existence. Nor can Anaximander abide its 
                                                 
3
 See Sugarman’s astute article, ‘Rancor against Time: The Phenomenology of Ressentiment’ (1980), 
featuring Anaximander the Milesian, ‘the first philosophical author of the ancients’ (PTG 4). 
4
 Shapiro’s excellent article featuring Anaximander’s famous declaration does not supply Nietzsche’s 
German text, but rather the original Greek. He notes Anaximander’s declaration is a textbook scrap 
discovered 1,000 years after its author’s death (1994:359). 
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corollary, that transience is the reason for all suffering. Sugarman summarises the 
Milesian this way: ‘Passing away is the penance paid for the injustice of having come-
to-be. For, nothing has the right to be. Coming-to-be is an illegitimate emancipation 
from the unbroken calm of eternity’ (2010:57). Nietzsche observes Anaximander posing 
guiltiness as a solution to the otherwise unexplainable suffering of existence. Rather 
than leave the dilemma of human existence hanging raw in an apathetic universe, 
Anaximander eases his angst by ‘superimposing an ethical drama upon an ontological 
datum’ (57). Nietzsche the ventriloquist indicts Anaximander by posing this question 
through him to all creatures, ‘What is your existence worth? And, if it is worthless why 
are you still here? Your guilt, I see, causes you to tarry in your existence’ (PTG 4). This 
tarrying exposes Anaximander’s hidden grudge against the march of time, and 
engenders a response of ‘“insolent apostasy” [as] a way of postponing penance, 
judgment, perishing’ (Sugarman 1980:57). 
Nietzsche moves from his early work in PTG to devote the whole of BGE and 
OGM (perhaps even his entire career) to Anaximander’s quest. What is the answer to 
suffering (OGM 3.28)? Ressentiment, set in motion by suffering and ending in self-
induced deception, goes a long way in answering his query. It provides an explanation 
based on creating a new morality and a new reality. Sugarman likewise casts 
ressentiment as the ‘rancor against the ordinance of time’, motivated ‘out of the spirit of 
revenge, [and responsible for] the aboriginal devaluation of existence’ (1980:57). That 
is, Nietzsche’s ressentiment originates in ‘man’s relation to his own finitude and 
temporality’ (97), which is swallowed up by what Nietzsche views as the unfathomable 
abyss of reality. Nietzsche famously portrays the human predicament in Zarathustra’s 
tightrope walker, suspended between the twin dangers of man’s history and his destiny 
(Z 1.3-8). Mutatis mutandis, Pascal speaks of man standing between, not one, but two 
abysses, one of the Infinite and the other of the Nothing (1995 1.15.199). 
Couched in philosophical terms, the problem that befalls everything, including of 
course every human being, is the penalty that being owes to becoming, essence to 
existence. Life is probation without the possibility of exoneration. Stated theologically, 
transience is evidence of sin, and the penalty of sin is death (see Rom 6:23), a judgment 
from which there is no appeal. The ‘insolent apostasy’ above, from a Pauline 
perspective, is a mask worn by fallen-man to hide the guiltiness and associated 
creaturely fear that stem from disobedience to God. In fact, I suggest that failure to seek 
such protection in the face of such judgment would be abnormal, for as Pascal asserts, 
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anyone ‘who considers himself in this way [i.e., as culpable for sin] will be terrified at 
himself’ (1995 1.15.199). Anaximander’s insolence, construed as fallen-man, covers his 
terror of God’s judgement, described variously as passing away, not existing at all, 
manifold sufferings, and death. Fallen-man, then, ‘flees into a metaphysical fortress’ 
(PTG 4) of a world ordered by his own wisdom (Rom 1:22). As a result, he accepts 
himself as the ground of his own value (see Rom 1:25a; Phil 3:9a). 
My philosophical discussion of self-deception now transitions from its historical 
context to one conducted in terms psychological and phenomenological. Nietzsche’s 
ressentiment remains the overall conceptual framework. 
 
4.3 Self-deception in the Context of Nietzschean Ressentiment  
Peter Poellner, in his ‘Self-deception, Consciousness and Value’ (2004), reconstructs 
Nietzsche’s observations concerning the phenomenon of ressentiment by combining 
them with other phenomenological insights, namely from Sartre and Husserl.5 I will not 
analyse the complexities of relevant affective behaviour. I will instead focus on his 
attempt to validate Nietzsche’s view of self-deception as a compelling explanation of 
that behaviour (2004:44).  
Nietzsche’s view of ressentiment dovetails nicely and in depth with Paul’s view of 
the fall. At stake in Poellner’s article is the condition Nietzsche believes to be necessary 
for morality, that condition in which a subject intentionally misrepresents her own 
conscious state (60).  
 
4.3.1 Problem of Nietzsche’s Self-deception 
Poellner strongly identifies self-deception with Nietzsche’s ressentiment (2009b:169), 
and in fact equates the two by means of a colon at the close of his introduction 
(2004:45f). Poellner later clarifies ressentiment as a particular form of self-deception 
(italics supplied, 62). Further, it is the consummating move of a six-part progression, a 
‘masking’ of the entire program from the ressentiment subject (48f). Poellner lists six 
mental states comprising the phenomenon of ressentiment: 1) pain from injury; 2) 
hatred of the offender; 3) desire for superiority; 4) judgement leading to blame; 5) 
justification of superiority; 6) masking of the entire process (49). Other authors organise 
their understanding of ressentiment along different This highly abbreviated scheme will 
                                                 
5
 Poellner relies on Sartre (1969) Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, and 
Husserl (1983) On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917), (2014) Ideas 
for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy. 
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benefit my critique of Poellner’s proposed solution, though others offer different 
arrangements.6 
According to Poellner, Nietzsche sees modernists making moral choices, not in a 
vacuum, but from ‘evaluative hierarchies’ and ‘ordinary practical evaluative 
commitments’ (2004:45). The ideals and values which constitute ‘morality’ give 
evidence of ‘expressing an unacknowledged, yet conscious, detractive intent’, which is 
to say, ressentiment (45). The source of ressentiment morality, ‘Nietzsche stresses’, lies 
in the ‘overcoming of suffering through a “self-affirmation” made possible by the 
consciousness of a moral superiority over the resented Other’. This superiority, which 
carries with it the threat of power, ‘is the fundamental purpose served by the dynamic of 
ressentiment’ (47). The moral superiority of Nietzsche’s ressentiment subject must be 
consciously held and intentionally motivated, while at the same time being somehow 
masked from herself.  
Those who challenge Poellner’s assessment do not hold that superiority, including 
its inherent threat of power, must be the impetus for ressentiment. Leiter, for example, 
removes the need for agency in power by abstracting its source (2003:202, also footnote 
13). I contend, however, that true power or lack thereof cannot exist in a vacuum. 
Powerlessness can only happen in the context of powerfulness.7 So rather than consider 
power as conducted in the vagaries of ‘states of affairs’ or of ‘circumstances’ as Leiter 
holds (203f), i.e., apart from someone who embodies or wields it, it seems universally 
natural to seek an agent to blame, a point made repeatedly in Chapter Two of this thesis.  
Poellner locates Nietzsche’s problem in the snares of two related paradoxes, one 
static and one dynamic (2004:49). In the static paradox the subject is both aware and 
unaware of facts pertaining to aspects of her own mental state. In the dynamic paradox 
the subject is both intentional and ignorant of pursuing a project to ‘mask’ her own 
experience (50).8 Poellner ultimately aims to find an explanation of (self-) 
consciousness compelling enough to account for the affective states of ressentiment and 
pave the way for self-deception (62). He rejects the three major solutions from the 
literature before offering his own. These are ‘Ressentiment and Split Mind Theories’, 
‘Ressentiment and Nonintentional Motivated Error’, and ‘Ressentiment as “Bad Faith”’ 
(2004:50-60). Each fails to adequately address the two paradoxes above, according to 
                                                 
6
 See section 1.3.2 of this thesis. 
7
 See also Bittner (1994), Wallace (2007), and Poellner (2011). 
8
 See Mele 2000:59-73 for a concise discussion of both paradoxes, or ‘puzzles’. 
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Poellner. His refutations of each model may be found in their respective subsection of 
his article. 
 
4.3.2 Solution to the Problem 
Poellner’s own model of Nietzsche’s self-deception may be called a Revised Sartrean-
influenced Ressentiment. Critical for Poellner is that ‘one notable feature of Nietzsche’s 
analysis is his emphasis on the comparative or relational character of the ressentiment 
subject’s orientation towards the positive values or virtues she “counterfeits” or 
“imitates”’ (2004:60). A subject confronted with her behaviour that conflicts with such 
values justifies herself on a relative or relational basis, rather than on an absolute or 
essentialist one. Not that she meets the standard and the oppressor does not. Rather, she 
must think of herself in relation to the values, or ‘disvalues’, she associates with her 
oppressors.9 She views herself as ‘“more just than x”, “more virtuous than x”, and so 
forth’ (italics supplied, 62).  
This distinction allows Poellner to navigate between unconscious values and 
conscious motivations. Regarding the former, it is by virtue of ‘the essentially 
comparative character of the ressentiment subject’s evaluative orientation’ that Poellner 
proposes to understand the artful character of ressentiment as devoid of ‘appropriately 
“fulfilled” consciousness’ (Poellner 2004:62). This leaves the subject with no conscious 
awareness of the values she avows in their essence (61f). Regarding the latter and by 
contrast, the subject is aware of the factors motivating her, some of which are only in 
terms of Sartrean or Husserlian pre-reflective consciousness (62). The subject can now 
reinterpret her response to injury in thematic terms so that the original offence is not 
seen to be connected with the object of ressentiment (i.e., the perpetrator), but is made 
against fabricated universal (derivative) values such as injustice and godlessness (63). 
But this signals the objection that the subject has no ‘fulfiled awareness’ of these 
fabricated values such as selflessness or humility that are required to drive the 
ressentiment mechanism. Such fulfiled awareness of values requires of her the sort of 
ownership of these values that is born of experiential understanding. Yet, if these values 
are ‘created’, as Nietzsche so famously asserts, and if there is no antecedent ‘fuel’ for 
the engine of value-formation, whence arises ressentiment? This creates a conundrum. 
                                                 
9
 Poellner does not here define what he means by ‘disvalues’. Elsewhere, however, he discusses them as 
anything valued by the ressentiment-subject, whose very life state is characterised as intrinsically life-
denying (2011:140f). 
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Poellner offers two possible solutions for it. First, the ressentiment subject can 
adopt values recognised by others in the same culture. This is simple enough. The 
second explanation is a fair inference from Nietzsche’s thought, though Poellner claims 
he never saw it himself. In this case, the ressentiment subject borrows values from 
herself, values she would own ‘in other contexts [in] a genuine (non-self-deceived), 
albeit relatively weak’, way (Poellner 2004:63). Poellner explains it this way. A 
subject’s hatred is directed toward the other (e.g., a boss) because of his superiority over 
her, either of position or power, real or imagined by the subject. To admit this disparity 
in power would diminish the subject, so she resents her boss for different and weaker-
to-her (i.e., tacitly acceptable) reasons, say for example, his immorality. She can do this 
because she maintains ressentiment values such as chastity, honesty, and trust that are 
familiar to her from past situations. The caveat is that those values must be pre-
reflective and non-thematic in character, such that she has a relatively weak grasp on 
them. The paramount value for her is really power (i.e., superiority) (63f). When the 
subject finds herself in the heat of resentment, she imports (i.e., borrows) the ‘content’ 
of those past ressentiment values into her present ressentiment situation. She deceives 
herself to believe she opposes her boss for his immorality. Her real reason, however, is 
that she is threatened by his power over her. This would be obvious to her, claims 
Poellner, if she were confronted with her hatred toward a different supervisor (i.e., over 
her) who, all things being equal, had none of the ‘disvirtues of character’ which she 
found objectionable (Poellner 2011:133). But she would never countenance such a 
scenario, for fear that her imported values might be falsified.10 Such an examination 
would defeat the ultimate aim of control (which Poellner stops shy of expressly stating).  
That is, it would thwart her ressentiment mentality of superiority by assigning blame to 
her boss, passing judgement on him, and feeling justified entirely in her reinterpreted 
superiority over him (see Deleuze 1983:123).11 The total scheme for Poellner constitutes 
a ‘project of self-deception’ (2004:64),12 and makes sense of Nietzsche’s oft-labelled 
incoherent statements regarding ressentiment (44).  
                                                 
10
 See Fingarette’s Self-Deception (2000). In Chapter Two, ‘To Avow or Not To Avow’, he claims the 
centrality of ‘the capacity of a person to identify himself as a particular person engaged in the world in 
specific ways, the capacity of a person to reject such identification and engagement, and the further 
supposition that an individual can continue to be engaged in the world in a certain way even though he 
does not avow it as his personal engagement and therefore displays none of the evidences of such an 
avowal’ (90). 
11
 See the end of section 4.2.4 for a preliminary discussion on the notion of justification within self-
deception. 
12
 Sartre, in Being and Nothingness, gives us the term ‘project’ in relation to self-deception: ‘project of 
bad faith’ (1956:49). 
146 
 
 
4.3.3 Significance of Poellner’s Solution 
Poellner’s explanation of Nietzschean self-deception offers three significant insights. 
First is a general explanation of self-deception, with specific expository reference to 
Nietzsche’s ressentiment. This he places at the centre of the late Nietzschean 
philosophical enterprise, the revaluation of morals (Poellner 2004:46). Poellner defines 
ressentiment as a double-deception, pulling the wool over one’s own eyes, so to speak, 
while keeping one’s self in the dark at having done so (49). He schematises 
ressentiment into six constituents, relegating the ‘act’ of deception to the finale (49). 
This dovetails well with my four-phase treatment.13 It is important to note that though 
both schemes view the act of self-deception at their end, self-deception occurs earlier as 
well. The tinge of it appears in Poellner’s fourth and fifth components, in the judgement 
of object values and consequent adoption of novel values made possible only by a 
psychologically generated position of superiority. This approach brings two paradoxes 
into view that Nietzsche’s ressentiment subject must face. In the static paradox the 
subject must deceive herself about the facts. In the dynamic paradox she must deceive 
herself about her strategy concerning the facts. Poellner organises the balance of his 
article around these challenges. 
Poellner’s second key insight relates to his reasons for rejecting the three major 
approaches to self-deception. He argues that split-mind theories do not account well for 
self-deception in terms of Nietzsche’s ressentiment, and I concur. Nietzsche does not 
seem to allow for a conscious split-mind. This makes it necessary to find an alternative 
explanation of how a subject may, in a given circumstance, a) behave in a systematic 
way commensurate with unconscious ressentiment values, b) notice that such behaviour 
is inconsistent with consciously held values, and c) not act to change the systematic 
behaviour (Poellner 2004:53f).14  
Regarding nonintentional motivated error, Poellner’s argument on nonintentional 
motivated error is compelling enough to accept as it stands. The relation between pre-
articulated and interpreted conscious episodes, however, needs illuminating. Poellner 
does not say why it is that a particular ‘previously conscious, but more inchoate, less 
articulated mental state’ is imported into a present one (2004:56). I posit that two events 
                                                 
13
 See see Chapter Two of this thesis. 
14
 One may argue that Nietzsche does not conceive of the self as unified at all, but as an agglomeration of 
drives (GS 4.333; BGE 1.6, 19, 2.36; WP 3.677, 715; see also Parkes 1994:278, 81, 90f, 351). Poellner 
treats the Nietzschean self as a practical individuated self, for which he makes the case elsewhere by 
appealing to the idea of phenomenal objectivity (2000:199-256; 2003; 2009b; 2011). 
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may share enough similarity in characteristics that they warrant association by the 
subject. In order to ‘connect’ them, an affective response to a past event is tied to a 
present event precisely by association of event-specific characteristics. This allows the 
earlier mental state experienced to be brought forward and attached to a new experience. 
This association of characteristics may be conscious or unconscious, but importing the 
former mental state to shape the latter response must remain unconscious. For example, 
a school boy who is bitten by a black Doberman on Tuesday cowers unreasonably when 
facing the black-jerseyed football opponents on Friday, the Dobermans.  
Poellner addresses the Bad Faith approach in a similar vein. He concludes it 
adequately addresses the dynamic paradox, but fails with respect to the static. His use of 
Sartrean second-order bad faith is sufficient to account for the dynamic paradox. His 
assertion that the high intensity of initial stimuli in ressentiment could not go unnoticed 
bolsters his rejection of the static paradox. Thus, Poellner leads us past the still-popular 
Sartrean model in search of a more satisfying solution to the problem. 
Poellner’s third key insight deals with his own Revised Ressentiment approach. 
Two questions guide the discussion. The first raises a challenge to Poellner’s view: if 
the ressentiment subject has no genuine acquaintance with the values ultimately avowed 
(e.g., humility), then how will she know when she achieves the said values, and thus 
fulfil the reinterpretation of a negative affect (Poellner 2004:62f)? Since Nietzsche 
himself describes ressentiment values to be derivative of prior values (OGM 1.7, 10, 
11), Poellner concludes that ‘Nietzsche’s … attempt to show that “moral values” in 
some sense are “created” by ressentiment … has not been found defensible’ (2002:64). 
Nietzsche’s failure here is salient to my thesis and is discussed below.  
Before moving on, I want to explore a further and important avenue of inquiry by 
applying the preceding to a Pauline enquiry. Humility for Poellner is artificial and 
opposed to the ‘natural’ value of pride. This presents us with the impossibility of 
‘fulfilled consciousness’ (i.e., regarding humility) accounting for its occurrence. Paul’s 
valuation is the inverse of Nietzsche’s. The noble par excellence in Paul’s system, the 
dominating other, is the Creator. Humility, along with values that he sanctions such as 
honesty, mercy, and patience constitute the moral status quo. If the words Nietzsche 
uses to characterise his own noble human are applied to man prior to the fall, it may be 
fairly construed that such a one lives these values ‘confidently and openly’ (OGM 1.11). 
Approval is unnecessary, either by external comparison or internal reflection. After the 
fall, the same person still knows these values intimately, though she wishes she did not 
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(see A 55). The values may be considered ‘resident’ because the divine image is only 
effaced, not erased. If, however, the fall is put in terms of ressentiment, it involves ‘an 
essential preoccupation with the locus of (ostensible) disvalue’ (italics supplied, 
Poellner 2004:62). By this, the ressentiment subject qua fallen ‘constructs [her] 
happiness artificially’ (62; see OGM 1.11) out of values which are opposite those of her 
‘oppressor’ (i.e., the Creator).  
How can these ressentiment values be construed as novel, yet feel so instinctive? 
A partial answer at least may be found in one of the ways Paul speaks of fallen-man. 
Paul characterises the fallen person, i.e., ressentiment-man, as living according to the 
flesh (Eph 2:3; Rom 1:29-31 cp. Gal 5:16; Rom 7:14-25). Nietzsche commentator and 
psychiatrist, Jefferey Satinover, would agree, and comments that on both psychological 
and behavioural levels that the homogenisation of values (i.e., the relativising of good 
and evil in Pauline categories) ‘tend[s] to increase our propensity to choose evil, 
considering it to be our good, since it often feels good’—that is, natural (1996:238). 
Thus, if we apply Poellner’s third insight to the Pauline context, then fallen-man’s 
(ressentiment) values are really disvalues. They are not new in the sense of having been 
‘created’, but are derived from prior values bestowed by the Creator in the imago Dei. 
A second guiding question from Poellner’s approach asks, could it be that self-
deception is generated by a motive more fundamental than what he proposes? His 
discussion of a subject reinterpreting her response to injury in thematic terms suggests it 
does. Importantly, the subject’s response is not directed at the object of ressentiment per 
se (Poellner 2004:63), so it makes sense to ask why she responds in this less than 
natural way. Poellner discusses the object perceived as superior in both position and 
power, which of course connects with the ‘injury’. This ignites the mechanism of 
ressentiment in the first place. Since outward manifestation of hatred is not an option, 
the impulse is suppressed. The subject, now forced to ‘live with’ such a powerful 
internalised force, reinterprets her hatred in terms of acceptable values. These 
‘acceptable values’ she must import from somewhere else, pre-reflectively yet still 
intentionally, while refusing to acknowledge doing so. Why not, and why expend the 
energy to such tormenting lengths (see OGM 2.19-22)? A prime candidate for an 
emotional response to each of these questions is fear: of the other, perceived-to-be 
superior or actual; of disintegration of the self by allowing the driving force of 
ressentiment, will-to-power, to fester within; of exposing the deception program—
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hidden to, but justified by the self—and thus destroying the path to a legitimately-
perceived upper hand.  
We now change directions to consider self-deception from a Pauline theological 
perspective. The particular frame of reference will be Pauline. 
 
4.4 Theological Perspective on Self-deception 
Two Christian scholars who focus on self-deception guide this discussion. Philosopher 
and theologian Greg Bahnsen studiously attempts a philosophical explanation of Paul’s 
teaching on self-deception in Romans 1. New Testament theologian and ethicist Dan 
Via discusses self-deception in the context of a wider Pauline theology, from which I 
will make application for my own interests.  
Bahnsen defends and supplements Cornelius van Til’s presuppositional 
apologetics, with particular reference to the role of self-deception therein. Bahnsen 
writes, ‘That self-deception which is practiced by all unregenerate men according to the 
apostle Paul’s incisive description in Romans 1:18ff is at once religiously momentous 
and yet philosophically enigmatic’ (1995:1). It is also problematic. How can the fallen 
mind believes what it knows not to be true? Peter Berger explains self-deception 
sociologically, speaking of the ‘intrinsic human propensity for unified thought. Honest, 
sustained reflection recoils from cognitive schizophrenia. It seeks to unify, to reconcile, 
to understand how one thing taken as truth relates to another so taken’ (1971:44). 
Bahnsen agrees, stating that ‘while men deny their Creator they nevertheless possess an 
inescapable knowledge of Him’ (Bahnsen 2002:38). Pascal concurs in the paradoxical 
observation that humanity is both great and wretched (Kreeft 1993:51-72). Mankind as 
creature possesses a capacity for truth, good, and happiness, which is ultimately a desire 
for God himself. This is humanity’s greatness. Yet this desire remains unfulfilled 
though pursued, claims Pascal, precisely because mankind as sinner rejects the only 
sufficient source of satisfaction for this desire, God himself. This is humanity’s 
wretchedness (Wood 2013:1-9). 
Bahnsen follows van Til’s insistence ‘that we must do justice to the twin facts that 
every unbeliever knows God and, yet, that the natural man does not know God’ (quoted 
in Bahnsen 1995:7). So he is committed to ‘“save the phenomenon,” while at the same 
time respecting the law of contradiction’ in order to find ‘an adequate and coherent 
analysis of [“strong”] self-deception’ (15). He concludes non-paradoxically ‘that 
unbelievers culpably deceive themselves about their Maker’ (31). Bahnsen, therefore, 
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addresses the classic and most difficult form of self-deception by giving ‘necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the truth of the assertion, “S deceived himself into believing 
that p,” as it is taken in the full-fledged … sense’ (15).15  
Modelled on other-deception,16 Bahnsen argues that self-deception simultaneously 
holds two incompatible beliefs (1995:25f). The self-deceived hold a first-order belief 
that disturbs his psychic composure. Some perceived ‘distressing’ reality catalyses ‘a 
special kind of belief: one which [the subject] dreads, cannot face up to, or wishes were 
otherwise since it brings some unpleasant truth before him’ (26). The self-deceived 
must then generate another, second-order belief to deal with this angst. This enables the 
subject to deny not only the distressing matter induced by the first-order belief, but also 
deny his denial of the belief altogether (i.e., first-order belief). The subject denies both 
ontological and psychological realities. To preserve the sought-after characteristic of 
coherence (26f) in the face of believing the angst-inducing (first-order), S adopts an 
additional belief that he believes angst-alleviating not-p (second-order), evidencing 
behaviour to show such.17 Thus, conflict between the two beliefs does not violate formal 
conditions, but is a matter of practicality: ‘S believes p, but his assent to it is blocked by 
acquiring the (false) second-order belief that S does not believe p’ (27).  
Two questions surface regarding this conflict. The first question concerns means. 
How can S in good conscience believe p, and at the same time believe that he does not 
believe p? Bahnsen’s explanation begins with a demand on S’s second-order belief, i.e., 
that belief which concerns his self-perception. This pressure drives S to super-ordinary 
exertions, which may be both mental and physical, in order to sustain his belief that p, 
contrary to evidence readily available to him.  
In the face of evidence adverse to his cherished second-order belief (about himself), S 
engages in contrived and pseudo-rational treatment of the evidence. That is, he manipulates, 
suppresses, and rationalizes the evidence so as to support a belief which is incompatible 
with his believing that p. He ignores the obvious, focuses away from undesirable indicators, 
twists the significance of evidence, goes to extreme measures to enforce his policy of 
hiding his belief that p from himself and others. (Bahnsen 1995:27) 
The second question concerns motive. Why does S subject himself to such extremes of 
rationalising? Bahnsen’s response is simple. ‘S distorts the evidence in order to satisfy a 
                                                 
15
 ‘S’ stands for subject; ‘p’ stands for proposition. 
16
 Bahnsen disclaims his model being taken as a case of literal deception, and gives several elements that 
it shares with other-deception (1995:25f). 
17
 But such posturing—intellectually, emotionally, and behaviourally—is also stress-inducing in itself. 
That is, the exertions thus called for are extra-ordinary, themselves requiring uncommon measures of 
accommodation, attended by commensurate stress and fatigue. See J Budziszewski’s discussion of ‘The 
Five Furies’ (2003:139-60). 
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desire—namely, the desire to avoid the discomfort, distress, or pain associated with 
believing that p’ (27). 
Bahnsen now leaps into the jaws of human self-deception by addressing questions 
pertaining to its crucial features of awareness and purpose. Pertaining to awareness, he 
refines his thesis question this way: ‘If S is intentionally trying to deceive himself (thus 
being conscious of what he is up to), how could he ever be successful (making himself 
believe contrary to that of which he is conscious)?’ (Bahnsen 1995:27f). The remainder 
of this paragraph is a paraphrase of Bahnsen’s answer (28f). While S perceives that p, 
and manifests evidence of belief in the same, he does not assent to p due to the adoption 
of the incompatible and false belief that not p by virtue of strategies of selection, 
distortion, and rationalisation regarding the presenting evidence. Thus, S, in a state of 
conscious ignorance relative to his holding mutually incompatible beliefs, avows 
mistakenly his belief that not p while believing that p.  
Pertaining to the purpose of self-deception, Bahnsen asks whether or not it is 
possible for S to deceive himself intentionally. His answer has to do with the special 
self-covering character of the intention to deceive oneself: 
It is one of a special class of human intentions which obscure awareness of themselves, in 
which case S can purpose not only to hide his belief that p, but also—to preserve his self-
esteem as a rational agent—to hide his hiding of it. (italics original, 1995:28) 
The intent to deceive oneself—with respect to obscuring the initial distressing belief 
that p carries with it—is such that further intent to deceive is no longer necessary (28).18 
To substantiate this explanation of self-covering, Bahnsen gives the example of sleep. 
We observe a person who intends to go to sleep, acting on the belief that he is going to 
sleep. Once asleep, however, he becomes unaware of his intention to go to sleep 
precisely because he is asleep. Likewise, ‘if successful, the “strong” self-deceiver will 
reach a point where he no longer looks back and spells out what he was doing’ (29).19 
The notion of self-covering per se is necessary to account for both of the coverings 
required in a non-paradoxical model of self-deception, while at the same time cutting 
                                                 
18
 Fingarette also speaks of ‘self-covering’, but in respect to a strategy to both hide truth from oneself and 
others, as well as to persuade oneself and others to believe ‘a more or less elaborate “cover-story”’ 
(2000:48f). Fingarette’s term applies to a policy adopted in self-deception, while Bahnsen’s use refers to a 
characteristic intrinsic to self-deception. 
19
 Bahnsen connects this with habitual human activity (1995:29, footnote 91), and it is commonly 
observed that repeated action without consequence desensitises. After years of living under the threat of 
God’s wrath (Rom 1:18), one may endure without discomfort the ‘injury’ that is guilty knowledge of the 
sort associated with God’s general revelation, Man misinterprets, albeit unconsciously, God’s patience 
unto repentance as inability, inattention, apathy, or change of mind with respect to promised judgement 
on sin and unrighteousness (2 Pet 3:3-9). Self-deception may thus be promoted by desensitisation. 
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the Gordian tangle of infinite, subsequent deceptions.20 Bahnsen gives no support 
beyond the example of the common experience of going to sleep,21 which leaves his 
explanation of ‘self-deception as self-covering’ wanting. 
I suggest that the ‘content’ of self-covering as proposed in Bahnsen’s example is 
not entirely sufficient for the effects required to shield oneself from something 
potentially traumatic or fearsome which, in present application, is the inherent threat of 
living in disobedience to God’s self-revelation. I allege that just as sleep does not 
inherently involve an intention (i.e., motive) strong enough to cover itself, so self-
deception does not possess that which is necessary to obscure itself. I do agree with 
Bahnsen’s explanation of self-deception per se. There must be a compelling reason for S 
to want to hide his project of self-deception. He claims that the subject desires to avoid 
‘discomfort, distress, or pain associated with believing’ when he discusses that motive 
for self-deception (Bahnsen 1995:27), and he describes the object of self-deception as a 
‘dreaded belief’ (28). In the ressentiment glossary, these would fall under the 
classification of ‘fear born of injury’. Therefore, while I take issue with the inadequate 
accounting of the motivation for self-deception, I do agree that Bahnsen’s philosophical 
explanation of the phenomenon ‘is adequate to explain Paul’s description in Romans 1 
of men who know (believe) that God exists and yet suppress that belief unrighteously’ 
(30f). 
Dan Via, in Self-deception and Wholeness in Paul and Matthew (1990), also 
provides us with guidance in finding sources of and explanations for self-deception in 
Paul. To aid his endeavour, he employs modern psychological categories to interpret 
both Pauline texts22 and Paul the author expressed therein (see 148, footnote 83). Via 
claims to hold to ‘some kind of partition theory’.23 The self must, to some degree, be 
divided to account for the repression of disavowed unwelcome beliefs (what he calls the 
inaccessible ‘real story’). Yet, the self must be integrated enough to allow these beliefs 
to manifest symptomatically and/or behaviourally, even while the self consciously 
                                                 
20
 See section 4.3.2 for Poellner’s rejection of split-mind models as they require an infinite regression of 
self-deception. For thoughts on sleep as possible delusion, see Pensées, Fragment 7.131.  
21
 Lloyd Arden and John Linford claim it is possible in the first stage of sleep that a person may still be 
somewhat aware of external stimuli (e.g., I hear the phone ringing, but I do not care to answer it), as well 
as their internal thoughts and motivations (e.g., I am aware of my desire to go to sleep, and I am glad that 
I did because I am feeling peaceful now) (2009:236-38). 
22
 Via also analyses Matthean texts with respect to self-deception (1990:77-132). 
23
 Via’s thought here follows Freud (1989), White (1988), Davidson (1986), and McLaughlin (1988). 
153 
 
maintains an avowed belief so as to achieve some level of psychic comfort (what he 
calls the conscious ‘cover story’) (16-18).24  
Via holds that the real story in Paul has both negative and positive editions. The 
negative edition knows that human wisdom is folly, that no one is righteous, and that 
any righteous achievement by the law is rubbish. The positive edition states God 
accepts people on the basis of his grace and not for their righteousness or wisdom. This 
is unwelcome news because fallen-man finds his identity in self-achievement. Though 
the real story is believed, it is unconscious enough to reduce the psychic tension 
produced by the unfavourable evidence of transgression. At the same time, it must be 
accessible enough both to generate the pain of fear and shame, as well as to account for 
the anxious zeal for the law whose violation bears death.25  
The real story motivates the manufacture of an untrue cover story. This also has 
positive and negative editions. In the positive edition, a person believes they are 
righteous and wise in and of themselves. In the negative edition, a person believes their 
righteousness and wisdom must be earned in never-ending pursuit. The cover story 
requires much psychic energy to maintain, for beneath the surface lies the suspicion that 
the person is not righteous, or at least not righteous enough (1990:29-33). Believing 
both these stories requires self-deception, which Via describes as ‘an instance of the 
violation of human wholeness, a rupture of the correspondence of the self with the self’ 
(77; see also Reginster 1997:297-305). 
Via’s chief Pauline exhibits are two warnings against self-deception, Galatians 6:3 
and 1 Corinthians 3:18. He supplements his findings with analysis of several other 
passages (Rom 7; 2 Cor 3; Gal 6; Phil 3; 2 Thess 2). Via’s metaphorical view of the 
contents of Scripture generates a paradox in which ‘God and Satan stand in a 
metaphorical relation to each other. Each is somehow seen as the other’ (Via 1990:21). 
All humanity has been placed under God’s law which, in principle, has been inscribed 
on their hearts (23f, 29). Via’s hermeneutic creates links that lead him to conclude the 
law is an agent of sin. Its demand for righteousness of sinful man (i.e., unconscious real 
story) actually leads him away from God’s righteousness. Instead of receiving 
righteousness by faith, man is compelled to accomplish righteousness by himself (i.e., 
                                                 
24
 Via substitutes the terms ‘real story’ and ‘cover story’ for the philosopher’s ‘p’ and ‘not-p’ (1990:141, 
footnote 63). I will employ this terminology for the most part throughout the remainder of the thesis. 
Also, while Via prefers the term ‘inaccessible’ over ‘unconscious’, he uses the two interchangeably, and 
holds that there are degrees of self-deception (17f). 
25
 Via also notes that, for the sake of the divine perspective, the real story must function well enough for 
Paul to hold people responsible to God for sin. Darkened minds are no excuse for rejecting God’s self-
revelation (Rom 1:19-21, 28) (1990:32). 
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cover story) (24f). Man must repress his repeated failure to achieve life through 
obedience (Rom 7) in order for Paul to assert the cover story of a good conscience 
before God (Phil 3:4-9). At the same time, man must somehow be conscious of his real 
story in order to account for the extraordinary lengths he pursues to attain the said 
righteousness (Gal 1:13f; Rom 10:2) (Via 1990:26f). Metaphorically speaking, Paul 
views ‘the law [as] a power that entices me into misinterpreting itself and thus into 
misinterpreting the nature of my existence … [It is] the metaphorical equivalent of the 
cosmic powers’ (44, see also 40). Via deduces that deception is perpetrated by God, 
Satan, the law, and even sin, even while man deceives himself according to Galatians 
6:3 (30).  
Via concludes self-deception for Paul results from deliberate choice and a kind of 
cosmic fate, each stemming from four factors. First, man’s self-claim to wisdom is itself 
the claim of a darkened mind. The claim results from or is concomitant with an 
intentional choice (Rom 1:21f). Second, creation offers general knowledge of God 
(1:19f, 21). Man rejects this knowledge both by suppressing it so as not to acknowledge 
God (1:18, 21, 23), as well as by exchanging that it for a lie (1:25). Third, the divine 
response to this wilful rejection is to release man to the confines of his darkened mind 
such that he cannot see or act according to the truth (1:24, 26, 28). Fourth, the law, with 
sin, deceives us (Via 1990:20-30).  
Via then makes three inferences for Pauline self-deception. One is that man 
mistakenly believes that obedience to the law rather than faith in God’s provision results 
in salvation. Another is that man cannot completely conceal from himself the real story. 
That is, no amount of ‘works of the law’ will ever make him righteous before God. 
Further, his futile attempts to live up to the law only results in the inner tension he feels 
between the self he is but does not want to be, and the self he wants to be but cannot 
achieve (see Rom 7:14-23).26 Finally, self-deceived man believes he is righteous but 
‘half-knows’ he is not. He then lowers the moral bar of the law’s requirements so that 
he feels he can achieve them (Via 1990:44f).  
The very different contexts in which self-deception has been analysed, first by 
Poellner in Nietzsche and subsequently by Bahnsen and Via in Paul, may seem to make 
any synthesis of their perspectives impossible. However, the fact that they all ostensibly 
deal with the same phenomenon does give hope that some comportment is possible. It is 
toward that possibility we direct our attention now. 
                                                 
26
 Via holds that this conflict pertains to Paul’s pre-conversion experience (1990:26). 
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4.5 Synthesis of Perspectives on Self-deception 
Nietzsche and Paul share the concept of self-deception. This opens the possibility of a 
dialogue between them. Nietzsche, in fact, did so through critique of Paul in in terms of 
ressentiment. This in turn enabled Nietzsche’s allegation of ressentiment to rebound on 
Nietzsche. Poellner analysed Nietzsche this way. I now propose to apply the theologies 
of Bahnsen and Via to Poellner’s analysis of Nietzsche. Synthesising their accounts will 
offer a clearer picture of self-deception at work in Paul’s fallen man, viewed through 
Nietzsche’s ressentiment.  
Bahnsen’s ‘orders of belief’ (1995:25-29) and Via’s ‘double-storied’ man 
(1990:29-33) comport well with Poellner’s two-fold self-deception in fact and process 
(Poellner 2004:49). Bahnsen’s first-order belief (1995:26) corresponds to Poellner’s 
static paradox (2004:49f). In this case, the subject believes p, but denies it because of 
the stress it provokes. In Via, this relates to the Pauline real story in which the subject 
suppresses the unwelcome news that he is both unrighteous and foolish, the reversal of 
which can only come about by God’s gracious initiative (1990:32). Bahnsen’s second-
order belief, that the subject is able ‘to deny something about himself (namely, his 
believing p)’ (1995:26), corresponds to Poellner’s dynamic paradox, in which the 
subject may be understood to be ‘deceiv[ing] herself about her own current mental 
state’ (2004:49). This move brings about a measure of comfort from the distress 
(2004:49f). Both of these correlate with Via’s Pauline cover story in which the subject 
does not believe the real story, but rather that he is righteous and wise of himself. His 
relentless quest for righteousness and wisdom actually reveals both his unrighteous 
status and his sinful strategy for coping with it (Via 1990:32).  
Nietzsche’s ressentiment cycle began with injury by and hatred of the Other. 
These generated matters of awareness and purpose of self-deception. Poellner’s view of 
awareness claims such intensity cannot be ignored (2004:59), which forces the false 
belief of ressentiment. This corresponds to Bahnsen’s first-order belief and Via’s real 
story. The story cannot end there, however, for it forces a further false-belief such that S 
does not believe p.27 This is made possible by a distortion and/or rationalisation of the 
belief that p. In Poellner’s terms, this manifests in an indirect hatred of the Other by 
means of values associated with the offending Other, which permits us to understand his 
                                                 
27
 Poellner distinguishes between logically contradictory beliefs and those whose ‘inferential and 
behavioral’ effects conflict (1995:26f, also footnote 90). 
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notion of self-deception functioning this way. S is conscious of being true to herself in 
her expectation of fulfiling ressentiment values (albeit mistakenly). At the same time, 
she refuses to countenance the possibility, ‘pre-reflectively, but intentionally’, that her 
values are illegitimate (i.e., foreign to her and, therefore, illusory and unattainable), and 
that her pursuit of them is less than honest (Poellner 2004:63f). This corresponds to 
Bahnsen’s second-order belief and to Via’s cover story.  
Poellner only glancingly discusses the purpose of self-deception. It offers the 
subject the ‘happiness’ that ensues from thinking of himself as living under authority 
[i.e., of ressentiment values]. This justifies the subject’s consciousness of superiority 
(62). Bahnsen claims that sinful man is ‘noble and rational’ in coming to his belief of 
not believing in God, even while he hides from himself his true motivations in 
misinterpreting the evidence to arrive at that belief (1995:31). Via’s cover story 
corresponds in that sinful man convinces himself that righteousness by the law is 
possible as a self-achievement and worthy in its own right as a quest (1995:32). 
Translated in terms of this thesis again, the subject tries to control their 
relationship with the offending Other, to whom they now consider themselves superior. 
Via’s commentary on Romans 1 is apropos here: ‘This for Paul is the equivalent of the 
idolatrous worship of the creature rather than the creator (Rom. 1:24-25). We want to 
interpret the world as if we were gods’ (1995:39). Man desires control.  
Paul sees the irony of self-deceived creatures who believe cosmic treason will end 
in creaturely control. Rather, he implies, idolatry leads to slavery (Rom 1:22-25). 
Absolutising a relative good ascribes supreme value to it. Worship reflects worth.  
Humans, then, naturally stake their identity and security on it, giving it god-like status. 
Such idolatrous investment obligates the investor to act according to the dictates of the 
idol. 
Paul tells the Corinthians, however, that an idol has no reality. How can a 
‘nothing’ (οὐδείς) enslave a worshipper? He answers in Romans 6:12-23. Slavery is 
obedience. Obedience is a choice, and the choice to obey entails yielding to authority. 
These are binary options. Either one chooses to obey sin via idolatry (1:22-31), resulting 
in death (1:32; 6:21, 23), or one chooses to obey God, resulting in righteousness and 
life, temporally and eternally (6:22f). Man chose the former. The idol, then, is merely a 
channel for man’s own sinful desires in contrast to the Creator’s supreme authority and 
worthiness of worship (Rom 1:24-31). The result is irony: freedom is enslavement to 
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God while freedom from God is enslavement. Only the self-deceived can see things so 
upside down (see Acts 17:6). 
Further synthesis may be made concerning the impetus of ressentiment. Bahnsen 
and Poellner stay on the mundane level, speaking theoretically and hypothetically. 
Bahnsen, however, circles back to his point of origin. He applies self-deception to man 
in relation to God. This opens the door for Poellner’s view of Nietzsche’s self-deception 
to Bahnsen’s ends. In place of Poellner’s ‘injurious Other’, one may easily read, ‘God’, 
as perceived by unregenerate humanity. Poellner speaks of the Other in three ways: a 
‘not-self’ who causes a suffering or discomfort resulting in ressentiment (2004:46f); the 
inspiration ‘to hatred of that Other …, and thence to a desire for superiority over the 
Other’ (62); ‘being in a position of power over’ the subject (63). God’s disposition 
toward fallen-man in Romans 1 warrants seeing his wrath as sufficient catalyst for ‘high 
affective intensity’ conscious states. Poellner claims these attend the initial cause of 
ressentiment (62f). Via also takes up Anaximander’s recoil from the abyss of existence 
to discuss Sartrean bad faith. ‘For Sartre the dynamic of self-deception is the felt desire 
to escape the burden and anguish of [existential] freedom’ (Via 1990:9).28 Bad faith 
causes a person to define their identity by negation. Undesirable traits, which everyone 
has, must be turned into their positive opposites. Thus, unrighteousness becomes 
righteousness and folly becomes wisdom. Via uses Sartre’s insight to make the point 
that both the truth that is hidden from the self, as well as the pursuit of such a program 
of deception, are generated by fear and anxiety about the self (9f, 31f). This aligns with 
my discussion of anger-hatred at the end of section 3.3, and thus suggests that 
Poellner’s affective state might be caused by fear.29 Bahnsen touches on this idea when 
he speaks of ‘a special kind of [first-order] belief: one which [the subject] dreads, 
cannot face up to, or wishes were otherwise since it brings some unpleasant truth before 
him’ (1995:26).  
One would expect investigators who do not avow Christian commitment to source 
the motive for self-deception in something other than the fear of death and divine 
judgement. It is surprising that Bahnsen does, and I might add in this context, so does 
William Wood. From his thoroughly Augustinian framework, Wood teases out of 
Pascal’s lengthy fragment on self-love (1995 4.C.978) that fallen-man is caught in a 
dilemma. By nature, he loves himself and aspires to greatness, but also knows that the 
                                                 
28
 ‘In bad faith we are-anguish-in-order-to-flee-anguish’ (Sartre 1956:45). 
29
 This point is significant for the argument which follows in section 4.6 of this thesis. 
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only qualities he possesses ‘are, in the classical Greek sense, shameful, wretchedness, 
faults, and flaws that deserve only the contempt of others’ (Wood 2013:106). We must 
reject any beliefs, e.g., in God or our fallenness, ‘that threaten to destabilize our false 
self-understandings’ (italics supplied, 107) as a ‘defence against distress’ (Fingarette 
2000:63f). None of these directly rely on fear of God as a psych motive for 
ressentiment. It is, however, the natural conclusion for each. Fingarette describes 
suppressing ‘belief-knowledge’ into unconsciousness ‘as defence against distress’ 
(2000:63f). Thus, while none of Bahnsen, Poellner, Wood, nor Fingarette directly 
attribute fear—and fear of God—to be a significant psychological mover in 
ressentiment, it is toward this conclusion that all their contributions seem to point.  
God continues to reveal his righteousness (Rom 1:17). His self-revelation should 
be sufficient for mankind to regard him as its moral ground, but it has rejected him 
(1:18). In a transgression of unbelieving inversion, this God becomes the catalysing 
basic belief30 that must be suppressed. Fear31 can be a most powerful psychological 
impetus to self-deception (Pears 1998:42-44),32 which is the crowning move of 
ressentiment.  
 
4.6 Fear of Death  
I have argued fear fuels self-deception in ressentiment, specifically, the fear of death. 
Paul claims in Romans 5:12ff sin entered the world. Evidence of its reality is ‘death 
reigned from Adam until Moses’ (14). He views spiritual and biological death as the 
penalty of moral condemnation (Schreiner 1998:272; Dunn 1988a:273).33 Nietzsche 
admits to biological death but denies its origin in divine judgment. When he analyses 
what may be justifiably termed the spiritual death of humans, he also agrees with Paul 
that people perish spiritually.  
 
                                                 
30 ‘Implications from contemporary research into the cognitive science of religion suggests that “atheism 
is not the default option”. Some inchoate religious belief is. … We are believers by default’ (Trigg 
2013:176). 
31
 Pears also includes jealousy here as an impetus. If it may be construed as an emotion whose psychic 
energy is expended along an anger-fear continuum and directed toward perceived disadvantage, he 
corroborates my work. 
32
 The experiments of Derakshan and Eysenck (2005) find that most repressors are successful in 
managing anxiety and defensiveness, thus becoming self-deceivers. 
33
 Most of the vices Paul indicts in Romans 1:32 are conducted in the sphere of earthly life against, or in 
the presence of, other humans. It is reasonable to consider death in a physical sense, in addition to a 
spiritual one. 
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4.6.1 In Nietzsche 
I explore Nietzsche’s work here for expressions of the fear of death, with the proviso 
that he does not necessarily spell out the notion when he trades on it. I am concerned 
with any parallel that may be seen to the Pauline perception of the sad fate that comes 
from falling short of our humanity. Significantly, Nietzsche connects this with pain and 
‘suffering’, for it foreshadows the ultimate pain of death (OGM 2.7, 21, 22; 3.15).  I will 
examine two ways in which Nietzsche views death, but my focus in this section is fear 
of death, and whether it is explicit or implicit. I will show it to be intrinsic to 
Nietzsche’s ressentiment morality. In secular form, Ernst Becker and Martin Heidegger, 
chief amongst others, sharpen our insight into the fear of death. In its religious form, 
Nietzsche himself links such fear with ‘the last judgment’ (OGM 1.14) and ‘the gate of 
hell’ through which the damned will be punished (1.15). The damned will be ‘covered 
in shame … as one fire consumes them … the dissolving flame [and] the fiery billows’ 
(1.15; see also 3.14, 16).34 Even Jesus, claims Nietzsche, ‘had to invent hell in order to 
have a place to send those who did not love him’ (BGE 9.269). For Paul, fear of death 
lies behind his discourse on God’s judgement. Paul argues those who sin in defiance of 
God’s self-revelation (Rom 1) can only expect his wrath and fury, without escape (Rom 
2:2-9; see also 3:5-8; 5:9; 9:22; Eph 2:3). Fear of death also underlies his discussion of 
slavery and redemption, most notably found in Romans 8, which I will discuss at the 
end of the section. 
In what sense does Nietzsche speak of death and dying, and what significance do 
they hold in his philosophy? To the first question, Nietzsche speaks of death in both 
literal and figurative terms. Taking the second question first, death bears heavily on his 
problem with Pauline morality, as well as his (i.e., Nietzsche’s) remedy for it. Nietzsche 
overcomes the problem of imposed morality through ‘lucky strokes’, those rare healthy 
cases of humanity that do not resent suffering and death (OGM 3.14). Real life, of 
which Nietzsche speaks, is so hard that the lure of escape to bliss through death is very 
strong. The healthy, strong cases must be protected from, not other strong ones, but 
from the weak and sickly, the ressentiment-driven. Nietzsche wants to quarantine his 
‘solutions’ from those who preach death. Consequently, he bids these preachers of 
‘eternal life’ success in wooing follower-types out of this plane of existence in order to 
purify the gene pool, and that ‘they pass on to it quickly!’ (Z 1.9; OGM 3.14; TI 36). 
                                                 
34
 Nietzsche quotes from Dante, Aquinas, and Tertullian here, the latter two in Latin, but we have 
rendered in English excerpts from the quotations (see Del Caro’s notes 58 and 59, pages 411f, in the 
Stanford edition of OGM, 2014).  
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Thus, Nietzsche can and does refer to death in the literal sense of the termination of 
biological life, as this example illustrates when he seeks to remedy humanity of those 
who pollute the race.  
Nietzsche occasionally mixes literal and figurative senses of death.35 Such is the 
case in TI where his quiver-full of ‘Arrows and Epigrams’ leads into ‘The Problem of 
Socrates’. Socrates’ death frames the entire essay and raises several questions. Is he 
courageous to the end in taking the cup (‘Socrates’ 12), or does he balk in breathing his 
last by pledging the cock (1)? Whichever his motive, Nietzsche strongly suggests that 
this most fabled philosopher is plagued by revenge, which is wielded formidably 
through reason (7-10; see White 1990:29f).  
Socratic reason has historically been a tyrant as well as a deceiver. Nietzsche 
exhibits Egyptian burial practices as rational arguments against death (Young 2006:171; 
TI ‘Reason in Philosophy’ 1). The Platonists extend Socrates. They ‘insist on the true 
world of absolute permanence’ so as ‘to overcome fear of death’ (Young 2006:172). Yet 
their failure is evident in the endless performance of guilt-laden rituals to address their 
fear. Heraclitus takes no part in this, which causes Nietzsche to regard him ‘with the 
greatest respect’ and as ‘an exception’ for his abstinence (TI ‘Philosophy’ 2). He does 
not succumb to deception—a favourite term of Nietzsche in TI—of the senses, of 
reason, of dialectics. Instead, he adopts a healthy perspective whereby one can release 
control of (and be released from) the totality of all that this world is.  
Nietzsche’s thoughts on suicide may belong precisely here. Zarathustra speaks 
of suicide as triumph over death: ‘Whoever consummates his life dies his own death, 
victoriously’ (Z 1.21). To go out on one’s own terms, to ‘die at the right time … the free 
death … because I will it (italics original, 1.21), is the ultimate formula for freedom as 
wielded by the sovereign individual of OGM 2.2. Paolo Stellino refines this as ‘a 
freedom over death, or to use a better expression, over the human, all too human fear of 
death which is “maybe older than pleasure and pain” (Nachlass 1884, 25[399], KSA 
11.116)’ (2013:6, see also footnote 13). Nietzsche claims from this ‘the thought of 
suicide is a strong consolation: it’s a good way to survive many an evil night’ (BGE 
4.157). Racked with pain all his adult life, this is no detached position for Nietzsche. He 
confides to Overbeck in a February 1883 letter, ‘the barrel of a revolver is for me now a 
source of relatively pleasant thoughts’ (Middleton 1996:206).  
                                                 
35 
Nietzsche expends great energy on the topic, as Young points out, from BT, through GS and Z, and on 
to TI (2006:14f, 102-04, 107-11, 171-76). Curiously, Young omits OGM, but we will not. 
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Nietzsche treats death in an especially figurative or spiritual sense when he 
considers the problem of morality. Zarathustra concludes the avoidance of suffering and 
death is to turn away from life (see ‘On the Despisers of the Body’). Life is freedom and 
the natural impulse to feel happiness as well as to feel (or even create) affliction (Z 1.4). 
When Zarathustra describes death as unconsciously motivated anger at life, he reprises 
the OGM 1.10 discussion of the ressentiment–motivated person who despises the 
material world, reacts against all that is natural, and resigns himself to a life of No-
saying.  
This death is the end result of a degenerating life that fights a losing battle to 
preserve existence (OGM 3.12, 13). ‘Life [that] wrestles in and through [the ascetic 
ideal] with death and against death’ is nonsense to Nietzsche (13). The only explanation 
for the misguided instincts of this ascetic-Christian ideal is ‘artifice’. Paradoxically, ‘the 
deepest instincts of life’ (i.e., those impulses that amalgamate in will-to-power) are 
responsible for waging ‘the physiological struggle of humans with death’ (italics 
supplied, 3.13). He qualifies this death-struggle as ‘weariness of life’, ‘exhaustion’, and 
‘the desire for the “end”’. It is a sickness that makes humanity ‘the sick animal’ (italics 
original). Nietzsche hopes mankind, ‘the great experimenter with himself, the 
dissatisfied and insatiable one who struggles with animal, nature and gods for ultimate 
mastery’, will not be cowed by death or discouraged by degeneration. Rather, it will 
press on and through death as ‘destruction and self-destruction’ unto the limitless 
freedom of real life. Christianity’s message, according to Nietzsche, is more than 
paradoxical. It is ‘psychic cruelty’ born of madness, and so powerful ‘that we have to 
forcibly forbid ourselves from looking too long into these abysses’ even though we 
would normally eschew such ‘black, gloomy, unnerving sadness’ (2.22). Christianity 
preaches wholeness, joy, and life only to hide sickliness, cowardice, and death. Death 
for negates life. It is the loss of freedom and meaning.  
Nietzsche’s discussion of Christianity’s life-denying message substitutes nihilism 
for divine judgement. It is for Nietzsche what spiritual death is for Paul, the worst 
possible fate that could befall a person. ‘What does nihilism mean?’ asks Nietzsche 
straightforwardly in 1887. His notes reveal nihilism is ‘that the highest values devaluate 
themselves. The aim is lacking; “why?” finds no answer’ (WP 1.1). It is ‘the radical 
repudiation of value, meaning, and desirability’ (WP ‘Toward an Outline’ 1). 
Accordingly, nihilism and death become primary concerns for Nietzsche and Paul, 
respectively, and the target of much of their discourse. 
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Nietzsche’s defence against nihilism is amor fati, ‘love of what is “necessary”, 
that is to say, of everything that has happened to now’ (Young 2006:174). Young 
borrows from GS 276 to point out that this faith is truly liberating, for by it, Nietzsche 
writes, 
A person is necessary, a person is a piece of fate, a person belongs to the whole, a person 
only is in the context of the whole,—there is nothing that can judge, measure, compare, or 
condemn our being, because that would mean judging, measuring, comparing, and 
condemning the whole … But there is nothing outside of the whole! ... The concept of 
‘God’ has been the biggest objection to existence so far … We reject God, we reject the 
responsibility in God: this is how we save the world’. (italics original, TI ‘The Four Great 
Errors’ 8) 
Thus, Nietzsche bases his account of reality on the claim of alternatively sufficient 
grounds.36 This obviates the traditional perspective of suffering as a sign of sin and as an 
indicator of future judgement in eternal death. The nauseating fear of death, inherent in 
western rationality and epitomised in Christian morality, is overcome.  
Nietzsche has not yet exhausted his theme. He advocates a new etiology for 
mankind as a promise-keeping animal (OGM 2.2-3). Humanity must overcome its 
natural bent for forgetfulness, caused by what Nietzsche terms both a ‘faculty of 
repression’ and a ‘repression apparatus’ (OGM 2.1). Humanity must become 
responsible. This requires freedom and sovereignty. Such autonomy enables will, and 
willing separates it from other animals. Humanity, then, becomes conscious of its value, 
its distinctiveness, and its capacity to make a promise, coupled with its obligation to 
deliver on it. Ultimately, mankind develops a conscience (2.2f).  
Nietzsche speculates on the ‘long history’ of mankind’s conscience (OGM 2.3). In 
‘those millennia before human history’ (2.14), the conscience is formed in a ‘terrible 
and uncanny’ process (OGM 2.3, 9). The ascetic redacts the record to create an 
alternative explanation of humanity’s moralisation (3.11; see also BT ‘Spirit’ 10). Thus, 
the foundation of human conscience is memory, the ability to connect intention with 
action. A person as an agent may take pride in their causal powers, which in turn enable 
them to envision a future, and their future (OGM 2.1). All of this, for Nietzsche, is 
bound up in the notion of promise, and promise depends on memory. This compels 
Nietzsche to ask, ‘How [then] does one make a capacity for memory in the human 
animal? How does one impress upon this partly dull, partly distracted momentary 
understanding, this forgetfulness incarnate, in such a way that it remains present’ (2.3)? 
His answer is succinct: pain.  
                                                 
36
 Fingarette discusses self-deception as the origin of ‘story’ which corresponds to natural facts in the 
lived experience (2000:48-61). 
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Human memory develops only through physical pain. ‘Something has to be 
burned in so that it stays in the memory: only whatever does not cease to hurt stays in 
the memory’ (italics original, OGM 2.3). By means of the creditor’s right to ‘all kinds 
of indignity and torture’, the promises made in a contractual relationship are made into 
memory in the promisor (2.5). More precisely, it is ‘that instinct that inuit[s] pain to be 
the most powerful mnemonic aid’ (2.3). That instinct is the fear that is associated with 
pain, and not just any fear. Fear is the instinct associated with pain. Fear encompasses 
the entire scale of cruelties that convey the hazard of death, leading to death itself.  
Nietzsche unfolds the story of pain necessary for morality to explain how such 
pain grows to its ‘most terrible and most sublime pinnacle’ (OGM 2.19). The debtor-
creditor relationship is analogous to that of the primeval tribe and its ancestors. The 
living owe the ancestral dead, and they repay their ancestors’ prior accomplishments 
and sacrifices with their own. The greater the success of the tribe, the greater the debt to 
the ancestors. Yet one never knows when the debt is met, so ‘this suspicion remains and 
grows’ to the point of maximum payment, human blood (2.19). The tribe’s nagging 
sense of debt is rooted in ‘the fear of the ancestor and his power’ (italics original, 2.19). 
With the passing of time, tribal ancestors take on the character of spirit which grows 
prodigiously until it becomes a god. The uniqueness of deity is power for weal or woe. 
Supremely, it is control over life and death. Nietzsche drives home his point: ‘Perhaps 
here we have even the origin of the gods, hence an origin from fear! (italics original, 
2.19). Nietzsche interprets the ancient Brahmins as using the ‘innovation’ of fear, the 
‘pressure of valuation ... to violate the gods and traditions in themselves’, thus giving 
rise to their caste system (2.10). It is in the Christian God, however, that humanity 
experiences the ‘maximum of guilt feeling’ (2.20). Under the circumstance, and perhaps 
also a residue of Nietzsche’s pietistic heritage, anger might be a controlling move to 
cover the fear of failure, and of facing its consequence, death.  
Regardless of religious tradition, Nietzsche explains in OGM 3.15 that 
ressentiment is redirected by the priest back into the sufferers by threatening them with 
the cause of their pain. The sufferers-turned-culprit are thus culpable for causing their 
own pain. This inspires fear, for this blame is moral, upheld by god. Before deity they 
must stand in answer for their guilt. This is the ‘main trick’ of the ascetic priest, ‘his 
exploitation of the feeling of guilt’ and ‘sin’ (3.20), threatening punishments with the 
fearful tyranny of damnation (3.16), ‘the inventiveness of hell itself’ (2.20). 
Ressentiment affords a way to live with such fear-anger-guilt through self-deception. It 
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is a ‘reinterpretation [of suffering] into feelings of guilt, fear and punishment’ (3.20). It 
is ‘ingrained innocence in moralistic mendacity’ (3.19). Nietzsche uses language from 
the Christian doctrine of judgement, i.e., the ultimate accountability before God 
resulting in a verdict of eternal death, to expose the secrets of the ascetic priest’s 
manipulation. These secrets Nietzsche interprets as the ‘mute torment, the most extreme 
fear, the agony of the tortured heart, spasms of an unknown happiness, the cry for 
“redemption”’ (3.20). It is this fearful guilt which Nietzsche concludes to be the deeply 
inward, toxic, and ‘life-gnawing’ conclusion of ressentiment to mankind’s ‘crying 
question, ‘Why suffering?’ (3.28). It is the question everyone must face. Like 
Anaximander, however, it is the question at which everyone blanches. 
Facing or denying this question is framed nicely by Walter Cannon’s putative 
expression, ‘fight or flight’.37 ‘Fight’ reveals some strength and hope in overcoming 
perceived injury or threat to survival. In ‘flight’, the consciousness becomes fugitive 
(see section 4.3.2), and reveals weakness and a fear that threat will overwhelm. 
Avoidance, wilful ignorance, diversion, and preoccupation are some of the many forms 
that flight can take. My interest in the flight response comes in relation to fear of death.  
No one is exempt from these strategies. Mark Johnston comments that ‘mental 
flight, like physical flight’ exhibits a lack of ‘ability to contain one’s anxiety and face 
the anxiety-provoking or the terrible’ (1995:454). Thoreau probes the same 
phenomenon when he writes, ‘The mass of men lead lives of quiet desperation ... A 
stereotyped but unconscious despair is concealed even under what are called the games 
and amusements of mankind’ (1960:10).38 No doubt Nietzsche would agree, but only 
with the stipulation that ‘mass of men’ refers to ‘the herd’, that corpus of humanity 
whose lives have been shaped powerfully but unknowingly by ressentiment. Christian 
thinkers from different eras, Pascal (1995 1.8.136) and Os Guinness (2015:100), 
heartily agree. Rolph, on whom Nietzsche relies, argues ‘not the pursuit of pleasure, but 
rather the flight from pain … that is the primary motivation of action’ (italics supplied, 
quoted in Moore 2002:75, footnote 25).  
Does flight from pain include flight from or fear of death? Ernst Becker, cultural 
anthropologist and sometime philosopher, explores the question via the human urge to 
heroism in his seminal book, The Denial of Death (1973). Though not a Christian work, 
                                                 
37
 This phrase is typically credited to Walter Cannon. Some references assert Cannon’s first usage in 1914 
in The American Journal of Physiology, others in the 1915 edition of Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, 
Fear and Rage. Still other place his first use of the term in a 1929 or a 1932 edition of the same book. 
38
 See Pascal’s musings on the notion of diversion in his Pensées, Fragments 8.132-39 (1995). 
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‘it does contain no small amount of Christian truth’ (Vanhoozer 2007:225). The heroic 
impulse for Becker rests on the concealment of endemic unconscious despair. This 
makes an obvious parallel to the self-deception at the heart of ressentiment.39 He argues 
the fear of death is ‘the universal human problem’ (italics original, 1973:8). His work 
will guide much of the discussion below. 
Fear of death is natural. Death is a threat. Flight from this threat is repression, and 
manifests as pursuit of optimisation. Violation of conscience results in painful guilty 
knowledge, which triggers repression. Each of these will be taken in turn below. 
 
Death as Threat 
J Marion opposes Nietzsche’s notion of death as a gateway ‘to a hierarchy of forces 
(quoted in Becker 1973:110). He designates it the ‘crisis par excellence’ and the 
‘ultimate crisis’ (112). Becker avers that this phobia ‘is a mainspring of human 
activity—activity designed largely to avoid the fatality of death, to overcome it by 
denying in some way that it is the final destiny of man’ (ix). Freud, whose influence 
Becker freely acknowledges, writes ‘that at bottom no one believes in his own death, or, 
to put the same thing in another way, that in the unconscious every one of us is 
convinced of his own immortality’ (2001a:289). French philosopher, Luc Ferry, holds 
that philosophy, like religion, seeks salvation from death ‘(but without the help of 
God)’, the irreversibility of time, and unhappiness (2010:3-8).40 Psychoanalyst Gregory 
Zilboorg asserts, ‘No one is free of the fear of death ... [It] is always present in our 
mental functioning. (1943 cited in Becker 1973:16). Thanatophobia, the fear of death, is 
the fear to end all fears. 
Why fear death, something so natural, so expected? Guinness asserts that ‘man is 
never at rest east of Eden … because [he] cannot escape the fear of non-being’ 
(2015:32f). The threat of death naturally causes fear. For Paul Tillich ‘fear … has a 
definite object’ (1965:44), ‘the outstanding example’ of which is death (46), while 
‘anxiety has no object’ and is concerned with ‘after death’ (45). He links the two when 
he writes that ‘fear and anxiety are distinguished but not separated. They are immanent 
within each other: The sting of fear is anxiety, and anxiety strives toward fear’ (46). 
Such fear induces anxiety, which Tillich characterises as ‘the negation of every object’ 
                                                 
39
 Contemporary psychology scholarship deals with this phenomenon under the rubric of ‘terror 
management theory’ (Greenberg, et al. 1986; Burke, et al. 2010), a key term of which is ‘mortality 
salience’ (Whitely, Jr. & Kite 2010). Primary sources are Becker (1962, 1971, 1973, 1975) and Rank 
(1936, 1941). 
40
 The quotation itself is parenthesised, and is found on page six of the book. 
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leading to ‘fear of the unknown’ (45). It is this existential anxiety ‘of not being able to 
preserve one’s own being which underlies every fear and is the frightening element in 
it’ (46f). Becker adds, ‘Fear is actually an expression of the instinct of self-preservation, 
which functions as a constant drive to maintain life and to master the dangers that 
threaten life’ (italics supplied, 1973:16). The gravity of ‘disintegration’41 is so great and 
so final that motivation stemming from its related phobia is the only counter-force 
sufficient to allow one to break its pull. Becker maintains that most healthy-minded 
people do not consciously struggle with ‘the terror of death’ (11).42 However, such 
psychological force must be contested, else it would burn out the organism in its drive 
for maintenance and mastery (6). Tillich concurs: ‘It is impossible for a finite being to 
stand naked anxiety for more than a flash of time’ (1965:47). He explains that the 
typical human response to the existential horror of death as non-being  
is ordinarily avoided by the transformation of anxiety into fear of something, no matter 
what. The human is not only, as Calvin has said, a permanent factory of idols, it is also a 
permanent factory of fear—the first in order to escape God, the second in order to escape 
anxiety; and there is a relation between two. For facing the God who is really God means 
facing also the absolute threat of non-being. (47) 
This is repression, a contrived avoidance, a flight from threat.43 Zilboorg says we 
use it to ‘keep us living with any modicum of comfort’ (cited in Becker 1973:17). 
Repression, negatively, means ongoing active struggle against the terror of death.  
 
Flight as Optimisation 
Positively, repression work by replacement and reformation. ‘It is not simply a negative 
force opposing life energies; it lives on life energies and uses them creatively ... Fears 
are naturally absorbed by expansive organismic striving’ (Becker 1973:21). This 
absorption signifies self-deception.  
The struggle often goes unnoticed because of fear; fear that humanity is not 
divine, but also that it is merely dirt. Thoreau describes the ‘misfortune’ of those 
inheriting a farm. They begin digging their graves at the moment of birth. Then they 
creep down the road of life toward treasures they have laid up without realizing theirs 
‘is a fool’s life’ whose end is ‘compost’ (2008:6f). Thoreau asks, “How godlike, how 
immortal, is he?’, then answers his own disdainful question: 
                                                 
41
 This is the oedipal plunge into what Nietzsche calls ‘the abyss of destruction [so as to] suffer the 
dissolution of nature in his own person’ (BT ‘Spirit’ 9). 
42
 This serves as the title of his second chapter. 
43
 See Chapter Two, footnote 22 regarding repression and suppression with respect to the phenomenon of 
self-deception in this thesis. 
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See how he cowers and sneaks, how vaguely all the day he fears, not being immortal nor 
divine, but the slave and prisoner of his own opinion of himself, a fame won by his own 
deeds. Public opinion is a weak tyrant compared with our own private opinion. (9) 
Absorption with striving and struggle is failure to achieve one’s potential, to 
realise the heroic ideal. Nietzsche longs for even a glimpse of such a complete, ‘happy, 
powerful, triumphant, something in which there is still something to fear [i.e., awe]! Of 
a human being who justifies the human being, … for whose sake we can hold on to our 
faith in human beings!’ (OGM 1.12; see 11; 2.7). Yet Nietzsche jettisons this profile of 
‘hero’ when it comes to the person of Jesus of Nazareth. He refers to Jesus with several 
aphorisms, for example, ‘The Psychology of the Redeemer’ (A 28; see 29). From this, 
he argues the common notion of hero (i.e., one who embodies moral values) is most 
‘unevangelical’ (A 29). The Jesus of the gospels who saves the day by saving the world 
is, for Nietzsche, an appropriation of myth and tradition. He is ‘Christian propaganda’ 
(31).  
Nietzsche extracts ‘the fanatic of aggression’ from this constructed Jesus (31). 
Rather than resisting instincts which make for morality and become noble values, Jesus 
abandons all struggle. Rather than preaching about eternal life, he spends his days 
demonstrating how to live here and now. Instead of filling out the profile of a Messiah 
mighty to save souls for another kingdom, he becomes as a child devoid of anger and 
sword, who has no agenda to judge people as good or evil, but who experiences ‘every 
moment [as] its own miracle, its own reward, its own proof, its own “kingdom of God”’ 
(32). Jesus is no servant subject to law, but a son of God who has no need for morality 
(BGE 4.164), obviating any sense of struggle against sin and temptation (A 33). Jesus, 
as Nietzsche’s anti-Christian hero, dies to give people ‘the superiority over every 
feeling of ressentiment’ (40). By contrast, he accuses Paul and Christianity of a ‘shrewd 
blindness’ (39), of exacting revenge on their enemies (i.e., turning masters into slaves) 
by elevating Jesus in the same way that the Jews have elevated Jehovah, ‘both [now] 
products of ressentiment’ (40). The power of ressentiment to create so powerful an ideal 
lies in its capacity for self-deception, i.e., repression. 
 
Violation Triggers Repression 
How does repression work to cultivate the heroic? It manifests in society through 
character formation (Becker 1973:46). As a child develops, he begins to encounter not 
only limits, but dangers, in the world around him. These of course block unmitigated 
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desire and instinctual growth along such lines. The child must adapt and compromise 
his expectations in order to 
act with a certain oblivious self-confidence, when he has naturalized his world. We say 
‘naturalized’ but we mean unnaturalized, falsified, with the truth obscured, the despair of 
the human condition hidden, a despair that the child glimpses in his night terrors and 
daytime phobias and neuroses. This despair he avoids by building defenses; and these 
defenses allow him to feel a basic sense of self-worth, of meaningfulness, of power. They 
allow him to feel that he controls his life and his death, that he really does live and act as a 
wilful and free individual, that he has a unique and self-fashioned identity, that he is 
somebody. (55) 
A life is fashioned to promote an illusion of a ‘somebody’, pertaining both to the 
falsified self and the preferred situation. Scheler speaks of an ‘organic mendacity’ 
which lies deeper than conscious lying. It is at work when a person shapes their 
perceptions and interpretations, and even convictions and values, to fit their biases. Self-
deception precludes the need for ‘conscious falsification’, for the false appears to be 
true, genuine, and honest. 
For all the truth, genuineness, and honesty that is generated, the pursuit of that 
elusive something continues.  
I argue here it is order, ‘control’. Failure forces a move to an alternative, 
suppression. Bahnsen comments, ‘Unbelievers, who genuinely know God (in 
condemnation), work hard—even if habitually (and in that sense unconsciously)—to 
deceive themselves into believing that they do not believe in God or the revealed truths 
about Him’ (2002:123). Suppression occurs as ‘exchange’ through the substitution of 
knowledge for volition. Budziszewski writes,  
By and large we do know right from wrong, but wish we didn’t. We only make believe we 
are searching for truth—so that we can do wrong, condone wrong, or suppress our remorse 
for having done wrong in the past. If the traditional view is true, then our decline is owed 
not to moral ignorance but to moral suppression. We aren’t untutored, but ‘in denial’. We 
don’t lack moral knowledge; we hold it down. (1999:25-26) 
Nietzsche engages in both strategies, suppression and exchange. His first use of 
‘sublimation’ dismissed ‘unegoistical actions’ and ‘moral, religious, [and] aesthetic 
representations and sensations’ (HH1 ‘Of First and Last Things’ 1.1). Since the 
metaphysical is really the material in disguise, all ‘moral, religious, aesthetic 
representations and sensations’, whether societal or personal, have been derived from 
‘base, even despised materials’ (i.e., chemicals) (1.1). Morality and rectitude are, for 
Nietzsche, comfortable metaphysical illusions based on self-deception. Becker agrees: 
One’s life style a vital lie … We don’t’ want to admit that we are fundamentally dishonest 
about reality, that we do not really control our own lives … All of us are driven to be 
supported in a self-forgetful way, ignorant of what energies we really draw on, of the kind 
of life we have fashioned in order to live securely and serenely. (1973:55) 
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Comfortable metaphysical illusions cannot reinforce the self. They inherently insulate 
the self from reality. As a result, they falsify self-value measured by the flourishing 
fulfilment one desires and believes one is achieving. In all actuality, self-valuation is 
held in tension between such an outlook and the nagging suspicion that life is fruitless. 
In order to carry on, the self fends off this suspicion by subconsciously contriving 
meaning, and infusing its life with it. Becker maintains we seek stress and push the 
boundaries of our experience—extreme sports and ‘living on the edge’ lifestyles spring 
to mind—in order to fend off despair, not to engage it (1973:56). If this defensive 
strategy fails, one is left with ‘the full flood of despair, the full realization of the true 
human condition, what men are really afraid of’ (57)—no blond beast, no conqueror, no 
hero. Such fears may be put to rest (alternatively, ‘pushed down’), though, by means of 
what Thoreau calls ‘games and amusements’ (1960:10). 
Nietzsche’s most significant exhibit in his fear of death museum is the doctrine of 
the eternal recurrence. Giles Fraser conjectures it is Nietzsche’s attempt to generate 
something of a framework for value to counter the tension issuing from the 
framelessness of time (2002:114). Nietzsche unawares, according to Fraser, uses eternal 
recurrence ‘to become a moral centrifuge, a way for the self to generate its own gravity’ 
(116). Borrowing from the Greek’s distinctions of time, Fraser asserts ‘that the 
temporality of the eternal recurrence is kairos–temporality rather than chronos–
temporality’ (117). The latter refers to the simple passage of moments, while the former 
is realised in the singular moment of decision (117). Kairos is the stuff of the eternal 
return, the moment charged with the ‘possibility of redemption. It is the fulcrum of 
Nietzsche’s alternative soteriology’ (119). His aspirational hero, Zarathustra, loves life. 
Thus, in contrast to the ‘preachers of death,’ he loves life (Z 1.9). He even composes a 
seven-sealed song44 to celebrate life as eternity (3.16). Whether taken metaphorically as 
a metaphysical principle or literally as a cosmological theory, Nietzsche’s eternal 
recurrence is his attempt to win victory for life over death (Williams 2006:166f).  
Nietzsche’s amoral components of admission of guilt and repayment of debt raise 
the issue of redemption (OGM 2.5, 8). In ancient religious traditions, especially 
Christianity, this translates as sacrifice to God (2.20-22). Self-deception makes 
sacrifices, to be sure, but alternative ones. Nietzsche knows all about payments of debt, 
but his morality calls for sacrifices beyond those of tradition. They must be directed by 
one’s own determination.  
                                                 
44
 This is no doubt intended as a counterpoint to the seven-sealed scroll in John’s Apocalypse (Rev 5:1). 
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The coupling of Nietzsche’s amor fati and eternal return serves as an example. 
Nietzsche muses near the end of his productive life that his character remains untainted 
and his personality undaunted despite a dearth of ‘any happy memories whatever from 
[his] childhood and youth’ (EH ‘Clever’ 2). He also laments the ‘widespread illness’ he 
has suffered in the past decade (10). He thus sums up his formula for greatness, to 
which his life testament, Ecce Homo, bears witness. It is amor fati, a life that does not 
‘want anything to be different, not forwards, not backwards, not for all eternity’ (10). 
Could it be that his amor fati is the sacrifice that must be made under the all-
encompassing judgement of the eternal return? That is, the highs and, particularly, the 
lows which comprise life experience, are unchangeable. If man must exist in an eternal 
recurrence of them, then his only way to live in harmony within such a system—a 
cheerful mien and absence of internal tension being two chief Nietzschean 
characteristics—is to resign himself to that which is, and must be—his life.  
Nietzsche’s sacrifice, then, may actually be happiness, a willingness to embrace 
pain. Conversely, one may say that moral debt denied still produces guilty knowledge, 
and such knowledge generates ‘pain after pain, price after price, in a cycle which has no 
end because we refuse to pay the one price demanded’ (Budziszewski 2003:148). This 
recalls the Pauline notion in Romans 1 that immoral defection from the creator results in 
death. In this light, Nietzsche’s alternative immoralism-as-a-way-to-life may be seen as 
nothing more than flight from reality. 
Zarathustra’s story climaxes with this question, ‘Who shall be lord of the earth’ (Z 
4.19.5)? Nietzsche signifies here mastery, the control of life and death, of history and 
destiny. He calls for redemption from Christianity’s ‘reigning ideal’, as well as from the 
ensuing ‘great nausea, the will to nothingness, nihilism’, that has enthralled mankind 
(OGM 2.24). The one with heart enough for such a mission has not yet come. When he 
does, however, he will face reality and not fly to an alternative one in order to redeem 
humanity from all decay and tragedy. He will conquer the God who wields the power of 
eternal punishment (2.21, 24). ‘End of the longest error; climax of mankind; INCIPIT 
ZARATHUSTRA’ (TI ‘How the “True World” Finally Became a Fable’ 6). Zarathustra 
thus paves the way for understanding the notion of eternal recurrence (Z 3.13.2).45 
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 Though delving into them would go beyond the scope of this thesis, Robin Small in Nietzsche in 
Context (2001) discusses aspects of the eternal recurrence in terms of probability (99-115), mathematics 
(117-34), and physics (135-52). See Williams 2006:167, footnote 40. Also, sometimes the eternal 
recurrence is referred to as the eternal return or eternal return of the same.  
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The problem for Nietzsche, transposing the existential into the everyday, begins in 
the present. People are bound to death, and history gives no hope for a different future. 
Zarathustra says, ‘“Everything passes away, therefore everything deserves to pass away! 
And this is itself justice, that law of time that time must devour its children”’ (Z 2.20). 
Christianity, however, offers a future different from the past. Those who live rightly in 
the world of ressentiment-generated concepts of evil, guilt feelings, and a god who can 
rescue mankind from neither, Christianity holds that ‘the present evil age’ (Gal 1:4) will 
give way to future shalom. Nietzsche rejects this on two grounds: working to control the 
material world of the here-and-now is an illusion, and longing for immortality in a 
spiritual world-beyond is a lie. So Nietzsche finds cause for distress over the state of his 
day. When it comes to the eternal recurrence, however, he is obsessed with neither the 
present nor the future. His passion is the past. 
Zarathustra’s mountain trek brings him to a critical point at a gateway called 
‘Moment’ (Z 3.2). This gate turns out to be the nexus of two paths that stretch to 
eternity, one into the past and the other into the future. ‘Moment’ serves as the present 
in which Zarathustra makes his way to mountain heights, chronicled after a fashion by 
the narrative of the entire book. His trek along the stony and cheerless mountain path is, 
presumably, toward the future, made all the more difficult by ‘the Spirit of Heaviness’ 
that wants to pull him ‘downward … abyssward’ (3.2.1). His ambitions46 are thwarted 
and, like everything that goes up, he goes down. He falls and cannot progress. He 
cannot overcome. He is stuck.  
There he lies in utter disillusionment until something within calls him to courage, 
and he resumes his pilgrimage. This time, however, he faces the other direction. This 
introduces the infinite regression problem of every feedback loop, purposelessness. 
Zarathustra says, 
From this gateway Moment a long eternal lane runs backward: behind us lies an eternity … 
Must not whatever among all things can happen have happened, and been done, have 
passed by already? … Must not this gateway too not already—have been? And are not all 
things knotted together so tightly that this moment draws after it all things that are to come? 
(3.2.2) 
No wonder Zarathustra is going nowhere. All his forward ‘progress’ has actually taken 
him down ‘this long and dreadful lane’, forcing him to venture the question amidst his 
fears, ‘must we not eternally come back again?’ (3.2.2). As of yet, the nature of this 
question remains ominous. 
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 See ‘I climbed, I climbed, I dreamed, I thought’ (Z 3.2.1). 
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Zarathustra also faces an immovable stone in his pathway to the past. It represents 
‘Will—that is the liberator and joy-bringer’ (Z 2.20). People believe it works for their 
advantage, determining their preferred future and securing their happiness, but does it? 
Schopenhauer argues that the will is never satisfied, that far too often the ideals and 
goals at which one aims give way to inadequacy, frustration, and suffering. No matter 
the turns in the kaleidoscope of choices, the result is ultimately the same for all: death 
colours the future. What lies ahead is pain, therefore, and not delight. Humanity knows 
this deep down. The evidence of a suffering world is all around. The obvious solution, 
therefore, is to work in the other direction and try to change the past. This proves to be 
impossible, and only exacerbates mankind’s frustration. So Zarathustra: ‘That time does 
not run backwards, this arouses the will’s fury; ‘That which was’—that is the stone 
which it cannot roll away’ (2.20). Mankind’s frustration-turned-wrath points us 
precisely to the existential origins of ressentiment. His inability to move the stone of 
That Which Was is, uniquely, ‘what revenge itself is: the will’s ill-will toward time and 
its “It was”’ (2.20). Where is the redemption in this eternal recurrence? 
The will remains the key. As liberator, the will only provokes revenge against 
time, but as creator it promotes reconciliation with time. The former leads to 
resignation and subjugation, the latter to assignation and domination. Zarathustra 
declares, ‘All “It was” is a fragment, a riddle, a cruel coincidence—until the creating 
will says to it: “But thus I willed it”’ (Z 2.20). To strengthen his inchoate doctrine here, 
Zarathustra has the creating will repeat itself verbatim, ‘“But thus I willed it”’, followed 
by a resolute coda, ‘“Thus shall I will it”’ (italics supplied, 2.20).  
Zarathustra renounces his ‘deadly enemy’, the Spirit of Heaviness (Z 3.11.1). Life 
is heavy because of gravity’s rule, and the only way to break its rule is to kill it (1.7). 
With gravity’s power broken, humanity will learn to fly even as Zarathustra has learned 
to fly (3.11.2; cp. 1.7; see BGE 5.193). The results of gravity’s death transcend 
humanity’s ascent, for all ‘boundary-stones will themselves fly into the air’ (Z 3.11.2). 
This defeated foe, the spirit of gravity, also denominated ‘arch-enemy’ and ‘primal 
enemy’ (3.11.1), seems to possess a similar power to the stone named That Which Was. 
The former, the Law of Gravity, prevents progress up the mountain, while the latter, the 
Law of Time, blocks the portal to the past. Both incarcerate humanity in present space 
and time, leaving them with nothing more than their will, which is a prison in itself. 
Hence, maximum security imprisonment! Eternal justice. ‘Can there be redemption 
when there is eternal justice?’ (2.20), cries Zarathustra. 
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Nietzsche offers the Old and New Tablets behind these moral forces.47 The old 
tablets are the Law of Moses, engraved in stone (Exod 31:18), which according to Paul 
in 1 Corinthians 15, condemn (see v. 56). In the same context, Paul speaks of 
resurrection, when the body will rise from its sleep to eternal life as a result of faith in 
God’s gift of Christ. Zarathustra, too, arouses a sleeping audience. They believe in ‘an 
old conceit … [of] what good and evil [are] for the human being’ (Z 3.12.1), ‘an old 
delusion that is called good and evil’ (3.12.9). So he urges them to smash the old tablets 
of God (or the gods) containing Thou Shalt Nots (3.12.10), and replace them with new 
tablets written by men-as-gods (3.12.10). Above all, thou shalt not accept a gift 
(3.12.4)! Christianity lays a heavy burden of written law on mankind. Anaximander’s 
Law of Time only intensifies it. Zarathustra’s ‘old Devil and arch-enemy, the Spirit of 
Heaviness and all that he created: compulsion, statute, need and consequence and 
purpose and will and good and evil’, implements and enforces it (3.12.2; see GS 3.335). 
The overman is born (or discovered) from this struggle (Z 3.12.3). He is named 
for that ‘over which [he] dances’, which includes ‘moles and heavy dwarves’ (italics 
original, 3.12.2) … and dogs that howl at midnight in long, moonlit, dreadful lanes. 
Does this mean Nietzsche is preoccupied with death? Zarathustra becomes afraid of his 
thoughts, the more he entertains the eternal recurrence. This provokes a ‘vision and a 
riddle (3.2.1). A dog’s howl transports him back to his earliest childhood memory of a 
dog howling (3.2.2). Zarathustra (or Nietzsche) ‘stood at once, alone, desolate, in the 
most desolate moonlight’ over that which appears to be a corpse … and the dog, which 
howls yet again (3.2.2). Amazingly, the dog then cries, reflecting overwhelming pity as 
he sees Zarathustra. It believes death is theft perpetrated by beings from beyond. 
Though Zarathustra does not interpret the vision, in the 1973 published translation of 
Z,48 Hollingdale comments: 
This scene is a memory from Nietzsche’s childhood. Nietzsche’s father died following a 
fall, and it seems that Nietzsche was attracted to the scene by the frightened barking of a 
dog: he found his father lying unconscious. It is not entirely clear why the scene should 
have been evoked at this point. The most likely suggestion is that Nietzsche at one time 
thought that events recurred within historical time, and was troubled by the idea that he 
might meet the same death as his father. (The idea seems to have assumed the nature of an 
obsession: its origin probably lay in Nietzsche’s fear of madness, which was strengthened 
by the fact that his father died insane. The insanity was cause by the fall, but Nietzsche was 
probably doubtful whether the fall did not merely bring to the surface an inherited 
weakness.) This old idea may have come into the author’s mind at this point, and have been 
included in the text as a cryptic ‘history’ of the theory of the eternal recurrence. What 
follows is, of course, symbolic and not actual. (Nietzsche 2003:341, note 25) 
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 Nietzsche composed the passage, ‘On Old and New Tablets, ‘during the most tiring climb from the 
station up to the glorious Moorish eyrie of Eza’ (italics supplied, EH ‘Zarathustra’ 4). 
48
 Republished in 2003. 
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This ‘vision of hell’ concludes in terrific fashion (Graybeal 1990:74). A heavy, 
black snake has taken hold down the throat of the corpse-become-shepherd, and is 
hanging out of his mouth, thus causing him to writhe and gag and convulse. If the man 
was only mostly dead before, the adder seems bent on finishing him. Zarathustra 
screams from the depths of his being for the shepherd to bite of the serpent’s head to kill 
it: ‘my horror, my hate, my disgust, my compassion, all my good and bad cried out of 
me’ (Z 3.2.2). The shepherd does so, and the horror ends. Zarathustra riddles in four 
questions: ‘What did I see then in the parable? And who is it that must yet come some 
day? Who is the shepherd into whose throat the snake thus crawled? Who is the man 
into whose throat all that is heaviest and blackest will crawl’ (3.2.2)? The answer seems 
to be Zarathustra, himself … and also his ventriloquist master, Nietzsche (see EH 
‘Destiny’). 
How does one extract so fundamental a part of oneself, the conscience-bound will 
that precludes any resolution to this damning riddle, leaving one resigned to future 
sentencing due to present sin? Zarathustra calls this a ‘fable-song of madness’ (Z 2.20). 
Does it help to know that the conscience is soaked in the spirit of revenge, that it rages 
against the unassailable law of time so that ‘existence must eternally be deed and guilt 
again’ (2.20)? Or is one left to lament the life-to-death cycle for all eternity into which 
one must inevitably pass? If the preceding scene does in fact reflect Nietzsche’s 
childhood experience, what hope might flicker within him upon hearing Zarathustra’s 
cry, ‘“Redeem all the dead!”’ (4.19.5)? In view of the love Nietzsche seems to sustain 
for his father, such redemption is highly desirable, but only in Zarathustra’s way: ‘Will 
you not, like me, say to death: Was that— life? For Zarathustra’s sake, very well! One 
more time!’ (4.19.1). 
Nietzsche knows facing death nakedly with no escape can paralyse (Harmon-
Jones, et al. 1997:24). His account of Anaximander’s death (i.e., passing away) 
compares to our own imagined deaths. Death is the ubiquitous and unforgiving 
reminder of human guiltiness and fear for, whether one violates the Ordinance of Time 
or the law of God. This in turn activates the ressentiment mechanism yet again to deal 
with the rage that arises in response. Then the ressentiment-created new value of 
‘morality of pity’ takes over (GS 3.338), baptised as love of neighbour.49 Love thy 
neighbour means helping those who suffer, and this instinct is strong, though it binds 
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 For a brief comparison and contrast of ‘pity’ and ‘compassion’, see Williams 2006:171; Nussbaum 
1994. Nussbaum’s argues Nietzsche is anti pity but pro mercy, as construed by the Stoics. 
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the helper to the wrong thing for the wrong reason (see 3.269). To overcome it one must 
be able to fly and to levitate boundary stones so as to create a future out of the past. One 
must be able to rewrite tablets so as to be a worthy lord of the earth and of eternity. One 
must be able to hike the lonely road to the peak of redemption that runs through the 
abyss of death, to travel ‘the path to one’s own heaven … through … one’s own hell’, 
so joined in the eternal recurrence (3.338; see Z 3.1). Nietzsche substitutes eternal 
recurrence for Christian redemption. It cannot, however, efface what drives it, revenge 
against passing away, which is to say, a fear of death.  
Martin Heidegger, who admits to thinking and writing in the shadow of 
Nietzsche’s brilliance (1958:107), addresses these issues, inter alia, in a book dedicated 
to Nietzsche’s doctrine, The Eternal Recurrence of the Same (1984). He claims that 
‘Zarathustra’s doctrine does not bring redemption from revenge’ (1984:229). In order to 
appreciate his conclusion, it is necessary to consider the entirety of Heidegger’s 
philosophy as a ‘lifelong project … to answer the “question of being”’ (Guignon 
1995:317). Heidegger’s highly original approach to the meaning of Being sees humans 
as embedded in the lived-experience, which, ‘in its totality involves death as Being-
towards-the-end’ (Heidegger 1962:293). For, ‘as soon as a man comes to life, he is at 
once old enough to die’ (289). Thus, in keeping with Ferry’s comment above, 
Heidegger’s philosophy is conducted in view of the phenomenon of death, taken in its 
widest sense (290). Heidegger considers death as the omnipresent ‘possibility of no-
longer begin-able-to-be-there’ (294, see also 307). It is humanity’s unique possibility 
that sets an absolute and unsurpassable boundary to the lived-experience. It goes beyond 
biological demise, and so must be considered an existential phenomenon (280-85). It is 
here the distinction between fear and anxiety becomes important.50  
Heidegger uses the term ‘fear’ for the natural state of mind or mood of being in 
the world (Heidegger 1962:179-82).51 People flee what they fear, whether other people 
or events, especially the event of our (physical) death (295). Such fear causes us to live 
inauthentically, that is, in denial of its reality. Heidegger reserves the term ‘anxiety’ (or 
angst) to describe flight towards the threat of our very existence in all its possible 
meaninglessness. (187). It is this anxiety that approximates what I refer to in this thesis 
as ‘fear of death’. It also recalls Anaximander’s experience as Nietzsche recounts it in 
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 See footnote 39 in this chapter. 
51
 Matthew Radcliffe (2015:55f) remarks that Heidegger’s term, Befindlichkeit, has been variously 
translated ‘affectedness’ (Dreyfus 1991), ‘attunement’ (Stambaugh 1996), ‘sofindingness’ (Haugeland 
2000), and ‘disposedness’ (Blattner 2006). 
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BT. Anxiety is always latent in Dasein, but it can promote courageous, authentic living 
(i.e., freedom) by acknowledging the reality of death (307, see also 234). However, 
anxiety can be perverted into cowardly fear (310f), or inauthentic living, which, ‘as 
such, [is] hidden from itself’ (234). Heidegger doesn’t talk specifically about self-
deception or repression, but he does say that is ‘possible for anxiety to be elicited 
physiologically’ (234). This generally comes through the tranquilisation of everyday 
living. That is, the routines of our lives give evidence of what is evaded, namely ‘death 
[as] conceived as one’s ownmost possibility, non-relational, not to be outstripped, 
and—above all—certain’ (italics original, 302).  
This everydayness of our lives transpires in the matrix of what Nietzsche calls the 
‘true world’, which is merely the ‘seeming world’, and closes us off from the true world 
(TI 5; see also Heidegger 1987:123-30). This is the projected world of semblance 
(1987:131). Heidegger claims that Nietzsche’s understanding of ‘truth as holding-to-be-
true’ is an unwitting surrender to the presuppositions foisted upon philosophy since the 
Greeks. Truth serves to fixate and make permanent Becoming, which in turn petrifies 
and makes hollow the notion of Being (137-41; 164f). It is to take that which is most 
vital to life, and, in Heidegger’s translation of Nietzsche’s WP 617, ‘To stamp 
Becoming with the character of Being—that is the supreme will to power’. For 
Heidegger, this means that Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence falls prey to the error, or 
cowardice, of Anaximander, that of the rancour against time (Heidegger 1984:227-30; 
see also PTA 4, Z 2.20). Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence, taken as the bridge to 
redemption from revenge, winds up being nothing more than a circular path to 
ressentiment that originates in ressentiment (Z 2.7). 
 
4.6.2 In Paul 
The Apostle Paul also speaks of fear of death in the heart of his letter to the Romans, in 
chapter 8: 12-25.52 By means of Ἄρα οὖν (Rom 8:12), the Apostle segues from present 
tense realities in the previous paragraph to present tense results in this one. His 
discussion of the previous realities suggests that humanity be viewed as two distinct 
groups. One group is characterised as being in the flesh, slaves in bondage, and 
condemned to die. The other group is characterised as being in the Spirit, sons of God, 
and destined to live. The first group lives under a death sentence, and bears both 
                                                 
52
 Other passages may be put forth as possible exhibits to fear of death: Romans 8:31-39; 13:1-7; 1 
Corinthians 15:12-19, 24-29, 50-58; 2 Corinthians 3:1-18; 4:1-18; 1 Thessalonians 4:13-18. 
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physical and spiritual aspects. Since they will go the way of all the earth, they may as 
well live according to the flesh.53 This reveals their fundamental identity as debtors 
(ὀφειλέται) to the flesh. This humanity will die in the future (13). But another aspect of 
this death sentence may be detected when Paul describes ‘the sufferings of this present 
time’ (18) as ‘bondage to corruption’ (21), the operative term, φθορά, here meaning 
‘decay’ (Arndt & Gingrich 1979:858). Such a connotation suggests that in some sense 
fallen humanity is already dead. This might be referred to as a living death, as Nietzsche 
hints in his characterisation of Socrates’ life as a long illness (A 3.12), and also as 
Nietzsche seems to view it in D 1.68.  
How can this be? Paul seems to have something similar in mind when, to those 
living in both Ephesus and Colossae, he writes about those who are dead in sin (Eph 
2:1, 5; Col 2:13). Both these passages, in a wider context, suggest that people are 
biologically animated, busy about their daily lives. Yet, since they conduct their lives 
apart from God, they are spiritually dead, possessing no life force sufficient to sustain 
them beyond their temporal and terrestrial existence. Like cut flowers, they appear 
vibrant and alive, but are not. What is more, Paul communicates this being dead in sin 
as a way of life, as simply ‘the way things are’.54 I have made the case that no one can 
live under the constancy of such a threat, so the self-deception of which Paul speaks 
elsewhere recommends itself as a strategy for managing it. 
The second group, by contrast, live in the Spirit. They manifest their identity as 
God’s children. They have been released from obligation to the flesh, i.e., set free from 
slavery to sin, and most salient to my argument, protected from experiencing fear. Fear 
of what? Paul states that ‘all who are led by the Spirit of God’ and who are ‘sons of 
God’ (Rom 8:14) ‘did not receive the spirit of slavery to fall back into fear’ (15). The 
English, ‘to fall back’, is actually a single Greek word. The preponderant usage of this 
adverb in Paul and the entire New Testament conveys the idea of repetition, often 
translated as ‘again’ (πάλιν). In this case, it modifies ‘did [not] receive’ ([οὐ] ἐλάβετε), 
signifying that when the Roman believers were brought into God’s family, they did not 
experience the fear they had previously known when in slavery. In that state, they were 
bound for God’s wrath unto the day of judgement (see Rom 2:5, 8; 5:9).  
Paul assures his Roman readers that they have grounds for hope in the relationship 
made possible through the Spirit’s work. Freedom through adoption into God’s family 
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 ‘Flesh’ here is concretely represented as the ‘body … [which is] dead because of sin’ (Rom 8:10). 
54
 The aorist tense controlling both Ephesians 2 and Colossians 2 indicates this status quo. 
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and the glory of bodily resurrection will supplant bondage to corruption, subjection to 
futility, and pain of suffering. This promised revolution has repercussions in the here-
and-now. In Nietzschean terms, this is a major values-inversion, one which manifests 
tacit agreement between himself and his counter-revolutionary, Paul. Staten writes, 
[Nietzsche] says no to the ascetic because he wants to say yes to the body—the animal, the 
senses, change, becoming, death. But what he rejects in the ascetic (when he rejects him) is 
his sickness and decay, which means that in saying no to the ascetic Nietzsche says no to 
the body, change, becoming, death. Sickness and decay are precisely what is bodily about 
the body, at least in the Christian tradition, which always figures the anarchy of desire as 
corruptibility and bondage to death. Nietzsche pretends to affirm the body and this earth in 
his affirmation of the strong and healthy, but Saint Paul when he preaches a body of life 
pursues just the same freedom from the fundamental conditions of embodiment as 
Nietzsche does in his idealization of strength and health. (1990:60f) 
In the present, all those who are trapped in this fallen estate live under a slavish fear of 
death (Rom 8:15). Against this fear, Paul exhorts present-day believers to hope in a re-
ordered world of tomorrow. Hope, as the emotion of faith, so to speak, contends with all 
the previously mentioned signals of death on the strength of promised redemption. 
Contra Nietzsche, who castigates Christianity as life-denying, Paul highlights the 
enduring goodness of the material world by extolling God’s purpose for the 
transformation of all creation, including the body (see Lippitt 2000, especially 84f).55  
Romans 8 begins with Paul exhorting his Roman readers that there is ‘now no 
condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus. For the law of the Spirit of life has set 
you free in Christ Jesus from the law of sin and death’ (Rom 8:1-2). Instead of groaning 
under fearful bondage leading to death, the redeemed and all creation can hope in 
release from that struggle and thus obtain life. For Nietzsche, the struggle is all there is, 
eternally. In the subconscious hell of suffering, man’s illusory metaphysical identity is 
dashed with each turn of the wheel of Ixion (OGM 3.6). Against all contrary sensory 
indicators, one must break through the veil of Maya with heart-rending courage to find 
the salvation that comes in eternally ‘going out to meet at the same time one’s highest 
suffering and one’s highest hope’ (GS 3.268). Only the one ‘who knows fear, but 
conquers fear, who sees the abyss, but with pride’ can make his way through the 
labyrinthine mystery of the morally perceived world to realise his true integrated self (Z 
4.13.4). Infernal destruction is paved with the hope of this rebirth; life must brave death 
in an odyssey of tragic joy that pursues becoming a full self (see EH ‘Birth’ 3). The way 
to Olympic glory runs through the horror of Tartarus (see Z 3.1; GS 4.338; OGM 3.10). 
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 By way of example, a David Jensen chapter entitled, ‘Eschatology and Sex: Making all Things New’, 
understands Paul’s envisioned transformation to extend to a revolution in sexual identity (2013:55-72). 
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Fear of death is fundamental to self-deception in both Nietzsche and Paul. Self-
deception is the crowning move which results from injury that threatens one’s self-
perception as ‘right’ and ‘sufficient’ in relation to the powerful other. Others impose on 
us their values, or at least constrain our values, in either case delimiting our freedom. In 
Nietzschean ressentiment, values are unconsciously revalued by the self in order to 
promote this view of oneself as independent, and even autonomous. This revaluation 
project is then hidden from the self so as to maintain the illusion of self-righteousness 
and sufficiency. In Pauline fallenness, truths are unconsciously suppressed and 
exchanged to the same end, that of perceived self-righteousness and wisdom. The 
ultimate other for Nietzsche is a raw, amoral, purposeless existence. Paul’s ultimate 
other is a good and purposeful God. Nietzsche’s ressentiment-man cannot bear merely 
to pass into and out of existence on the tides of eternity. Ressentiment-man views this as 
the ultimate penalty, and he resists this as a wrong by fashioning for himself an essence, 
which is the origin of morality in the universe and the source of self-deception. The 
ultimate other for Paul is God who, as an expression of his love and power, brings into 
existence mankind, creating them in his image. For the creature to know the Creator is 
the ultimate blessing; to deny this relationship is the essence of self-deception. To know 
God is freedom for Paul; not to (have to) know God is freedom for Nietzsche.  
The functioning of self-deception, whether in a framework of Nietzschean 
ressentiment or Pauline fallenness, bears the same result: a self-validated right to 
autonomy. ‘Way of life’ becomes nothing more than what ‘is’. For Nietzsche, this is 
ultimate freedom. For Paul, it is a manifestation of self-deception. Bahnsen’s comment 
is a fitting summation here: ‘Unbelievers, who genuinely know God (in condemnation), 
work hard—even if habitually (and in that sense unconsciously)—to deceive themselves 
into believing that they do not believe in God or the revealed truths about Him’ 
(2002:123). 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND SIGNIFICANCE 
  
5.1 Conclusions of Thesis 
This thesis has explored connections between aspects of Pauline fallenness and 
Nietzschean ressentiment. I operated on the hypothesis that the reaction of Paul’s fallen-
man, as portrayed in Romans 1 and 2, could plausibly be construed in terms of 
Nietzsche’s ressentiment-man. The chief characteristics they share are values-inversion 
and self-deception. I then used this construal to make a Pauline assessment of 
Nietzsche. 
My goal was to perform a Nietzschean ressentiment reading of Paul, principally of 
the Apostle’s understanding of sin involving self-deception as practised by the 
‘unrighteous’ in Romans 1 and 2. I immediately encountered a problem. There was 
much creational language and allusion in verses 18ff, and my hermeneutical approach 
suggested the exegetical consideration of a subtext to the passage. Based on numerous 
factors in the text, I determined Paul builds his account upon the creation stories of 
Genesis. I contended Paul’s disquisition on God’s wrath on man may be more fully 
appreciated by attending to fallen-man’s reinterpretations of this primordial setting. The 
result of man’s ‘injury’, his perceived threat of the penalty attached to the prohibition 
concerning the tree (Gen 2:16f), is he finds himself powerless in the face of absolute 
power. He reacts to his vulnerable state by pressing against his restrictive original state. 
The psychic energies that strive for life are bent back into him when he is confronted by 
the penalty of death. The associated painful emotions and cognitive reflections are only 
possible in such an internal, reflective environment. Man develops from a two-
dimensional, brutishly instinctual animal to an introspective and ‘interesting’ creature. 
Nietzsche’s means for how this evolution is the shaping force of proto-ressentiment. 
Thus, the earliest chapters of Genesis are, for Nietzsche, the seedbed from which man 
grows into a soulish being, one capable of transforming the value of ‘bad’ into ‘evil’. 
This constituted the internalisation stage of ressentiment in my argument. 
Having concluded an examination of the subtext of Romans 1, we returned to the 
surface of Paul’s text. There I identified the second stage of ressentiment, moralisation. 
Here, man effectively fashions himself into a moral being, and shapes the world around 
him accordingly. Paul founds his argument on ‘the gospel’, declaring it reveals the 
power of God both in salvation (Rom 1:16f) and in condemnation (18ff). The gospel 
consists of both the offer of divine help and the offence of divine judgement. Focusing 
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on the latter, Paul says God is revealing his wrath on ‘all ungodliness and 
unrighteousness’, i.e., fallen humanity (18; see also 3:10f). Paul indicates this wrath is 
predicated on ‘the truth’ (1:18), and particularly man’s response to it. Before discussing 
man’s response to the truth, I conducted an enquiry into relevant aspects of that truth. 
The truth about which the Apostle writes is ‘the truth about God’ (Rom 1:25). 
Using a Barthian approach, I concluded this truth is unattainable to man in his own 
lights. Paul claims truth about God can only be known if God reveals it (19). The 
content of this self-revelation is comprised of God’s ‘invisible attributes’. Like a painter 
known through their art, so God’s eternal power and divine nature are on display in his 
creation (20). I concluded this self-disclosure is intended to be perceived by man 
through two means. The first comes by man’s empirical perception of the material 
world governed by natural laws. My investigation of the Romans 1 text revealed a 
subtext. A straightforward reading of this subtext showed God’s work in creation 
reflects his identity as a just and powerful creator. Yet a ressentiment perspective of this 
same material reads him as a powerful, oppressive master. The second means whereby 
man perceives the work of God in creation comes by human conscience. A 
straightforward reading of the Romans 1 text assumes the faculty of conscience as part 
of man’s created constitution. In ressentiment terms, however, human conscience results 
from the oppressive first state, the internalisation stage, set up by the creator. This stage 
gives rise to the soulish internal environment from which the moralisation stage 
develops. Nietzsche himself designates this environment as the conscience, and though 
it formally conforms with a natural law interpretation, the origin story Nietzsche gives it 
is subversive to a traditional reading of the text. This said, whether man encounters the 
truth about God through creation or conscience, Paul claims he clearly perceives it. This 
truth is God is the eternally powerful Other. Though it is not enough to save, Paul does 
insist it precludes any excuse for not properly responding (20f). 
The truth about God engenders an improper response in man, one that will 
culminate in self-deception. Man’s response provokes, in turn, God’s wrath, which 
fallen man perceives as a threat. In ressentiment terms, Nietzsche would characterise 
such as injury and offence (OGM 2.4, 11). This is precisely how Paul later defines his 
gospel (Gal 5:11; see also Rom 9:33). To cope with such perceived wrong, man 
responds with the stratagems of ressentiment. Since God in his omnipotence is 
unassailable, man cannot overtly achieve retribution. Thus, the first ressentiment 
strategy is a non-response: man withholds the honour that is God’s due (Rom 1:21). To 
183 
 
use the modern psychological term, passive aggression, it is the only way to redress 
man’s offence (GS 3.135). The sin of slighting God is the only way man can devise 
repayment for the (perceived) debt he incurs because of God’s wrath (OGM 2.5).  
The second ressentiment strategy identified was a response comprised of two 
actions. The first action is to suppress the truth about God (Rom 1:18). If man can 
succeed in this, the issue of God’s anger for him is moot. I suggested at least three 
motivations for this suppression. One is man cannot countenance the possibility he is 
ontologically contingent and morally unrighteous, and thus does not warrant autonomy 
in the absolute sense. Second, man does not want to admit his process of revaluation has 
been faulty. This would invalidate his judgements, the most important being he is 
justified in and of himself, as well as the justifier of all he esteems. Third, and a logical 
concomitant to the previous two, man wants to avoid accountability to a more just 
and/or powerful party than himself. These are three powerful reasons why man 
suppresses the truth. Effectively, Paul claims guilty knowledge cannot not be known 
(1:19-21). Ressentiment suggests a reason for this, that because this knowledge carries 
such threatening force (OGM 2.16), it must be redirected and pressed down. It must be 
suppressed.  
The second action man takes in reaction to the truth about God is to exchange it 
(Rom 1:25). The same motives that activate suppression apply in this action. Paul 
communicates in Romans 1:23 and 25 that the truth about God, which reveals that he is 
altogether worthy of homage, is displaced by a lie. The lie is man the creature is worthy 
of worship in place of God the creator. Nietzsche would endorse this exchange as ‘the 
authentic lie, the genuine, resolute “honest” lie’ by which men ‘open their eyes to 
themselves, that they know how to distinguish between “true” and “false” in 
themselves’. Nietzsche seeks to rally ressentiment-man to acknowledge this to 
overcome ‘the dishonest lie’, which entails man’s willingness to be subjugated to 
another (OGM 3.19; see also A 55). Paul, on the other hand, considers this exchange to 
be fundamentally dishonest. He would have no problem construing it as the crowning 
move of ressentiment, self-deception. Moreover, he would consider one who promotes 
such a move for autonomy to be full of ressentiment and in the thrall of self-deception. 
We next performed a ressentiment reading of Romans 2. I proposed that insights 
gained from the reading of Romans 1 validated my hermeneutical strategy of reading 
Paul in light of Nietzsche. I particularly focused on the first half of the chapter to 
conduct a theological exegesis. In verses 1-11, Paul discusses God’s impartial 
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judgement, and he principally addresses the Jew. I noted the historical and political 
context of the Apostle’s letter finds the Jews a subjugated people due to Roman 
imperialism, including those of the diaspora, as Paul’s audience is. Nietzsche tells us 
that the Jews were thus placed in ‘impossible conditions’ in which they are ‘confronted 
with the question of being or not being’ (A 24). This psychological pressure is a 
necessary factor in the origin of ‘the ressentiment of the masses’ (43; see also GS 
3.137).  
Paul addresses his Jewish audience in diatribe, not merely to highlight what he 
perceives to be their hypocrisy in condemning the Gentiles for sinful behaviour, but to 
reveal their ‘practice [of] the very same things’ (Rom 2:1) leaves them condemned. I 
interpreted the Jew’s1 failure to ‘obey the truth’ (8) as self-deception, and ressentiment 
helps us understand how this could be. The fundamentally reactive nature of 
ressentiment causes one who perceives himself to be disadvantaged as oppressed. The 
socio-political circumstances of Rome likely left the average Jew feeling inferior to the 
Gentiles. To rectify that imbalance, he must do something both to the standard of 
valuation and to the perceived-to-be superior oppressors. The Jew in Paul’s address 
inflates his own capacity to keep the law (1f, 9), and devalues the deeds of some 
Gentiles who ‘by nature do what the law requires’ (Rom 2:14). The commonality in 
both is God’s law. This opens the Jew up to all Paul’s indictments of Gentiles in 
Romans 1:18-32. The lawbreaking Jew may thus be seen as a suppressor of truth about 
God (i.e., his absolute and impartial righteousness and wisdom), and also as an 
exchanger of truth about God for a lie made possible by false valuation. I confirmed this 
by associating two behaviours of the Jew to those of ressentiment-man. The first comes 
by way of viewing the Jew’s hypocrisy as a projection of his own failure onto the 
Gentiles (Rom 2:2). The second comes in noting the Jew’s self-perception is made in 
comparative, even inverted, terms to the Gentiles (19ff). The parasitic nature of 
ressentiment is crucial for Nietzsche in that any claim to superiority made by the 
oppressed must find its source in the strength of its oppressor (OGM 1.10). For Paul, the 
reality is the Jew is the one who is blind, in the dark, and foolish. 
I concluded the motivation for such self-deception spills over from Romans 1. In 
keeping with previous findings, this would be avoidance of the wrath of God’s 
judgement on sinful behaviour, which the Jew by virtue of his knowledge of the law, 
must know in some sense ‘rightly falls on those who practice such things’ (Rom 2:2). 
                                                 
1
 Paul uses the singular. 
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Paul explicit talk of God’s wrath tacitly nullifies any benefit of the Jew’s covenantal 
status by warning him that he will be subject to God’s judgement if he does not humbly 
submit to his law (5f; see also 25, 27). A huge aspect of ressentiment is the creation of a 
mass of humanity that shares the same ideals and morality—what Nietzsche calls the 
herd and herd morality—and the safety afforded by strength of numbers. Anonymity is 
found in the herd, and it is from this sense of security that ressentiment-driven 
individuals are emboldened to moralise. In so doing, they create for themselves a 
perception of superiority over others, even as they distance themselves from the very 
values they denounce in them. Paul’s rhetoric searches the moralising Jew out of the 
crowd by stating that ‘wrath and fury’ and ‘tribulation and distress’ await ‘every soul of 
man who does evil’ (8f). Like the Gentiles of Romans 1, the Jew in Romans 2 is 
unrighteous and disobedient to the truth about God revealed in creation. Though he 
seeks to hide that truth from himself, God has revealed it in the law. He will judge all 
who transgress it, Jew or Gentile.  
In Romans 2:12-16, Paul expounds God’s impartial judgement by the law. I 
concluded the law of which Paul speaks is the standard of morality that reflects the 
eternal character of God. It is generally manifest to all humans and, at the time of Paul’s 
writing, is specially revealed in the Hebrew Scriptures. Paul’s subject in this passage is 
the Gentiles, unregenerate humanity. Even though they do not have special access to 
God’s revelation as do the Jews, they attempt to align their actions with the 
requirements of the law. They do this by virtue of the conscience, which is not the same 
as the law, but is rather an independent mechanism that evaluates one’s actions and 
attitudes against the standard of the law. Typically, the conscience condemns for failure 
to keep the law. Sometimes it signals approval, but not in a salvific sense. 
Paul assumes the reality of the conscience in this passage. On a ressentiment 
reading, it carries over from the subtext of Romans 1, wherein we saw the formation of 
the conscience in the internalisation stage of ressentiment. I took Paul’s description of 
the Gentile ‘thought process’ in 2:15 to refer to the functioning of their conscience. 
Motives and thoughts, both conscious and unconscious, are debated and evaluated in the 
conscience. In ressentiment terms, this is the famous internal struggle of forces 
competing for outward manifestation. Paul’s account indicates the Gentiles experience 
such a struggle over the law of God. Yet elsewhere he says the Gentiles do not have the 
law (2:12, 14). So how can they be held accountable for violating it, let alone desire to 
conform to it? The answer lies in other, somewhat puzzling statements of Paul. He says 
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the Gentiles are ‘a law unto themselves’ (14), and ‘they show that the work of the law is 
written on their hearts’ (15). I determined these statements to reveal the function of their 
conscience, by which a sense of moral responsibility to keep the law is expressed. From 
Romans 1, we gathered God’s moral norm is given to man as law, and a ressentiment 
interpretation of such limitation is seen as oppressively restrictive, and therefore 
injurious. Violation of this law carries with it tacit knowledge of consequences which 
may be seen in the Gentiles’ self-deceiving behaviour (Rom 1:18, 25). This self-
deception finds further support when Paul speaks about ‘secrets’ in 2:16.  
A ressentiment construal of the self views the self as a sea of forces clashing 
against one another for the sake of dominant expression. These forces include emotions, 
motives, and thoughts (collectively, ‘thoughts’), any of which may be conscious to the 
self. Other forces may be unconscious due to repression, with the result they are hidden 
from the self. Paul deftly moves from discussing the Gentiles’ self-arbitration of 
thoughts in the present (Rom 2:15) to the future when the secrets of all men will be 
exposed in the final judgement of God (16).  
The concept of self-deception recommends an explanation as to why secrets are 
kept in the first place. The conscience functions by measuring thoughts against the law 
of God, which is universally and unavoidably known. Thoughts that transgress that 
standard must be hidden for their condemnatory nature. That is, they are made secret, 
first from God and then from the self. The revaluative function of ressentiment sheds 
light on how this happens. In the internal struggle of the weak person, those thoughts 
that are repressed reflect values associated with, and resented, in the strong. Their (i.e., 
the values) worth is still maintained by the weak, however, so they continue to exert 
pressure on the self. On top of this, the conflict involved in repressing these values and 
thoughts about them is repressed. This results in a disintegrated self, which violates the 
pursuit of wholeness and the manifestation of an integrated identity. The revaluation of 
ressentiment is completed by borrowing a standard alien to the self to use in measuring 
the self’s identity.  
Paul’s description of the Gentiles’ secret thoughts finds resonance with this 
model. Gentiles hide certain thoughts from themselves because they deviate from God’s 
law. In this sense, the law serves as the moral standard imposed at creation. It comes 
with consequences of judgement and death for transgression, and these in turn are 
portended by God’s wrath. Fallen-man as ressentiment-man is so offended by such 
limitation on his freedom that he rejects the imposition of the law, effectively rejecting 
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the one who gives it. Man cannot reject God openly because he is overwhelmingly 
powerful. He therefore unconsciously revalues his situation, hiding both the results and 
the process from himself, so he can feel justified in what he perceives to be his resultant 
superior position. Desires and thoughts of freedom and self-determination still exert 
force, but they must be repressed to achieve a unified sense of self that conforms to 
God’s law. This is how the self-deception of ressentiment works. Thoughts hidden from 
the self that comprise it are parallel to the Pauline ‘secret’ thoughts of Romans 2:16.  
Further conclusions regarding the nature of self-deception were reached by 
analysing the work of four scholars. The existential origins of ressentiment and self-
deception were explored in Sugarman’s work. In PTG, Nietzsche concludes that 
ressentiment is rooted in animosity toward the fleeting nature of existence. Life is 
nothing more than existential transience, or change (PTG 4). There is no cause or 
purpose, just existence. Man, however, wants purpose and permanence. This, Nietzsche 
claims, belies resentment at his circumstance of suffering and death. He wants to 
overcome death, but without a purpose for his existence, he is left without recourse for 
violation of that purpose. He invents morality, featuring a sense of guilt, to supply 
himself with purpose, and to fashion of himself being (i.e., a self). Thus, I concluded 
morality owes its success to self-deception. Ultimately, that is the move that makes 
permanent man’s sense of being and justifies his existence. 
Poellner’s philosophical treatment of ressentiment supplied a clue to an impetus 
strong enough to account for the energy required for self-deception. The goal of 
Nietzschean ressentiment is to overcome the suffering inherent in subjugation. It is 
achieved through moral superiority over a perceived-to-be more powerful and 
threatening other. This comes about by revaluing one’s circumstances, which must be 
consciously held and intentionally motivated, but at the same time masked from the self. 
I hypothesised that the initial injury catalysing ressentiment not only results in anger, 
but in a paradoxically-close emotional relative, fear. This accords with the conditions of 
ressentiment-man in relation to the perceived threat of the oppressive other, and also of 
fallen-man who finds himself in transgression against the ultimate other, God.  
I used the work of Bahnsen to test this hypothesis. Couched in a Romans 1 
framework, Bahnsen claims self-deception in fallen-man is demonstrated by denying 
the creator despite possessing knowledge of him. Like Poellner, he concluded it is 
possible to intentionally deceive oneself, yet be genuinely deceived. The key is 
sufficient motivation to explain the extraordinary lengths undertaken to accept evidence 
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favouring a desirable belief about the self, while a) avoiding, perverting, or otherwise 
hiding distressing and painful evidence that would falsify that perception, and b) 
covering that policy of hiding. To escape the infinite regress of deception (i.e., covering 
the coverings), I concluded this policy of covering must have the property of self-
covering. Bahnsen’s work confirmed the plausibility that fear is sufficiently strong to 
completely cover, experientially speaking, a belief that threatens a desirable self-
perception. In terms of Romans 1, this means fallen-man supresses truth about God, 
about himself, and the enmity between God and himself. 
Via’s work on Paul helped round out the study of self-deception. Fallen-man 
mistakenly but willingly fashions a cover story of belief that obedience to the law of 
God (i.e., his values), rather than faith in his provision apart from the law, results in 
salvation. But man cannot completely conceal from himself the real story that no 
amount of law-keeping will achieve righteous standing before God. Man’s efforts to 
live up to the law yield only an inner tension between the undesirable self he does not 
desire to be, and the preferred self he desires to be but cannot realise. This tension 
generates the kind of fear and anxiety (Rom 8:15; Phil 4:6) that drives him to assuage 
them. As self-deceived, fallen-man zealously pursues the acquisition of righteousness 
on his own merits against warranted beliefs to the contrary. Thus, he devalues the law’s 
obligations in a way conducive to a preferred self- righteousness image.  
Synthesising these findings permitted me to speak of certain relevant aspects of 
man’s fallenness in terms of ressentiment, with self-deception serving as the nexus 
between Nietzschean and Pauline systems. Poellner’s double-deception, Bahnsen’s 
orders of belief, and Via’s cover stories all dovetail in the notion of self-deception. They 
speak to man’s dual quest. Half of the quest is for life and well-being. It comes in 
pursuing both the belief he lives according to his own law and authority, and the 
awareness he is worthy of that existence. The other half of the quest is overcoming 
death and judgement. It comes in a desperate fleeing from both the penalty of not living 
according to God’s law and authority, and the awareness he is worthy of the penalty for 
violating them. Fallenness as ressentiment is manifested in revaluing man’s 
circumstances such that God, the law, and man’s own self are revalued and inverted. 
God is unworthy of obedience and worship for the oppression that comes by way of his 
injurious law, and man is adequate to achieve his own righteousness by attaining a 
standard which he himself sets. Man considers himself ipso facto worthy of existence 
based on a world that supports his carefully crafted self-image. Nietzsche endorses such 
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a man powerful and wise enough to create a world without gravity (Z 3.11) that 
revolves around a new sun (GS 3.125). Paul would see this as the folly of self-
deception, and fallen-man’s extraordinary efforts in world-creation as evidence he 
knows deep down he is deserving of death. 
I therefore suggested that fear of death may be a plausibly sufficient motive in 
self-deception. It is intrinsic to Nietzsche’s ressentiment morality, and is amenable to 
Paul’s notion of consequence to sin. Nietzsche treats death in the normal sense of 
biological cessation of life, as well a figurative or spiritual sense. His problem with 
morality comes in dealing with death, and its resultant fear, in a figurative sense. 
Nietzsche claims that acquiescence in suffering and death is to turn away from life and 
give up hope of creating anything beyond oneself (Z 1.4).2 Death is the result, 
figuratively speaking, of the slaves’ losing battle to preserve their existence (OGM 3.12, 
13). Therefore, Nietzsche rails against the message of Christian redemption because it is 
a tacit reaction to this fear of death (2.22). He considers this death to be nihilism, an 
existential threat which he defines as the abandonment of all ‘value, meaning, and 
desirability’ (WP ‘Toward an Outline’ 1).  
I borrowed sociological insights from Becker, among others, to provide resolution 
on my argument that fear of death drives self-deception. Becker acknowledges 
unconscious despair over the certainty of death to be an endemic human trait. It is so 
powerful that no one can bear its constant threat, so it must be concealed from the self. 
Nevertheless, it manifests in general anxiety. A person must fashion a superior, heroic, 
image of the self to combat it. This is done by revaluing the world around the self. I 
determined this flight to one’s preferred reality is a form of repression, and a way to 
overcome the fear of death. In this vein, I proposed Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence and 
amor fati amount to a different way to cope with fear of death, a Nietzschean alternative 
redemption. Nietzsche’s construal of death as nihilism recommended the use of 
Heidegger. He views fear of physical death, and anxiety over existential death, to be so 
powerful it forces us to live inauthentic lives. We desire the certainty and permanence 
Anaximander sought, so we seize on being a certain way in the world, a world of our 
choosing. This, I claimed, is resonant of the revaluation of self-deception in 
ressentiment.  
Finally, the Apostle Paul recognises the powerful force of fear of death in the 
domain of fallen humanity. His discussion of redemption in Romans 8:12ff treats 
                                                 
2
 Nietzsche’s text here is intentionally ambiguous, referring to both figurative and literal death. 
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suffering in the world as a harbinger of ultimate demise. Life under the fall may 
continue in the sense of biological functioning, but given man’s separation from God 
due to sin, he is spiritually dead. Paul discusses man’s life as dead in sin/transgression 
(Eph 2:1, 5; Col 2:13), so he sees it as characteristic of the way life in the fallen world 
is. Paul tells us the threat of death, revealed in the wrath of God on sinful creation, is 
both being suppressed and exchanged for an amenable view of the world, and of 
oneself. Nietzsche would view it as the self-deception of ressentiment. 
 
5.2 Contributions of Thesis 
No matter which way one turns, scholarship abounds in Nietzschean philosophy and 
Pauline theology. Pairings of Nietzsche with religious studies3 or Paul with 
philosophical studies4 are likewise numerous. When it comes to Nietzsche’s analysis of 
Christianity in specific, however, few authors feature Paul and his role, tending instead 
to favour Nietzsche’s own use of Jesus. For example, Karl Jaspers leaves Paul at the 
margins in discussing Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity, preferring instead to focus on 
Jesus as the centre of that account (1961:26-36). Walter Kaufmann acknowledges 
Nietzsche’s designation of Paul as the first Christian, but goes no further than Jaspers in 
saying that Paul’s evangel comes by inverting the figure of Jesus to become a rallying 
point for resentful people to overcome their leaders and rulers (1974:343-45). Even 
fewer authors directly relate Nietzschean and Pauline thought to one another.5  
Narrower still is the field on which Nietzsche and Paul are brought into 
engagement over matters of morality. Tim Murphy (2001) takes Nietzsche’s issue to be 
ills he perceives in modern Christian Europe, and his view that Paul, even more than 
being the instigator of Christianity, stands as the origin of a sign-chain extending 
through the early church as Peter, and on into the historical Church as Luther. Jörg 
Salaquarda (1985), Christa Acampora (2013), and Abed Azzam (2015) all highlight the 
contest between Nietzsche and Paul. Salaquarda views the relationship between the 
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 Relevant works on Nietzsche and religion include Bonifazi 1953; Scheler 1998; Jaspers 1961; Küng 
1980; Geffré & Jossua 1981; Deleuze 1983; O’Flaherty 1985; Valadier 1985; Ratschow 1988; Salaquarda 
1996; Roberts 1998; Kee 1999; van Tongeren 2000; Westphal 2000; Marion 2001; Murphy 2001; 
Santaniello 2001; Benson 2002; Fraser 2002; Moore 2002; Deane 2006; Milbank 2006; Williams 2006; 
Young 2006; Hovey 2008; Huskinson 2009. 
4
 Relevant works on Paul and philosophy include Pfleiderer 1906; Adams 1992; Sandnes 1993; Gooch 
1997; Vattimo 1999, 2003; Fredrickson 2000; Winter 2002; Badiou 2003; Žižek 2003; Agamben 2005; 
Jennings 2006; Wasserman 2008; Caputo 2009; Engberg-Pedersen 2008; Blanton & De Vries 2012; Frick 
2013. 
5
 Relevant works include Lea 1972; O’Flaherty, et al. 1985; Schacht 1994; Kee 1999; Lippitt & Urpeth 
2000; Fraser 2002; Girard 2000; Taubes 2004. 
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‘revaluator’ Nietzsche and the ‘revaluator’ Paul, not in terms of simple conflict, but in 
terms of dialectical overcoming (Salaquarda 1985:127). Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence 
of the same, as the positive Dionysian promise of life, overcomes what Nietzsche 
considers the old system of values ensconced in Christianity and promulgated by the 
Pauline negative notion of the destruction of the law. Acampora takes Nietzsche to 
contend with Paul in a bid to end traditional morality. At stake is Nietzsche’s vision for 
mankind’s future. Thus, he contests the very type of battlefield. If the contest takes 
place on a spiritual, other-worldly plane, Pauline motives and values have the 
advantage. If the battle transpires on a this-worldly plane, then slave values may be 
overcome by Dionysian values. They promote a desire for becoming, which is more 
basic and enduring than that of being, and bears its own seeds of demise (Acampora 
2013:110-28). For Azzam, it is their respective efforts to authorise a radical system that 
liberates humanity from the past—for Nietzsche’s Paul, it is Christ as the anti-
Dionysian; for Nietzsche, it is the Antichrist as the ‘anti-anti-Dionysian’, which is to 
say, the truly free and active Dionysus (Azzam 2015:49).  
The area to which this thesis contributes is the moral space contested by Nietzsche 
and Paul that features ressentiment, and thus opens avenues to explore its inherent self-
deception. Two works stand out in this regard, Morgan Rempel’s Nietzsche, 
Psychohistory, and the Birth of Christianity (2002), and Bruce Benson’s Pious 
Nietzsche (2008). Rempel conducts a psychohistorical analysis of Nietzsche’s 
psychological approach to understanding Jesus and, crucially for my purposes, Paul, in 
the birth of Christianity (Rempel 2002:9f). He finds that while Nietzsche’s intent 
concerning Jesus is to rescue him from Pauline Christianity (139-41), he trains his 
sights on the Apostle Paul in open hostility, with ‘the occasional indication of 
begrudging respect’ (61). Rempel makes much of Nietzsche’s aphorism, ‘The First 
Christian’ (D 1.68), in which he recounts Saul the young Pharisee tormented by the 
demands of God’s law (2002:63-65). As a transgressor of the law, he unconsciously 
projects his failings on others, making them transgressors, whom he then pursues in 
hope of winning favour from God (65-68). No favour is forthcoming, however, even as 
the pain of guiltiness over moral failure increases.  
This failure underlies Paul’s official mission to the Syrian capital (Acts 9:2). 
Nietzsche claims his fragile psychological state gives way to ‘the thought of thoughts, 
the key of keys, the light of lights’ (D 1.68). This insight relieves Paul of the fatigue of 
zealotry by virtue of the Cross of Christ. God no longer persecutes transgressors 
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because he has destroyed the law through the death of Jesus. ‘And where there is no 
law’ Rempel reminds us from Romans 4:14, ‘there is no transgression’ (2002:77). This 
is ‘essentially what happened’ to Paul, asserts Nietzsche, detected through a 
psychologist’s eye able to ‘really read’ Paul (D 1.68). Every claim reveals something 
about the one who claims it, claims Nietzsche (BGE 5.187). So the key to interpreting 
Paul lies in discovering his psychological needs, not in uncovering any historical ‘truth’ 
(2002:77; WP 2.171).6  
Thus, Paul’s ‘second enlightenment’ was bound to happen (D 1.68). That is, his 
need for deliverance from the excruciating pain of guilt generates a reality-induced 
perception of deliverance, embodied in the resurrected Christ. Nietzsche redacts Paul's 
conversion through psychological analysis.7 Rather than the unconditional surrender of 
wholehearted admission of guilt before the demands of God and his law—genuine 
repentance—Nietzsche reads into Paul’s thinking what may be viewed as a ‘second 
enlightenment’. Rempel’s analysis turns on two key thoughts in the Apostle’s mind, 
summarised as follows. Here is a way to deal with my problems. First, as Saviour he 
can rescue me from my pain by his death on the cross. Second, this revelation to me 
allows me to control the message of the destruction of the law. Heretofore, forgiveness 
shall come exclusively through the message which I publish! (see Rempel 2002:71-77; 
D 1.68). 
Rempel explains Nietzsche’s perspective is the source of Paul's enthusiasm for his 
new-found direction (2002:77-81). Running along with Paul's pain are his 
‘psychoconstitutional deficiencies’ (78), from which stem an intolerance of the 
ambiguity that inheres to liberty. Dissonance and scepticism inhabit the domain of 
grand intellects, the psychologically strong, and free spirits. By contrast, in A 54 
Nietzsche asserts convictions and beliefs are proclivities of the weak, the intellectual 
prisoner. The believers’ truth must conform to their belief, given they are ‘not free to 
have any sort of conscience for the question “true” or “untrue” ... People with 
convictions have pathological conditioned optics, which makes them into fanatics’ (A 
54). Listening to Nietzsche, one hears Paul is a faithful fanatic. For neither prior to his 
vision, nor subsequent to it, does he really want to know what is true (A 52). Nietzsche 
goes on to explain such conceptual epileptics are not really sincere in their belief-
                                                 
6
 As one who cannot abide such an interpretive strategy, Foot criticises Nietzsche as a ‘partly wonderful 
psychologist and partly a mere speculating philosopher far exceeding any plausible basis for his 
speculations’ (1994:13). 
7
 Rempel’s section entitled, ‘Phase Two: Paul’s Conversion’, features Nietzsche’s audacious rereading of 
the Damascus Road event. 
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conviction, but are rather self-interested. They adopt what they need in the beginning 
(i.e., a lie), then build up a tradition of belief to strengthen their own position into that of 
fact, and on to orthodoxy (i.e., truth, A 55).  
Nietzsche argues believers compensate for and camouflage their false truth, so to 
speak, with fanaticism (A 54). The fanatic lives by the peril of the pendulum in that 
‘extreme positions are not succeeded by moderate ones but by extreme positions of the 
opposite kind’ (WP 1.55).8 So it is with Paul, explains Rempel. Nietzsche claims Paul 
merely exchanges the object of his conviction—from faith in Law to faith in Christ—
without disrupting his epileptic expression of will-to-power, i.e., fanaticism. Altogether, 
this creates a very powerful messenger indeed (Rempel 2002:81). 
How could Paul the Apostle hijack Jesus the Master’s message? The answer lies 
in a confluence of factors, the first of which is a very impressionable first-century 
milieu ripe for misunderstanding the gospel (Rempel 2002:85-112; see Magnus 
1985:297-305). Nietzsche numbers himself and Jesus among a very few ‘emancipated 
spirits’ (A 36) who remain untainted by their surrounding culture (Rempel 2002:99, 
101f). Another factor relates to the death of Jesus. Had he evaded premature death, no 
doubt he too would have hardened along with the rancorous ethnos which Judaism had 
become, and been locked into its diseased system. He would thus have preached a very 
different message (16-20). Jesus does indeed die too early, according to Nietzsche, 
which leaves ‘Jewish Christians’, the ‘first congregation’ (A 44), those ruled by a 
‘priestly aristocracy’ (OGM 1.6), free to translate his message in conformity with their 
needs (Rempel 2002:90-92). Now available for the masses, Christianity is born, its 
Saviour ‘only possible in a Jewish landscape—I mean one over which the gloomy and 
sublime thunder cloud of the wrathful Jehovah was brooding continually’ (GS 3.137). 
The soil of this landscape is toxified with the ‘deepest and most sublime hatred’, 
yielding a values-inverted morality, the present system of good and evil (OGM 1.6; see 
7). Rempel rightly identifies the main toxifying agent as ressentiment (2002:92-112). 
Rempel rightly addresses Nietzsche’s questioning of Paul’s Damascus Road 
vision, wherein Nietzsche claims that what Paul ‘really sees’ is generated by a strong, 
felt reaction to the pain of condemnation. Rempel makes clear that in reading the 
Apostle’s own account, one cannot deny Nietzsche radically reinterprets Paul’s 
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 In Philippians, the Apostle uses cognates of διώκω to describe both his pre-conversion persecution of 
the church as a religious zealot (3:6), and his post-conversion pursuit of Christ as a believer (3:12). The 
former manifests his faith in the Law, the latter his faith in the Christ-God. 
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experience (2002:72f).9 This thesis has turned the equation around to ask why it is 
Nietzsche reacts this way, with such a profoundly divergent interpretation of Paul? As I 
have shown, such a reactive mode is characteristic of ressentiment, and ressentiment 
entails the threat of exposure to that which has been previously hidden. A Pauline 
construal would argue this is truth about God and its consequences for humanity. I posit 
Nietzsche’s contestation with Paul’s god is too difficult a prospect to countenance, so 
Paul himself becomes the face of opposition and the focal point of Nietzsche’s wrath. 
Therefore, he spends the rest of his life locked in mortal combat with the Apostle, for 
the self-image and life arising from Nietzsche’s own philosophy depend on overcoming 
him (see Danto 1965:154f). 
Nietzsche’s attack may be understood in two ways. In terms of defence, one must 
account for his disproportionate response to Paul—‘There has not been since Voltaire 
such an outrageous attack on Christianity [as mine]’ (Middleton 1996:219). Based on 
Rempel’s work (see 2002:70), it must be considered whether or not, in Pauline 
perspective, Nietzsche just as much seeks to escape reality as Paul himself is accused of 
doing from Nietzsche’s point of view. If, deep down he knows he cannot overpower 
Paul (or Paul's message), he must seek to circumvent the pain. Granted, Nietzsche’s 
philosophical path is also pockmarked with pain, but not nearly so much as the way he 
perceives Paul's message leads, which is to ultimate rejection by God. Concomitantly, 
Nietzsche’s path is also a means by which the self devises control. Offensively, 
Nietzsche critiques Jesus and attacks Paul. Nietzsche links Jesus’ ‘instinct of hatred for 
every reality’ with his ‘flight into the “unimaginable,” into the “inconceivable” … [into] 
a world that has become completely “internal”, a “true” world, an “eternal” world’ (A 
29). Whereas Jesus may be excused for his immaturity and incapacity for such a 
perspective, Paul may not. His distortion and promulgation of Jesus’ message into a 
dysevangel is diabolical and designed for control. Therefore, Nietzsche undermines 
Paul’s psychological state as a fledging Pharisee, arguing he is the one incapable of or 
unwilling to grasp reality as it is. Nietzsche also employs a strategy of defusing the 
Apostle’s power as an apologist for Christianity, casting aspersions on his motives.  
All of this I contend is a manifestation of ressentiment. The alternative is 
repentance and would signal defeat, inadequacy, wretchedness, and humiliation for 
                                                 
9
 See also Badiou, who remarks on Nietzsche’s recounting of Paul’s ‘Damascene moment’ in A 58 that 
‘nothing in this text fits’ (2003:31). 
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Nietzsche: in a word, impotence. In a world where the self equals power, this is a fate 
worse than death. Surely Rempel’s ultimate conclusion is correct, that  
the first Christians and St. Paul are not alone in their tendency to ‘adjust’ their image of 
Jesus ‘into an apologia of themselves.’ Nietzsche of course does this precisely as well ... 
The redeemer Nietzsche eventually extricates from Christianity ends up resembling the 
philosopher’s self-image to a remarkable degree. (2002:141) 
What Nietzsche proffers as wisdom about others, then, rebounds on himself: I realise 
‘what every great philosophy has been so far: namely, the personal confession of its 
author and a kind of involuntary and unnoticed mémoires’ (BGE 1.6).10 Solomon 
concurs, writing of Nietzsche, ‘There are all of those pages unmasking ressentiment in 
some of the greatest minds in Western thought, but they are self-evidently animated by 
the same unmistakable resentfulness and envy in their unloved and unappreciated 
author’ (1996:215). Huskinson, among others, accuses Nietzsche of hypocrisy over the 
very same matter, using Paul as a ‘mere motif’ to his own ends of deconstructing and 
discrediting Christianity. ‘We could even go further in our psychological speculation,’ 
she writes, ‘and suggest that Nietzsche’s Paul is a product of Nietzsche’s own 
ressentiment’. (2009:31). What Nietzsche despises in others, he boasts in himself, 
ironically falling prey to ‘the most common lie’, ‘the one you tell yourself’ (A 55). 
Staten places this realisation under scrutiny by posing the question at the beginning of 
his Nietzsche’s Voice, ‘“Every great philosophy so far”: does this mean up to, but not 
including, Nietzsche’s?’ (1990:10) Staten responds to his own question, at least 
preliminarily, at the end of his first chapter: 
So it appears that Nietzsche is here falsifying his own insight, using it to justify his pose of 
autarky and ataraxia. He is engaging, in fact, in an economic subterfuge of a type that is all 
too human, perhaps the most human subterfuge of all. Specifically, and ironically, one 
motivated by what Nietzsche teaches us to call ressentiment, the vengefulness of the 
impotent against those who have power over them. (:38) 
Girard agrees, commenting that Nietzsche ‘shares’ in ressentiment, from which ‘none of 
Nietzsche’s achievements as a thinker can be divorced’ (2000:246). Finally, Giovani 
Papini argues Nietzsche is ‘actuated by resentment’, causing him to fail ‘to understand 
the vitality of Christianity’ … thus revealing ‘his own blindness, which was the sign of 
his weakness’ (Ledure 1981:44). This notion that Nietzsche, himself, might be a 
candidate for self-deception via ressentiment, particularly in view of his discourse over 
Pauline morality, led to the contemplation of a Pauline riposte to Nietzsche as self-
deceived.  
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 Along these lines, see Safranski’s Nietzsche: A Philosophical Biography (2003). 
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This recommends consideration of a theological perspective on the Nietzsche-Paul 
engagement afforded by the work of Benson. Reminiscent of Jaspers,11 Benson claims 
that Nietzsche’s mature philosophy bears a striking resemblance to the Christian Pietism 
of his youthful Christianity. Benson identifies significant similarities, in form if not in 
content, between the respective beliefs of the younger Fritz and the older Friedrich.12 
The younger sees a spiritual/moral fall; the elder, decadence. The younger overcomes 
suffering through salvation; the older, by embracing it. The younger affirms 
metaphysical reality, both now and hereafter; the older, only the present material world. 
The younger believes in the transcendent, loving God of truth from Christianity; the 
older, in the Dionysian reality of amor fati, resulting in the affirmation of all that is Life, 
including the self. Regardless of the development of his thought, however, not only 
does Nietzsche not rise above the life-denying decadence of philosophy, art, or religion 
by eschewing faith in anything transcendent, Benson believes he cannot. Instead, 
Benson exposes Nietzsche’s all-too-human, and implicitly Pauline, need for meaning. 
Küng, amongst others, anticipates Benson’s association of Nietzsche and Paul in 
demanding Nietzsche’s atheism ‘be taken wholly seriously in theological terms’ 
(1980:371). Benson asserts fundamentally Nietzsche argues most with those whom he 
resembles: Socrates, Wagner, and Paul (2008:73). Regarding the latter figure, Benson 
coalesces his reasoning by putting forth Nietzsche as a ‘second Paul’ (119). I tease out 
and distil into two points of comparison from Benson’s discussion of Nietzsche in 
relation to Paul. A third comparison, derived from Benson, is subsequently be offered. 
Scope of impact is one characteristic shared by Nietzsche and Paul. Both 
catalysed explosive, history-altering movements. Paul’s Christianity numbers more than 
two billion adherents worldwide according to a survey by the Pew Research Center 
(2011:9). Many of Nietzsche’s views were appropriated by the fascist regimes of both 
Italy and Germany (Shirer 1960:99-101; Sluga 1993:29-52). Nietzsche scholars, 
Solomon and Higgins, assert that ‘Nietzsche is now the most often cited philosopher in 
the Western tradition’ (2000:3). Their claim gains traction in Nietzsche’s influence on 
twentieth-century thinkers such as Klossowski, Heidegger, Bataille, Kojève, Danto, 
Foucault, Deleuze, Guattari, Derrida, Camus, Kaufmann, and Nehamas to name a few. 
This is to say nothing of commonplace terminology today that he either coined or 
                                                 
11
 See Jaspers’ third chapter in Nietzsche and Christianity, entitled, ‘Nietzsche’s View of World History 
Stems from Christian Motives Drained of Their Substance’ (1961:46-85). 
12 ‘Fritz’, the sobriquet for ‘Friedrich’, is how Nietzsche is affectionately known in his youth. 
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popularised such as aesthetics, values, will-to-power, free spirit, sublimation, cultural 
philistine, nihilism, superman, and self-overcoming.   
Nietzsche views Paul as his ‘chief rival’, but also respects him as ‘the exemplar 
for what he himself wants to accomplish’ (Benson 2008:136). He envies Paul’s genius 
insight into the ressentiment-motivated, ‘secretly seditious … antichrist intrigues in the 
Empire’, as well as the scope of his vision for discovering ‘how … to kindle a “world 
fire”’ (A 58; see Benson 2008:119, 37; Salaquarda 1985:103-10). Benson cites 
Nietzsche’s summation of Paul's mastery over Rome (2008:135; A 58). For Nietzsche, 
Paul is the first Christian—Benson substitutes, ‘first theologian’ (124)—the one who 
single-handedly transvalues all values. Nietzsche proclaims his desire to realise the 
same feat (119): 
Revaluation of all values: that is my formula for an act of humanity’s highest self-
examination, an act that has become flesh and genius in me. My lot would have it that I am 
the first decent human being, that I know myself to be opposing the hypocrisy of millennia 
… I was the first to discover the truth because I was the first to see—to smell—lies for what 
they are’. (EH ‘Destiny’ 1) 
In light of declarations such as this, Benson finds it hard to believe Nietzsche does 
not recognise himself as ‘a kind of modern Paul, or even anti-Paul’, in ‘overturning 
Paul's “perversion”’ (2008:75). Benson is surely right, and paves the way to view Paul's 
success as rivalling that which Nietzsche envisions for himself, thus rendering the 
Apostle an equal and worthy enemy (EH ‘Why I Am so Wise’ 6f). 
Deception as a motive is a second characteristic shared by Nietzsche and Paul. 
Ressentiment evidences decadence par excellence. Nietzsche blasts Paul as a master of 
ressentiment for his ‘high priestly’ sway over the masses. Of course, the mature 
Nietzsche is confident that 
anyone who knows how seriously my philosophy has taken up the fight against lingering 
and vengeful feelings, right up into the doctrine of ‘free will’—the fight against Christianity 
is just one instance of this—anyone aware of this will understand why I am calling attention 
to my own behaviour, my sureness of instinct in practice. (EH ‘Wise’ 6) 
Benson points out that Nietzsche views himself untouched by ressentiment. But 
vengeful hatred is fundamentally chameleonic (2008:152f, 190). As such, it may be 
alleged Nietzsche knows all too well it is often sublimated in other forms (152f; OGM 
3.16-20), and may even go ‘underground’ (3.14; Benson 2008:131f).  
Nietzsche has no trouble with intentional deception. In fact, it may amount to self-
artistry (BGE 4.192). However, deception is also a major facet of ressentiment. Though 
Nietzsche forbids himself such dabblings in decadence (EH ‘Wise’ 6), his words betray 
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him. For instance, since he discusses doing good as a means of evil (Z 1.19; see Rom 
12:20), the same may be attributed to his own do-gooding: 
You just need to do to me [i.e., Nietzsche] some wrong … I ‘retaliate’, you can be sure of 
that: I quickly find some opportunity to thank the ‘wrong-doer’ (occasionally even for the 
wrong)—or to ask him for something, which can be friendlier than giving him something. 
(EH ‘Wise’ 5) 
Here Nietzsche speaks of retaliation in terms of repaying good for evil, but in his 
economy of revalued values, doing so runs the risk of actually doling out evil (i.e., good 
borne of love). How does Nietzsche, therefore, avoid what he rails against? Benson 
suggests it comes by a hatred that blinds even as it compels, and draws one into the 
vortex of ressentiment (2008:59f). Nietzsche speaks of repayment, presumably as a 
means of avoiding the ressentiment he goes on to discuss in the following aphorism. 
Through Zarathustra, he says that it is even better to respond with open anger than to 
mask an offence with a response of kindness (Z 1.19). Yet in EH Nietzsche advocates 
reprisal via kindness. What is this if not indirect retaliation? Nietzsche, himself, seems 
caught in the trap he so earnestly desires to escape. Poellner’s thought13 concurs in 
theory the strength of the pull of ressentiment:  
Ressentiment is essentially a purposeful distortion of the character of its objects in order to 
justify a negative affect—hatred—regarding them which is motivated by their possessing 
some power over the ressentiment subject, and which remains unacknowledged by the 
subject. (2009:247) 
Nietzsche would no doubt disavow any such motive or behaviour on his part, and 
does so in his auto-biopic, EH. Benson presses his case against Nietzsche’s ‘who I am’ 
(EH ‘Preface’ 1) by cataloguing the ways in which he is in the dark about himself. First, 
Nietzsche has not transcended all dealings with God, but is rather ‘obsessed with God 
throughout his life’ (Benson 2008:210). Second, Nietzsche’s rejection of his German 
ancestry for Polish is a strategy of masquerade, a useful lie needed to justify personal 
transformation (EH ‘Wise’ 3; ‘Clever’ 4; see Middleton 1996:293). This denial is fatal 
to Nietzsche’s amor fati commitment to ‘yes-saying’ (Benson 2008:210). Third, 
Nietzsche appears unaware he has resurrected the redemption project. In EH, the 
indispensable vehicle for Nietzsche ‘to say who I am’ (‘Preface’ 1), Benson quotes the 
philosopher as dismissing any personal awareness of spiritual need. ‘Really religious 
difficulties, for example, I don’t know from experience ... “God,” “the immortality of 
the soul,” “redemption,” “beyond”—without exception, concepts to which I have never 
devoted any attention, or time; not even as a child’ (Benson 2008:210). Benson 
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 See section 4.3 of this thesis. 
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identifies a troubling ambiguity in Nietzsche through perceptive readings of his 
‘Sorcerer’ (Z 4.5-7), and ‘Ariadne’s Complaint’ derived from it. He desires both the 
absence and presence of God: 
True, he moves from his old faith in the God of Christianity to faith in Life, resulting in 
both a desire to serve Life and a willingness to say ‘Yes and Amen’ to Life rather than God. 
But he has not left what Salomé terms the ‘mystical God-ideal’ behind. (Benson 2008:211) 
At the same time, he longs to escape such tension, revealing in the end he is mired in 
decadence. He  
wishes to be free from the very hope of redemption. But … it would seem that to be saved 
from salvation—or redeemed from redemption—is once again to repeat the very logic from 
which one wishes to escape. Nietzsche does realize that one cannot escape decadence 
merely by making war against it ... but how, then, can Nietzsche truly escape from 
escaping, overcome overcoming, redeem himself from redemption, or save himself from 
salvation? (213) 
As Nietzsche is left with nothing more than a ‘religious move’ of faith, Benson purports 
to have exposed his shortcomings in faithfulness as a Dionysian disciple. Nietzsche fails 
to attain the childlike faith necessary for the overcoming to which he aspires and, 
ironically, to which he is much closer in his youthful pursuit of Christ (213f). There is 
also incongruity in Nietzsche’s late period when he explicitly teaches redemption 
through Zarathustra’s speech, ‘On Redemption’ (2.20). It may be argued that in doing 
so, Nietzsche tacitly acknowledges the need for liberation, albeit on his own terms. In 
the end, his apparent flight from reason into madness may secure for him his dream 
(Benson 2008:201f, 216). Perhaps he obtains his Dionysian ideal and ‘feels himself to 
be a god’ (BT ‘Spirit’ 1; see Roberts 2000:221f). 
Nietzsche considers Paul to function as a priest (A 42; Benson 2008:130), and all 
those of the priestly class are shot through with a hatred of ‘tremendous and uncanny 
proportions, to the most spiritual and poisonous variety’ (OGM 1.7). This gives rise to 
ressentiment, ‘an entire trembling earth of underground revenge’ against the powerful 
and happy (3.14). But Nietzsche recognises the priest (i.e., Paul) is able to somehow 
control ressentiment, i.e., to direct it. Thus, to accomplish his desired ends, the priest 
turns back the force of hateful revenge stemming from guilt upon the self, moralising it 
in the process (3.15). This second turn in the ressentiment cycle results in the formation 
of religion, Christianity its acme. As the architect of Christianity, Paul is the master of 
deception, for he must use it to blind his followers to the real cause of their pain. 
Nietzsche believes ‘Paul understood that lying—that “belief” was necessary’ (A 47). 
Paul consciously trades in deception, which is an exceptional accomplishment. Genius! 
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(58). By contrast, Nietzsche may be considered self-deceived, ironically, by his own 
words:  
By lie I mean: wishing not to see something that one does see; wishing not to see something 
as one sees it. Whether the lie takes place before witnesses or without witnesses does not 
matter. The most common lie is that with which one lies to oneself; lying to others is, 
relatively, an exception. (Benson 2008:162f; see 95, 210f; also A 54) 
Benson’s work allows theological extrapolation for the sake of positing control as 
an ultimate objective, and thus a third characteristic linking Nietzsche and Paul. Benson 
appreciates the centrality of power for Nietzsche, and no one states it more essentially 
than Nietzsche himself: ‘I am dynamite’ (italics supplied, EH ‘Why I Am a Destiny’ 1). 
As a philologist and expert on classic Greek civilisation, Nietzsche is fully aware of the 
etymology of his appellation (Solomon 1996:56f).14 In his mature philosophical thought 
it is hardly contestable that power, for Nietzsche, is the ‘guiding’ force in the world: 
‘the world is the will-to-power—and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this 
will-to-power and nothing besides!’ (Nietzsche 1968:550). Kaufmann refers to it as ‘the 
central conception of Nietzsche’s later thought’ (1974a:211), and Carson writes that ‘his 
whole project of going back to uncover the origins of morality is in fact predicated on 
the need to replace morality with power’ (2006:21). Persistent detractors 
notwithstanding (Magnus & Higgins 1996:215f), Nietzsche equates ‘the essence of life’ 
in no uncertain terms with ‘will to power’ (OGM 2.12; see BGE 2.36). As far as 
Nietzsche is concerned, will-to-power is neither moral nor immoral in the traditional 
sense. It merely is, and what is stands as good. On the other side of the equation, Paul is 
also about power, per Nietzsche: ‘The “God” that Paul invented for himself, a God who 
“confounds all worldly wisdom” …, is in truth just Paul’s firm decision to do it himself’ 
(A 47). God is the Apostle’s sock-puppet that allows him to exercise his own will. 
Further, Paul's soul-burdened preaching of the sin-bearing cross of Christ reveals his 
own insatiable lust for power (D 1.68). Benson describes Nietzsche’s will-to-power  
as a concatenation of wills or forces or instincts that are continually shifting in their 
hierarchy. At any given point, there can be a kind of ‘contract’ that spells out the hierarchy 
of forces, although it is always subject to revision. (2008:62; see WP 2.380f) 
Will-to-power is good. It is good because it is the essence of life. Evidently, however, 
too much of an essential good is bad. Relative to the competition between forces 
comprising will-to-power, Benson quotes Nietzsche in his concern over too great a 
contest. It is too great because it is ‘very unhealthy, inner ruin, disintegration, betraying 
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 ‘Dynamite’ is rooted in the Greek, dunamis, meaning ‘power’ (Barnhart 1995:227). Kaufmann suggests 
that Nietzsche also has in mind potentia (1974a:186). 
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and increasing and inner conflict and anarchism’, a state overcome only, he continues, 
when ‘one’s passion at last becomes master’ (62). Health is achieved when competing 
wills, forces, or instincts are unified.  
Benson quickly ushers in both GS 4.333 and Nietzsche’s quoting of Spinoza’s 
dictum on knowing, ‘Non ridere, non lugere, neque detestari, sed intelligere!’, as a foil 
for his own explanation.15 Knowledge is the ‘[singular] result of the different and 
mutually opposed desires to laugh, lament, and curse’, rather than the exclusion of one 
or more of any of them (4.333). As these competing perspectives press their view, 
‘ultimately, we must decide which perspective we wish to accept as the “ruling” 
perspective’ (Benson 2008:62). This refereed result does not come primarily through 
‘conscious thought’; rather, ‘the greatest part of our spirit’s activity remains 
unconscious and unfelt’ (GS 4.333; see Benson 2008:63). In that Nietzsche does not 
dismiss the knowledge process entirely from conscious thought, he leaves himself room 
for mastery, more commonly understood as control. Benson quotes Nietzsche from 
BGE 6.211, ‘True philosophers are commanders and legislators: they say, “That is how 
it should be”’ (italics original, 2008:63). Nietzsche’s discourse on true philosophers 
continues: ‘their “knowing” is creating, their creating is a legislation, their will to truth 
is—will to power’ (BGE 6.211). Benson highlights the tension between viewing will-to-
power either as a physical or as a metaphysical principle, eventually landing on the 
latter (2008:36-39). Kaufmann disagrees (1974a:204-07). On either view, power is a 
many splendored thing.16 In the former, it might be construed as muscular capacity, 
electro-mechanical force, or military might. In the latter, it may be understood as 
capacity in the abstract, majority right, legal authority, persuasion, or influence. It is this 
last sense of ‘influence’, which I term ‘control’, which is now taken up.  
Merold Westphal, positing Nietzsche as ‘right in his interpretation of Spinoza’s 
conatus as the “will to power”’, concludes, ‘then everything tends to absolutize itself, to 
treat the world as its oyster, as the collective means to its own flourishing’ (2001:288).17 
Applying this to Nietzsche’s account of Paul's conversion, one cannot dismiss the 
likelihood that Nietzsche has control in mind when referring to Paul, and Benson 
marshals Nietzsche’s Dawn18 as well as his Nachlaß as evidence (2008:121-25). 
                                                 
15
 Kaufmann’s translation: ‘“Not to laugh, not to lament, nor to detest, but to understand.” Tractatus 
Politicus, I. § 4’ (GS 4.333, footnote 62). 
16
 Solomon and Higgins lead a brief exploration into the multifaceted nature and ambiguous use of 
Nietzsche’s term (2000:215-22). Kaufmann provides a more detailed discussion (1974a:178-333). 
17
 Further discussion of will-to-power, and conatus in particular, see section 3.3.3. 
18
 Benson cites Daybreak, Hollingdale’s 1982 translation. 
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Nietzsche asserts Paul’s ‘lust for domination’ supersedes his need to ease his troubled 
conscience. This directly leads to Paul’s reinterpretation of Christ’s crucifixion, on 
Nietzsche’s lights, so that ‘history will turn around [Paul] alone!’ (D 1.68). This is 
control indeed, manifested in two ways. The most obvious is seen at the end of the 
quotation in Paul’s manipulation of the Damascus event to effect a desirable result for 
himself: a self-centred history to instigate a self-centred world. What is not quite so 
obvious is power in the sense of that which ‘controls’ Paul. Earlier in the same 
aphorism (D 1.68), Nietzsche speaks of Paul's need to assuage his troubled conscience 
stemming from the demands of the law of God. Imagined or not, the pressure Paul feels 
to conform to the law builds to the point where something must give. At such a point, 
Paul's motive for relief catalyses the vision that ‘could only have been the case’ (see 
2.2.1). This controlling power does not relegate him to victim status, however. Rather, 
Nietzsche identifies this as Paul’s lust for domination. It is important to recall, 
according to Nietzsche, the world as power is never ‘other’ so as to yield plural 
essences. There are only competing currents which comprise the world of power. These 
are forces of will-to-power, and they converge at any given moment to manifest and/or 
masquerade as the self, then flow onward and outward to seize more power. Thus, Paul 
is controlled by ressentiment as ‘an insatiable instinct and power-will that wants to 
become master not over something relating to life, but over life itself’ (OGM 3.11). He 
seeks to control the world both around and within him, both past and future. For 
Nietzsche, Paul is a control freak. 
What does Nietzsche’s claim say about Nietzsche (BGE 5.187)? This section 
began with Nietzsche pointing an accusatory finger at Paul. Now the accusation 
rebounds. Benson effectively faults Nietzsche for being full of ressentiment and self-
deception (2008:162f). This harmonises with Poellner, who writes, ‘It is evidently 
impossible to state Nietzsche’s ressentiment hypothesis without a concept of self-
deception’ (2000:229, note 33).19 Perhaps Nietzsche’s revaluation project may even be 
viewed as dishonest, for Nietzsche notes this in other authors, but not in himself 
(Benson 2008:134). Benson finds support regarding Nietzsche’s complicated 
interpretation of Paul from Bernstein, who writes such revaluation is 
in part based upon what Paul wrote, in part on a travesty of what Paul wrote, and in part on 
Nietzsche’s own psychologizing, from someone who did not disclaim an intimate 
acquaintance with the ‘lust for power.’ By not making any distinction between these, 
however, Nietzsche obscured the difference between the confessions by Paul, made with a 
purpose, and that which seems to penetrate beneath what Paul himself thought and can 
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 Benson frequently associates and even equates the two concepts in Nietzsche (2008:202-11). 
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serve to cast aspersions on him and his thought in their entirety. And by obscuring this 
distinction Nietzsche could avoid raising the question whether Paul's struggle with the law 
was at all related to the most legitimate aspects of his own ‘immoralism,’ if aspects that 
were often obscured by Nietzsche himself. (2008:134) 
By means of his psychologising, Nietzsche effectively silences Paul. Then he 
places words in his mouth that purportedly issue from thoughts and ‘beliefs’ in his own 
mind, i.e., ‘Here is truly the way out! Here is truly the perfect revenge’ (D 1.68). In this 
way, I note Nietzsche frames Paul as a swindler who pushes that which is unnecessary, 
and even harmful from Nietzsche’s perspective, on the unsuspecting. Benson says as 
much by using Nietzsche’s words, alluding to Paul’s supposed dual need for relief from 
pain and desire for control (2008:135). In A 58 he claims Paul uses ‘the belief in 
immortality in order to devalue “the world”, and that the idea of “hell” could still gain 
control over Rome … that the “beyond” could be used to kill life’. Yet Paul's attitude 
and words toward others reflect a genuine sharing of life, not the withholding of it, as 
Benson astutely cites 2 Corinthians 1:19-20 in this regard, 
For the Son of God, Jesus Christ, who was preached among you by me and Silas and 
Timothy, was not ‘Yes’ and ‘No,’ but in him it has always been ‘Yes.’ For no matter how 
many promises God has made, they are ‘Yes’ in Christ. (2008:135) 
Paul may also be heard to accuse Nietzsche in his own right. He is fundamentally 
about power, even though he is not entirely aware of it, i.e., projecting his quest to meet 
his own needs onto others (210f). In view of this, I find Westphal’s contribution 
constructive:  
Nietzsche didn’t intend his doctrine of the ‘will to power’ to be a secular, 
phenomenological account of original sin or his practice of suspicion to be an extension of 
the Pauline, Augustinian, and Lutheran employment of sin as an epistemological category; 
but he can be fruitfully read in that way. (2000:26) 
Far from overcoming traditional morality shackled to sin, Westphal claims Nietzsche 
may be seen as giving evidence of sin. Driven by will-to-power, Nietzsche cannot bear 
the limitation exemplified in his own paramount exhibit of Christianity-as-the-law-of-
God. Thus, we can conceive of Paul asserting Nietzsche, in a Gentile heritage devoid of 
the Law (of Moses), becomes a law to himself (Rom 2:14). It is in this light one may 
consider amor fati to be Nietzsche’s law, ‘saying yes to life, even in its strangest and 
harshest problems’ (TI ‘Ancients’ 5). But this is 
Nietzsche wearing a mask to help make himself into the person he so desperately wants to 
be. Making this claim turns out to be a strategy Nietzsche employs for overcoming his 
religious concerns, a way of viewing his life from a different perspective in order to reframe 
it and, ultimately reshape it ... He is full of denial’ (Benson 2008:210). 
If Benson is correct, Nietzsche may be employing a strategy of self-deception for 
fear of the inadequacy he might see—and deep down, knows—in himself to be true (see 
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2 Cor 3). Furthermore, the self-deception involved in denying this inadequacy extends 
to denying the reality of the standard against which he himself is measured.  
With this in mind, and leaning on our gains from Chapter 4, I venture two 
questions. Might a subject who is aware of, and holds true belief about, some 
threatening reality, manipulate evidence20 to create within the self a false belief 
concerning that reality? Furthermore, might this deception be ‘self-covering’, permitting 
the subject to operate according to a preferred perception of the self (or ‘selves’ in 
Nietzsche’s case), while at the same time maintaining their strategy of concealing true 
belief from the self? Benson’s argument leads me to think would answer these questions 
in the affirmative. He claims that Nietzsche ‘is all too aware of his own failings to live 
up to his own teachings’ (2008:214), and supports this by his confession from EH ‘Why 
I Am so Clever’ 4: ‘When I have looked into my Zarathustra, I walk up and down in my 
room for half an hour, unable to master an unbearable fit of sobbing’ (214). These are 
no tears of joy because Nietzsche discovers abysses in himself that reveal the depth of 
his despair over ‘the nothingness within him and the nothingness without’ (214; see also 
211-15; EH ‘Clever’ 4). Benson’s insight here is perceptive: 
What Nietzsche calls ‘the free spirit par excellence’ is able to dance ‘even beside abysses’ 
... As the supposedly free spirit with ‘Dionysian faith’ enabling him to say ‘Yes and Amen’ 
to all that comes, he ought not to be sobbing. Instead, he should have the resolution … to 
say: ‘All life gives I will joyfully accept: happiness and unhappiness … and boldly look 
even death in the face. (2008:215) 
Nietzsche’s sobbing exposes him as the antithesis of the ‘Dionysian man’, more closely 
resembling the fallen, quintessentially ‘wretched man’ of which Paul speaks in Romans 
7:24.  
Combining insights from Rempel and Benson allows the novel contribution of 
bringing Nietzschean ressentiment and Pauline fallenness into engagement with each 
other. The impetus for this project resulted from the tentative identification of a shared 
feature within each of their respective systems, self-deception. Nietzsche’s explication 
of the phenomenon of self-deception, in the context of his analysis of ressentiment, 
alerted us to potential similarities with what may be termed self-deception in Paul, as set 
in the context of his anthropological diagnosis of man’s fallen condition. By employing 
a hermeneutical strategy derived from Barth’s approach to Romans, I was able to 
surmount the ‘translation problem’ and pave the way for a fruitful interaction.  
                                                 
20
 Read ‘suppressing’ as one connotation of such manipulation. 
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I am now in a position to summarise the thesis argument rehearsed in section 5.1, 
specifically in relation to the contribution it makes to the field. This dialogue began with 
a Nietzschean reading of Paul through a ressentiment lens, principally an understanding 
of sinful self-deception on the part of the ‘unrighteous’ in Romans 1 and 2. From a 
ressentiment perspective, we understood fallen-man’s opposition to God as hatred for 
his authority over him. The truth about God, particularly his powerful wrath as a portent 
of divine punishment on sin, was seen to catalyse the Pauline moves of suppressing and 
exchanging this reality (i.e., truth) about God in relation to fallen-man. A ressentiment 
reading of these moves informed us the impetus of these moves on the part of fallen-
man was hatred and revenge toward God. Fearing reprisal, however, fallen-man 
repressed external expression of these motives. Not only did this mask relevant affects 
to the outside world, but crucially, these motives were also hidden from the one who 
possessed them, as was the process by which they were hidden; hence, the notion of 
self-deception. I was also able to propose a further motivation for self-deception, that of 
fear. Since the divine punishment for sin was death, this made plausible that fear of 
death should also be considered a powerful force driving self-deception. An exposition 
of Romans 8 brought this out in Pauline thought. Effectively, therefore, this aspect of 
the engagement allowed Nietzsche to equate Paul’s fallen-man, and even Paul himself, 
with ressentiment-man.  
Turning the equation around to say that ressentiment-man is fallen-man 
introduced the second aspect of the dialogue, a Pauline riposte to Nietzsche. I 
demonstrated Nietzsche’s thought bore significant resemblance to Pauline theology in 
relation to fallenness. For example, nihilism for Nietzsche was in many respects 
analogous to spiritual death for Paul. This was a threat that provoked a tremendous 
philosophical reaction for Nietzsche, the creation of the doctrines of amor fati and the 
eternal recurrence of the same. I argued these together constituted an alternate form of 
redemption for Nietzsche, a salvation from nihilism that overcomes the nauseating and 
enervating fear of death. At the end of his life, Nietzsche made a self-assessment in 
which he denied being concerned with such ideas as God, the soul, redemption, and the 
beyond, even from childhood (EH ‘Clever’ 1). He also claimed to have overcome 
ressentiment (‘Wise’ 6). I have shown, however, that Nietzsche’s thought is permeated 
with these ideas. Typically, he mounts polemical arguments to wrest any power these 
ideas might have, and allow him to overcome them. I claimed this displayed blindness. 
And since he often waged these arguments in the first person, I found permission to 
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read his claims as the self-deception inherent to ressentiment. Nietzsche’s mask-wearing 
strategy helped him overcome the religious obligations he felt, and adopt a different 
perspective on life to reshape the world to fit his desires. In this, he retraces the moves 
of the Pauline fallen-man in Romans 1:25 who exchanges worship of the Creator-God 
for man himself. In light of this ultimate value inversion, I proposed that Nietzsche’s 
accusation of Paul rebounded onto himself: Nietzsche, as ressentiment-man, resembled 
also the Pauline fallen-man. 
 
5.3 Significance of Thesis 
The deeper significance of this thesis lies in that to which it points. In as far as it is 
important to understand ourselves, this enquiry on self-deception points to the complex 
field of psychology of religion. One of the most contested issues in this field is whether 
or not ontology and religion should be mixed. More specifically, can ontological claims 
made in the service of religious experience be evaluated scientifically, or is religious 
experience driven by the unconscious, and therefore influenced by immaterial factors 
(Grünbaum 1987)? Freud believed the two were incommensurable. He classified the 
grounding of transcendent reality in religious experience as delusion or simple wish 
fulfilment (2010:147-59). A generation of psychologists of religion, led by the work of 
Edmund Husserl, sought to work around this impasse by borrowing a method from 
phenomenology known as ‘bracketing’. Husserl, who conceived this method, wrote, 
‘We do not abandon the thesis we have adopted, we make no change in our conviction 
… we set it, as it were, “out of action,” we “disconnect it,” “bracket it”’. (2014:54). The 
focus is thereby limited to the psychological processes in religiously interpreted 
phenomena as they are analysed from the natural standpoint (Hood 2014:13; see also 
Belzen 2009).  
Though the firmament of the psychology of religion is dotted with such 
luminaries as Carl Jung, Erich Fromm, Alfred Adler, and Otto Rank, two figures eclipse 
them all. William James and Sigmund Freud represent opposite sides of the issue. 
Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, concludes that religion is a hindrance to the 
analysis of psychic functions and to the goal of integrating the personality (Johnson 
1959:210). In so doing, he particularly rejects the central historical truth-claims of 
Christianity, considering them a strategy to unify conflicting psychic forces. This, 
however, opens him up to the criticism of preferring his own conclusions based on 
certain ontological realities to deny claims of another tradition based on different 
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ontological realities (Hood 2014:16). James, one of the founders of psychology of 
religion (Spilka, et al 2009:22), on the other hand, relies on empirical data in his study 
of varieties of religious experience, concluding that they may in fact validate 
ontological claims of the great world religions (James 1990:342-86).  
Researchers in the train of Freud who bracket truth-claims of the faith-content of 
religious experience tend to direct their investigations toward matters of mental health 
and coping (Hampson & Boyd-MacMillan 2008). Researchers in the train of James are 
persuaded that bracketing is not warranted for the study of the psychology of religion. 
Hence, they challenge their Freudian counterparts to show how and why their evaluative 
theories based on one set of ontological possibilities may be used to invalidate those 
based on a different set. Jamesian researchers are therefore typically more open to 
philosophical and even theological considerations in the study of human religious 
phenomena (Poloma & Hood 2006).  
Nietzsche inveighs against the morally inverted world as he saw it (EH TI 1). The 
mass of humanity is full of ressentiment, and yet ignorant of its decadent condition. To 
rectify his world, Nietzsche must destroy the reigning moral systems, and he trains his 
energies on the acme of all such systems, Christianity.  
I want to write this eternal indictment of Christianity on every wall, wherever there are 
walls ... I call Christianity the one great curse, the one great innermost corruption, the one 
great instinct of revenge … And time is counted from the dies nefastus when this 
catastrophe began,—from the first day of Christianity!— Why not rather from its last day 
instead?—From today?— Revaluation of all values! (A 62) 
Yet, even a philosopher (and self-proclaimed psychologist) the stature of Nietzsche is 
unable to realise his vision for mankind in the foreseeable future. Perhaps in 
acknowledgement of this, he claims to a friend that his is a ‘future philosophy’ that 
can’t, or shouldn’t, be read until ‘about the year 2000’ (Middleton 1996:256). The year 
2,000 has come and gone, and still Nietzsche’s commentators wrestle over the myriad 
issues stemming from his moral psychology. They include the functioning of self-
deception in the ressentiment mechanism, and the relatively thin body of literature on it 
has invited this further research. While I do not pretend to be that ‘lucky throw of the 
dice,’ a Nietzscheism used to signify evolutionary leaps forward in human development, 
this thesis has examined the phenomenon of self-deception at the intersection of 
Nietzschean philosophy and Pauline theology.  
This project has innovated a way in which a Pauline text concerning self-
deception, together with its ontological claims, may be understood in philosophical and 
psychological terms Nietzsche uses devoid of those claims. Parties who have previously 
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engaged the subject only in the language of their respective sides may now ‘speak’ to 
the another. This does not promise immediate resolution of contested issues, but I hope 
to have aided in removing stigmas relative to the interpretive side taken and more 
clearly defined their differences, thus making arguments more productive. For example, 
Pauline scholars inclined to investigate Nietzsche’s moral philosophy may do so in 
terms other than outright fallenness or depravity due to the ‘translation’ of such 
concepts in the Nietzschean categories of internalisation and moralisation. They thus 
avoid unnecessary entanglements in accusations of religious pique, and are even able to 
go deeper than considering Nietzsche as a general case of ressentiment (State 1990:10; 
Solomon 1996:215). On the other side of the engagement, by removing ontological 
bracketing, Nietzschean scholars can find resources in Paul to explore new aspects of 
ressentiment and self-deception. For example, how might a Pauline construal of sin in 
terms of wages (e.g., Rom 6:23) strengthen the psychological impact of ressentiment, 
and how might the state of self-deception be deepened? When Paul speaks of religious 
obligation to God in terms of slavery (Gal 4), how might this reinforce, and perhaps 
refine, the motives of anger and fear that fuel self-deception?  
Recent research in Terror Management Theory (TMT) offers possibilities for 
further exploration into my proposal of fear of death as a force in the self-deception of 
ressentiment. TMT indicates awareness of mortality in the human subject provokes 
terror that causes the subject to ‘flee’ to the safety of a cultural worldview. This 
worldview crucially provides the psychological means for negotiating a potentially 
paralyzing fear by providing meaning, stability, and safety beyond the finality of death 
(Solomon, et al. 2000:200). Extensive empirical research shows reminders of mortality, 
or mortality salience (MS), results in defense mechanisms both positive and negative 
(Burke, et al. 2010). Positively, it involves the bolstering of one’s own worldview 
construct. Negatively, it involves the derogation of beliefs and ideas contrary to one’s 
own. Both aspects are motivated by the fundamental human need for existential 
psychological security (Greenberg, et al. 1986; Harmon-Jones 1997; Dechesne, et al. 
2000; Wojtkowiak & Rutjens 2011). TMT and MS provide a framework for further 
consideration of Nietzsche’s philosophy along these lines. Specifically, his postulates of 
the eternal recurrence and amor fati might be considered positive aspects of the said 
defense mechanism, and his prolonged campaign against moralistic worldviews that 
promise a world beyond the present might be considered negative aspects of the same—
both as potential expressions of the self-deception phenomenon.  
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There are implications for those on the Pauline side of the equation as well. For 
the theologian, the structure of ressentiment provides explanatory power to Pauline 
fallenness. Mapping the one onto the other provides a way to explicate self-deception as 
it functions in Paul’s thought. By association, it also lends credence to his doctrine of 
the flesh, suggesting future projects in which such an understanding spells out the 
tremendous influence Paul grants to it. Another benefit for the scholar concerns 
additional biblical material for interpretation in terms of Nietzschean ressentiment and 
self-deception. Pauline passages to exegete might include Romans 3:1-19; 7:7-25; 1 
Corinthians 3:18-23; Galatians 6:2-10, 11-21; 2 Thessalonians 2:1-12. Via’s work on 
self-deception in Matthew alerts us to the further possibility of investigating non-
Pauline texts, for example, Matthew 7:15-20 and 12:33-27 (1990:77-132). This is to say 
nothing of other religious texts that involve self-deception such as Bhagavad-gita 2.63; 
The Holy Qur’an Surahs 3:28-30, 16:101-10, 67:20f; and Doctrines and Covenants, 
Section 10. For the psychologist and counsellor, my research recommends exploration 
into resources for dealing with matters related to repression. It supplies a lens for a 
theological viewing of phenomena rooted in psychology. For the pastor and the 
university worker, it may supplement apologetical discussion. In conversations with 
those who reject God, an understanding of Nietzschean self-deception could help 
identify psychological roadblocks to address beyond those obstacles typically 
considered to be intellectual. 
In the end, Nietzsche’s vision for humanity entails a revolution of life on earth 
that would break through the self-deception of the traditional moral order. Since neither 
he nor mankind’s few ‘lucky hits’ in history accomplished this, he looked to the future 
for a hero. That hero is the Übermensch, but he is presaged in Prometheus as the one 
who can overturn the ‘natural’ order. By overturning this order, Nietzsche meant 
transgressing it. In BT ‘Spirit’ 9, he contrasts Adam’s failure in the biblical fall with 
Prometheus’ feat of stealing divine fire to showcase fearlessness. But Prometheus must 
embrace the terrible consequences of his deed, which include intellectual darkness, 
psychological fettering of guilt, spiritual confinement to solitude, and physical 
shackling with decrepitude. The ultimate consequence is death (which for Nietzsche 
was eternal pain and meaningless existence), but it is precisely in facing death that 
Nietzsche’s hero is supposed to find life. One of the lessons from the juxtaposition of 
Adam’s and Prometheus’ tales is those who submit to the morality of tradition, 
especially the Christian tradition, cannot see how restrictive and life-denying morality is 
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because they do not want to see it. Thus, the way of Nietzsche and of his Übermensch is 
to defeat self-deception by living courageously in the wisdom of irreverent defiance. 
The goal is liberation to pursue the dictates of one’s spirit. 
Paul’s vision for humanity also calls for the revolution of a morally disordered 
world (see Gal 1:4). He also viewed the world as power in struggle, both as human 
internecine conflict and as a battle pitched by humanity against God (see Eph 6:10-12). 
In the fall, man became sinfully self-directed (i.e., fleshly) instead of responsive to God 
(i.e., spiritual), which is why he came to struggle. To make matters worse, man is also 
blinded by his condition to his condition, even while he futilely seeks to remedy it. The 
solution to this self-deception is not further rebelliousness, but humble reverence before 
God (see Rom 1:21). This is the gospel Paul preached so that the power of God may 
result in salvation for man (16f). The salient aspect of this salvation, for my purposes, is 
breaking through the self-deception of man’s victimisation so that he need neither 
blame God out of anger or fear, nor seek life apart from him (22f). This, according to 
Paul, reflects true wisdom and results in real life. Though this solution will ultimately 
be realised in the future, it’s benefits can be experienced now. By submitting to the 
divine moral order perceived in creation and via conscience, man can anticipate with joy 
and not anxiety that day when all opposition to God will be subdued, and wholeness and 
freedom will be restored to all creation (1 Cor 3:21-23; 15:20-28).  
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